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This thesis examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger as the key 
feature of the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. It was Nixon’s 
presidential leadership that drove the new China initiative, together with Kissinger as 
a skilful operator and negotiator. The centralization of power in the White House and 
the exclusion of the State Department from the direct decision-making process was a 
‘diplomatic coup.’ Nixon and Kissinger over-emphasized the speed and effectiveness 
of the transformation in the China policy to counteract the danger of bureaucratic 
leaks and the possibility of a conservative backlash in American domestic politics.
At policy planning level, however, Nixon and Kissinger were still dependent on 
interdepartmental policy studies by the bureaucracy, mainly the NSC staff and the 
State Department in order to develop and implement the new China initiative. The 
National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) papers from 1969 to 1971 on the 
China policy were much more comprehensive and detailed than were previously 
estimated. Owing to the excessive secrecy, however, Nixon and Kissinger did not 
sufficiently use the multiple intelligence sources from the State Department to more 
effectively operate the China policy.
The resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 
was the first major breakthrough during the U.S. opening to China, officially 
clarifying the U.S. intention to promote a new dialogue with the People’s Republic of
China. On the other hand, the preparation for the Warsaw talks also revealed the 
difference between the White House and the State Department; while Nixon and 
Kissinger wanted to move faster to send a special envoy to Beijing and discuss major 
security issues directly with the Chinese leaders, the State Department’s Bureau of 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs remained cautious, still seeking to obtain more 
substantial concessions on the Taiwan issue. From late 1970, without the State 
Department’s expertise, the White House sought to focus on the U.S.-Soviet-China 
triangular relationship and pursued back-channel communications with the Chinese 
through third parties, such as Pakistan and Romania.
In direct talks in July and October 1971, and February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger 
gave an assurance to the Chinese leaders for the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan in 
relation to the negotiated settlement in Indochina. Simultaneously, Nixon and 
Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that the remaining U.S. military 
presence in Asia would serve China’s security interests in order to contain the 
emergence of any other states, such as the Soviet Union, Japan, and India. This thesis 
concludes by assessing the rapprochement as the beginning of a long process to 
pursue pragmatic co-existence between the United States and China, neither as 
enemies nor as friends.
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A Note on Transliteration of Chinese Terms
In general, this study has used the Pinyin system of transliteration of most Chinese 
names and places. It uses the original forms regarding Wade-Giles spelling in direct 
quotations from primary documents. For example, the declassified transcripts and 
policy analysis papers wrote ‘Peking,’ ‘Mao Tse-tung,’ and ‘Chou En-lai,’ which the 
Pinyin transliteration system has rendered as ‘Beijing,’ ‘Mao Zedong,’ and ‘Zhou 
Enlai,’ respectively.
A Note on References and Footnotes
Following University Regulations, this study has chosen the system of references 
and footnotes of thesis in the style of Parenthetical References and References Lists as 
described in Kate L. Turabian’s A Manual fo r  Writing o f Term Papers, Thesis, and 
Dissertation, Sixth edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Quotation 
marks and inverted commas are used for direct quotations, unless otherwise noted. 
Underlinings are as in the originals. All the materials cited in footnotes are listed in 
the bibliography.
1Introduction
1. The location of this study
This study examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by President Nixon and the 
National Security Adviser Kissinger in foreign policy decision-making as a principal 
characteristic in the U.S. rapprochement with China.1 It differs from previous major 
works because it makes substantial use of new archival materials in the Nixon 
Presidential Materials Staff and the State Department files in the National Archives 
and documents in the Library of Congress.2 Equally important, this study is also based 
on Komine’s interviews with former U.S. officials, and with senior academic experts 
on U.S.-China relations, and on oral histories, newspaper articles, and new website 
materials. The sources used in this work shed new light on the complexity and 
dynamism of the evolution of the new China initiative and demonstrate the existence 
of many policy options and different perspectives among U.S. officials.
From a theoretical point of view, Graham Allison examined the decision-making 
process of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study in crisis management. This study 
perceives the foreign policy decision-making mechanisms in the U.S. rapprochement 
with China as a case study of a ‘diplomatic coup’ by Nixon and Kissinger. Together, 
they centralized power within the White House and sought to exclude the State 
Department from the direct decision-making process. While the so-called “rational
1 ‘Rapprochement’ is a term o f French origin, which implies 1) a coming together again in friendship 
o f former enemies, and 2) the reconciliation, restoration, and renewal o f relations, especially between 
states. Longman Dictionary o f  Contemporary English, New edition (Essex: Longman, 1991). In 
particular, die term ‘rapprochement’ is often used to describe the U.S. opening to China, namely the 
development o f U.S. initial diplomatic contact with China from January 1969 to June 1971, which 
resulted in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, and Nixon’s trip to China in February 
1972. ‘Normalization’ implies a much longer political process toward the establishment o f U.S. official 
diplomatic relations with China in January 1979.
2 The year 1997 marked the 25th anniversary o f N ixon’s trip to China. Therefore, historians anticipated 
that U.S. official documents on the opening to China would be declassified in the following years. This 
study (from October 1997 to January 2005) has examined both new publications and declassified 
documents. A survey o f published works and new documents are conducted in the following sections.
actor model” perceives the government as a unitary actor with agreed-goals to be 
attained, the alternative “bureaucratic politics model” emphasizes government as the 
representative of diverse interests.3 On the basis of the rational actor model, the 
conventional interpretation of the U.S. rapprochement with China emphasizes the 
importance of the strategic and geopolitical calculations for the development of the 
balance of power between the U.S., the Soviets, and China.4 On the basis of the 
bureaucratic politics model, this study examines how the pursuit of strict secrecy by 
Nixon and Kissinger affected the rivalry between the White House and the State 
Department over the devising and implementing the new China initiative.
Owing to personal distrust of the Washington bureaucracy and their high sensitivity 
to the danger of leakages (especially by the State Department and also by U.S. allies), 
Nixon and Kissinger centralized power and operated foreign policy from the White 
House. They were also afraid of the conservative backlash by the pro-Nationalist 
China lobby in Congress against a new initiative toward Beijing. Following the 
Korean War and two decades of mutual hostility, the only formal communication 
between the United States and China was via ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Thus, in 
addition to the exchange of a number of public signals, Nixon and Kissinger privately 
used the so-called “back-channel” - “a direct negotiation through White House 
communications, bypassing regular diplomatic channels and forums” - through third
3 Graham Allison, Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 
1971), pp.4-7. Allison suggests three models for the analysis o f foreign policy decision-making 
analysis: 1) the rational actor model - an examination o f purposive and reasonable actions by a unified 
national government; 2) the organizational model - an exploration o f the pattern and operating 
procedure o f organizational behavior; and 3) the bureaucratic politics model - an analysis o f a resultant 
o f various bargaining process among players within national government. Chapter 2 o f this thesis 
examines these concepts within the context o f the revitalization o f the National Security Council 
system.
4 Strengths and weaknesses o f  specific examples are reviewed in the following section. Kissinger’s 
views on the balance o f power in theory and in practice are discussed in Chapter 1.
parties, such as Pakistan and Romania, to communicate with the Chinese leaders.5 In 
essence, Nixon and Kissinger valued the efficiency and speed of these back-channel 
communications.
On a global level, Nixon and Kissinger believed that because of the deepening Sino- 
Soviet rift, the opening to Beijing would make Moscow become more cooperative 
with Washington in arms control talks. On a regional level, they sought to explore the 
opportunity to use China’s influence on North Vietnam to promote a negotiated 
settlement in the Vietnam War. As Kissinger repeatedly stressed, the U.S. 
rapprochement with China marked the beginning of a new relationship, the so-called 
‘strategic triangle’ between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, which 
they saw as a means of restoring stability in the international system.
Nixon and Kissinger operated within a certain time frame -  they wanted to see the 
realization of rapprochement with China before the presidential election in 1972.6 
They sought to obtain credit for an historic breakthrough, dramatically ending two 
decades of hostility with Beijing. Nixon envisioned that the opening to China would 
earn him international credit as a peace-maker, and thus significantly enhance his 
domestic political support. At the same time, after his secret trip to Beijing in July 
1971, Kissinger sought to establish international prestige as a great diplomat in an era 
of negotiation. Together, Nixon and Kissinger wanted the China breakthrough to 
come as a “great headline,” calculating that “public excitement would sweep away a 
lot of the uncertainty, suspicion, hostility, [and] criticism that might otherwise have 
accrued.” 7
5 Henry A. Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal (Boston: Little Brown 1999), p.79.
6 Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004. The time frame started in January 1969.
7 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office o f Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department o f State, 
1965-81), Oral History Interview, p .l 1, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, Foreign Affairs 
Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, 
Georgetown University.
4Nixon stressed the need for secrecy because “the more we had to put things into 
words, the less freedom of movement we would have in our dealings with the 
Chinese.”8 Kissinger also explained defensively that owing to the “delicacy of the 
event,” the “uniqueness of the opportunity,” and the unforeseeable outcome, it was 
essential for the United States to be in control of the presentation of the China 
initiative. “[W]e did not want to risk inflating expectations, generating pressures, and 
forcing the two sides to take public positions before the results were known.”9 Thus, 
as Bundy and Isaacson suggest, the pursuit of secrecy for the China initiative was 
necessary and could be justified because of the danger of leaks, possible conservative 
opposition, and finally bureaucratic pressure to seek concessions.10
In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger’s strict secrecy caused a number of serious 
problems, both internally and externally. At the operational level, Nixon and 
Kissinger reformed the National Security Council as the President’s principal forum 
for foreign policy decision-making. However, as Allen Whiting suggests, the re­
vitalized NSC system was “very secretive at the top” and thus highly personalized.11 
Nixon did not share some information with Kissinger. Together, Nixon and Kissinger 
did not share their intentions and agenda with other senior officials within the 
administration. Kissinger’s NSC staff was “very small” and “closely held.”12 On the 
other hand, Nixon and Kissinger still relied on bureaucratic expertise, especially that 
o f State Department officials and NSC staff members. However, owing to the
8 Richard M. Nixon, RN  (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.555.
9 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston Little Brown, 1979), pp.762-763.
10 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f  Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: 
Hill and Wang A Division o f Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 1998), p.233, and pp.244-245; and Walter 
Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp.342-343, and pp.347-348. 
Hanhimaki also interprets that secrecy was a “means to a broader bureaucratic end” for Kissinger to 
secure his “personal reserve” o f U.S. China policy. Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry 
Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.xvii, and p .l 18.
11 Allen Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.
12 Ibid.
obsession with secrecy and the resulting limitation of expert advice in the decision­
making mechanism, Nixon and Kissinger failed to understand the subtle and symbolic 
signals that China was sending in the attempt to promote a new dialogue.13
Nixon and Kissinger, because of their highly personalized use of the foreign policy 
decision-making machinery, also caused unnecessary confusion and friction within 
the bureaucracy. Former NSC staff member, Morton H. Halperin, recalls that 
Kissinger “manipulated” the NSC staff and “dealt with each one separately and 
instructed them not to tell anyone else what they were doing. Often he had two people 
working on the same issue without telling them.”14 The problems arose as Nixon and 
Kissinger “wanted to operate without talking to the cabinet members.”15 Thus, Nixon 
and Kissinger did not make sufficient use of multiple intelligence resources to 
develop and operate the China policy more effectively. As Rosemary Foot argues, it 
also appears that Nixon and Kissinger introduced a number of ideas without 
attempting “to discover the kinds of policies toward China that had [previously] been 
advocated.”16 Finally, the lack of sufficient communication between the White House 
and the State Department increased the perception gap between them for a new China 
policy.
On the international level, Nixon and Kissinger, because of their desire for secrecy, 
underestimated the importance of the U.S.’s regular diplomatic channels with its 
allies, especially the Republic of China and Japan. In comparison, while the White 
House was principally interested in improving relations with its adversaries, the State 
Department was concerned about coordinating U.S. relations with its allies, especially 
the Republic of China and Japan. Finally, despite the initial excitement created, the
13 David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003. Specific examples are discussed in 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
14 Morton Halperin, Interview with Komine, May 11, 2004.
15 Ibid.
16 Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
opening to China did not necessarily bring as many positive outcomes as Nixon and 
Kissinger had hoped: Beijing’s ability to influence Hanoi to accept a negotiated 
settlement in the Vietnam War was limited, and the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks 
made relatively limited progress. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger tended to impose 
the simplified global framework of a U.S.-Soviet-PRC strategic triangle on complex 
and subtle regional issues, such as the future of Taiwan’s status, the future of Japan’s 
role, and the India-Pakistan rivalry.
Accordingly, in order to establish the basis of synthesis, it should be clarified how 
the advantages and disadvantages of the pursuit of secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger in 
U.S. rapprochement with China have been examined so far.
2. Literature review
For almost three decades, a number of former officials, scholars, and journalists 
have attempted to present a more rounded and informative picture of the U.S. 
rapprochement with China. The existing literature can be divided into the following 
categories17:
• Chronological descriptions of the opening to China (including chapters in 
early biographies of Nixon and of Kissinger) by journalists and by former
17 As for the key arguments in the existing literature on the Kissinger years, see, for example, Richard 
Bernstein, “An Architect o f Diplomacy Seeks Detente with History,” New York Times Review o f  
Books, March 17, 1999; Odd Ame Westad, “The New International History o f  the Cold War,” 
Diplomatic History, 24, (Fall 2000); Evelyn (Chui-Ling) Goh, “From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit’ Ally: 
Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974” PhD thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford 
University, 2001; and Jussii M. Hanhimaki, “‘Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”? Kissingerrogy, Thirty 
Years and Coming,’ Diplomatic History, vol.27, no.5, (November 2003).
7officials, based on unidentified interviews and leaks, published during the 
1970s.
• The memoirs of Nixon (1978) and of Kissinger (1979, 1982, and 1999).
• Critical analyses of the opening process by journalists, based on extensive 
interviews with former officials and other unidentified leaks, published during 
the 1980s.
• Scholarly analyses of the U.S. rapprochement with China in relation to the 
concept of detente, published from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.
• Memoirs of former officials, published since the early 1990s.
• Highly critical accounts of the U.S. opening to China (including chapters in 
new biographies of Nixon and of Kissinger) by journalists, based on limited 
private access to classified primary documents and the private papers of 
former officials, published since the early 1990s.
• Scholarly reassessments of the long-term importance of U.S. rapprochement 
with China beyond the Cold War context, published since the early 1990s.
• Recent publications on the Chinese side based on new archival materials.18
During the 1970s, journalists and former U.S. officials, such as Marvin Kalb and 
Bernard Kalb (1974), Safire (1975), Price (1977), Morris (1977), Szulc (1978),
18 Recent publications examine Chinese motivations for the rapprochement with the United States and a 
series o f internal policy studies as well as internal discussions among the Chinese leaders. Since this 
study principally focuses on the U.S. side, the materials on the Chinese side are used in a 
supplementary way in order to comprehend what U.S. officials failed to grasp from the Chinese signals 
during the opening process from January 1969 to July 1971. David Shambaugh recognizes that Zhang 
Baijia, the son o f Zhang Wenjin, former Foreign Minister [1971-72], is a very important historian in 
the Chinese Communist Party’s Party Research Office in Beijing. David Shambaugh Interview with 
Komine, October 15, 2003. See, for example, Zhang Baija and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock 
Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontations: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the 
Chinese Perspective,” and Li Jie, “Changes in China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. 
Relations,” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China 
Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001); 
Chen Jian, M ao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f  North Carolina Press, 
2001); Qiang Zhai, China & the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North 
Carolina Press, 2000); Qiu Jin and Elizabeth Perry, The Lin Biao Incident and the Cultural Revolution 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); Philipe Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry 
Holt & Company, 1999); Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1999); and Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash o f 1969: From Zhenbao Island to 
Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2000; Chen Jian, and David 
Wilson (eds.), “All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos”—Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and 
the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69, Bulletin 11, Cold War International History 
Project, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Haldeman (1978), and Walters (1978), all contributed to the chronological description 
of the U.S. rapprochement with China within the Cold War context.19 The main focus 
of these works was the exploration of the secret diplomatic process of U.S. 
rapprochement with China from January 1969 to July 1971. The early works in the 
1970s revealed many facts, such as the exchange of subtle diplomatic signals from 
1969 to 1971, the back-channel communications with the Chinese through Pakistan 
and Romania, as well as Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing via Pakistan. It was 
Kissinger’s role as a policy operator and negotiator in secret diplomacy that formed 
the focus for the literature that followed in the 1980s.
However, without substantive access to primary documentary sources, the studies in 
the 1970s were mostly journalistic descriptions based on unidentified interviews and 
leaks. There were no detailed and precise references to where the information was 
obtained, and so these works were challenged on the ground of reliability. For 
example, it was not entirely clear how accurate some accounts of conversations 
between Nixon and Kissinger were. In particular, these studies acknowledged the 
importance of Nixon’s presidential leadership; however, they did not stress it, perhaps 
owing to the continuing negative impact of the Watergate scandal. These works also 
pointed out Kissinger’s unfamiliarity with China, but failed to provide sufficient 
evidences to back this up. Finally, owing to their emphasis on Kissinger’s operational 
role and his secret trip to Beijing, these early works overlooked the importance of 
Nixon’s presidential trip to China in February 1972. This study overcomes these 
limitations by examining the direct negotiations between the two sides in July and
19 Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (London: Hutchinson, 1974); Roger Morris, Uncertain 
Greatness (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977); Tad Szulc, The Illusion o f  Peace: Foreign 
Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking, 1978); H.R. Haldeman (with Joseph Di Mona), The End 
o f  Power (New York: Times Books, 1978); and Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (New York: 
Doubleday, 1978).
October 1971 and February 1972, on the basis of substantial direct access to new 
archival materials.
In their respective memoirs, Nixon and Kissinger both claim credit for initiating the 
U.S. rapprochement with China. Nixon (1978) stressed his presidential leadership in 
making a decision to “pull China back into the community of nations.”20 He 
emphasized his role in making public statements and giving interviews with the media 
as subtle diplomatic signals toward Beijing. Nixon also stressed his personal 
initiatives to establish the backchannels through Pakistan and Romania in October 
1970 to communicate with the Chinese leaders. In particular, he selectively revealed 
the contents of private letters exchanged between the U.S. and the Chinese through 
the Pakistan backchannel from late 1970 to mid-1971. Finally, Nixon put strong 
emphasis on his leadership in the breakthrough in July 1971 and his presidential trip 
to China in February 1972. These were the trips that ended two decades of mutual 
hostility between the U.S. and China.
However, the China section in Nixon’s memoirs is very short (only 36 pages), and 
ignores possible contributions from other senior officials in his administration. Nixon 
stated only that the Chinese “ignored the low-level signals” which the United States 
sent during 1969 and that it was not until 1970 that the U.S. “began a serious 
approach” to open dialogue with China.21 Thus, the Nixon memoirs failed to explore 
his administration’s early efforts, especially those by the State Department from early 
1969 to the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in January and February 
1970, to develop policy options in order to begin communications with the Chinese. 
He completely ignored NSC meetings on China policy and consultations with his
20 Richard M. Nixon, RN: Memoirs o f  Richard M. Nixon (New York: Grssett & Danlap, 1978).
21 Ibid., p.545.
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advisors, and even failed to refer to most of Kissinger’s briefings and memos. Finally, 
he failed to describe any details about his own private preparations for his trip to 
China. Overall, Nixon’s memoirs stress the importance of his presidential leadership 
without going into details of the policy development process within his 
administration. This thesis examines the development of Nixon’s view on China 
before 1969 in greater depth, and the roles of other important officials and details of 
the development of America’s China policy from 1969 to 1971 will also be analyzed.
Kissinger (1979) analyzes the U.S. rapprochement with China within the context of 
the development of strategic triangular relations between the United States, China, 
and the Soviet Union.22 He repeatedly stresses the importance of Realpolitik and the 
balance of power. Kissinger criticizes China experts (both in the bureaucracy and in 
academia) and the liberals who failed to recognize the opportunity for the U.S. to 
exercise leverage within the Sino-Soviet relationship. His memoirs provide the most 
detailed chronological description of the evolution of a highly centralized National 
Security Council system. He discusses the public and secret signal-exchange 
processes between the U.S. and the Chinese from January 1969 to June 1971; his trips 
to Beijing in July and October 1971; and the February 1972 summit. In particular, 
Kissinger emphasizes the importance of the Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to 
September 1969. He also describes the possible impact of the U.S. opening to China 
on the promotion of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The first volume of 
Kissinger’s memoirs, followed by the second volume (1982) which covers Nixon’s
22 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston Little Brown, 1979); and Idem, Years o f  Upheavals 
(Boston Little Brown, 1982).
second term, presented the overall geo-strategic context, as well as the detailed 
operational process of the U.S. rapprochement with China.23
However, Kissinger over-states the importance of his role in the opening to China. 
He creates the impression that he independently came to realize the necessity and 
possibility of the opening to China during the early period from 1968 to 1969.24 He 
exaggerates his contribution in the exploration of U.S. leverage in Sino-Soviet 
hostilities, and he overstresses the speed and degree of his understanding of the 
implications of the Sino-Soviet border clashes. Moreover, Kissinger downgrades 
other senior officials’ contributions to the issues, such as Taiwan and the resumption 
of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in January and February 1970. He also understates 
the NSC staff members’ expertise in drafting briefing papers before his trips to 
Beijing in July and October 1971, as well as Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. 
Overall, he over-exaggerates his intellectual and operational input without sufficiently 
assessing the importance of contributions from other officials within the 
administration. This thesis adopts a more comprehensive approach by examining the 
development of Kissinger’s views on China before 1969. The influence of 
bureaucratic and academic expertise on Kissinger’s views on the Sino-Soviet border 
clashes of 1969 will be examined by means of a comparative analysis of the published 
memoirs of former U.S. diplomats, oral history collections, interviews, and new 
archival materials.
23 In the third volume o f his memoirs, Kissinger (1999) presents his latest reflections on the Nixon 
presidency, including the development o f the National Security Council system and the China 
initiative. He also conducts detailed and often defensive descriptions o f  the Ford administration’s 
China policy from August 1974 to January 1977. In short, Kissinger’s third volume o f memoirs is 
intended partly to counter the anticipated criticisms from new publications. Henry A. Kissinger, Years 
o f  Renewal (New York: Little Brown, 1999).
24 In reality, however, Kissinger was originally an expert on European power politics. Therefore, it 
could be argued that Kissinger’s interests, knowledge, and experience on China were limited in 1969. 
This subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 2.
Since the early 1980s, what Nixon and Kissinger over-estimated, under-valued, and 
omitted in their respective memoirs has been widely publicized by journalists and 
former officials.25 Hersh (1983) provides a highly critical account of the development 
of the National Security Council system, revealing how Nixon and Kissinger secretly 
sought to centralize the power in the NSC system and to run foreign policy from the 
White House. Hersh’s detailed description of the rapprochement with China is highly 
critical of Kissinger’s role, as it gives some examples of his intellectual insecurity 
regarding Asia, and particularly China. Having interviewed a number of former 
officials, including NSC staff members and State Department diplomats, Hersh shows 
how other senior officials and bureaucrats made contributions to the development of 
the U.S. initiative toward China from January 1969 to July 1971. For example, he 
points out the development of the differences between the Kissinger NSC and the 
State Department on the speed in establishing direct communication with the Chinese 
after the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in February 1970.
Garthoff (1985, 1994) provides a detailed survey of the process of the U.S. opening 
to China from January 1969 to July 1971, which is much clearer than Kissinger’s 
lengthy and often confusing account. Importantly, the signal-exchange process was 
even more complicated than Nixon and Kissinger had previously explained. Because 
of the exclusion of the State Department’s expertise from the policy-making process, 
resulting in an unbalanced analytical basis, key U.S. officials occasionally 
misunderstood Chinese intentions and sometimes even failed to grasp implications of 
messages from Beijing. Consequently, Nixon and Kissinger delayed the process of
25 Seymour Hersh, The Price o f  Power (New York: Summit Books, 1983); Alexander M. Haig Jr., 
Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984); U. Alexis 
Johnson, The Right Hands o f  Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984); and 
Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985). 
In 1994, Garthoff published a new edition with further documentary evidence to reinforce his main 
arguments.
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upgrading the diplomatic communications with the Chinese, especially after the 
collapse of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in early 1970.
On the other hand, neither Hersh nor Garthoff had sufficient access to primary 
documentary sources, as this study will demonstrate. Hersh too often stresses the 
negative aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger pursuit of secrecy, and thus creates an 
impression that is journalistic, and even sensational, rather than historical and 
analytical. Although more balanced in his analysis and highly revealing regarding the 
behind-the-scenes preparations for the opening initiative, Garthoff fails to analyze 
NSC policy studies in sufficient details. Because their main focus is on criticizing the 
problems of Kissinger’s memoirs, neither Hersh nor Garthoff conducts sufficient 
analysis of Nixon’s presidential role in the opening to China; they are especially weak 
on the process by which Nixon’s interest in China policy developed. Being principally 
based on private interviews, and occasionally on some unidentified sources, their 
studies are weak in the analysis of precise examples of the expertise contributions 
from the State Department and NSC staff members. Hersh and Garthoff reveal 
important issues which were the subject of Kissinger’s secret talks with Zhou in July 
1971, such as the intelligence briefings of Soviet military deployment along the Sino- 
Soviet border areas; however, Hersh and Garthoff give little coverage of Kissinger’s 
official visit to Beijing in October 1971 and Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. 
Overall, despite the lack of substantial access to primary documents, Hersh and 
Garthoff created a counterargument against what is claimed in Kissinger’s memoirs. 
This study will re-examine specific points in their criticism of Kissinger’s memoirs on 
the basis of new sources.
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From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, many scholars, such as Bell (1977), 
Hoffmann (1978), Gaddis (1982), Litwak (1984), and Schulzinger (1989), have 
conducted more systematic and critical analyses of the Nixon-Kissinger global 
strategy of political-military retrenchment, including detente and the Nixon Doctrine, 
and the rapprochement with China.26 In order to assess the key concepts in 
Kissinger’s political realism, such as legitimacy, equilibrium, and balance of power, 
these scholars conduct a detailed analysis of his early writings. Within the changing 
international system, characterized by the loosening of rigid military and ideological 
bipolarity and the development of political and economic multipolarity, Kissinger 
urged the need to recognize the multidimensional nature of power in the world and the 
limits of U.S. power resources to continue an open-ended containment of 
Communism. These scholars critically analyzed Kissinger’s conceptual approach 
toward the U.S. opening to China, which was still weak in military, political, and 
economic terms, rather than details of the opening process. Within the Cold War 
context, these scholarly studies made a useful contribution to the clarification of the 
conceptual framework underlying the U.S. opening to China.
The limitation of these scholarly works is that they examine the opening to China 
mainly in relation to Sino-Soviet mutual hostility, and thus fail to address the China 
policy independently in a broader historical context. Although they refer to the U.S. 
withdrawal from Indochina, they do not fully examine the implications of the U.S. 
rapprochement with China in the context of East Asian regional security. In particular, 
these works do not analyze specific security issues between the two sides. Finally,
26 Coral Bell, The Diplomacy o f  Detente (New York: St. Martin’s, 1977); Stanley Hoffman, Primary or 
World Order (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Robert S. Litwak, Detente and Nixon Doctrine: American 
Foreign Policy, 1969-76 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Robert D. Schulzinger, 
Henry Kissinger: Doctor o f  Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
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owing to their main focus on Kissinger, they fail to analyze the importance of Nixon’s 
presidential leadership.
In the 1990s, many more former U.S. officials, such as Haig (1992), Green, Stokes, 
and Holdridge (1994), Haldeman (1994), and Holdridge (1997) began to describe 
their experiences in more detail; they provided a more comprehensive understanding 
of the operational process of U.S. rapprochement with China.27 Despite the deliberate 
and systematic exclusion of the State Department, Nixon and Kissinger depended 
heavily on it, especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, headed by 
Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, for a number of policy studies. Moreover, a 
number of officials and regional experts directly and indirectly contributed to the 
formulation of China policy without knowing the real intentions of Nixon and 
Kissinger. The memoirs of former diplomats reveal some of the ways in which Nixon 
and Kissinger secretly made use of bureaucratic studies within the National Security 
Study Memorandum (NSSM) process.
Though he was the dominant intellectual on the NSC staff, Kissinger was less at 
home as an administrator. Thus, while Nixon preferred to avoid face-to-face meetings 
with other senior officials, Kissinger greatly benefited from Haig’s bureaucratic 
experience as well as from Haldeman’s role as intermediary in dealing with the State 
Department. As the White House Chief of Staff, Haldeman was present when Nixon 
and Kissinger held private discussions about China policy. Thus, Haldeman’s diaries
27 Alexander M. Haig Jr., (with Maccarry Charles) Inner Circles, How America Changed the World: A 
Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992); H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon 
White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994); Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William 
N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service o f  the United 
States (Maryland: Dacor-Bacon House, 1994); and John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An 
Insider’s Account o f  the Normalization o f  U.S.-China Relations (Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1997).
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provide very useful records about precisely when Nixon and Kissinger discussed 
China policy.
While maintaining low profiles, NSC staff members such as Winston Lord played a 
crucial role in the day-to-day operation of the China policy. NSC staff regional 
experts, such as John Holdridge, Richard Smyser, and Richard Solomon, provided 
expertise in policy studies; they prepared detailed briefing papers prior to Kissinger’s 
trips to Beijing and Nixon’s trip to China. There was bureaucratic rivalry among U.S. 
officials with different views on the priority of issues in the U.S. relations with China. 
For example, there was disagreement between the NSC staff and State Department 
officials, and also between China experts and Soviet experts within the State 
Department over the timing and agenda of a new China initiative.
The memoirs published in the 1990s, however, had only limited access to primary 
documentary materials. Haig’s memoirs are principally based on his interpretation of 
events about U.S. China policy. In the Haldeman diaries, the China issue began to 
appear from late 1970 to early 1971, and it is not entirely clear how the China policy 
was discussed in the period from early 1969 to early 1970. The memoirs of NSC staff 
members and of State Department officials are partly based on the edited excerpts of 
the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic Studies 
and Training (ADST).29 Thus, the originals of the collection should be examined to 
develop a more detailed and balanced analysis of the U.S. rapprochement with China.
In particular, crucial meetings on major events during the U.S. opening to China, 
such as the Nixon-Kissinger private meetings in the Oval Office and NSC meetings 
also needs to be examined on the basis of new archival materials, such as memoranda 
of conversations and the Nixon White House Tapes. The development of Nixon’s
28 Specific examples are examined in the main chapters.
29 Details are discussed in the Section 3.1.
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personal interest in China prior to 1969 as well as the uncertainty of Kissinger about 
Asia and China in 1968 and 1969 should be examined in more detail. Equally 
important, much more substantial analysis needs to be conducted on concrete 
examples of bureaucratic and operational problems during the opening to China. 
There should also be an analysis of the specific roles and contributions of the NSC 
staff members and the State Department officials.
Since the early 1990s, a growing number of journalists and historians, such as 
Isaacson (1992), Bundy (1998), Mann (1999), and Tyler (1999), have examined new 
documentary sources on the U.S. rapprochement with China, creating more critical
TOand revealing studies. Isaacson (1992) described Kissinger’s personality, including a 
critique of his secretive operational and negotiating style. Isaacson’s work was based 
on a number of interviews, including one with Kissinger himself. Moreover, Bundy 
(1998), a historian and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs in the Johnson Administration, conducted a critical analysis of Nixon- 
Kissinger foreign policy.31 Bundy’s work is based on extensive personal interviews as 
well as on the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the ADST. In particular, 
Bundy stresses the importance of the question of Japan’s strategic position in East 
Asia as one of the major issues during the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 
1971. Mann (1999) examines the evolution of the U.S.-PRC relations as tacit allies in 
the 1970s. Mann’s work is based on the declassified documents collected at National 
Security Archive (NSA), some excerpts of Nixon’s handwritten notes before and
30 Isaacson, Kissinger, Bundy, A Tangled Web; James H. Mann, About Face: A History o f  Am erica’s 
Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999); and Patrick 
E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 
1999).
31 Bundy served as the Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from March 1964 
to May 1969.
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during his trip to China in February 1972 collected from the National Archives, and 
the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of ADST. Tyler (1999) conducted a more 
detailed analysis of the development of Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 and the 
subsequent development of U.S.-USSR-PRC strategic triangle. Tyler’s work is based 
on declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests, document files at the NSA (a collection of 15,000 pages), and the State 
Department’s record entitled: “Private Statements Made by PRC Leaders to Secretary 
Kissinger or President Nixon Regarding the Peaceful Liberation of Taiwan” which 
covers the period from 1971 to 1974.
The above listed works from the 1990s, however, fail to explore adequately the 
security environment of the Asia-Pacific region in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 
Moreover, although these authors have conducted interviews and had access to 
archival sources, more substantial research needs to be done on the originals of the so- 
called ‘Nixon Papers’ at the National Archives. More research is also needed on the 
updated originals of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of ASDT.
One of the major trends among scholars, such as Harding (1992), Ross (1995), Foot 
(1995), and Garver (1997), since the 1990s has been to re-assess Nixon’s opening to 
China within the context of the long-term development of U.S.-PRC relations from 
the early 1970s to the late 1990s.32 As the Cold War ended, the triangular relationship 
between the U.S., the USSR, and the PRC decreased its importance as the principal 
issue in the study of U.S.-China relations. Instead, Taiwan’s status became more
32 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1992); Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and 
China 1969-1989 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995); Rosemary Foot, The 
Practice o f  Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); 
and John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy 
(New York: An East Gate Book: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997).
significant as a major conflicting issue between the U.S. and China. For example, 
using primary sources on the U.S. as well as the Chinese side, Ross (1995) argued that 
Kissinger’s underestimation of Taiwan obscured the reality of Sino-U.S. relations. 
Taiwan was the most contentious issue in U.S.-PRC relations throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, requiring continuous negotiations and adjustment. Garver (1997) 
examined how relations with Chinese Nationalists played an important role in U.S. 
strategy for splitting the Sino-Soviet bloc and containing the revolutionary expansion 
of Communist China from the 1950s to the 1960s. Foot (1995) emphasized the 
importance of a much wider conceptual framework in the U.S. attempt to integrate 
China into the international community through the practice of “structural power” -  
the establishment of multiple international interactions with China strategically, 
commercially, intellectually, and militarily.
However, substantial primary documents on the rapprochement issue were not 
available for those scholars. Because of this, there has not been sufficient analysis of 
aspects of the policy-making process, such as the contributions from the NSC staff 
and the State Department in drafting policy option papers, as well as the bureaucratic 
rivalry between the two institutions regarding the China initiative. Thus, more 
analysis is needed of other major security issues discussed by U.S. and Chinese 
officials, such as the Vietnam War, the Soviet military threat, Japan’s future role, and 
India-Pakistan rivalry.
33 Since the end o f  the Cold War, there has been a growing debate about the so-called ‘China threat.’ 
The recent debate is a dialogue between open-door engagement and closed-door restraint in relation to 
the question o f China’s intentions and capabilities. See, for example, David Shambaugh, “Growing 
Strong: China’s Challenge to Asian Security” Survival, 36, No.2, (Summer 1994); Idem, “Containment 
or Engagement o f China” International Security, Vol.21., No.2, (Fall 1996); Gerald Segal, “East Asia 
and ‘Constrainment’ o f China,” International Security, Vol.20, No.4, (Spring 1996); and Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, China I: “The Coming Conflicts with China,” and Robert S. Ross, China 
II: “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 76, No. 2, March/April 1997.
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The most recent works by biographers and historians, such as Reeves (2001), Ross 
and Jiang (2001), Hanhimaki (2004), and Goh (2004), are based on new archival 
materials.34 The volume by Ross and Jiang includes some chapters on the 
development of American domestic debate on China and the resumption of the 
Warsaw ambassadorial talks. Their works are based on archival materials declassified 
up to 2001. Reeves sought to provide a detailed chronological description to 
“reconstruct the Nixon presidency as it looked from the center.”35 He examined 
Nixon’s talks with foreign leaders and senior officials in his administration during the 
opening to China. He also emphasizes how preoccupied Nixon was with the White 
House staffs news summaries of major events, such as his trips to Asia and Romania 
in 1969, the Ping Pong diplomacy in April 1971, and the presidential announcement 
for his trip to China in July 1971. Hanhimaki’s new biography of Kissinger, the first 
major reassessment since Isaacson’s work, conducted a comparative analysis of 
Kissinger on the one hand as a skilful diplomat and on the other as a bureaucratic 
manipulator obsessed with secrecy. Regarding U.S. China policy, Hanhimaki’s 
interest is in Kissinger’s role in the development of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing 
strategic triangle. Thus, he overlooks the roles of the State Department and of the 
NSC staff members; he also fails to examine sufficiently the impact of the new China 
initiative in the Asia-Pacific region. While Reeves and Hanhimaki reassessed the 
political careers of the respective leaders in a broad context, this study examines the 
similarities and differences between Nixon and Kissinger regarding their China 
initiative in particular.
34 Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); 
Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954- 
1975 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001); Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: 
Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement 
with China, 1961-1974: From ‘Red M enace’ to ‘Tacit A lly ’ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004).
35 Reeves, President Nixon, p. 13.
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Goh’s work is the latest study on the U.S. rapprochement with China, based on 
archival materials declassified up to 2001.36 She argues that as Sino-U.S. relations 
were restored, China moved from being regarded as America’s most implacable 
enemy to a friend and tacit ally. Goh claims further that although the previously 
existing accounts of the rapprochement focus on the shifting balance of power 
between the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China, they cannot sufficiently explain the 
timing and policy choices related to Washington’s decisions for reconciliation with 
Beijing. Instead, she demonstrates that ideas of reconciliation with China were 
already being debated widely within U.S. official circles during the 1960s. Realizing 
the importance of that broad political context suggested by Goh, this study pays 
particular attention to the development of Nixon’s early view on China. While sharing 
the view that the U.S. and China became tacit allies in the 1970s, this study disagrees 
with Goh’s argument that China became a friend of the United States. In spite of the 
development of a cordial atmosphere, U.S. relations with China remained based on 
unsentimental calculations of utility for the maintenance of U.S. centrality in the 
international security.
Overall, it is possible to undertake a more detailed analysis of U.S. rapprochement 
with China than the above works because this study has substantial access to new 
archival materials which had been declassified until December 2004.
36 This study has conducted a comparative analysis o f its approach and Goh’s approach by accessing 
the following sources: Evelyn (Chui-Ling) Goh, “From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit’ Ally: Constructing the 
Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974,” PhD thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2001; and 




In November and December 1976, Henry Kissinger donated his papers from his 
time at the White House and the State Department to the Library of Congress. He 
requested that they be classified either until 5 years after his death or 25 years later -  
2001, whichever came later.37 Over 90 percent of the papers in the so-called 
‘Kissinger Papers’ are the copies of the originals from the files of the State 
Department, the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff at National Archives II, and the 
Ford Library. The only exceptions are the transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone 
conversations, which the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980 ruled to be private.
On August 9, 2001, the State Department announced that Kissinger returned to them 
the copies of approximately 10,000 pages of the transcripts of his telephone 
conversations conducted during his term as Secretary of State (September 1973- 
January 1977).38 On February 11, 2002, Kissinger returned to the National Archives 
and Record Administration’s custody the copies of the transcripts of telephone 
conversations from his earlier years as the National Security Adviser to President 
Nixon (January 1969-September 1973).39 In May 2002, the National Archives 
released 107,200 pages of documents from the National Security Council Files of the 
Nixon Presidential Materials Staff.40 In July 2003, the National Archives also released
37 Bruce Kirby, Manuscript Reference Librarian, Manuscript Division, Library o f Congress, Discussion 
with Komine, October 7, 2003. See also Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts, pp. x-xi.
38 It was the years o f efforts made by the NSA that encouraged the State Department to seek this return. 
See Archive Hails Turnover o f  Kissinger Papers: GWU Group Persuades State Department to Recover 
Telephone Transcripts, NSA. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010809)
39 Archive Hails Turnover o f  Kissinger Telecons: GWU Group Persuades National Archives to Recover 
Telephone Transcripts, NSA. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20020211/index2.html)
40 The National Security Council Files, NPMS, NA.
(http://www.archives.gov/nixon/national_security_council/nsc_files.html)
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the National Security Council Institutional Files.41 In May 2004, the National 
Archives released approximately 20,000 declassified pages of Kissinger’s private 
collection at the Library of Congress 42 
In October 2004, the CIA’s Historical Review Group released a number of National 
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) concerning China.43 The National Intelligence Council 
(NIC) produced and published this collection.44 Its works ranged from brief analyses 
of current issues to broader estimates of major trends in the world.
At the current stage of writing (January 2005), the U.S. official documentary 
records during the Nixon Presidency (1969-1974) Foreign Relations o f the United 
States (FRUS) have not been published in their entirety with the exception of some 
volumes, such as FRUS, Volume I: Foreign Policy Foundations o f  the Nixon 
administration from 1969 to 1972; and Volume V: United Nations, 1969-1972.45 This 
study has also used FRUS volumes on China covering periods from the late 1940s to 
the late 1960s.
Other U.S. Governmental publications, such as Public Papers o f the President o f  the 
United States and Bulletins o f the Department o f State include record of speeches, 
press releases, press conferences, and interviews. President Nixon’s and Kissinger’s 
background briefings to the press are very useful information sources on the 
intellectual assumptions underlying U.S. China policy. Finally, newspaper sources,
41 The National Security Institutional Files, NPMS, NA.
(http://www.archives.gov/nixon/national_security_council/institutional_files.html)
42 The Kissinger Telcons, NA. (http://www.archives.gov/nixon/kissinger/index.html)
43 The China Collection, Central Intelligence Agency, (http://www.foia.cia.gov/china_collection.asp)
44 Tracking the Dragon: Selected National Intelligence Estimates on China, 1948-1976, National 
Intelligence Council, CD-ROM (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004). This 
study also obtained the NIEs’ documents, which were transmitted to the NSC files and the State 
Department files, at National Archives.
45 For the proposed list o f the volumes, see U.S. State Department, Office o f  the Historian, Foreign 
Relations o f  the United States Series, 1969-72, The Nixon Administration.
(http ://state. g o  v/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon_em/)
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such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, are used to follow the media’s 
coverage of major policy announcements and developments.
3.2. Published declassified documents
An increasing number of declassified primary documents collected and published 
by historians have made contributions to the development of a more comprehensive 
description of the U.S. rapprochement with China.46
William Burr, an archivist of the National Security Archive, has had access to the 
State Department Files (Record Group 59, especially Winston Lord’s files) at the 
National Archives; and he had collected a number of cables as well as some 
transcripts of the conversations between Kissinger and Chinese officials from 1971 to 
1977 (including the transcript of the Nixon-Mao talks on February 21, 1972)47 
The NSA possesses the copies of some of the now declassified documents on the 
Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to September 1969, the development of back- 
channels with China through the intermediaries, namely Pakistan and Romania, the 
transcripts of the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 1971, the transcripts of the 
Zhou-Haig talks in January 1972, and the transcripts of the Nixon-Zhou talks in 
February 1972.48 Taking into account the release of the above-listed copies and 
excerpts, this study has made direct access to a number o f originals at the U.S. 
National Archives.
46 See, for example, Richard Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests through ‘Old 
Friends ’ (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1999); and Jeffrey Richardson (ed.), China and 
the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998, The National Security Archive.
47 William Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow  (New  
York: The New Press, 1999); and Idem, “Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969: The Sino-Soviet 
Border War and Steps towards Rapprochement,” Cold War History, V ol.l, No.3, April 2001.
48 See the Bibliography, Section 4. ‘Published Documentary Materials on Websites. ’
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3.3. A survey of new archival materials
The principal archival source of this study is the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NA), Archives II, College Park, Maryland.49
Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS) 
The National Security Council Files (NSCF)
Subject Files (SF) include National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), the 
subsequent NSSM papers, and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs). 
The files also include memoranda from Kissinger to Nixon as well as memoranda of 
conversations involving Nixon and Kissinger.
President’s Trip Files (PTF) include records of Nixon’s trip to Europe from 
February to March 1969, including meetings with De Gaulle in March 1969; and 
records of Nixon’s trip to Asia from late July to early August 1969, including his
49 For Nixon’s pre-presidential papers, and post-presidential papers, the Nixon Library & Birthplace is 
the only presidential library which is not U.S. government-sponsored, owing to N ixon’s resignation as 
a result o f the Watergate scandal. The materials on China policy in the Nixon Library are rather thin. 
Julian Kirstin, Archivist, The Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace, Correspondence with Komine, May 
11, 2004; Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; Rosemary Foot, Interview with 
Komine, July 13, 2004; and Evelyn Goh, Correspondence with Komine, August 2, 2004. Documents 
on Nixon’s pre-presidential period were thus obtained from the Transition Files in the National 
Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives. FRUS volumes on China 
include a number o f  documents from Nixon’s Vice-presidency era. For Nixon’s speeches and 
interviews on China during the 1960s, this study consulted newspaper articles. Komine’s interviews 
with former NSC staff members also provide new evidence for N ixon’s interest in China before 1969. 
Finally, the Congressional bill signed by President George W. Bush in earlier 2004 will allow for the 
move o f President Nixon’s White House papers and records from the National Archives’ storage 
facilities in Maryland to the Nixon Library in Yorba Linda in February 2006. The transfer will christen 
the Nixon Library as part o f the official system o f Presidential libraries. Bulletin from Yorba Libra: 
Nixon Papers On The Road To Yorba Linda, December 10, 2004. On March 10, 2005, however, 
sixteen historians asked Congress to suspend plans for the transfer o f  the Nixon tapes and files from the 
National Archives in College Park, Maryland to the Yorba Linda facility. The historians informed the 
members o f the U.S. Senate and House committees on appropriations that “The unprofessional 
behavior o f the Nixon Library leadership calls into question that institution’s fitness to join the 
Presidential Library system.” “Historians Ask Congress to Suspend Nixon Transfer,” National Security 
Archive Update, March 10, 2005.
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announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on July 25, 1969. The files also include the 
records of the preparations for Nixon’s trip to China from July 1971 to January 1972, 
and the records of Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972.
Country Files (CF) include records regarding South Asia, especially the 
development of India-Pakistani mutual hostility from the early 1971 to the outbreak of 
war in December 1971. The files on Poland include the preparation of the Warsaw 
ambassadorial talks in February 1969, and in January and February 1970.
Name Files fNF) include individual records of such important academic experts and 
officials as Allen Whiting and Marshall Green. The folder on China includes 
Kissinger’s memoranda to Nixon prior to his visit to China in February 1972.
For the President Files (Winston Lord) -  China Trip/Vietnam (FPF/Lord) include; 
the briefing papers, the so-called ‘Books’ for Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and 
October 1971; the State Department’s briefing papers for Nixon’s trip to China; the 
records of Nixon’s conversations with Chinese leaders in February 1972; exchanges 
with China from July 1971 to December 1972; and the records of Kissinger’s trip to 
Beijing from June 19 to 23, 1972.
Alexander M. Haig Special File (Haig-File) includes the preparation for Haig’s 
advance trip to China, especially the ‘Books’; the original transcripts of Haig’s talks 
with Premier Zhou in January 1972; and Haig’s daily cables to Kissinger from China.
Presidential/HAK Memcons (P/HAK Memcons) include the memoranda of 
conversations between Nixon and foreign leaders, including De Gaulle (February 28 
to March 2, 1969), (March 31, 1969), and Ceausescu (August 2 to 3, 1969), (October 
26 to 27, 1970).
For the President Files (FPF) -  China/Vietnam Negotiations include the records of 
exchanges from December 1969 to July 1971; and the transcripts of Kissinger’s with
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the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua regarding the drafting of the 
joint communique in February 1972.
Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF) include: General Goodpaster’s 
memoranda on the new NSC system; Transition Books; the NSC Planning Material; 
the NSC staff material; and the chronological details of U.S. China Policy 1969-1972.
National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF)
This collection, declassified in July 2003, includes briefing papers for Nixon and 
Kissinger (NSC staff summary and Talking Points) and the NSC records (Senior 
Review Group Meeting Minutes, National Security Council Meeting Minutes, 
Washington Special Action Group Meeting Minutes).
White House Central Files (WHCF)
Confidential Files (CF) include the records of writings by and about the President 
(Books and Articles) as well as the President’s News Analysis.
White House Special Files (WHSF)
President’s Office Files (POF) include summaries of Nixon’s meeting with Cabinet 
members and with Congressional leaders on foreign policy issues (including the 
briefing after Kissinger’s July and October 1971 trips, and before and after the
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Nixon’s February 1972 trip). The White House staff member, Patrick Buchanan, kept 
notes on Nixon’s talks with foreign leaders.
President’s Personal Files fPPF) include Nixon’s handwritten notes on a yellow pad 
taken to prepare for foreign trips and major speeches.
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG59)
Subject-Numeric Files (SNF) include Intelligence Note, Research Study, Memcon 
(Memorandum of Conversation), Telegram (incoming/outgoing), embassy cables 
Chinese officials’ public statements, Memoranda for the President, Secretary of State, 
the Under Secretary, Kissinger, Weekly Reports on China, and media/newspapers 
analysis. The major issues in these documents includes the policy options on the 
opening to China from December 1968 to February 1972, the development of Sino- 
Soviet mutual hostility from 1968 to 1972, and the preparation for the resumption of 
the Warsaw ambassadorial talks from late 1968 to mid 1970.
Winston Lord kept records while he was the director of the Policy Planning Staff in 
the State Department from 1973 to 1977. Lord Files include the record of Kissinger’s 
meetings with Chinese leaders from 1973 to 1977; the ‘Books’ prepared for 
Kissinger’s trips to China from 1973 to 1975; and the ‘Books’ prepared for Ford’s 
visit to China in December 1975.
Lot Files (LF) include documents maintained by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, and his office in the State 
Department. In particular, the collection covers such files as Background of Sino-U.S.
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Relations; Lifting of Trade and Travel Restrictions; Public correspondence from 1971 
to 1972; Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 (Background, Plans, and Meetings).
The Nixon White House Tapes (NWHT)
This collection, beginning in February 1971, covers Nixon’s conversations with his 
staff on major foreign policy developments, such as the Ping Pong diplomacy in April 
1971; Nixon’s presidential announcement for his trip to China in July 1971; the 
briefing of Kissinger’s secret trip to China to Congressional leaders; and the briefing 
of Nixon’s China trip to Congressional leaders.50
H.R. Haldeman Diaries (HRHD) (Tapes and CD-ROMs)
The chief of staff in the White House, H.R. Haldeman, kept diaries from January 
1969 to June 1973.51 The written and recorded diaries reveal the development of 
Nixon’s thinking on the China initiative. The major events covered in the diaries 
include Ping-Pong diplomacy, Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971, the 
Cabinet meetings on China policy, the briefings to the Congressional leaders after
50 In early 1971, Nixon told the White House Chief o f Staff, H.R. Haldeman, that he needed a record o f  
his decision making to protect himself in the eyes o f history. Nixon wanted Oval Office and Cabinet 
Room meetings recorded on tape. Hence, the Technical Services Division o f the U.S. Secret Service 
installed a voice-activated system in the Oval Office and a switch-activated system in the Cabinet 
Room starting on February 16, 1971. The entire system, which was completed during the next four 
months, recorded conversations between President Nixon, his staff, and visitors at locations in the Oval 
Office; the President’s Executive Office Building hideaway office; the Cabinet Room; various White 
House telephones in the Oval Office and the Lincoln Sitting Room; and at various Camp David 
locations. History o f  the Nixon White House Tapes, Audiovisual Research Room, NPMS, NA.
51 While the book version o f the diaries is 700 pages, the CD-ROM version’s vast capacity allows the 
full publication o f  2,200 diary pages.
30
Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, the preparation of Nixon’s 
presidential trip to China, and the briefing on the Nixon trip to the Congressional 
leaders. Importantly, Haldeman recorded the day-to-day development of events 
during the China trip from the departure on February 17 to the arrival in Washington 
on February 29, 1972.
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (LCMD) 
Elliot Richardson Papers
This collection of Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State (1969 to 1970), 
includes Richardon’s handwritten notations and memoranda of important 
conversations, discussions, and meetings, which show the variety of policy options 
presented by the State Department. Particularly important, the speech files include 
Richardson’s handwritten notes of his major speech on September 9, 1969, which 
clarified the U.S. policy towards the Sino-Soviet border clashes.
Papers of the Nixon White House, Part 5, H.R. Haldeman: Notes of White House 
Meetings, 1969 -1973
This collection includes Haldeman’s handwritten notes during Nixon’s meetings 
with his advisors and Congressional leaders. The meeting notes began on January 12, 
1969, and they were kept for Haldeman’s use only. Haldeman was at almost every
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major meeting in the Oval Office. The notes show the President’s directives as well as 
describe the atmosphere of the meetings. The collection helps the examination of the 
Nixon White House Tapes, where it is often difficult to understand what is being 
discussed. The main issues in the Haldeman notes will be examined in conjunction 
with his written and tape-recorded diaries.
3.4. Oral history collections
A number of interviews have been conducted with former Nixon administration 
officials. Gerald S. Strober and Deborah Hart Strober published one of the first 
comprehensive oral history collections of the Nixon era, Nixon: An Oral History o f  
His Presidency (1994), which includes chapters on Nixon’s character, personality, 
administrative style, and foreign affairs (including the China policy).52 However, its 
main aim is to reassess the Nixon era as a whole rather than to examine his foreign 
policy in particular. The CNN documentary series entitled The Cold War provided 
full episode scripts as well as transcripts of interviews with former U.S. officials 
regarding the U.S. opening to China and the U.S. detente with the Soviet Union.53 
Important interviews with senior officials were conducted, including former Secretary 
of Defense, Melvin Laird, and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green. A Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) documentary 
entitled Nixon’s China Game provided transcripts of interviews with Kissinger as well
52 Gerald S. Strober and Deborah Hart Strober, Nixon: An Oral History o f  His Presidency (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1994).
53 CNN, The Cold War, (http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/coldwar/), Episode 15: China, and Episode 
16: Detente.
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as with General Haig. However, TV broadcasting means that the questions of the 
interviews on both CNN and PBS are general rather than investigative.
The Brookings Institution’s National Security Council Project has conducted a 
series of oral history roundtables with former NSC staff members and State 
Department officials. These include The Nixon Administration National Security 
Council, China Policy and the National Security Council, and The Role o f  the 
National Security Adviser,54 This study re-examines specific materials from these 
collections.
Nancy Bemkopf Tucker has edited an extensive oral history collection of former 
U.S. officials entitled China Confidential. She has participated in the development of 
the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection at the Association for Diplomatic Studies 
and Training (ADST) at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Arlington, 
Virginia.55 The quotations in the volume are edited and shortened for publications. In 
particular, Tucker explains that one of the main reasons why the Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Collection was established was because a former State Department official, 
Marshall Green, was “bitter” about Kissinger’s underestimation of other officials’ 
contributions to the Nixon foreign policy. Green thus provided some of the funding 
for the ADST to develop a collection which would help to advance a more balanced
54 The Nixon Administration National Security Council, December 8, 1998. 
(http://www.brookings.org/fp/research/projects/nsc/transcripts/19981208.htm)
The Roles o f  the National Security Adviser, October 25, 1999. 
(http://www.brookings.org/fp/research/projects/nsc/transcripts/19991025 .htm)
China Policy and the National Security Council, November 4, 1999.
(http:// www. brookings. org / fp/research/proj ects/nsc/transcripts/19991104. htm)
The National Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHP), The Brookings 
Institution and Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.
55 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker (ed.), China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American 
Relations, 1945-1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p.xi.
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understanding of important initiatives, including the opening to China.56 Significantly, 
the collection of interviews has been added to and updated every year.
This study has made extensive use of the updated originals in the Foreign Affairs 
Oral History Collection in the Special Collection Division of Association for 
Diplomatic Studies and Training at Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.57 
Finally, this study is also based on Komine’s interviews with former U.S. officials and 
senior academics on U.S. relations with China.58
4. Main research questions
In light of the above literature review and the new archival materials which have 
become available, the major objectives of this study are to examine the following 
research questions in order to fill gaps in knowledge and advance new interpretations:
1. When, why, and how did Nixon and Kissinger come to convince themselves 
of the necessity and possibility of the rapprochement with China? How did 
Nixon develop his personal interest in China as Vice President in the 
Eisenhower administration during the 1950s and as a private citizen during the 
1960s? How did Kissinger overcome his earlier uncertainty about the opening 
to China? What differences and similarities were there between their 
respective views on China policy?
2. What kind of difficulties did Nixon and Kissinger anticipate for a new China 
initiative, both internally and externally? How did they seek to overcome those 
difficulties? For example, how did Nixon and Kissinger attempt to manage
56 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003. The Foreign Affairs Oral History 
Program was established in 1988 and housed in the Lauinger Library o f Georgetown University and at 
the Foreign Service Institute. Charles Stuart Kennedy, the Director o f the ADST Oral History Program, 
conducted most o f  the interviews. Tucker and Green also conducted some interviews respectively.
57 For the list o f  country files and individual files, see the Bibliography.
58 For the list o f interviewees and correspondences, see the Bibliography.
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possible opposition from the so-called ‘China lobby’ in Congress? How 
serious was the fear that China would enter into the Vietnam War during the 
late 1960s? How important was Nixon’s long-term public reputation as an 
anti-Communist Cold War warrior for his new initiative toward China?
3. How does the bureaucratic politics model enhance the understanding of the 
diversity among U.S. officials? What were the roles of the NSC staff members 
and of the State Department for the development of policy options during the 
opening towards China? What were the differences between the White House 
and State Department over the method, timing, and agenda for the promotion 
of a new dialogue with the Chinese? How important was the resumption of the 
Warsaw ambassadorial talks from December 1969 to February 1970 to the 
rivalry between the White House and the State Department?
4. Why did Nixon and Kissinger pursue strict secrecy during the opening to 
China? Why did Nixon and Kissinger use third parties, specifically the 
Pakistan, Romania, and France backchannels? Did they consult any other 
officials for an appropriate alternative to approaching the Chinese? What 
mistakes did Nixon and Kissinger make as a result of their secrecy?
5. What did Nixon and Kissinger mean by the emergence of the multipolar 
balance of power in the early 1970s? How did Kissinger develop his 
understanding of the notion of balance of power both in theory and in 
practice? How important were Nixon’s public statements on the re-emergence 
of China as a great power? How did Nixon and Kissinger assess China’s 
geopolitical importance in Asia and the world?
6. How did Nixon and Kissinger develop agendas for direct talks with Chinese 
leaders in July and October 1971 and in February 1972? Who made 
contributions to the development of agenda? Which issues proved to be 
difficult? In particular, this study examines the following five major issues:
6.1. The Taiwan question. Regarding the question of U.S. credibility in 
world politics as well as the possible backlash from the so-called 
‘China lobby’ in America’s domestic politics, how did U.S. officials 
(not only Nixon and Kissinger, but also the NSC staff and the State 
Department) analyze the importance of the Taiwan issue? How did
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U.S. officials assess the Chinese position on the Taiwan issue during 
the opening process?
6.2. Conflicts in Indochina. What were the interrelationships between the 
development of the so-called ‘Nixon Doctrine’ and the U.S. opening 
to China? Who made contributions to develop policy options for the 
new doctrine? How did Nixon and Kissinger come to conclude that 
the Chinese would respond to their new initiative despite the on-going 
conflicts in Indochina?
6.3. Japan’s future role. How did U.S. officials reassess Japan’s future role 
in the Asia-Pacific region? How did U.S. officials estimate the impact 
of the U.S. opening to China on Japan? How did Nixon and Kissinger 
handle Chinese concerns about Japan’s defense policy in the future?
6.4. The India-Pakistan rivalry. How did the White House and State 
Department assess the implications of the India-Pakistan rivalry? 
How important for the opening to China was the interrelationship 
between the India-Pakistan rivalry and the deepening Sino-Soviet 
hostilities?
6.5. The growth of the Soviet military threat. What were the views of 
Nixon and Kissinger on the development of the Sino-Soviet rift 
before they entered office? How did the White House and the State 
Department analyze the implications of the escalation of Sino-Soviet 
border clashes from March to September 1969? How did U.S. 
officials assess the impact of the U.S. opening to China on the 
deepening Sino-Soviet hostilities?
7. How did the Nixon administration prepare for the China summit in February 
1972? What were the main concerns of Nixon and Kissinger in their thinking 
about the summit? What were the results of the talks? How did Nixon and 
Kissinger reassess the significance of the China initiative after the summit? 
Overall, did the U.S. rapprochement with China meet its original aims?
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5. The structure of this thesis
This thesis consists of three major parts and eight chapters. Part I (chapters 1
and 2) examines the conception of U.S. rapprochement with China. Chapter 1 
reassesses how Nixon and Kissinger developed their respective perceptions of the 
China policy before President Nixon entered office. Chapter 2 analyzes the 
revitalization of the National Security Council system during the transition period 
from November 1968 to January 1969. It examines the advantages and disadvantages 
of the highly secretive and centralized foreign policy decision-making machinery. In 
particular, the chapter compares the respective roles in the new China initiative played 
by the NSC staff and State Department officials.
Part II (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) examines the implementation of the U.S. 
rapprochement with China. This study divides the U.S. opening to China into four 
major stages. Chapter 3 analyzes the initial development of strategic perspectives and 
policy options for a new China initiative that emerged in the first half of 1969. 
Chapter 4 explores the bureaucratic reassessments of the U.S. China policy in the 
latter half of 1969. Chapter 5 examines the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial 
talks from December 1969 to January and February 1970, and their collapse as a 
result of the Cambodian military operation in May 1970. Chapter 6 analyses the 
development of back-channel communications with the Chinese via Pakistan and 
Romania from June 1970 to December 1970, and also the breakthrough from April to 
June 1971 in terms of the further pursuit of secrecy by the White House in order to 
exclude the State Department.
Part III (chapters 7 and 8) analyzes the direct talks between the U.S. and the 
China. Chapter 7 begins by examining the development of policy option studies for 
Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. It analyses the five major issues which 
arose during the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 1971: the Taiwan question; 
the conflicts in Indochina; Japan’s future role; the India-Pakistan rivalry; and the 
growth of the Soviet military threat. Finally, it examines how Nixon and Kissinger 
assessed the implications of a new China initiative in briefing meetings with Cabinet 
officials, Congressional leaders, and foreign leaders from July 1971 to January 1972. 
Chapter 8 begins by examining the final preparations for the Nixon trip, such as 
Haig’s advance trip to China in January 1972 and the briefing papers for the 
President. The chapter mainly examines how Nixon and the Chinese leaders discussed 
the five major issues in February 1972. Finally, it analyses how Nixon and Kissinger 
assessed the implications of the China summit in briefing meetings with Cabinet 
officials and Congressional leaders.
The Epilogue briefly discusses how U.S. officials continued to discuss the 
remaining conflicting issues with the Chinese leaders, such as the conflicts in 
Indochina, Japan’s future role, the Soviet military threat, and the treatment of 
Taiwan’s status during the middle of the 1970s.
The Conclusion summarizes and evaluates the major issues raised in this study and 
assesses what the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s achieved, and 
what it left unresolved.
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Part I. The Foundations of Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
Chapter 1. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership for a New China Initiative
This chapter investigates both the similarities and differences between Nixon and 
Kissinger on their respective views on U.S. China policy. The first half of this chapter 
examines the development of Nixon’s view on China from the late 1940s to the late 
1960s. The latter half of this chapter analyses the development of Kissinger’s view on 
the balance of power in theory and in practice. It also examines how Kissinger 
developed his view on U.S. China policy. Finally, this chapter assesses the Nixon- 
Kissinger leadership for the opening to China.
1. Richard M. Nixon as the architect of U.S. rapprochement with China
1.1 The development of Nixon’s early view on China
This study perceives Richard Nixon as the architect of the U.S. opening to China. 
Richard Solomon, a former NSC staff member, and China expert, emphasizes the 
importance of distinguishing between Nixon as a politician and Kissinger as an 
academic.1 Nixon had “a lot more exposure to Asia and foreign policy decision­
making than Kissinger did.” Solomon argues that because of his life-long involvement
1 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Since his death in April 1994, there 
have been a number o f  reassessments on Nixon’s influence in re-shaping U.S. foreign policy and 
American society. See, for instance, Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Perseus Books, 1994); 
Michael Barone, “Nixon’s America,” U.S. News & World Report, 9/20/99; William Bundy, A Tangled 
Web: The Making o f  Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang S Division o f  
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998); Melvin Small, The Presidency o f  Richard Nixon (Kansas: University 
Press o f Kansas, 1999); and Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2001). Kissinger reassesses N ixon’s presidency, foreign policy style, and personal 
character in his third memoirs, Years o f  Renewal (Boston: Little Brown 1999). As for the controversial 
dark characteristic aspects o f Nixon, see Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swan, The Arrogance o f  
Power: The Secret World o f  Richard Nixon (London: Victor Gollancz, 2000).
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in politics, Nixon was an “expert on a policy and political issue.” It is thus important 
to take into consideration the “self-confidence” of successful politicians - the ability 
to understand the “political dynamics” of the international situation.2
The development of Nixon’s view on China needs to be re-examined within the 
broader context of change and continuity in the U.S. relations with China. There are 
three major angles in America’s historical view on China from the mid 19th century to 
the mid 20th century:
• From an idealistic point of view, to transform China into a friendly and 
stable nation in Asia,
• From a realist point of view, to create China as a central political force to 
maintain stability in Asia,
• From a commercial point of view, to foresee China as a potentially huge 
market in Asia.3
The origins of Nixon’s interest in China policy can be traced back to his political 
career in the late 1940s and the early 1950s.4 During his early career as congressman, 
Nixon built up his political reputation as a strong anti-Communist cold warrior by
2 Ibid.
3 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003: and Allen Whiting, Interview with 
Komine, October 19, 2003. Shambaugh uses the term “paternalism” to describe the U.S. approach to 
China prior to the Second World War. Paternalism means “co-optation, hegemonic power and patron- 
client relationship,” in which the U.S. intended to transform China in its own image from Christian 
ideological standpoint. David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003.
4 Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; and Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 
13, 2004. Regarding Nixon’s view on China in his pre-presidential era, see, for example, Irwin 
Gellman, Richard Nixon: The Congress Years, 1946-1952 (New York: Diane Pub Co, 1999); Philipe 
Pope, “Foundation o f Nixonian Foreign Policy: The Pre-Presidential Years o f Richard Nixon, 1946- 
1968,” PhD thesis University o f Southern California, August 1988; and Glenn Speer, “Richard N ixon’s 
Position on Communist China, 1949-1960: The Evolution o f a Pacific Strategy,” PhD thesis, City 
University o f  New York, 1992.
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criticizing the Truman administration’s ‘Loss of China’ to the Communists.5 It was a 
result of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the 
formulation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950, the outbreak of the Korean 
War in June 1950, and Chinese volunteer troops’ entry into the war in October 1950.6 
Within the United States, while the pro-Nationalist China Lobby exerted heavy 
pressure on Congress and influenced public opinion, the State Department was under 
sharp criticism.7 The United States pursued an open-ended containment policy 
towards the monolithic threat from Communism without clarifying a distinction 
between vital interests and peripheral interests.8 The main elements of U.S. policy 
toward Beijing during the two decades of mutual hostility were the following:
• Military containment of Chinese Communist expansionism embodied in the 
renewed support for the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, the stationing of the 
Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, and the maintenance of a web of military 
security treaties with non-Communist Asian states.
5 In spring 1949, the Truman Administration published the so-called ‘White Paper,’ which claimed the 
inevitable course o f the fall o f the mainland under the control o f the Chinese Communists. Nixon 
accused Secretary o f State, Dean Acheson o f heading a “Cowardly College o f Communist 
Containment.” See U.S. Department o f State, United States Relations with China (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1949); and Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs o f  Richard Nixon (New  
York: Grssett & Danlap, 1978), p .l 10. During his campaign for a Senate seat in 1950, Nixon declared: 
“All that we have to do is to take a look at a map and we can see that if  Formosa falls the next frontier 
is the coast o f California.” A Speech by Richard M. Nixon during the California Senate Campaign, 
September 18, 1950, in China and US Foreign Policy (Congressional Quarterly Service, 1971), p. 19. 
While running for Vice President in 1952, Nixon charged that: “China wouldn’t have gone Communist 
-  if  the Truman Administration had had backbone.” Ibid.
6 On the question o f the “Lost Chance” o f Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in the late 1940s, see Warren 
I. Cohen, ‘Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China: Introduction: Was there a “Lost Chance” 
in China?’ Diplomatic History, vol.21, no. I, Winter 1997; and Nancy Bemkopf, Tucker, Patterns in 
the dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York 
Columbia University Press, 1983).
7 See Robert. S. Ross, After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1998); and Ross Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 
1960).
8 This subject is discussed by John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982).
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• Political isolation of the Beijing regime in the international community as 
reflected in the sustained U.S. effort to keep the People’s Republic of China 
from membership in the United Nations and associated agencies.
• Economic embargo imposed by the United States on any trade with 
Communist China.9
During the 1950s, as the Vice President in the Eisenhower administration, Nixon 
publicly maintained his firm political attitude towards the threat of Communist China. 
In the late spring of 1953, Nixon took his first official trip to Asia, which became a 
highly “educational” influence on Nixon’s thinking, establishing the basis of his 
foreign policy experience.10 In particular, the trip gave him a crucial opportunity to 
“assess” Asian attitudes toward the “emerging colossus” of Communist China.11 
Nixon concluded that Communist China was the “major new and unfathomable 
factor” in Asia, and that its influence was already “spreading throughout the area.”12 
During the NSC meeting on December 23, 1953, Nixon emphasized that there was 
“very little chance” for the U.S. policy of “containment and economic blockade” of 
the Beijing regime on the basis of the hope of “overthrowing the government from 
within instead of from without.”13 Nixon suggested the alternative “to continue the 
policy of containment and isolation but to allow trade,” which could be a “good
9 Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004. These policies are comprehensively analysed 
in Rosemary Foot, The Practice o f  Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford New York: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). Armstrong interprets the U.S. attempts to pressure China as the process o f  
socializing it in “the norms” o f the international community. David Armstrong, Revolution and World 
Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993), p. 177.
10 Nixon, RN, p. 134. Nixon recalls that throughout his political career, as Vice President, as a private 
citizen, and as President, he often dealt with people whom he had already met during his early trips, 
including the 1953 trip.
11 Ibid., p. 119.
12 Ibid., p.136.
13 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 177th Meeting o f  the National Security Council, Washington, 
December 23, 1953, Foreign Relations o f  the United States (FRUS), 1952-54, vol. XIV, China and 
Japan (lof2) (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), p.348.
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cover” without necessarily recognizing Beijing.14 Nixon concluded that although it 
was important to “retain Formosa” as a “symbol,” the United States should tell 
Chinese Nationalists that “they can’t go back to the mainland.”15
The U.S. Government publicly maintained its policy of nuclear deterrence against 
any aggression from Communists.16 On March 17, 1955, Vice President Nixon argued 
in Chicago that: “tactical atomic weapons are now conventional and will be used 
against the targets of any aggressive force.”17 During the Taiwan Straits Crises in 
1954-55 and in 1958-59, Nixon continued to suggest firm response to pressure and 
contain the expansionism of Chinese Communists. For example, on September 12, 
1955, in the National Security Council meeting, Nixon insisted on paying close 
attention to any sign of miscalculation from Beijing. Nixon suggested that “the only 
practical choice” would be to “play poker” in order to “keep the Communists 
guessing” and to “take a chance on the possible consequences.”18
On the other hand, Vice President Nixon suggested the easing of trade and travel
14 Ibid., p.349. On the other hand, in December 1953, Vice President Nixon already privately expressed 
his interest in Communist China: “Someday I’ll go to China.. .mainland China.” In 1960, Nixon sought 
to obtain the permission to visit the People’s Republic o f China. This was refused by the State 
Department. Summers with Swan, The Arrogance o f  Power, p. 163.
15 Ibid.
16 On the more realistic aspects o f the Eisenhower-Dulles policy toward China, see Nancy Bemkopf 
Tucker, “A House Divided: The United States, the Department o f State, and China,” in Warren I. 
Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.) Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York: Columbia University, 
1990); and John L. Gaddis, “The American Wedge Strategy, 1949-1958,” in Harry Harding and Yuan 
Ming (eds.), Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment o f  a Critical Decade 
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989).
17 The New York Times, March 17, 1955.
18 Memorandum o f  Discussion at the 214th Meeting o f the National Security Council, Denver, 
September 12, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, pp.622-623. On the U.S. policy toward the two 
Taiwan Strait Crises, see Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp.106-115, and pp.240-246; Ronald W. Pruessen, “Over the 
Volcano: The United States and the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954-1955,” and Robert Accinelli, ‘“A Thom 
in the Side o f  Peace”: The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands Crisis,’ in Robert 
Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001).
sanctions on Communist China as means of unwind its political and ideological 
rigidity. During an NSC meeting on August 18, 1954, Nixon argued that Communist 
China was “the key problem” for the U.S. policy in Asia.19 Nixon remained cautious, 
suggesting that any decision to change the policy of containment and isolation 
towards Communist China “should be postponed for the time being.”20 Nixon 
presented three specific points to consider: 1) how much the U.S. was willing to trade 
with Communist China; 2) whether the U.S. would recognize China; and 3) whether 
and when Communist China would be admitted to the United Nations.21 Nixon 
claimed that the U.S. would have to face the final decision whether to adopt “a hard or 
a soft policy” toward Communist China.22 He went on to suggest that the U.S. should 
explore “an area of action between war and appeasement” because “in the long run,” 
the Soviet Union and Communist China “can and must be split apart.”23 Thus, Nixon 
entered into the policy debate on the possibility of a rift between China and the Soviet 
Union. Foot argues that Nixon was “less influenced by the ideological tenor” of the 
Beijing government, and “more concerned about power issues - the balance of power 
issue - even in those days.”24
During the presidential debate in October 1960, while condemning the Eisenhower- 
Dulles team for their “brinksmanship” in the Taiwan Strait crises, Democrat candidate 
John F. Kennedy insisted that the small offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu were 
“not strategically defensible” or “essential to the defense of Formosa [Taiwan].”25
19 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 211th Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, 





24 Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
25 Robert W. Barnett, Oral History Interview, March 2, 1990, p.9, Foreign Affairs Oral History 
Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, Georgetown
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Nixon sought to defend the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the offshore 
island crisis of 1958 by emphasizing that if the United States drew a “line” at the
island of Formosa itself, it would lead to a “chain reaction” of aggression by Chinese
• 26Communists. On October 13, Nixon emphasized Communist China’s expansionist 
threat: “Now what do the Chinese Communists want? They don’t want just Quemoy 
and Matsu. They don’t want just Formosa. They want the world.”27 
Importantly, Nixon became “very fascinated with China”: his main concern was the 
Soviet threat, and his interest in the China issue grew out of the Quemoy-Matsu 
discussion during the campaign debates.28 Solomon emphasizes the long-term 
importance of the Nixon-Kennedy debate in 1960 on the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 
1958, which “set off some interesting trends that took over a decade to fully play 
themselves out.”
1.2. Changes and Developments of the China issue during the 1960s
The development of Nixon’s view on China took place within the context of the 
gradual development of academic and bureaucratic discussion on relaxation and 
subsequent reconciliation with Beijing.
From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, a fragmentation emerged in Sino-Soviet 
relations. One of the major causes of the split was the Soviet attempt to seek detente
University. See also Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), 
p.345.
6 Ibid. See also Nixon, RN, p.220.
27 China and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., Congressional Quarterly, Washington D.C., 1973, p .l.
28 Richard H. Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p. 18, FAOHC.
29 Ibid.
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with the West, which was against China’s anti-capitalist united front strategy.30 
Hence, the Chinese were “competing against” the Russians, “making a deliberate, 
direct challenge for the leadership of the world communist movement.”31 
Since the first nuclear explosion in October 1964, which was a major symbol of her 
self-reliance, China began to pursue a revolutionary dual strategy towards the two
32superpowers. Throughout the 1960s, however, Chinese leaders had an increasing 
sense that they were surrounded by hostile enemies. In the north, the Soviet Union, 
with its satellite state, Mongolia, increased hostilities along the long disputed border 
areas with China. In the east, China faced the U.S. network of allied relations with 
Japan and South Korea with their extensive bases. Moreover, the regular U.S. navy 
patrolling in the Taiwan Straits indicated Washington’s continuing support for the 
Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. In the southwest, after the Sino-Indian border conflict 
in October 1962, there was a continuing increase of tension between Beijing and New 
Delhi leading India to move towards the Soviets. In the southeast, U.S. military 
intervention in Indochina increased tension in China’s southern hemisphere. Thus, 
Beijing came to face with the danger of full “encirclement.”33 In 1966, Mao launched 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, terminating all diplomatic relations with 
other states (except with Egypt) and bringing about China’s political isolation.
During the 1960s, the Cold War still “hindered the whole image of China as a
30 See Chen Jian, M ao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f North Carolina 
Press, 2001); Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 
1948-1972 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990).
31 John Holdridge (Interviewed by Marshall Green), Oral History Interview, in A China Reader, 
Volume II, p.22, January 1995, FAOHC.
32 On U.S. policy toward China’s nuclear capabilities, see, for example, Rosemary Foot, The Practice 
o f  Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), chapter 7; and 
Electric Briefing Book N o .l, The United States, China and the Bomb; and The United States and the 
Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964, The National Security Archive, George Washington University.
33 Chen, M a o ’s China and the Cold War, p.240.
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positive element in the international community.”34 Public opinion polls showed that 
some 90% of Americans still had a negative image of China, and approximately 70% 
saw China as the greatest threat to the world peace. Within the U.S. government, the 
China threat was “seen in a domino sense.”35 Thus, there was a “huge debate” about 
the question of “whether China would intervene in the Vietnam War.”36 Equally 
important, there were “heated and bitter” arguments about the Sino-Soviet rift. On the 
one hand, a group of opinion insisted that the Chinese had very deep “anti-foreign 
feelings,” especially toward the West, and that they would move back toward the 
Soviet Union if it suited their national purposes.37 However, another school o f thought 
insisted that China was “not aggressive” as previously estimated, and could be a 
“bulwark” against the Soviet Union, and thus the United States should “open up 
relations” with China.38
On a bureaucratic level, since the early 1960s, State Department officials had 
discussed the beginning of a “task force” approach on the “broad-scale rethinking 
exercise” of China policy.39 By the mid 1960s, although Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, “resisted very strongly” any moves toward China, a change in China policy was
34 Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.
35 Ibid.
36 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Solomon argues further that what the U.S. 
government did not fully understand at that time was that Mao needed the army within China to 
support the Cultural Revolution politically, rather than to send it o ff to fight in Vietnam.
37 James R. Lilley (CIA station, Hong Kong, 1969-1970), Oral History Interview, pp.61-62, 1996, 
FAOHC.
38 Ibid.
39 Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, “Quick Thought on China,” March 1, 1961, FRUS, 1961-63, 
vol. XXII, China; Korea; Japan (Washington D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1996). A China expert 
in the Policy Planning Staff, Edward Rice, prepared a detailed paper on possible initiatives toward 
China, including the lifting o f the trade embargo and the promotion o f  the Warsaw Talks. “U.S. Policy 
Toward China,” October 26, 1961, FRUS, 1961-63, vol. XXII, pp.162-167. For bureaucratic 
reassessment o f China policy during the 1960s, see James C. Thomson, Jr. “On the Making o f U.S. 
China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,” China Quarterly, 50 (April-June 1972); 
and Rosemary Foot, “Redefinition: The Domestic Context o f  America’s China Policy in the 1960s,” in 
Ross and Jiang (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War; and Evelyn (Chui-Ling) Goh, “From ‘Red Menace’ 
to ‘Tacit’ Ally: Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974,” Chapters 2-4, PhD thesis, 
Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2001.
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“debated in bureaucracy.”40 Rusk was also “extremely reluctant to acknowledge” the 
Sino-Soviet split because he emphasized the monolithic threat from the Sino-Soviet 
alliance to “rationalize the deeper engagement in Vietnam.”41 There still remained 
rigidity at the top level of the foreign policy decision-making machinery, while 
middle rank officials in the State Department were reassessing U.S. China policy.
During the twenty years of mutual hostility, despite harsh exchanges in public, 
Washington and Beijing attempted to develop and preserve a communication line at 
Ambassadorial level, firstly in Geneva from 1955 to 1957, and then in Warsaw from 
1958 to 1968.42 Although the talks did not reconcile profound political and 
ideological differences, the two sides continued to communicate in order to prevent 
any misunderstanding of the degree of threat in the case of crisis. As a former State 
Department official, Donald Anderson, recalls, U.S. officials kept informing the 
Chinese in Warsaw that “we seek no wider war in Vietnam,” which was intended as 
an “assurance” that the United States did not intend to invade North Vietnam.43 
Anderson argues further that State Department officials also attempted to “promote
40 William H. Gleysteen, JR. (career Foreign Service officer, 1951-1981), “China Policy and the 
National Security Council,” p.5, The National Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History 
Roundtables (OHR), Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and the Brookings 
Institution, November 4, 1999. For Rusk’s rigidity on China policy, see also Foot, “Reflections,” p.283.
41 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office o f Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department o f State, 
1965-81), Oral History Interview, p.3, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC. The 
creation o f the Office o f Asian Communist Affairs in 1965 -  the separation o f the ROC from the 
mainland led to turn the focus o f policy attention much more on the People’s Republic. Ibid. Moscow  
supplied more advanced weaponry to Hanoi than Beijing, which could only advise the pursuit o f  
guerrilla warfare and provide rifles and bullets. However, Hanoi had no intention o f  being M oscow’s 
puppet, and exploited Sino-Soviet hostility, obtaining military aid from both, but taking sides with 
neither. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f  
North Carolina Press, 2000), pp.3-5.
42 “A Resume o f the Warsaw Talks, 1955-1970,” October 12, 1971, Secret-Sensitive, Box 2189, 
Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records o f the Department o f  State, Record Group 59 (STATE- 
RG59), National Archives. See also Steven M. Goldstein “Dialogue o f the Deaf: The Sino-American 
Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955-1970,” in Ross and Jiang (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War, and 
Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953- 
1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
43 Donald Anderson, (China Desk/Warsaw talks, Department o f  State, 1966-1970), Oral History 
Interview, p. 12, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
48
some sort of informal non-official contact,” such as to get journalists into China in 
order to “improve the atmosphere” and “lower the tension levels” between the two 
sides.44
Overall, the State Department officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
prepared a list of policy items to move towards a “civil dialogue with China,” in an 
attempt to “open up travel and trade.”45 In reality, however, the possible flexibility of 
the Johnson administration’s policy in East Asia was tied down by the combination of 
the escalation of the Vietnam War, the Chinese refusal to ease tension with three 
major adversaries, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and India, and the 
outbreak of Cultural Revolution 46
During the 1960s, it was academic experts who led the public argument about the 
need to move toward China.47 For example, during the height of the Cultural 
Revolution, William Bundy, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs of the Johnson administration, “set up sort of a Wise Men’s Group of some 
academic scholars,” such as A. Doak Barnett, Alexander Eckstein, John King 
Fairbanks, Lucian W. Pye, and Robert Scalapino, to discuss periodically “whither 
China”48 In reality, however, Whiting points out that the Vietnam War had “broken 
the sense of community” in America, and thus, there was no “academic community”
44 Ibid.
45 Ralph Clough (Deputy Chief o f Mission American Embassy Taipei, Taiwan, 1961-65), Oral History 
Interview, p. 19, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
46 Foot, The Practice o f  Power, pp. 262-263; and Robert D. Schulzinger, “The Johnson Administration, 
China, and the Vietnam War,” in Ross and Jiang (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War. President Johnson 
remarked that “lasting peace” could never come to Asia, “as long as 700 million people o f mainland 
China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.” The New York Times, March 14, 1966.
47 As for academic activities on the re-assessment o f  China policy during the 1960s, see Foot, 
“Redefinition,” pp.278-279, and Idem, The Practice o f  Power, pp.93-103.
48 Anderson, Oral History Interview, p. 15, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
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as a whole.49 Thus, there had to be “some public form that could legitimise the 
consideration of China as a normal power.”50
From March 8 to 30, 1966, the Hearings for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee entitled “U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China” broadcasted a 
number of views of China experts as well as International Relations experts in 
academia.51 A. Doak Barnett urged the shift of America’s China policy from 
“containment plus isolation” to “containment without isolation.”52 John King 
Fairbank advocated an open policy to promote “international contact with China on 
many fronts,” in order to encourage its leaders to “reshape” their worldview and to 
bring China into “the international order.”53 Thus, the Hearings provided the most 
comprehensive discussion of China policy ever given to the American people.
Foot, Shambaugh, Tucker, and Whiting all emphasize the importance of the mid 
1960s as a crucial “turning point” which promoted the American domestic political 
attitude of the necessity of new relations with China.54 The American public came to 
realize that the existence of Communist China was a fact of life. Foot suggests that a 
broad “consensus” of opinion emerged in America regarding the integration of China; 
and this consensus became a powerful “inheritance” for Nixon and Kissinger to take 
an initiative toward China.55
49 Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. Whiting explains further that among academic 
experts on China, A. Doak Barnett was the “foremost progressive speaker” who was a “cautious, 
optimistic, forward-looking, but he was not advocating any radical move.” Robert Scalapino supported 
the Vietnam War, and “took a lot o f abuse because o f that.” Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 “U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China,” Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate, 89 Congress, 2nd session, March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966.
52 A. Doak Barnett statement, Ibid., p. 306.
53 John King Fairbank statement, Ibid., p.309.
54 Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004; Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003; 
Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.
55 Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004; and Idem, The Practice o f  Power, p.85, pp. 112-113. 
See also Thomson, “On the Making o f U.S. China Policy, 1961-9”; and Goh, “Constructing the 
Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974” PhD thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2001.
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Nixon, as a private citizen, paid close attention to the U.S. policy and public opinion 
toward China during the 1960s. In public, Nixon maintained his anti-Communist 
hardliner stance by describing the Vietnam War as a manifestation of Communist 
China’s expansionism, namely a “confrontation” between the U.S. and China.56 In 
private, however, there were signs of development in Nixon’s view on China. During 
his private trip to Europe in June 1963, Nixon met French President Charles De 
Gaulle and discussed “whether it might not be wise to develop lines of 
communications with the Soviets and the Chinese.”57 Nixon argued that there was 
“considerable sentiment” in the U.S. State Department, not only in favor of a “Soviet- 
U.S. detente” but also of a “lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the U.S. against 
Chinese.” Nixon judged that while this might be a “good short-range policy,” it was 
more important in the longer run to recognize that China and the USSR were “two 
great powers,” and to develop “parallel relationships with them.”58
In March 1967, Nixon again took a trip to Europe, during which the China issue 
came up regularly. The West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer urged, “as had de 
Gaulle four years before,” that in order to “counterbalance” the growth of the Soviet 
military threat, the United States should lean toward China.59 Nixon’s initial reply to 
Adenauer was that the West should not unilaterally exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
However, Nixon continued to argue that if the situation developed, the United States
56 Speech to the Commonwealth Club o f California by Richard M. Nixon, The New York Times, April 
2, 1965. For the Johnson administration, Communist China and North Vietnam were still inevitably 
“linked.” In response to N ixon’s recommendation to take a hard line in Vietnam, President Johnson 
stated that: “China’s the problem... We can bomb the hell out o f Hanoi and the rest o f that damned 
country, but they’ve got China right behind, and that’s a different story.” Nixon, RN, pp.280-281.
57 During his presidential visit to France in March 1969, Nixon reviewed the China issue o f their 1963 
talk with De Gaulle. Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, March 1, 1969 [Morning session], p.6, 
Presidential/HAK MemCons Box 1023, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives 
(NA). In his memoirs, Nixon fails to mention the specific contents o f  his private talk with De Gaulle in 
June 1963. See Nixon, RN, p.248.
58 Ibid.
59 Nixon, RN, p.281.
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might benefit from the expansion of differences between the two communist states.
During his talk with the Romanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu, Nixon expressed 
his doubt whether any true detente with the Soviet Union could be achieved until 
“some kind of rapprochement” was reached with Communist China.60 Nixon felt that 
if China remained isolated, within twenty years, it could pose a grave threat to world 
peace. In the short run, Nixon remained cautious, expressing doubt about the 
possibility of establishing effective communications with China until the Vietnam 
War had ended. Nixon argued that after that, the United States could “take steps to 
normalize relations” with China.61
In April 1967, Nixon took a trip to Asia and consulted with Asian leaders and U.S. 
diplomats regarding the development of recent changes in the region. Nixon 
recognized that there was a “growing concern” about China’s emergence among 
Asian leaders who came to agree that some “new and direct” relations between the 
United States and China were “essential” for the restoration of stability in the post- 
Vietnam era.62
In Indonesia, Nixon met the U.S. Ambassador, Marshall Green, with whom he had a 
long private conversation on events in East Asia, especially China.63 Green 
emphasized the development of new nationalism in Asia and suggested that it would
60 Ibid. See also James H. Mann, About Face: A History o f  Am erica’s Curious Relationship with China, 
from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p.17.
61 Ibid.p.282.
62 Ibid, pp.282-283. Nixon’s speechwriters, Raymond Price and William Safire, recall that Nixon had a 
great knowledge on foreign affairs. For example, while they were preparing for briefing books for 
N ixon’s trip to Asia in April 1967, Nixon made his own preparation, asking specific questions on 
leadership and political situation o f Asian countries. See William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside 
View o f  the Pre-Watergate White House (DaCapo Press, 1975), pp.367-368.
63 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Marshall Green, Evolution ofU.S.-China 
Policy 1956-1973: Memoirs o f  An Insider, p.25, FAOHC. Nixon “took down notes on key points” and 
also tape-recorded his talks with Green. Green recalls: “When I asked him what he did with all these 
notes and tapes, he replied that he had them transcribed, filed and cross-filed for later reference.” Green 
remembers Nixon as the “best informed on foreign affairs” o f all the luminaries who visited Jakarta 
during his four years there. Ibid. However, in his memoirs, Nixon did not mention his conversation 
with Green.
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be wise to limit the U.S. presence and promote each Asian country’s initiative in 
dealing with Asian problems. In particular, Green recalls Nixon’s much more 
“realistic” and “strategic” remarks on the development of the Sino-Soviet split: “We 
must not line up with China or with the Soviet Union against the other; we must 
always play it even-handed.”64 As Solomon explains, Nixon was assessing “policy 
alternatives based on domestic concerns” by consulting with many American people 
and other experts on Asia, and his approach to China policy was driven by the 
concern about the Soviet Union and the Vietnam War.65 Overall, Nixon’s trips 
overseas during the mid-1960s provided crucial opportunities for him to assess 
geopolitical changes in Asia, especially the re-emergence of China.
1.3. “Asia After Viet Nam” in October 1967
Nixon’s article entitled “Asia After Viet Nam” appeared in Foreign Affairs of 
October 1967.66 As the two decades of containment of China became an increasingly 
heavy burden for the U.S., Nixon urged the need to comprehend the reality of China’s 
re-emerging geopolitical dynamism in Asia and the world:
64 Ibid.
65 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
66 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs, (October, 1967). Nixon’s speechwriters, 
Raymond Price and William Safire, assisted the drafting o f the article. Richard Solomon, Interview 
with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Safire, Before the Fall, pp.367-368. On July 29, 1967, Nixon 
made an informal speech to the Bohemian Club, San Francisco, arguing: “We live in a new world,” 
with new ideas and new leaders, which his Foreign Affairs article developed further. It was off the 
record and received no publicity. Nixon, RN, p.284; Kirstin Julian, Richard Nixon Library and 
Birthplace, Correspondence with Komine, May 11, 2004; and Daniel Santamaria, Council on Foreign 
Affairs Archives, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. Correspondence with 
Komine, September 3, 2004.
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Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever 
outside the family of nations.... There is no place on this planet for a 
billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.... The 
world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent we 
can influence the events, shall be to induce change.67
Nixon suggested that: 1) in the short term, “a policy of firm restraints of no reward, of 
a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interest can be served 
only by accepting the basic rules of international activity” and 2) in the long term, 
“pulling China back into the world community -  but as a great and progressing 
nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”68 Reflecting the re-emergence of 
Japan and Western Europe as economic great powers, Nixon also urged that the 
United States should coordinate its relations with its major allies in order to reduce its 
burden for the open-ended containment of Communism. Finally, Nixon encouraged 
the U.S. continuing presence in Asia, as an “Asian power,” and emphasized that U.S. 
leadership should be exercised “with restraints,” and there was a need for American 
“subtle encouragement” of the Asian initiatives.69
When the Foreign Affairs article was first published, it was generally considered as 
Nixon’s political attempt to moderate his anti-Communist image and acquire the 
nomination for the Republican Presidential Candidacy in 1968.70 After the 
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on July 25, 1969, the article captured public 
attention as the framework of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy. However, the 
importance of the Nixon article should not be over-stated. Nixon’s suggestions were 
“not entirely new” because his views reflected the debate which were taking place
67 Ibid., p. 121.
68 Ibid., p. 123.
69 Ibid., p. 124. In this article, Nixon perceived the Soviet Union as a European power.
70 “Nixon Sees Asia Helping Itself,” The New York Times, September 17, 1967.
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among Democrats and also among Republicans during the 1960s.71
In the short run, Nixon still preserved his hard-liner stance, criticizing that the
“containment without isolation” covered “only half the problem.”72 In particular, 
Nixon was still against any short-term change to allow trade with China. He also 
advocated pressuring China by the build-up of Asian allies’ military capabilities. 
Finally, it was not the U.S. but China that had to change.
On the other hand, David Shambaugh assesses that the article was a “crucial piece
of evidence” regarding Nixon’s interest in China. Shambaugh emphasizes the 
importance of Nixon’s “intentional” selection of terms in his writing, which avoided 
direct criticism of China’s ideology or expansionist tendency.73 Nixon clearly had a 
political intension to present his personal interest in opening a new dialogue with the 
Chinese leaders. In particular, the phrase of Nixon’s article, especially China being 
“outside the family of nations” suggests that there was a broader and “multitiered 
conceptualisation” of engaging China “as a society and as an economy, not simply 
strategically playing it off against the Soviet Union.” Finally, Nixon’s proposal of 
integrating China into the world community was an origin of the policy of 
engagement.74
More particularly, Foot stresses the importance of the U.S. long-term practice of its 
“structural power” to embrace China into an international pattern of behavior.75 In the
71 Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
72 Nixon, “Asia, After Viet Nam,” p. 123. For example, in October 1967, Secretary Rusk warned o f the 
danger o f  billions o f  Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. See Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, 
New Jersey: Cooper Square, 1980), pp.283-289.
73 Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003.
74 Ibid. See also David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement o f China,” International Security 
vol.21, no. 2, (Fall 1996), p. 182.
75 Foot, The Practice o f  Power, pp.9-21, pp.262-265. Foot refers to Nye, who introduces distinctions 
between “hard” and “soft” power and between “the coercive and visible forms and the consensual and 
less visible aspects.” In particular, “soft” power refers to more indirect ways o f getting others to do 
what one wants by “the attractiveness o f one’s culture and ideology” or “the ability to manipulate the 
agenda o f  political choices.” Hence, the issue o f legitimacy, drawn from a recognized authority,
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historical perspective, the integration strategy reflects a very long lasting tradition in 
the U.S. approach to China, which could be traced back to the end of nineteenth 
century, namely the idea that the U.S. could “tutor” China to “either protect it or 
modify it or change it.”76
Former NSC staff members, such as Lord, Rodman, and Solomon, and China 
experts, such as Foot, Shambaugh, and, Tucker all emphasize that, after his trip to 
Asia in April 1967, Nixon’s views on Asia and China were already very developed.77 
Nixon had become aware of the need to shift the course of foreign policy with more 
restraints of power. By the late 1960s, it was widely recognized that Washington’s 
non-recognition policy to Beijing became largely stalemated because of the major 
changes in the international situation, such as the Sino-Soviet rift, the U.S. over­
involvement in the Vietnam War, and the prolonged Sino-American hostility. Hence, 
realizing the major shifts in “American conceptions o f what needed to be done in 
terms of China policy,” Nixon assessed the political advantage of promoting 
accommodation with China.78 In his meeting with Premier Zhou on February 24, 
1972, President Nixon remarked:
[M]y goal is normalization with the People’s Republic.... I started down this 
road in 1967 in an article in Foreign Affairs, with some rhetoric. And now we 
are trying to follow it with action. The goal of normalization is the one which I 
alone at the outset initiated and it’s my intent to realize this goal.79
becomes important to the exercise o f power in normative terms. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature o f  American Power (New York: Basic Book, 1990), p.267 n.l 1, cited in Ibid., pp3-5.
76 Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
77 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, 
October 15, 2003; and Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003; Foot, Interview with 
Komine, July 13, 2004; Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; and Shambaugh, Interview 
with Komine, October 8, 2003.
78 Foot, The Practice o f  Power, p. 103.
79 Memcon, Nixon and Zhou, February 24, 1972, p. 10. Memoranda for the President, “Beginning 
February 20, 1972,” Box 87, President’s Office Files (POF), NPMS, NA. During the height o f the
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In essence, Nixon viewed the materialization of diplomatic normalization as the 
beginning of long and complex process to integrate China into the international 
system.
1.4. China issue during the 1968 Presidential Election Campaign
During the presidential campaign in 1968, Nixon’s public statements on the China 
issue reflected two contradictory aspects of his view. On the one hand, Nixon 
continued to maintain a firm attitude towards China’s aggression, and thus denied any 
immediate possibility of recognizing the Beijing regime. In October 1968, Nixon 
remarked that:
I would not recognize red China now and I would not agree to admitting it to the 
U.N. and I would not go along with those well-intended people that said, “Trade 
with them, because that will change them.” Because doing it now would only 
encourage them, the hardliners in Peking and the hardline policy that they’re 
following. And it would have an immense effect on discouraging great numbers
of non-communists elements in Free Asia that are now just beginning to develop
80their strength and their own confidence.
On the other hand, Nixon expressed the view that, in the long run, Washington 
should begin a new dialogue with Beijing. On August 9, 1968, after obtaining the
Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao had not only already read Nixon’s writings, including the October 
1967 Foreign Affairs article, but also followed a number o f America’s newspaper accounts o f the 
policy reassessment progressing in the State Department. See Richard H. Solomon, Chinese 
Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through 'Old Friends' (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute o f Peace, 1999), p.48; and Chen, M ao’s China, pp.238-239.
80 China and U.S. Foreign Policy 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), p.89, 
Quotation marks in original.
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nomination for the Republican Presidential candidacy, Nixon stated that: “We must 
not forget China. We must always seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the 
USSR.... We must not only watch for changes. We must seek to make changes.”81 
Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the tension between 
Beijing and Moscow increased further along their shared border areas.82 On 
September 17, 1968, the United States proposed a resumption of the Warsaw 
ambassadorial talks. On November 8, New China News Agency (NCNA) article 
described U.S. election as “cut-throat competition” between various cliques of 
“Monopoly Capitalism,” and all these groups are “jackals of the same lair” and 
equally incapable of saving U.S. “from fate of utter defeat.”83 On November 15, 1968, 
the U.S. government proposed postponing the next Warsaw meeting until next 
February after being unable to obtain any answer from the Chinese on their intentions 
with respect to the scheduled November 20 meeting. On November 26, 1968, Beijing 
responded by proposing a Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talk at Warsaw to take place on 
February 20, 1969. Beijing added a “very significant” statement in the eyes of U.S. 
officials: “It has always been the policy of the People’s Republic of China to maintain
81 U.S. News & World Report, September 16, 1968, p.48. Reflecting the policy review within the 
Johnson administration for “containment without necessarily isolation,” Democrat presidential 
candidate, Herbert Humphrey also advocated such specific moves as 1) the lifting o f the ban on exports 
o f non-strategic goods, 2), the promotion o f exchange o f scholars, journalists, and technicians, and 3) 
the clarification o f the U.S. intention to welcome China’s participation in the international community. 
Herbert Humphrey, Interview with Asahi Shimbun, October 22, 1968, Translated and transmitted by 
American Embassy in Tokyo, October 31, 1968 to Bryce Harlow, Office o f President Elect Nixon, The 
Pierre Hotel, New York, HAK Administrative & Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, 
Henry A. Kissinger’s Office Files (HAKOF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.
82 As for China’s criticism o f the Soviet Union after its invasion o f Czechoslovakia as a “social- 
imperialist” state, see Chen, M ao’s China and the Cold War, pp.242-243. Shambaugh explains that 
there are two types o f rules in Chinese governance, benevolent rule “Wan” and coercive rule “Ba.” The 
Soviet Union was announced as “Ba” - hegemon. The difference between hegemony and imperialism is 
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15,2003.
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friendly relations with all states, regardless of social systems, on the basis of the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence.”84 Finally, the Chinese urged the United States to 
“withdraw all its armed forces from China’s Taiwan Province and the Taiwan 
Straits.”85
During the meeting with Kissinger on November 25, 1968, Nixon mentioned his 
concern about the “need to re-evaluate” U.S. policy toward China, and urged 
Kissinger to read the October 1967 Foreign Affairs article.86 Winston Lord assesses 
that China was one of the “three real priorities” of Nixon, along with Vietnam and 
Russia.87 By 1968, Nixon had a personal interest in seeking an opening towards 
China, though he had not yet formulated the precise methods and timing of a new 
initiative. It is likely that Nixon tactically manipulated his political image and utilized 
ideological rhetoric with a practical aim. In reality, although many of its older 
generation passed away, the China Lobby still had influence, particularly in the 
Republican Party.88 Thus, Nixon was still concerned about the “backlash” from pro- 
Taiwan conservative supporters, such as Anna Chennault, the widow of Claire L.
84 Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Volume II, pp.21-22, January 1995, FAOHC. 
Premier Zhou first brought up the five principles o f peaceful coexistence at the Geneva Conference in 
1954.
85 Chen, M ao’s China and the Cold War, p.245; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 166.
86 Nixon, RN, p.341. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger does not refer to Nixon’s suggestion to read 
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Nixon during the transition. I suspect they did. Before he took office, Kissinger independently saw the 
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87 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. After the victory in the presidential election on 
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Chennault, an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek during the Second World War, Walter 
Judd, former medical missionary in China and Congressman, and Ray Cline, former 
CIA officer and CIA station chief in Taipei.89
Finally, there is one interesting point, which is related to Nixon’s long experience of 
foreign affairs. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nixon had already met almost all the 
major political leaders in the world, and he had visited most Asian countries. China 
remained the only major state which Nixon had not visited, and Mao Zedong and 
Zhou Enlai were two of the few world leaders whom Nixon had not met. Thus, before 
entering the office, Nixon had developed a strong personal interest in obtaining the 
sole credit for the historic opening to China.
2. Henry A. Kissinger’s role in U.S. rapprochement with China
2.1. Kissinger as a theorist for new administration’s foreign policy philosophy
Henry A. Kissinger came to office with his experiences as an academic over 15 
years at Harvard and also as a consultant to the Democrat administrations during the 
1960s. In essence, he provided the fundamental “intellectual framework” for the new 
administration’s foreign policy.90
In his early writings, Kissinger defines an international order as “legitimate” if all 
the major states agree about the “nature of workable arrangements and about the 
permissible aims and methods of foreign policy”; he defines it as “revolutionary” if
89 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
90 Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004. See also, Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: Biography (New  
York: McGraw-Hill, 1992); Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and 
American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Idem, ‘“Dr. Kissinger” or 
“Mr. Henry”? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,’ Diplomatic History, vol.27, no.5, 
(November 2003).
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one or more of the major dissatisfied states refuses to cope with other states in 
accordance with the conventional rules of state relations.91 In a legitimate international 
order, status quo states are principally concerned with their security, and there is a 
tendency for the pursuit of equilibrium on the basis of the practice of balance of 
power. Hence, stability is a consequence of generally accepted legitimacy. A 
legitimate international order does not prevent conflicts, but it limits the scope of 
them.
By the late 1960s, owing to the prolonged open-ended containment policy of the 
monolithic threat of Communism, the United States was in relative economic, 
military, and psychological decline. In his article of 1968, a year before he entered the 
government, Kissinger presented his perspective on the newly emerging political 
multipolarity. He argued that military bipolarity caused rigidity: “A bipolar world 
loses the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the 
other. Every issue seems to involve a question of survival.”92 Political multipolarity 
would not necessarily guarantee stability, but it would reduce rigidity and provide 
greater opportunities for developing “an agreed concept of order” in the contemporary 
international system.93 The great powers had to exercise power with restraint, and also 
restrain the actions of less cooperative states in order to maintain the stabilizing 
equilibrium of the system. Kissinger believed that although overwhelming military 
strength would remain with the two superpowers, a pluralistic world was in U.S. long-
91 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 1-2; and Idem, Nuclear 
Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp.316-321. On Kissinger’s 
intellectual base as an academic, see, for example, Coral Bell, The Diplomacy o f  Detente: The 
Kissinger Era (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), chapters 2 and 3; Robert L. Beisner, “History and 
Henry Kissinger,” Diplomatic History, 14 (Fall 1990); Richard Weitz, “Henry Kissinger’s Philosophy 
o f International Relations,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 2, no.l, (March 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, 
“Rescuing Choice from Circumstance: The Statecraft o f  Henry Kissinger,” in Gordon A. Craig and 
Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), Diplomats 1939-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
92 Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues o f American Foreign Policy,” in American Foreign Policy: 




In order to re-adjust U.S. power resources to a new international situation, Kissinger 
urged a pragmatic conception of foreign policy, namely the re-assessment of the 
national interests in military, political, economic, and psychological terms. 
Accordingly, the Nixon administration advocated that America’s new initiative should 
be based on “a realistic assessment of our and others’ interests,” proclaiming: “Our 
interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.”94 The 
Nixon administration sought to promote “mutual self-restraint” among states to 
accommodate conflicting national interests “through negotiation rather than 
confrontation.”95 It was this particular issue of self-restraint that was the fundamental 
requirement for the balance of power among states.
2.2. Kissinger’s balance of power in theory
Kissinger has often explained the U.S. opening to China in terms of maintaining a 
balance of power: “It was not to collude against the Soviet Union but to give us a 
balancing position to use for constructive ends -  to give each Communist power a 
stake in better relations with us. Such an equilibrium could assure stability among the 
major powers.”96 He argues that the traditional criteria of balance of power were
94 Richard M. Nixon, “United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A Strategy for Peace,” A Report to 
Congress, vo l.l, February 18, 1970, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 119.
95 Richard M. Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure o f Peace,” A Report 
to the Congress, vol.3, February 9, 1972, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States, 
Richard M. Nixon, 1972 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp.345-346.
96 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 192; Idem, Years o f  
Upheaval, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p.54. Idem, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 
pp.722-723; Idem, Years o f  Renewal (New York: Little Brown, 1999), p. 140. See also Gaddis, 
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territorial; military power was considered as the final recourse.97 However, he 
maintains that in a nuclear age, power cannot automatically be translated into 
influence, and it is difficult to use power diplomatically.98 Managing a military 
balance of power required vigilance on two levels: “being strong enough not only 
strategically with nuclear power but also locally with conventional arms.”99 
In theory, Kissinger’s concept of balance of power evolved from the intellectual 
base of the traditional/classical realist school.100 Realists perceive states as the main 
actors in international relations, and the international system as the most important 
level of analysis. On the international level, the most crucial factor is the permanent 
existence of the struggle for power among states. In the absence o f any central 
authority maintaining order, states seek to maintain and enhance power, especially 
militarily, to secure their survival. States also practice balance of power in order to 
prevent the emergence of a predominant state in the international system. Hans 
Morgenthau suggests that the balance of power takes four forms: 1) a policy aimed at 
certain state affairs, 2) an actual state of affairs, 3) an approximately equal distribution 
of power, and 4) any distribution of power.101 Balance of power functions only when 
states recognize “the same rules of the game” and act “for the same limited stakes” in
97 Kissinger, “Central Issues,” pp.59-60.
98 Ibid., pp.61-62.
99 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 62.
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order to achieve “international stability and national independence.”102 Finally, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the balance of power as a policy of a state to prevent 
the emergence of predominant power and the balance of power as a system within 
which the state interactions prevent the predominance of any one state.103
Reflecting the diffusion of power resources and the emergence of economic 
interdependence among states from the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the neo-realist 
school advanced the analysis of balance of power by emphasizing “structure.”104 
Structure is defined as the interrelationship of states composing the international 
system. The international political system is defined by anarchy and differentiated by 
the distribution of power capabilities in military, political, and economic terms among 
sovereign states. There is a strong tendency towards balance within the system, and 
the expectation is that balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or the 
other. A state thus reacts to the emergence of a more powerful state by 
counterbalancing - either to enhance its own power or to align itself with an opposing 
state or group of states. Structure imposes constraints on states’ behavior.
In sum, the balance of power is a rule-based system, inseparable from diplomatic 
practice as a policy, which restrains the sources of instability, limits the scope of 
conflicts, and brings relative stability in which no single state or group of states would 
be in a permanent position to determine the fate of others. Kissinger’s concept of 
balance of power system evolved as a central characteristic of the loosening military 
bipolarity and the emerging political multipolarity from the late 1960s to the early 
1970s. Kissinger’s concept of balance of power regarding the U.S. rapprochement
102 Ibid., pp. 189-190.
103 Ibid.
104 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979); Robert O. 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and Barry 
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with China can be defined as the application of realist logic to exploit the deepening 
Sino-Soviet hostility, which led to the development of triangular relations between the 
U.S., USSR, and China. Accordingly, Kissinger’s practice of balance of power policy 
toward U.S. rapprochement with China needs to be clarified.
2.3. Kissinger’s balance of power in practice
Kissinger has been very critical of academic experts on China. For example, during 
the transitional period, a group of academic experts from Harvard and Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology sent a memorandum to President-Elect Nixon.105 These 
experts examined the implications of the U.S.-Soviet-PRC relations:
Implicit in the foregoing suggestions is the hope that the new 
Administration will attempt to view Sino-American relations as a separate 
problem from Soviet-American problem, though inevitably a related 
problem. The Sino-Soviet split provides us with an opportunity to treat 
each party separately and to scrutinize our national interests in each 
relationship with care. We urge that the new Administration, in its proper 
concern with the bilateral super-power balance, avoid judgments about 
China and its development that derive from Moscow’s views of Peking. A 
Soviet-American alliance against Peking may serve Russian’s interests; 
but it may not automatically serve U.S. national interests.106
Kissinger criticizes that these experts missed the geopolitical perspective “with 
respect to the Soviet Union that the Chinese might have an incentive to move toward
105 “Memorandum for President-Elect Nixon on U.S. relations with China,” November 6, 1968, Re­
produced in “Communist China Policy,” Hon. John Rousselot, The House o f  Representatives, August 
6, 1971, pp.30765-30767.
106 Ibid., p. 30765.
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us without American concessions but their need for American counterweight to the 
Soviet Union.”107 In other words, Kissinger condemned their proposal for its failure 
to explore the linkage among the three states and the possible U.S. leverage within the 
context of Sino-Soviet hostility.
In October 1969, Kissinger’s NSC staff assessed that the diffusion of independent 
political activity among states had encouraged the loosening of Cold War military 
bipolarity. For example, Western Europe and Japan, sought much more independence 
from the superpowers in policies and national will. However, this diffusion had not 
yet taken the “form of the emergence of significant new centers of military power,” 
such as the destruction of alliances, major realignments or the consolidation of new 
groupings among states.108 The only notable exception, the Sino-Soviet alliance, had 
become a deep rivalry and created a “tripolar relationship” in which (a) the U.S., 
USSR, and the PRC respectively had an interest in preventing the other two states 
cooperating, (b) the Soviets had parallel interests with the U.S. in containing China, 
(c) the U.S. ability to achieve closer relations with China and to exploit Moscow’s 
fear of a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement was limited.
The most comprehensive explanation of the multipolar balance of power came from 
President Nixon during his interview with Time magazine in January 1972:
107 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165. Italic in original. Despite his personal antipathy toward 
academia, Kissinger was still “interested in what the scholars thought” on China. Levin, “China Policy 
and the National Security Council,” p.9, NSCP-OHR. For example, in April 1969, Kissinger and the 
NSC staff organized a meeting with 48 scholars. As for the options for China policy, a NSC staff 
member Richard Sneider sought to obtain expertise view on: 1) what the long-range U.S. objective on 
dealing with China should be; and 2) what concrete steps the U.S. might take toward these objectives. 
Memo from Sneider to Kissinger, “Tentative Schedule for April 12 Meeting,” April 9, 1969, p .l, Box 
H-299, NSC Vol. II, 4/1/69-5/30/69 [2 o f 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
108 Kissinger to Nixon, “Analysis o f changes in international politics since World War II and their 
implications for our basic assumption about U.S. foreign policy,” October 20, 1969, Agency Files, 
NSC 1969-1971, National Security Council Files (NSCF), NPMS, NA.
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We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had 
any extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power. It was 
when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential 
competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the 
United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we 
have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan each 
balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.1 9
On February 14, 1972, three days before Nixon’s departure to China, Kissinger 
provided his assessment of the future role of China within the triangular diplomacy:
For the next 15 years we have to lean the Chinese against the Russians. We have 
to play this balance of power game totally unemotionally. Right now, we need 
the Chinese to correct the Russians, and to discipline the Russians. ...Our 
concern with China right now, in my view Mr. President, is to use it as a 
counterweight to Russia, not for its local policy. .. .The fact that it doesn’t have 
a global policy is an asset to us, the fact that it doesn’t have global strength yet -  
and to prevent Russia from gobbling it up. If Russia dominates China, that 
would be a fact of such tremendous significance.110
In sum, Kissinger’s practice of the balance of power policy toward the U.S. 
rapprochement with China can be defined as the diplomatic practice of using the 
weaker China as a counterweight against the stronger Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry, while publicly seeking to create an appearance of taking an even-handed 
political approach toward the two communist giants. Accordingly, it should be 
examined how Kissinger developed his view on U.S. China policy before 1969.
109 President Richard M. Nixon, Interview with Time, January 3, 1972, p.3. As Secretary o f State, 
Kissinger came to realize the emergence o f the balance o f power at different levels: “In the military 
sphere, there are two superpowers. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. 
Politically, many more centers o f influence have emerged.” Henry A. Kissinger, Address to the Pacem 
in Terris III Conference, Washington, October 8, 1973, Cited in Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment,
p.282.
110 Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, February 14, 1972, 4:09-6:19p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 
671-1, White House Tapes, NA.
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2.4. Kissinger’s early views on China
Kissinger was originally not an Asia or China expert, and thus he approached China 
“from his experience as a European politics specialist.”111 In his memoirs, although 
admitting: “China had not figured extensively in my own writings,” Kissinger still 
emphasizes the importance of his role in the composition of the draft of Nelson 
Rockefeller’s presidential campaign speech of May 1, 1968 which proposed “a 
dialogue with Communist China.”112 In particular, the speech suggested the possible 
development of a “subtle triangle” of relations between Washington, Beijing, and 
Moscow: “we improve the possibilities of accommodation with each as we increase 
our options toward both.”113 Former NSC staff members, Lord and Rodman point out 
the importance of this speech.114 Rodman perceives Kissinger’s suggestion as 
“independent of Nixon’s.”115 
In reality, however, Kissinger’s early writings failed to show depth on the changing 
nature of the Sino-Soviet relations, and America’s China policy was never discussed 
independently. In the late 1950s, Kissinger considered China as a “revolutionary”
111 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
112 Nelson Rockefeller, Speech to the World Affairs Council o f  Philadelphia, May 1, 1968, The New 
York Times, May 1, 1968.
113 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165; and Idem, Diplomacy, p.721. The intellectual origins o f  
Kissinger’s policies toward Sino-Soviet relations, what was to be known as the triangular diplomacy on 
the basis o f the balance o f power concept, can be traced back to his early writings. In a study o f the 
European balance o f  power after the Napoleonic upheavals, Kissinger praised Mettemich for placing 
Austria in a position among its rivals where it served as “the pivotal state” so that “the differences o f  
the major powers among each other were greater than their respective differences with Austria.” Henry 
A. Kissinger, A World Restored, p.247. Kissinger also analysed Bismarck’s proposal to “manipulate 
the commitments o f  the other powers so that Prussia would always be closer to any o f the contending 
parties than they were to each other.” Henry A. Kissinger, “White Revolutionary: Reflections on 
Bismarck,” Daedelus, XCVII (Summer 1968), pp.912-913.
114 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 
2003.
115 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
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power along with the Soviet Union.116 He referred to the U.S. primary task of 
“dividing” the Sino-Soviet alliance: the Sino-Soviet relations might become “cooler,” 
if the U.S. sought to pressure the two communist states to take risks where only one 
stood to benefit.117
In the early 1960s, Kissinger cautiously argued that the possibility of a “rift” 
between Communist China and the U.S.S.R “must not be overlooked.”118 He hinted 
that “if it [a rift] occurs we should take advantage of it rather than force the erstwhile 
partners into a new alliance through intransigence. Our diplomacy cannot have as a 
goal what we can only treat as a fortunate event.”119 Therefore, Kissinger had failed to 
explore sufficiently the seriousness and complexity of Sino-Soviet hostility.
By the mid-1960s, Kissinger acknowledged the fact of a Sino-Soviet split; he 
suggested that it was “insoluble” owing to the two parties’ conflicts over doctrinal 
issues.120 It was De Gaulle who sought to play off the weaker Communist China as a 
“counterweight” to the stronger Soviet Union.121 However, Kissinger still tended to 
regard China as an “objective threat” to U.S. “global responsibilities.”
In his memoirs, Kissinger argues that there was a tendency in the new 
administration to view China as an aggressive power:
Originally, we had not thought reconciliation possible. We were 
convinced that the Chinese were fanatic and hostile. But even though we 
could not initially see a way to achieve it, both Nixon and I believed in the 
importance of an opening to the People’s Republic of China.122
116 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, chapter 10.
117 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
118 Kissinger, The Necessity fo r  Choice (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961), p.202.
119 Ibid.
120 Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal o f  the Atlantic Alliance (New York; 
McGraw-Hill, 1965), p.198, andpp.201-202
121 Ibid., pp.59-60. In 1964, France became the first Western state which recognized the People’s 
Republic o f  China.
122 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 163.
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However, the above statement is misleading, because as previously suggested, it 
was Nixon who came to suggest the importance of opening a dialogue with China by 
1967. In Solomon’s assessment, Nixon estimated that the Soviet Union was a “much 
greater threat” than China.123 Moreover, Nixon was coming to power at the time when 
the country was “tom apart by Vietnam.” And he did “not want to fall into the trap 
where Lyndon Johnson was trapped, and his presidency was destroyed by the 
Vietnam conflict.” Thus, when Nixon was talking about the “secret plan for ending 
the Vietnam War, a critical element of that was including the relations with China.” 
On the contrary, Kissinger saw China as a “real threat” to the U.S. and regarded the 
Vietnam War as a “trap drifting resources and political attentions away from the 
Soviet problem.” Thus, Solomon concludes that: “Nixon was several years ahead of 
Kissinger.”124
In February 1972, Kissinger admitted to Mao and Zhou that: “We thought all 
socialist/communist states were the same phenomenon. We didn’t understand until the 
President came to the office the different nature of revolution in China and the way 
revolution developed in other socialist states.”125 Thus, in 1968 and 1969, Kissinger 
still viewed China as much more aggressive than the Soviet Union.
Kissinger claims that, despite some differences in opinion, he and Nixon came to 
realize that the development of triangular relations between the United States, the
123 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
124 Ibid.
125 Memcon, Mao, Zhou, Nixon, and Kissinger, February 21, 1972, p.8, CHINA -  President’s Talks 
with Mao&Chou En-lai, February 1972, Box 91, Country Files -  Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
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Soviet Union and China would provide “a great strategic opportunity for peace.”126 
Lord argues that: “Each one came to office, considering the benefits of opening to 
China with respect to primarily the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and Asia in
127general.” In reality, however, Kissinger was not initially interested in China, and 
remained “skeptical” about any quick move toward China during the early months of 
the new administration. Kissinger perceived the China issue in terms of its short and 
mid term relationship to Sino-Soviet rift. Thus, for Kissinger, China policy was 
initially a part of a much broader Soviet policy.128 Nixon believed that “ending the 
isolation of 800 million Chinese itself removed a great threat to peace.”129 Thus, 
Nixon was convinced that, even without the growing Soviet military threat, it was still 
“essential” to open towards China, while China was still physically weak rather than 
waiting until later when China would have less need of a relationship with the United 
States.130 It was Nixon’s determination that drove the initiative, and Kissinger brought
1 i i
the initiative to fruition and fit into a triangular global balance framework.
3. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership
One of the main reasons why the opening to China was conducted “very secretly” 
was because Nixon and Kissinger were afraid that if it became public, the “public and 
political reaction could have killed off the initiative before it began.”132 Paradoxically,
126 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164.
127 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
128 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003; and Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 
2003.
129 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164.
130 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. See also Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace 
(New York: Random House, 1994), p. 130.
131 Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003.
132 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
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it was Nixon’s life long background as a “staunch anti-Communist” that provided a 
strong basis within the U.S. domestic political context to open a new dialogue with 
Communist China.133 On the other hand, Kissinger admits the relative weakness of his 
position in the early period: “I did not have the political strength or bureaucratic clout 
to pursue such a fundamental shift of policy on my own.”134 Moreover, as the briefing 
books for his October 1971 trip to Beijing indicated, Kissinger anticipated that 
domestic political reactions to a new China initiative would be “manageable.”135 With 
his past credentials and his following from the right and center, Nixon was “much less 
vulnerable to attack than would be more leftist figures” in American society. Thus, 
the President was probably the “only leader who could carry through this policy.”136 
Kissinger explained to Zhou in October 1971 that Nixon asked him to “reaffirm in the 
strongest terms his personal commitment” to the improvements in relations between 
the U.S. and China.137 Finally, during the Nixon-Mao meeting on February 21, 1972, 
Kissinger admitted that: “It was the President who set the direction and worked out of 
the plan.”138
Regarding the actual policy operational process, Kissinger emphasizes that once the 
President set “a policy direction,” he left it to the National Security Adviser “to 
implement the strategy and manage the bureaucracy.”139 Ambrose evaluates 
Kissinger’s role “as agent, tool, and sometimes adviser, not as a generator of ideas”:
133 Ibid; and Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
134 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 163.
135 Opening Meeting, HAK Talking Points, p.6, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part 
I], For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) — China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
136 Ibid.
137 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, October 20, 1971, 4:40-7:10 p.m., p.3, HAK visit to PRC October 
1971 Memcons - originals, For the President’s Files -  China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1035, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
138 Memcon, February 21, 1972, p.3, CHINA -  President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 
1972, Box 91, Country Files -  Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
139 Kissinger, White House Years, p.163. See also Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, p.47, pp.61-62.
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“The basic thrust of Nixon’s innovations came from the President, not the National 
Security Adviser.”140 Haig assesses Nixon as a “strategic thinker of historic 
dimensions” and Kissinger as a “brilliantly gifted diplomatic tactician carrying 
Nixon’s ideas forward.”141 
Interestingly, Edgar Snow’s interview with Premier Zhou shows that the Chinese 
knew about Kissinger through their intelligence system and through reading of his 
writings. “Kissinger?” Zhou said, “There is a man who knows the language of both 
worlds - his own and ours. He is the first American we have seen in his position. With 
him, it should be possible to talk.”142 Finally, during a meeting with Zhou in February 
1972, President Nixon described Kissinger’s role:
I think that one thing which Dr. Kissinger has greatly contributed in his 
services to my administration is his philosophic views. He takes the long 
view, which is something I try to do also, except sometimes my schedule 
is so filled with practical matters and decisions on domestic and foreign 
policy that I don’t have as much time to take the long term view as he 
does.143
In Winston Lord’s assessment, Nixon and Kissinger “divided labor very skilfully; 
Nixon was providing fundamental guidance. Kissinger was a skilful negotiator and an 
operator, as well as a strategist.”144 Haig, Isaacson, Lord, and Solomon thus give 
credit to both Nixon and Kissinger in terms of the speed of transformation in the U.S.-
140 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume II: The Triumph o f  a Politician 1962-1972 (London: Simon 
and Schuster, 1989), p.655. Former Soviet Ambassador to America, Anatoly Dobrynin, assesses that 
Kissinger was a “good tactician” in both direct and behind-the-scenes negotiations in Soviet-American 
relations. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: M oscow’s Ambassador to Am erica’s Six Cold War 
Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division o f Random House, Inc, 1995), p. 195.
141 Haig, Inner Circles, p.204.
142 Zhou Enlai, Interview with Edgar Snow (conducted on November 5, 1970), Life, July 30, 1971 p.3. 
After the July 1971 secret talks, Zhou privately commented on Kissinger, “very intelligent - indeed a 
Dr.” Chen, M ao’s China and the Cold War, p.266.
143 Memcon, February 26, 1972, p. 16, Box 87, POF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
144 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
China relations.145 Based on his vision, Nixon held ultimate authority, making the 
final decision for a new initiative. Kissinger was a dynamic theorist and tactician, 
very skillfully conducting a series of crucial negotiations. In reality, however, Nixon 
and Kissinger still needed the foreign policy decision-making machinery and 
bureaucratic expertise on America’s China policy, as the following chapter examines.
145 Ibid; Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Isaacson, Kissinger, p.353. 
Holdridge recalls that: “I’m sure Nixon respected Kissinger for his intellectual capabilities, but the 
respect did not necessarily mean a warm and intimate friendship.” John Holdridge, Oral History 
Interview, p. 108, July 20, 1995, FAOHC.
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Chapter 2. Foreign Policy Decision Making Machinery for the U.S. 
Rapprochement with China
This chapter examines the revitalization of the National Security Council system as 
the principal decision-making machinery for the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and 
Kissinger. In particular, it analyses the development of the systematic control of 
policy study papers by the Kissinger NSC and the subsequent exclusion of the State 
Department from the direct decision-making process. Finally, this study compares and 
contrasts the roles of the NSC staff and State Department officials for the U.S. policy 
towards China in greater detail. The existing diversity on policy options among 
foreign policy decision makers will be analyzed not as the mere extension of 
conflicting bureaucratic interests but as a more dynamic interplay among different 
geo-strategic perceptions reflecting a broader debate within the foreign policy 
decision-making circle.
1. Organization and Procedure for a New NSC System
1.1. Problems of the previous NSCs
During the transition period from November 1968 to January 1969, President-elect 
Nixon and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
designate Kissinger sought to re-vitalize the function of the National Security Council 
to identify the U.S.’s capabilities, interests, and objectives.1 In their meeting on
1 The functions and responsibilities o f the National Security Council were set forth in the National 
Security Act o f  1947, and amended by the National Security Act Amendments o f  1949. Its membership 
included the President, Vice President, Secretary o f State, Secretary o f  Defense, and other high 
officials, such as the Director o f the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate. See, for example,
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November 25, 1968, President-elect Nixon talked with Kissinger about a “massive 
organizational problem.”2 Nixon did not trust the State Department bureaucracy 
because of his personal experiences: the Foreign Service disdained him as Vice 
President during the 1950s and ignored him as a private citizen during the 1960s. 
Nixon also believed that the State Department would “not hold secrets” and had some 
very conservative views in some areas that would “resist change.”3 In response, 
Kissinger recommended that if the President-elect intended to operate foreign policy 
on a “wide-ranging basis,” he would need to establish the best possible national 
security machinery within the White House that could plan, analyze, and review 
“policy options” systematically for him before making decisions.4
Nixon and Kissinger wanted to establish a system which would enable them to be 
presented with all sides of any issues in the presence of all concerned.5 The President 
needed to understand not only the substantive background of the issues but also their 
bureaucratic histories and political implications because he would inevitably be 
surrounded “by advocates with strong, often institutional, and nearly always 
conflicting views.”6 The new administration thus needed a mechanism that would 
establish “clear, consistent, and feasible goals” in the national security field, which
History o f  the National Security Council (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html); John Prados, 
Keepers o f  the Keys: A History o f  the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), pp.29-32; John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American 
Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas, Fifth edition (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 
Inc., 1989), pp.45-49; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: 
Pattern and Progress, Fifth edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp.348-353.
2 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston Little Brown, 1979), p .l l .  On December 2, 1968, 
Nixon officially announced the appointment o f Kissinger as the Special Assistant for the President for 
National Security Affairs.
3 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
4 Richard M. Nixon, RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.341.
5 As for the development o f the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system, see NSC History: The Nixon 
Administration 1969-74 (http://www.whitehouse.gOv/nsc/history.html#nixonn); Prados, Keepers o f  the 
Keys, pp.265-267, pp.277-283; and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.351-353.
6 “The National Security Process, National Security Staffing in the White House,” International Social 
Studies Division, November 6, 1968, p.3, HAK Administrative & Staff Files (HAK-ASF), Box 1, 
Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, Henry A. Kissinger’s Office Files (HAKOF), The National Security 
Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA).
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would “translate” these goals into “specific programs” and “monitor the progress” of 
these programs.7
Before entering office, Nixon and Kissinger already showed their respective views 
towards a highly bureaucratized foreign policy decision-making process. During the 
1968 campaign, Republican Presidential candidate Nixon promised to “restore the 
National Security Council to its pre-eminent role in national security planning.”8 
Kissinger criticized the combination of abstractness and rigidity resulting from 
traditional American idealism, insisting that foreign policy had to be based not on 
sentiment but on an assessment of strength. When policy became identified with the 
consensus of a committee, it was fragmented into a series of ad hoc decisions which 
made it difficult to achieve a sense of overall direction.9 Thus, the National Security 
Council was “less concerned with developing measures” in terms of “a well- 
understood national purpose than with adjusting the varying approaches of semi- 
autonomous departments.”10 In particular, Kissinger emphasized the importance of 
secrecy in the decision-making machinery:
One reason for keeping the decisions to small groups is when an unpopular 
decision may be fought by brutal means, such as “leaks” to the press or to 
congressional committees. The only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from 
the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged with carrying 
it out. In consequence, the relevance of the bureaucracy might continue to send 
out cables with great intensity, thereby distorting the effort with the best
7 Lean Sloes to Kissinger, “Organizing the National Security Machinery,” December 21, 1968, p .l, 
HAK-ASF, Box 3, General Transition Books, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
8 Richard M. Nixon, Radio Speech, October 24, 1968, cited in Kissinger, White House Years, p.38.
9 Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in American Foreign Policy: Three 
Essays (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp.29-34.
10 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity fo r  Choice; Prospects o f  American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960), pp.343-344.
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intensions in the world. You cannot stop them from doing this because you do 
not tell them what is going on.11
Hence, the Nixon transition staff reassessed the main problems of the National 
Security Council during previous administrations.12 President Truman was suspicious 
of congressional intent in establishing the NSC system, which might have restricted 
his flexibility of action. Thus, he initially restricted its policy role and began to pay 
substantive attention to its function only after the outbreak of the Korean War.13
President Eisenhower institutionalized the NSC into a large and highly structured 
body, with formal procedures, staff systems, and interdepartmental relationships.14 It 
appeared, however, that the Eisenhower administration’s NSC mechanism became 
very formalized, especially during its second term, because the machinery spent a 
long time to reach an interdepartmental consensus, which resulted in delays in getting 
staff papers to the Council, and many staff papers without clearly defining policy 
alternatives. As Vice President, Nixon was frustrated by Eisenhower’s practice of 
encouraging a consensus among the NSC principals before an issue reached the 
President for the final decision. Nixon wanted a system that was formal and orderly 
but not as rigid as the Eisenhower system and which moved authority from the 
departments to the White House.15
11 Henry A. Kissinger, “Bureaucracy and Policymaking: The Effects o f Insiders and Outsiders on the 
Policy Process,” in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign 
Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), p.89, Quotation marks in original.
12 Letter from Kissinger to Senator Henry M. Jackson, March 3, 1970, p .l, Box H -  300, NSC System, 
NSC Organization [1 o f 3], National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF), NPMS, NA.
13 Colonel J.M. Chambers to Bryce N. Harlow (Assistant to the President-Elect), “Suggested 
Revitalization for the National Security Council,” November 12, 1968, p.3, HAK-ASF, Box 1, 
Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
14 Ibid. See Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (New York: 
Macmillan Press LTD, 1996), pp.23-24; and Prados, Keepers o f  the Keys, pp.57-95.
15 Morton H. Halperin, Interview with Komine, June 10, 2004.
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The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations maintained the NSC system in “name 
only,” downgrading its role as a continuing, objective entity and relying only on a few 
personal advisors.16 The Kennedy NSC was relatively informal, more flexible, and, in 
many respects, action rather than policy-oriented. The Johnson NSC was a 
combination of informal, issue-oriented committee, individual advisers, and the so- 
called “Tuesday Lunches” at the White House where current concerns were discussed 
in an unstructured and highly personalized manner. The Kennedy-Johnson national 
security policies thus relied too much on ad hoc planning which did not sufficiently 
engage the resources of the bureaucratic experts on the Council. In consequence, 
Kennedy-Johnson national security decision-making suffered from the “absence of 
systematic policy planning,” the “weakness of procedures for inter-agency 
coordination,” and the “lack of continuous assessment of short and long range 
objectives.”17
1.2. Goodpaster’s memoranda
As for actual planning of a new NSC system, at Nixon’s request, Kissinger 
consulted General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s NSC Staff Secretary, and asked 
him to produce option papers.18 Goodpaster recommended strengthening the NSC as
16 Chambers to Harlow, “Suggested Revitalization for the National Security Council,” November 12, 
1968, p.5, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
17 Sloes to Kissinger, “Organizing the National Security Machinery,” December 21, 1968, p.2, HAK- 
ASF, Box 3 General Transition Books, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
18 Halperin, Interview with Komine, June 10, 2004. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp.41-44; 
and Idem, Years o f  Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp.72-76. As Staff Secretary o f the 
NSC during the Eisenhower administration, Goodpaster was responsible for the flow o f matters on 
security and international activities between the President and the departments and agencies. The roles 
o f Staff Secretary and National Security Adviser were combined during the Kennedy-Johnson NSCs. 
Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Security Affairs Staff Responsibilities Under President Eisenhower,” 
December 12, 1968, pp. 1-2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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the President’s “highest deliberative, advisory and policy-formulating body.”19 The 
system should formulate “broad and far-reaching conceptions of a long-range 
character” and provide the “main structure of the nation’s approach to its international 
and security problems.”20 Its policy process should provide “coherence and reasoned 
dynamism, together with a sense of direction, to the whole complex of policy and 
action.” Goodpaster recommended that in order to decrease bureaucratic friction, the 
control of agenda creation should be managed by the White House, and the Special 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should run the key 
committees.22 It was crucial to impose some degree of order on the flow of 
information and action papers to and from the President and to have that supervised 
by the National Security Adviser who should be fully familiar with the President’s 
views, priorities, and interests.
The new NSC structure appeared similar to the one Eisenhower used in terms of its 
structure for systematic analysis of policy options. Goodpaster recalls Eisenhower’s 
statement: “Plans are nothing, but planning is everything” which emphasized the 
importance of preparatory work, giving all departments and agencies concerned a 
chance to present respective positions and bringing together all of the relevant facts.23 
Regarding Nixon’s view, Goodpaster assesses that: “he put a real value on the way
19 Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Organization and Procedures for the Conduct o f  National Security 
Affairs,” December 13, 1968, p .l, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 The idea o f White House control o f the NSC agenda was reinforced when Goodpaster and Kissinger 
consulted with former President Eisenhower at Walter Reed Army Hospital in December 1968. 
Eisenhower insisted that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) structure (which was established in 
1967 and chaired by the Under Secretary o f State) should be abolished because the Defense 
Department would never like taking orders from the State Department. Kissinger, White House Years, 
p.43; and Idem, Years o f  Renewal, p.75.
Andrew J. Goodpaster, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.3, The National 
Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHR), Center for International and 
Security Studies at Maryland and the Brookings Institution, December 8, 1998.
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that had been done during the Eisenhower time.” While Eisenhower “intended to 
maintain control through laying down the policies, main guiding policies, and then 
allowing that to evolve as the years went on,” Nixon “personally intended to take an 
active part in major initiatives that could reshape the relationships -  major 
relationships in the world -  particularly the relationships among the great powers.”24 
Goodpaster thus emphasizes that it was not just a Presidential control of foreign 
policy, but that Nixon was going to “direct” it and “engage” himself in it.25
1.3. Halnerin’s memorandum
Kissinger also asked Morton Halperin to produce a memorandum on how the 
analysis of bureaucratic politics could be applied to national security and foreign 
policy decision-making.26
In theory, bureaucratic politics analysts focus on the politics of a government, where 
foreign policy decision-making is characterized as a resultant of a bargaining process 
among a multitude of bureaucracies with competing viewpoints and possessing 
different amounts of power within the national governmental hierarchy.27 Thus,
24 Ibid., pp.4-5.
25 Ibid., p.4. As for the study o f the presidential leadership in foreign policy decision-making, see, for 
example, Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use o f  
Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); and Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential 
Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics o f  Leadership from Roosevelt to Regan, Fifth edition, 
(New York: Free Press, 1990); and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.502-532.
26 Halperin, Interview with Komine, June 10, 2004. Kissinger consulted with Goodpaster and cleared 
Halperin’s memo with him without saying that Halperin wrote it. Then Lawrence Eagleburger dealt 
with Goodpaster. Halperin was originally a junior professor and also Kissinger’s former teaching 
assistant at Harvard. See also Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1992), pp. 154-155.
27 For bureaucratic politics o f foreign policy decision-making, see, for example, Morton H. Halperin 
and Arnold Kanter, “A Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework,” in Morton H. Halperin 
and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1973), pp. 1-42; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American
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policy-making is a matter of widening the base of support within the executive branch 
through the constant modification of the proposed policy. Concessions are made 
toward potential allies to satisfy their interests and overcome their objections to 
establishing a majority intradepartmental coalition. A major characteristic of policy­
making is its time-consuming nature.
In practice, there were two fundamental issues to the new NSC system: who would 
control the agenda and the flow of policy papers; and who would chair key NSC sub­
committees. Halperin proposed two major changes. The first proposal, also reflecting 
General Goodpaster’s view, was to eliminate the Senior Interdepartmental Group 
(SIG), which was chaired by the Undersecretary of State and was in charge of 
reviewing all options and proposals before they reached a formal NSC meeting.28 It 
would be replaced by a Review Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, 
which would give Kissinger: the power to approve any papers submitted to the 
President by departments and agencies; and the control of the agenda for NSC 
meeting. Halperin’s other proposal was to give the National Security Adviser the 
power to direct National Security Study Memorandum (NSSMs, which were 
pronounced NIZ-ums) to departments and agencies.29 These directives would become 
a key tool for Kissinger to decide which policies should be reconsidered, when they 
would be placed on the agenda, and how they would be discussed. It would also allow 
him to use the bureaucracy without revealing his real purposes as well as to conduct 
negotiations secretly. In short, the new NSC system emphasized two principal 
objectives of the President: the retention of control over foreign policy decision-
Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas, Fifth edition, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 
Inc., 1989), pp.61-71; Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.476-490; and Graham 
Allison and Philipe Zelikow, Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis second edition 
(New York: Longman, 1999), pp.4-7.
28 Ibid.
29 TVtisJ
making at the top of the system; and the systematic development of clear policy 
analysis and alternative choices.
1.4. Obiections from the Defense Department and the State Department
Kissinger sent his memorandum on the new NSC system to Nixon, which he 
privately approved. On December 28, 1968, Nixon summoned Secretary of State- 
designate William Rogers and Secretary of Defense-designate Melvin Laird to Key 
Biscayne to discuss the Kissinger Plan. After the discussion, Nixon gave the final 
approval of the plan. On December 28, 1968, the New York Times reported that 
President-elect Nixon intended to “enlarge the role of National Security Council.”30 In 
his memorandum to departments and agencies on January 16, 1969, Kissinger made 
clear the flow of policy papers under the control of NSC:
All communication directed to the President originating in executive 
departments and agencies, including those from department and agency heads, 
should be delivered to the office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs. 
The NSC office under the direction of the Assistant to the President will 
establish secretariat control of all incoming papers prior to forwarding them to 
the office of the President. National security papers which the president asked 
upon or otherwise disposed of will be preceded out of the President Secretariat 
to the NSC office. Any subsequent actions required, such as the relay of 
Presidential decisions, return of signed correspondence or follow-up on 
Presidential comments will be accompanied under the direction of the Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs.31
30 The New York Times, December 28, 1968.
31 Memorandum for Executive Departments and Agencies, Attached to Memo from Kissinger to 
Haldeman, “Arrangements for Secretariat Control o f National Security Papers,” January 16, 1969, 
HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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In reality, however, the State Department and the Defense Department were not 
entirely convinced of the newly increased role of the National Security Adviser.
Secretary of Defense-designate Laird objected to a “closed loop” in which “all 
intelligence inputs would be channelled through a single source” - the Assistant and 
his NSC staff.32 Such an arrangement would isolate not only the President from direct 
access to intelligence community outputs, but also the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, and other key members of the President’s team. Laird also 
objected that the proposal would place in the hands of the Assistant and his NSC staff 
the primary right of initiating studies and directing where they would be performed as 
well as determining which policy issues should be placed on the agenda for NSC 
meetings. Laird thus suggested that there should be some “consultation” with the NSC 
principals to establish the priorities of these studies. The principals should be able to 
place policy issues on the agenda subject only to the veto of the President.
Secretary of State-designate Rogers had agreed to the general outline in Key 
Biscayne. However, “in light of the objections of his Foreign Service subordinates,” 
Rogers wanted to reserve judgement, which Kissinger commented: “It would not be 
helpful to begin the Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement.”33 In their 
memorandum to the President-elect, State Department officials insisted that it should 
be the principal responsibility of the State Department to define and formulate the 
issues, and to bring them to the attention of the President. In foreign policy decision­
making, the Secretary of State must have authority not only over the State 
Department, but also over other departments. In particular, State Department officials
32 Laird to Kissinger, “Your Memorandum dated on January 3, 1969 concerning a New NSC System,” 
pp. 1-2, January 9, 1969, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger to Nixon, “NSC Procedures,” January 7, 1969, p .l, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, 
HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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insisted that policy papers prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups for the NSC 
should be transmitted through the Secretary of State to the NSC Review Group.34 The 
Secretary of State, through the Under Secretaries Committee, must review papers on 
their way to the NSC to ensure all options were adequately examined, and the NSC 
should be seen primarily as an appeal board for when departments disagreed. In 
essence, the basic studies for NSSMs should be conducted at the assistant-secretary 
level o f the State Department on an interagency basis, and then sent directly to the 
NSC Review Group.
Kissinger criticized that the State Department was unable to take the lead in 
managing interagency affairs because the Foreign Service, in training and 
background, was “inadequate” to the task of long-range planning and management, 
and that their forte was in “compromising differences,” and “avoiding a confrontation 
of conflicting point of view.”35 In particular, Kissinger argued that the State proposal 
would restrict the Interdepartmental Groups in preparing policy papers to the scope 
and context of State Department functions, rather than fully and directly giving them 
the broader perspective of Presidential security concerns.36 The only way the 
President could ensure that all options were examined, and all the arguments fairly 
presented, was to “have his own people” who were “responsive to him, and with a 
Presidential rather than departmental perspective” to oversee the preparation of the 
papers.37 Overall, the fundamental question was whether Nixon was going to have a 
State Department oriented system or an NSC oriented system. If the President wanted
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. As for State Department’s organizational and operational problems, see, for example, Kissinger, 
“Bureaucracy and Policymaking,” in Halperin and Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign 
Policy, p.89, pp.95-96; Spanier and Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic 
Dilemmas, pp.51-65; and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.379-387.




to control policy, he had to control the policy-making machinery. Kissinger thus 
recommended to Nixon that the State proposal should be “rejected.”38 
Goodpaster had a meeting with Under Secretary of State-designate Elliot 
Richardson and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs-designate U. Alex Johnson. 
The fundamental confrontation with the State Department was “over control of the 
agenda and the exercise of chairmanship of the principal committees that would be 
established.”39 Finally, the conflict was resolved by enforcing Nixon’s decision, 
“overruling” the position of the State Department.40
2. The Structure and Procedure of the New NSC System
The new National Security Council became the “principal forum” for consideration 
of policy issues requiring Presidential determination 41 The issues ranged from current 
crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning.42 At 
the Presidential direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as the 
chief supervisory officer, was responsible for “determining” the agenda and
38 Ibid.
39 Goodpaster, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.3, NSCP-OHR.
40 Ibid., pp.3-4. Nixon urged that anyone who opposed his decision for the new NSC system “should 
submit his resignation.” See Kissinger, White House Years, p.46.
41 National Security Decision Memorandum 2 (NSDM2), “Reorganization o f the National Security 
Council System,” January 20, 1969, p .l, National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs), Box 
363, Subject Files (SF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.
42 The Council met regularly, and discussions were limited to agenda subjects except in unusual 
circumstances. At the first NSC meeting, President Nixon stated that the NSC would meet two times a 
week during January. After January, meetings would be once a week. Within approximately four 
months, meetings should be conducted on a bi-monthly basis. NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H- 
300, NSC Organization [2 o f 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA
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“ensuring” that the necessary papers were prepared.43 There was a continual flow of 
memoranda to and from the President, and Presidential requests to Kissinger fell into 
two main categories: 1) directives and 2) requests for more information. The Nixon- 
Kissinger NSC system was structurally three-tiered with the Council at the top, the 
NSC Review and Operational Groups in the middle, and the Interdepartmental Groups 
at the base.44
Once the President, with recommendation from his National Security Adviser, 
determined that an issue involving interdepartmental considerations required analysis 
and Presidential decision, the NSC staff prepared a National Security Study 
Memorandum (NSSM) to “direct” a study of the issue to one of the Interdepartmental 
Groups (IGs) chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State.45 The IGs drafted the basic 
paper for consideration by the NSC, defining the issue requiring Presidential decision, 
setting forth U.S. objectives, and outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the 
alternative courses of action.46 As a former NSC staff member, Winston Lord, recalls, 
at the beginning of the administration, there was a number of NSSMs being sent out 
asking for studies for two main reasons: one was a “genuine search for an intellectual 
path, analysis and preparation of options for policy by the various agencies,” and the
43 NSDM2, “Reorganization o f  the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p .l, NSDMs, 
Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
44 History o f the NSC, (No date), p .l, NSC History Files (NSC-HF), Box H-314 [1 o f 2], NSCIF, 
NPMS, NA.
45 National Security Decision Memorandum 1 (NSDM1), “Establishment o f NSC Decision and Study 
Memoranda Series,” January 20, 1969, p .l, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. There were six 
Interdepartmental Regional Groups, such as Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Near and Middle East, 
Europe, Politico-Limitary - each chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary o f State. History o f the 
NSC, (No date), p.4, NSC-HF, Box H-314 [1 o f 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
46 NSDM2, “Reorganization o f  the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p.4, NSDMs, 
Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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other reason was to “put so much work on the bureaucracy and keep them so busy” 
that enabled Nixon and Kissinger to establish their control over U.S. foreign policy.47
After an IG meeting, the NSC staff prepared a Review Group meeting book which 
included the following items:
• Cover Memo, which briefly stated the subject of the meeting and pointed out 
any special problems of particular points;
• HAK Review Group Talking Points, which was in outline form including all 
the issues Kissinger should raise at the meeting. (The views of the NSC staff 
on the answer and the likely responses of other Review Group members was 
also indicated);
• Review Group paper, which was the paper as it was distributed to the other 
members of the Review Group. A summary was prepared and placed on top;
• Background Papers;
• NSSM;
• Memo Requesting NSC Briefings, which was a draft of a memorandum to 
relevant agencies requesting briefing for the NSC discussion of this subject;
• Issues for Decision.48
After the papers were examined in Pre-Review Group meeting, the Review Group, 
chaired by the National Security Adviser, met as a “planning board” to examine 
policy study papers “prior to” their submission to the NSC.49 The role of the Review 
Group was to “assure” that the issue under consideration was worthy of NSC 
attention; “all realistic alternatives” were presented; and the “facts” and “all
47 Winston Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.7, NSCP-OHR.
48 Halperin to Kissinger, “NSC Procedures,” June 23, 1969, p.2, NSC, Vol. Ill 6/1/69-12/31/69 [2of2], 
Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
49 Kissinger to Nixon, “Additional Provisions Concerning the Conduct o f  National Security Affairs,” 
January 10, 1969, p .l, HAK-ASF, Box 2, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
department and agency views” were fairly and adequately presented.50 In September 
1970, the Review Group was re-named the Senior Review Group and raised from the 
Assistant to the Under-Secretary level.51 The Washington Special Actions Group 
(WSAG), chaired by the Assistant to the President, drafted contingency plans for 
possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action on a 
daily basis. Solomon emphasizes the importance of the “preparatory activity” that 
preceded a formal NSC meeting “where the issues of who really trusts whom, and 
who’s really relying on whose judgment, and the pre-planning of positions gets 
worked out.”53
Prior to the NSC meeting, the NSC staff prepared a briefing book for the President 
including:
• HAK Memo to the President - A brief memo summarizing what the issue was 
and calling any special problems to the attention of the President;
• Issues for Decision - An analytical paper summarizing the issues for decision 
from the Review Group paper, with recommendations on the issues;
• RN Talking Points -  A brief memo including an introductory sentence, a list 
of the briefings, and an indication that Kissinger should be called on to discuss 
what the issues were;
50 NSDM2, “Reorganization o f  the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p.2, NSDMs, 
Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The membership o f the Review Group included: The Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs (Chairman); a representative o f the Secretary o f  State; a 
representative o f  the Secretary o f Defense; a representative o f the Director o f Central Intelligence; and 
a representative o f  the Chairman, Joint Chiefs o f Staff.
51 National Security Decision Memorandum 85, “The National Security Council Senior Review 
Group,” September 14, 1970, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The Senior Review Group comprised: 
the Under Secretary o f  State; the Deputy Secretary o f Defense; the Director o f Central Intelligence; the 
Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
(Chairman). As for other interagency review groups in this category, the Verification Panel was formed 
to gather the essential facts relating to a number o f  important issues o f  strategic arms limitation, such as 
Soviet strategic capabilities. The Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) examined the factors which 
would determine the course o f  Vietnamization.
52 The WSAG consisted o f the Review Group (later the Senior Review Group), enlarged by additional 
military and intelligence specialists.
53 Richard Solomon, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.34, NSCP-OHR.
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• Review Group Paper, with a summary on the cover;
• Background Papers;
• HAK Talking Points - in outline form summarizing the main issues and pros 
and cons (Included only in HAK’s copy of book.);
• NSSM (In HAK book only);
• Memo Requesting Briefings (In HAK book only).54
At the NSC meeting, with the President in the chair, the National Security Adviser 
outlined the issue and the alternative courses of action, and the President requested 
comments and recommendations from each NSC member. In addition to arguing for 
his own favored course of action, each NSC member had the opportunity to disprove 
the arguments of the other members with whom he did not agree.55 Nixon encouraged 
a “free give and take discussion” at NSC meeting, because he wished to hear “all” 
points of view rather than a “consensus recommendation.”56
A former NSC staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt explains that the roles of the NSC 
meetings were mainly to “keep the President’s options open” without allowing any 
officials to formulate a majority position, so that the President would not have to 
overrule other officials.57 Nixon and Kissinger were also “very careful not to show 
their cards” in the meeting.58 Thus, the President would “never decide at the 
meeting.”59 Nixon and Kissinger were also sensitive to the dangers of leakage. 
During the first NSC meeting on January 21, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the
54 Halperin to Kissinger, “NSC Procedures,” June 23, 1969, pp.3-4, NSC, Vol. Ill 6/1/69-12/31/69 
[2of2], Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
55 History o f the NSC, (No date), p.5, NSC-HF, Box H - 314 [1 o f 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
56 NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 o f 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
57 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, (senior NSC staff member on Soviet affairs, 1969-1974), “The Nixon 
Administration National Security Council,” p.33, NSCP-OHR.
58 Michael Guhin (NSC staff member, 1969-1974), “The Nixon Administration National Security 
Council,” p.33, NSCP-OHR.
59 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.33, NSCP-OHR.
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importance of maintaining “the strictest security” with respect to the deliberation of 
the NSC and directed its members to inform their subordinates that “press leaks must 
be avoided.”60
After each NSC meeting, the NSC staff reviewed the records of it and presented 
their views and suggestions for a “follow-up” consideration by Nixon and Kissinger.61 
Kissinger summarized the main issues of the staff recommendations as well as his 
views in a memorandum to the President. After his private talks with Kissinger, the 
President made his final decision. At this stage, the NSC staff prepared a National 
Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) to “report” the contents of the Presidential 
decision to the departments and agencies. In response to NSDMs, the Under 
Secretaries Committee (USC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, with 
representation at the Deputy or Under Secretary level, developed operational plans 
and recommendations to implement policy decisions.63
In essence, three levels of meetings in the new NSC system emerged: 1) State- 
chaired interdepartmental working group meetings at the Assistant Secretary level; 2) 
Kissinger-chaired meetings (where the basic decisions were essentially either made or 
prepared for the President); and 3) the NSC meetings. As Lord points out, the 
“crucial” factor in the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system was that many of the sub­
committees were chaired by Kissinger or his staff, which Kissinger himself was “very 
conscious about.”64 Besides, reflecting Nixon’s personal reluctance to settle
60 NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 o f 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
61 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.33, NSCP-OHR.
62 NSDM1, “Establishment o f NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series,” January 20, 1969, p .l, 
NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
63 History o f the NSC, (No date), p.3, NSC-HF, Box H - 314 [1 o f 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
64 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.7, p.32, NSCP-OHR.
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disagreements directly with Cabinet members and heads of departments and agencies, 
the new NSC system came to rely heavily on “memoranda rather than face-to-face 
meetings.”65 In this new NSC system, the President became almost inaccessible or 
even isolated from the head of each department and agency. It was only Kissinger 
who had full access to the President, and thereby Secretary of State Rogers and the 
State Department were decreased their influence in foreign policy decision-making.
3. Other Key Players in the New China Policy
3.1. NSC staff
3.1.1. NSC staff procedures
Kissinger, as the executive secretary of the National Security Council staff, outlined 
the problems and options and managed the day-to-day policy process. In December 
1968, General Goodpaster produced the outline of new NSC staff procedures, 
stressing the importance of its supporting role for the President’s consideration of 
“broad, far-reaching conceptions of the central importance in guiding policy and 
operations.”66 The President would need a strong NSC staff that could present him 
with clear-cut alternatives, explain to him the implications of choosing between 
alternatives, and help him to articulate his chosen policies. Goodpaster suggested that 
the NSC staff should also prepare for, conduct, and take further action on the 
meetings, and to manage the NSC supporting structure.67 Hence, during the transition
65 Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, p.68.
66 Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Organization and Procedures for the Conduct o f  National Security 
Affairs,” December 13, 1968, p.4, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
67 Ibid., p .l.
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period, Kissinger sought to recruit the best available young experts from the State 
Department, the Defense Department, the intelligence community, and academia.68 
The newly emerged National Security Council Staff was divided into three main 
groups, plus the military assistant:69
• Assistant for Program - three or four Assistants, such as Morton Halperin 
(1969), and Anthony Lake (1969-1970), integrating planning and operations 
by bringing a long-range (five-year) perspective to current operations.
• Operations Staff - approximately five senior staff members, each senior staff 
member responsible for certain geographic regions and functional activities 
(such as East Asia, Europe, Near East, South Asia, Latin America, Africa). Its 
main roles were to follow day-to-day matters, attend inter-agency meetings, 
and bring to the attention of the National Security Adviser matters requiring 
Presidential attention. Its senior members on East Asia included: John H. 
Holdridge (1969-1973), Richard Smyser (Vietnam expert, 1970-1971 and 
1973-1975), Richard L. Sneider (Japan expert, 1969), Richard Solomon 
(China expert, 1971-1976). Holdridge explains that the “geographical line” of 
the NSC staff was organized more or less “corresponding to the same bureau 
that would be in the Department of State.”70 In particular, Kissinger highly 
valued Solomon’s expert insight regarding the implications on Chinese public 
statements and private messages, and on China’s domestic political situation.71 
Solomon assesses that Kissinger worked by “departmentalizing different
72people in little boxes.”
68 Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.50, Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, 
Georgetown University; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.23-24.
69 A New NSC System, pp.4-5, NSC, Vol. II, 4/1/69-5/30/69 [2 o f  2], Box H-299, Memo from William 
Watts to Kissinger (via Lake/Haig), “Revised NSC Staff Arrangements,” September 12, 1969, NSC 
System, Staff & Committees [2 o f 3], Box H-301, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
70 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.81, FAOHC.
71 Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
72 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
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• Planning Staff - approximately three senior staff members, such as Richard V. 
Allen (1969) and Winston Lord (1969-1973; also special assistant to Kissinger 
for China policy, 1970-1973), and five junior staff members, such as Peter 
Rodman (1969-1977). Its roles included: preparing NSC agenda papers on 
planning matters, producing necessary follow-up papers, supporting Assistants 
for Programs, participating in inter-agency planning studies, and providing 
alternative thinking to the National Security Adviser. Lord explains that: “Our 
job was also to help manage the paper flow, working with the relevant 
regional honcho or functional honcho on the staff.”73
• The Military Assistant - helped the National Security Adviser in developing 
staff papers on military matters, including judgements on military questions, 
and in monitoring and assembling intelligence material. Colonel Alexander M. 
Haig Jr. (Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
1969-1973) and Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1969) were in the Office of the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Rodman recalls that Kissinger “wanted to have all this sort of diversity of opinion,” 
and contrary to the usual image of him, Kissinger “liked to have debates” and 
“respected people who stood up to him.”74 Overall, the NSC staff had “coherence and 
competence.”75 It was “bureaucratically very complex and very personalized.”76 
Kissinger “kept everything very tightly controlled inside the White House” and the 
NSC staff practically operated as a “separate State Department.”77
73 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
74 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.51, FAOHC. Rodman states 
further that K /singer’s NSC staff was “surprisingly liberal, moderate, and intellectual,” especially for a 
Nixon administration. Ibid.
75 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
76 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
77 Ibid.
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3.1.2. Drafting of policy papers
Kissinger valued and benefited from the individual contributions of the NSC staff 
members. Sonnenfeldt comments that: “the quality of a paper drafted by one 
individual with a couple of assistants is bound to be better than a State Department 
internally negotiated document, or a Defense Department internally negotiated 
document.”78 As for actual drafting of policy studies, Holdridge recalls that Kissinger 
“would have three different groups working on a problem in the National Security 
Council, which might even include China. Not one of the members of those groups
70knew that the others were working on the same problem.” Kissinger’s style of 
operation in a sensitive negotiation was to have both the “substantive experts” from
the NSC staff and one of his “special assistants” to be his private secretaries. For
example, Winston Lord was Kissinger’s principal special assistant, and thus was very 
much involved in preparations for the China initiative. Lord also kept notes of 
Kissinger’s talks with Chinese officials. Peter Rodman was a junior special assistant, 
and there was a division of labor between Lord and Rodman.81 In his own operational 
role in particular, Lord explains that “I was working as part of a team for a variety of 
issues. I was always paired with a Vietnam expert on Vietnam, a China expert on 
China, and a Russia expert on Russia. I was the only one who was involved in all 
these in addition to Kissinger himself.”82 Overall, the NSC staffs role included 
“setting up meetings where various agencies submitted their views. And NSC papers
78 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” pp.25-26, NSCP-OHR.
79 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Volume II, p.31, January 1995, FAOHC; 
and Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003.
80 Rodman, Oral history interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.9, FAOHC.
81 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
82 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
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usually summarized those views, trying to present them fairly but also often 
presenting Kissinger’s views on top. These were usually drafted either by the regional 
experts concerned or by people like myself or some combination.”83
Kissinger took speeches “very seriously, demanding many drafts” from his NSC
84 •staff. In particular, during the transition period, Kissinger proposed to Nixon an idea 
to produce a document that would serve as a “conceptual outline of the President’s 
foreign policy, as a status report, and as an agenda for action.”85 Kissinger expected 
that the report would also “guide our bureaucracy and inform foreign governments 
about our thinking.”86 Nixon approved the proposal on January 30, 1969. Richard 
Allen recalls the drafting of Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress (February 
1970, February 1971, February 1972 and May 1973) as one of the “great exercises” 
for the NSC staff, which was in a sense a “challenge to long-range planning.”87 
Rodman agrees that the drafting of the report “educated” the NSC staff, because 
Kissinger “spent a lot of time on it with his staff in shaping.. .what should be our 
approach, what is the philosophy of our policy in this area, what are our real goals and 
interests.”88 Holdridge emphasizes the drafting of the first report of February 1970 as 
the “turning point” because it was drafted “entirely inside” the National Security 
Council without any “clearances” or “input” from the State Department.89 After the 
NSC staff issued the first report in late 1969, President Nixon called all of the NSC 
staff members in the Cabinet Room, and expressed his personal distrust of Career
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 158.
86 Ibid. However, Kissinger complains that although changes in U.S. attitude toward China were 
“foreshadowed” in the reports, the media covered only the section on Vietnam. Ibid., p. 159.
87 Richard V. Allen, “The Roles o f the National Security Adviser,” p.25, and p.35, NSCP-OHR, 
October 25, 1999.
88 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.47, FAOHC.
89 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.79, FAOHC.
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Foreign Service officials that: “If the State Department has had a new idea in the last 
25 years, it is not known to me.”90 Nixon thus made it very clear that his 
administration’s foreign policy would be “run” by the NSC: “we were to keep our 
distance from State and not in fact do anything more than to ask inputs, but certainly 
not for advice.”91
3.1.3. The Kissinger-NSC staff relations
Within the White House, Kissinger himself was “an object of considerable 
suspicion throughout those early months,” because he was originally a “Rockefeller 
man.”92 In addition, most of the newly recruited members of NSC staff Kissinger had 
appointed turned out to be Democrats, which greatly increased the suspicion of the 
White House political staff.93 Thus, as Holdridge recalls, members of the NSC staff 
were ‘always treated and sneered at as “the intellectuals” by the rest of the White 
House staff.’94 Lewis assesses that Kissinger was also “quite deliberately 
downgrading the staff in order to upgrade himself.”95 Finally, in trying to avoid 
antagonizing other departments and also to prevent leaks, Kissinger ordered the NSC 
staff not to have contacts with outsiders, especially the press. In reality, however, 
Solomon reveals that he “developed a dialogue with some press people,” particularly 
on the Asia issues, because what Kissinger was telling the NSC staff was usually very
90 Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Volume II, p.29, January 1995, FAOHC.
91 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.79, FAOHC.
92 Richard Moose (Staff Secretary o f the NSC, January-August 1969), “The Nixon Administration 
National Security Council,” p. 12, NSCP-OHR. Kissinger was originally the chief foreign policy 
adviser to Nelson Rockefeller who competed with Nixon for the Republican presidential candidacy in 
1968.
93 Lewis, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p .l 1, NSCP-OHR.
94 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.94, FAOHC.
95 Lewis, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 12, NSCP-OHR.
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different from what he saw going on and he had to know the difference between 
Kissinger’s “inside” game and his “outside” game in order to fulfil his roles.96
Moreover, there were private communications that occurred outside of the official 
lines between the NSC and the CIA. Solomon emphasizes that Kissinger’s excessive 
secrecy caused “compartmentalization of the policy process.”97 Kissinger could not 
even turn to the CIA for support in learning about senior Chinese leaders for his first 
trip to Beijing in July 1971. Thus, Solomon personally developed a covert “off-line” 
arrangement with CIA analysts to “draw on the intelligence community’s expertise 
and grasp of history.”98
The NSC staff rarely saw the President because Kissinger gathered the information 
from his staff and did all the briefing of the President himself, even on subjects on 
which he was not necessarily an expert. Lord argues that Kissinger “did keep the staff 
from having access,” and that NSC staff would sit in on meetings with foreigners at 
times,” however, no NSC staff would sit in “when he [Kissinger] was consulting with 
the President.”99 Lord also recalls that “When Nixon and Kissinger talked alone, he 
[Kissinger] would generally keep us informed.”100 
Both foreign and U.S. ambassadors tended to deal directly with the NSC, and 
Kissinger developed his own channels of communication with the ambassadors.101 
However, Kissinger “continued to mistreat and ignore most [U.S.] ambassadors,” 
although there were exceptions during the opening to China, especially Ambassador
96 Solomon, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.47, NSCP-OHR.
97 Ibid. The U.S. government had previously dealt with the Chinese Communist leaders during the 
1940s in Chungking and Yenan, and therefore there were a number o f  documents on these contacts in 
the CIA files. However, as Solomon recalls, “no one was tasked to go look at this material, we never 
drew on our past experience.” Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 13, NSCP-OHR.
100 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
101 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.59, NSCP-OHR.
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Walter Stoessel to Warsaw, Poland, and Ambassador Joseph Farland to Rawalpindi, 
Pakistan.102
During the early months of the new administration, diplomatic observers already 
began to speculate that Kissinger inevitably would be over-burdened in his new staff 
function. Kissinger himself was reported to have stated that “it may not be possible to 
handle both planning and coordination of operations in this job.” 103
At the beginning of the day, Kissinger did not necessarily give briefings to the 
President by himself, as Harry R. Haldeman (The White House Chief of Staff) or John 
Ehrlichman (Nixon’s top domestic affairs adviser) was usually in Oval Office. 
Kissinger had a “hard time” with their presence, because he was “not comfortable 
with it.”104
Very importantly, however, Rodman assesses that Haldeman did not “interfere in 
foreign policy,” because he believed that Nixon was the “master” in foreign policy; 
Haldeman had “no claim” to know the foreign policy, and thus the most important 
substantive discussions were conducted between Nixon and Kissinger “just alone.”105 
Haldeman also “backed up” Kissinger when there was a bureaucratic fight between 
the NSC and the State Department; Haldeman would sometimes ring up Secretary of 
State Rogers and say, “The President wants this. 106 Haldeman would play an
102 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.56, NSCP-OHR.
103 The Boston Globe, January 30, 1969, in Box 95, Folder: Kissinger, Henry A., Elliot Richardson 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library o f Congress.
104 Moore and Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 14, NSCP-OHR. 
Philip Odeen (member o f the NSC staff, 1971-1973) recalls that: ‘when w e’d be in a meeting and 
Haldeman would walk in, Henry would get “visibly nervous.” ...It was different with Ehrlichman -  
Ehrlichman was less threatening. But Haldeman -  everybody got nervous when Haldeman was around. 
He was, at least from my perspective, kind o f a fierce guy. I would see Henry seemingly act differently 
when Haldeman was around.’ Ibid., p. 13. Quotation marks in original.
105 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 16, FAOHC.
106 Ibid., p. 17. Kissinger recalls that: “Because Nixon’s method o f governing guaranteed incessant 
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intermediate role between Kissinger and Rogers on the China initiative after 
Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. Overall, Haldeman was a “totally loyal 
person who did things because of what the boss wanted.” Haldeman was a “gate­
keeper” of any access to the Oval Office because Nixon preferred interacting with a 
minimum number of people.107
There was “competition within Kissinger’s sphere over who would be his 
deputy.”108 The White House staff, especially Haldeman and Ehrlichman did not want 
too many liberal academics on the NSC. The argument was that in order to “balance 
experience and perspective,” a military person should be Kissinger’s deputy.109 
Alexander M. Haig Jr. was thus appointed as the deputy, however in reality this was 
also to “keep an eye on Kissinger.” 110 
As the deputy to the NSA, Haig would advise Kissinger on questions involving 
military considerations and help to produce policy memoranda and other papers on 
foreign affairs to be placed before Nixon for his decision.111 Haig was “very 
disciplined,” making the machinery work and dealing with the NSC staff, as Kissinger 
had less and less contact with them owing to his tight schedule. Haig was thus the 
“manager of the staff’ and “master of the bureaucratic process” in the Nixon- 
Kissinger NSC system.112
controversies. Sometimes he would ask Haldeman...to settle the disputes he both fomented and 
resented.” Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, p.69.
107 Ibid., pp.17-18. As for the importance o f a strong Chief o f Staff, see Kegley and Wittkopf, 
American Foreign Policy, pp.346-347.
108 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
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Importantly, Haig knew “how to smooth the rough edges” between Kissinger and 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.113 Laird was a “more wily bureaucratic operator,” 
in Kissinger’s words, a “better guerrilla fighter” than senior officials in the State 
Department.114 When it came to specific defense issues, Kissinger did not have the 
“competence to press hard” because he did not have the “depth of background or 
experience.”115 In particular, as for the pace of Vietnamization, which Laird himself 
defines as a program to “turn over the war in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese and 
give them the responsibility,” there was a bureaucratic struggle between the NSC and 
Defense.116 Lord assesses that where Kissinger wanted on “the whole to go slower,” 
Laird wanted to “speed it up.”117 To put it another way, while Laird, being a 
Congressman in the past, was familiar with the “congressional and domestic mood,” 
Kissinger was more concerned with U.S. capability to “maintain military balance” 
and “leverage” with the North Vietnamese.118 Secretary of Defense Laird thus 
established direct “communications channels” between Kissinger’s office and his own 
office regarding all official Department of Defense (DOD) elements which would be 
involved in NSC matters.119 As a result, the Kissinger-Laird rivalry became a 
significant example where the new NSC system did not necessarily defeat 
bureaucratic politics.
113 Ibid., p.24.
114 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.8, NSCP-OHR. See also Isaacson, 
Kissinger, pp. 198-202. As for operational roles o f the Defense Department, see Kegley and Wittkopf, 
American Foreign Policy, pp.387-400.
115 Odeen, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.21, NSCP-OHR.
116 Melvin Laird, Interview in CNN Cold War, Episode 15: China. Interview Transcript, National 
Security Archive.
117 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.22, NSCP-OHR.
118 Ibid. Laird had his own information sources, such as the National Security Agency, learning that 
Kissinger often used the military’s cable network. For example, to coordinate messages involving the 
secret opening to China, which was arranged with Pakistan as an intermediary, a secure channel was 
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Department of Defense highly valued the intermediate role of Alexander Haig, Jr.
between the DOD and the NSC. The “authoritative source” in the absence of
Kissinger owing to his busy schedule was Colonel Haig who had “direct and
continuing access” to Kissinger and the entire NSC staff. Haig was often able to
“reflect the views of the President himself.”120
Most importantly, Haig “had increasingly direct contact” with Nixon when
Kissinger was away on trips, which made Kissinger “very sensitive.”121 Thus, there
emerged a triangular dynamic between them: Kissinger sought to gain Haig’s support
and to co-opt him; Haig operated between Kissinger and Nixon, maintaining his good
working relations with the President, and also working closely with Kissinger.122
Overall, Haig presented himself as the President’s man, an “enforcer,” to make certain
1that the President’s orders were followed.
3.2. The State Department
3.2.1. Secrecy in bureaucratic politics
As previously explained, one of the main reasons for the pursuit of strict secrecy by 
Nixon and Kissinger during the opening to China was their personal distrust of 
bureaucracy, especially the State Department.124 For Secretary of State, Nixon 
appointed his long-term friend and colleague, former Attorney General of the
120 Lemnitzer to Admiral Johnson, September 29, 1969, p .l, Box H - 300 NSC System, NSC 
Organization [1 o f 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
121 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.23, NSCP-OHR.
122 Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p.36, FAOHC.
123 Ibid.
124 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 
24, 2003. During his visit to China, Nixon stated to Zhou that: “our State Department leaks like a sieve. 
Also within our bureaucracy there is great opposition to some of the positions I have taken.” Memcon, 
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Eisenhower administration, William P. Rogers.125 By taking advantage of Rogers’ 
unfamiliarity asset, Nixon intended to assure his control of foreign policy decision­
making from the White House.126 Kissinger, on the other hand, had uneasy relations 
with Rogers. Sonnenfeldt argues: “Henry wasn’t exactly sure where he was going to 
fit in this close friendship and long-time association. I think it became a total surprise 
to Henry that Nixon didn’t want Rogers to play a major role, except publicly.”127 
However, Secretary Rogers himself did not fight hard in the rivalry over the control of 
foreign policy, which resulted in the “demoralization of the State Department and its
• 198expertise.” Lord confirms that Kissinger “mistreated Rogers, although a lot of this 
was President Nixon’s fault, not his. But he would admit he didn’t resist the Nixon 
approach.”129 Whiting assesses that the State Department was “ready to serve,” 
however, they had no access and were consequently “under-used.”130 Whiting 
emphasizes that it was “not a mobilization of expertise and knowledge” which one
131expects m a government.
In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still needed help from the State 
Department. Levin points out that: “their work was the mortar and the bricks of what 
happened when the grand policy designs actually took form. They heavily influenced 
policymaking by the information and analysis they provided, through they had little
125 Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 197; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.26-32.
126 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary o f  
State for East Asia and the Pacific, 1969-1973), Oral history interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, pp. 10- 
11, FAOHC.
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Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.44, NSCP-OHR.
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opportunity for formal policy advocacy.”132 On China policy, Nixon and Kissinger 
“benefited from all the thinking in the administration.”133 In particular, Nixon and 
Kissinger “used the interagency process” to obtain what they thought was the “best of 
the technical knowledge” of the bureaucracy, especially the State Department.134 
Thus, there was “a whole menu of steps” that was developed, namely a series of steps, 
which the United States could take toward China, such as opening up trade and lifting 
travel restrictions.135 Thereafter, Nixon and Kissinger would form the strategy 
themselves, deciding “how to play it” on their own initiative and schedule.136 Nixon 
and Kissinger “did everything to minimize the risk of leak by dealing only with a very 
few officials,” and therefore, most of the early cable instructions went through CIA or 
Navy channels rather than the State Department’s regular channels.137
3.2.2. Senior State Department officials
As Lord reassesses, despite their pursuit of secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger still could 
have brought in a few key State Department officials on the China policy and “sworn 
them to secrecy and used their expertise and had more bureaucratic support.”138 
During the early months of the new administration, Kissinger still sought to smooth 
the relations between the NSC and the State Department and held regular meetings
132 Herbert Levin, (NSC staff member for East Asian affairs, 1970-1971), “China Policy and the 
National Security Council,” p.4, NSCP-OHR, November 4, 1999.
133 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
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his third memoirs that: “The interdepartmental process produced option papers from among which 
Nixon and I were able to select the course o f action most compatible with our overall strategy without 
necessarily informing the authors o f the decision until we had achieved a diplomatic breakthrough.” 
Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, p.83.
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with Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson (January 1969 - June 1970), who 
chaired the Undersecretaries’ Committee. Kissinger did not have intellectual 
uncertainties about “being overrun by the Foreign Service,” as Rodman recalls, “[H]e 
knew that he could provide intellectual leadership; he found that they provided a lot of 
expertise.”139
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alex Johnson (February 1969 - 
February 1973) developed a close working relationship with Under Secretary of State 
Richardson and also with Secretary of State Rogers.140 Johnson also acted as an 
intermediary between the White House and the State Department. In particular, 
Johnson, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, kept emphasizing the importance of 
coordination between the U.S. and its major allies in Asia, especially Japan and the 
Republic of China (ROC) regarding the linkage between their respective sensitivities 
to possible U.S. withdrawal from Asia in the post-Vietnam era and U.S. moves 
toward China.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green (May 
1969 - May 1973) was a “very astute” career Foreign Service Officer who got along 
very well with both Secretary of State Rogers and Congress.141 Green chaired an 
Interdepartmental Group: East Asian and Pacific Affairs (IG/EA&P/NSC-10), 
including the “China Working Group,” which performed the following functions:
139 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 14, FAOHC.
140 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hands o f  Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 
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105
• discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which could be settled at 
the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of implementation of 
NSC decisions;
• preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC;
• preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the 
NSC.142
In reality, however, Green did not get along well with Kissinger, and remained very 
bitter about Kissinger’s handling of East Asian issues and deliberate undermining of 
the roles of the State Department in the opening to China.143 Green criticizes that: 
“Kissinger had lots of gaps in his knowledge of the world,” and that “his failure to 
draw upon the expertise of people who had spent their lives working on East Asia was 
a great mistake on his part. 144 Green, who was the State Department’s main 
counterpart toward Kissinger on East Asia, especially suffered from the secrecy 
surrounding the China initiative. Green recalls that:
When you are “cut out” of things, you begin to lose confidence in yourself. 
.. .Kissinger knew that you didn’t have the complete picture, and therefore he 
tended to discredit your views accordingly. It ended up by nobody really 
knowing what the other person knew or didn’t know. ...We had a wonderful 
opportunity but, of course, a lot of that was not properly used. We could have 
done much better.145
142 Interdepartmental Group: East Asia and Pacific Affairs (IG/EA&P/NSC-10), Chartered by NSDM 2 
(January 20, 1969), NSC Organization [2 o f 3], Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
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Despite his unpleasant experiences with Kissinger, Green continued to remain loyal to 
President Nixon, whom he greatly admired for his knowledge and understanding of 
foreign affairs. During the early months of the new administration in 1969, Green 
held some significant conversations with Nixon regarding possible options and steps 
of opening a new dialogue with China.146 Overall, despite the exclusion from the 
direct decision making-process, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asia and 
Pacific played a crucial role in the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 
process.
3.2.3. Intelligence sources
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is the State Department’s 
representative in the U.S. intelligence community.147 The INR is the unit through 
which the State Department makes its input into various interagency committees that 
seek to guide intelligence operations. The INR draws on multiple intelligence source 
input from other agencies and also from overseas posts and provides value-added 
independent analysis of events to the Department’s senior officials. In particular, its 
staff drafts very insightful intelligence analyses, such as the ‘Intelligence Note’ and 
the ‘Research Study,’ which are among the most highly valued within the
148government.
146 The main issues in their talks are examined in the following chapters.
147 Bureau o f Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department o f State, (http://www.state.gOv/s/inr//); 
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In addition to U.S. embassies abroad, the State Department had an intelligence base 
in the Consulate General in Hong Kong, which was a very vital place for China 
watchers.149 A former State Department official and China watcher, Herbert 
Horowitz, recalls that: “people who came out of China as refugees or escapees would 
come to Hong Kong, and people who were going into China for business or trade 
would enter via Hong Kong and come out via Hong Kong.”150 Thus, Hong Kong was 
essentially a “gateway in and out of China” where China watchers obtained 
information from many different parts of Mainland China.151 As for China’s 
American policy, a former Deputy Chief of Station in the U.S. Consulate General in 
Hong Kong, James Lilley, explains that: “we were dealing with the Chinese who were 
passing us messages from the Chinese Communists. They were telling us that they 
were reasonable and were coming out of this very bad experience during the Cultural
Revolution. They said that they wanted to open up to the United States. ...We
1reported this in some detail to Washington.”
3.2.4. The State Denartment-NSC staff relations
There was a question of rivalry between the NSC staff and the State Department. As 
early as January 1969, there was already media coverage on Nixon’s centralization of 
foreign policy decision-making within the White House. On January 29, President 
Nixon called upon the State Department to re-affirm his confidence in the nation’s
149 Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p.4, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
150 Herbert Horowitz (China watching, American Consulate General Hong Kong, 1965-1969), Oral 
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foreign policy establishment. Nixon denied the media’s speculation that Kissinger and 
his NSC staff began to seize authority from Secretary Rogers.153 Although Nixon’s 
exact plans for the new NSC had not yet been made public (until the publication of 
Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970), and Kissinger’s staff 
kept silent about its rules and procedures, it was widely speculated that the NSC had 
been “re-vitalized.”154 
Kissinger initially requested that the State Department conduct a number of policy 
studies, and thus State Department officials could express their views. However, after 
a while, the State Department officials became cynical because they felt that they 
were just doing a “make-work,” and their views were not being taken seriously.155 
Without having a strong influence of its own, the State Department’s bureaucracy 
“often would look for the NSC to take the lead on an issue in order to bring the other 
agencies into a workable sort of arena.”156 
In reality, as Solomon points out, most regional experts in the NSC staff were 
originally recruited from the State Department, and thus still kept “secret dealings” 
with their former colleagues “without telling Kissinger.”157 Holdridge emphasizes 
that: “Those of us who were on detail from the State Department had to be very 
cautious. We tried to be as open as we possibly could, to keep in good, personal 
contact with Marshall Green, [U.] Alexis Johnson.”158 Levin also confirms that
153 “Nixon Denies Kissinger To Dictate Foreign Policy,” by Crocker Snow Jr., The Boston Globe, 
January 30, 1969, in Box 95, Folder: Kissinger, Henry A., Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library o f  Congress.
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Johnson and Green “never pressured me to do anything or tell them anything when I 
was on the NSC staff, but we did meet privately.”159
3.2.5. The question of geopolitical perspective
There was a significant difference of geopolitical perspective between the White 
House and the State Department. In the first place, the State Department had a “weak 
organizational base,” and that it was “very hard to get the State geopolitical view into 
a NSSM.”160 The State Department was also “much more anxious to try to keep some 
control of the regional issues,” and it never fought nearly as hard on the “functional” 
issues.161 Hence, there was a diversity of views on China within the State Department.
First, as Lord emphasizes, some officials in the State Department initially insisted 
that the United States would “alienate the Russians” if it “opened up with the 
Chinese.”162 The so-called “Slavophile” opinion group, especially Ambassadors 
Charles Bohlen and Lyewellyn Thompson, both specialists on the Soviet Union, 
claimed that Moscow was very suspicious of a Washington-Beijing “collusion,” and 
therefore any effort to improve U.S. relations with China would cause serious trouble 
for the promotion of Soviet-American relations.163 Sonnenfeldt recalls that: “until the 
Nixon administration, the State Department insisted on briefing the Soviets on every 
conversation that Alex Johnson and others had with the Chinese in Prague and
159 Herbert Levin (member o f the NSC staff for East Asian affairs, 1970-1971), “China Policy and the 
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Warsaw. ...Thompson religiously called Dobrynin [Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet 
Ambassador to the United States] in and gave him a full briefing. The suggestion that 
we might have a relationship with the Chinese without reassuring or telling the 
Soviets would not have occurred to anybody in the State Department.”164 
Regarding a positive course for the new China policy, the so-called “Sinophile 
group” had long favored a “broad policy review.”165 Thomson stresses the importance 
of “a decade-old ‘laundry list’ of possible U.S. initiatives towards China and a great 
deal of internal paper to support them.”166 For the public, the U.S. government 
continued to express its support for the Republic of China on Taiwan. Rodman argues 
that China experts in the government insisted that: “Taiwan was such an 
overwhelming problem, and we could never have contact with China without 
sacrificing Taiwan.”167 Simultaneously, within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, there were a number of policy study papers that had been written on the 
recognition of Beijing. As a former Taiwan Desk officer, Thomas P. Shoesmith points 
out, there was increasing pressure to bring the People’s Republic of China into the 
United Nations, and thus the State officials’ main concern was to try to find a way to 
“retain the Republic of China in the General Assembly.”168 Thus, having assessed that 
the so-called “China Lobby” in Congress by the late 1960s was “no longer a 
significant factor,” and that Taipei would be “increasingly isolated, diplomatically and
164 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p. 17, NSCP-OHR. Dobrynin 
recalls that Llewellyn Thompson told him confidentially in mid-June 1971 that there were two camps 
o f views within the American leadership: one side leaned toward giving priority to agreements with the 
Soviet Union; and other view gave precedence to an opening to China, believing that China could help 
end the Vietnam war soon, partly by “bringing pressures to bear upon the Soviet Union.” Anatoly 
Dobrynin, In Confidence: M oscow’s Ambassador to Am erica’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) 
(New York: Times Books, A Division o f Random House, Inc, 1995), p.224.
165 A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1977), p. 381; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 165, p. 182; and Isaacson, Kissinger, p.335.
166 James C. Thomson Jr. “On the Making o f U.S. China policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic 
Politics,” China Quarterly (April/June) 1972, p. 243.
167 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2004.
168 Thomas P. Shoesmith (Taiwan Desk, Department o f  State, 1966-1971), Oral History Interview, p .l, 
in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
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internationally,” State Department officials examined possibilities of pursuing “a two- 
China policy.” In military-security terms, as Shoesmith stresses, the Republic of 
China was “very cooperative in allowing us to use their bases in support of our 
activities in Vietnam.”169 Nevertheless, even the U.S. Embassy in Taipei came to 
share a prevailing view within the State Department that “sooner or later relations 
[with China] should be normalized.”170
From Kissinger’s perspective, however, those within the State Department who 
supported the opening towards China appeared to be concentrated on “trade and 
cultural exchanges” with the Chinese, which was “secondary” compared to the 
“geopolitics and the Russian and Vietnamese dimensions.”171 As for a Soviet 
dimension, namely the U.S. policy towards the Sino-Soviet rift, Paul Kreisberg, the 
former director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs (ACA), recalls that one of 
the key differences of between the State Department and the NSC was that while the 
State Department saw the normalization with China as being “beneficial to us in an 
Asian context,” the NSC, especially Kissinger saw it in “Soviet terms” and regarded 
the Asian context as “minor.”172 Overall, Kreisberg reassesses: “We saw the Soviet 
Union as one factor, but not the driving one. He [Kissinger], obviously, saw it as the 
driving one.”173
As for the Vietnam dimension, the Kissinger NSC expected that the opening to 
China would influence North Vietnam to end the war. Lord explains that: “If we were 
dealing with both of Hanoi’s patrons, Beijing and Moscow, it would help to isolate
169 Ibid., pp.2-3.
170 James Klemstine (Economic Officer, American Embassy, Taipei, Taiwan, 1970-1973), Oral History 
Interview, p.2, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
171 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.45, NSCP-OHR.
172 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office o f Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department o f  
State), 1965-81, Oral History Interview, p.8, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
173 Ibid.
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them and put pressure on them to be more reasonable at the negotiating table.”174 
Kissinger interprets that Nixon regarded the opening toward China as “a somewhat 
great opportunity” in order to “squeeze” the Soviet Union “into short-term help on 
Vietnam.”175 Although the subject never came up in any official instructions, Nixon 
may also have thought that: “if we were able to improve relations with China, we 
would indirectly diminish the Chinese interest in supporting the Vietnamese.”176 
On the other hand, the State Department was principally concerned about reassuring 
the Chinese in the Warsaw ambassadorial talks that the U.S. military operation in 
Indochina was “not designed to threaten China.”177 Thus, the State Department 
underestimated the degree of China’s support for North Vietnam. Kreisberg explains 
that: “most of us were surprised as we found out to what degree the Chinese had 
engaged themselves. ...we all saw the Vietnam-China issue as one that was, 
essentially, peripheral.”178 The State Department perceived the Beijing-Hanoi 
relations in regional security term. Kreisberg recalls that: “most of us at the EA 
Bureau level saw the Chinese, at most, as wanting to use the Vietnam War as a lever 
to weaken the United States, but not to expand the war and not to risk war with us. 
And when we talked about it in Warsaw, they never wanted to say very much about it
• 9 * 179other than to support the Vietnamese.”
In summary, the re-vitalization of the NSC system was much more systematic and 
complex than was previously estimated. The NSSMs and NSDMs were planned to
174 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
175 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164.
176 Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p .l 1, in >4 China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
177 Ibid., p. 13.
178 Ibid. The Chinese continued to provide aircraft gunners and logistics personnel in North Vietnam. 
See Foot, The Practice o f  Power, p.286; and Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 
1964-1969,” China Quarterly, 142, (June 1995), pp.357-387.
179 Ibid.
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provide a broad range of policy alternatives and perspectives. The fundamental source 
of Kissinger’s power was his control of the flow of policy study papers by chairing 
the key subcommittees, such as the Review Group and the Washington Special Action 
Group.
On the other hand, the State Department lost its chairmanship of key committees for 
policy planning. However, it still remained the principal provider of ideas and 
recommendations in the NSSM process. The State Department obtained information 
from a number of sources, such as U.S. embassies, foreign officials, and journalists 
and conducted a day-to-day analysis of change and development in Chinese foreign 
policy. Moreover, despite Kissinger’s pursuit of strict secrecy, State Department 
officials and the NSC staff members maintained informal communication to exchange 
views and develop policy studies.
The NSC meeting became a formal occasion for departments and agencies to 
present their respective views and issues rather than acting as a decision-making 
body. Nixon’s preference to avoid face-to-face meeting enhanced the development of 
communication by memoranda between the Oval Office and other senior officials in 
his administration. The President, accompanied by Kissinger, maintained the authority 
for making the final decision in a highly confidential way. Together, Nixon and 
Kissinger would pursue strict secrecy during the U.S. opening to China. It was on the 
basis of the presidential initiative and highly centralized foreign policy decision­
making machinery that the U.S. rapprochement with China would evolve as the 
following chapters demonstrate.
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Part II. The Evolution of the Opening Policy 
Chapter 3. The Development of Policy Options from January to July 1969
This chapter explores the evolution of a new China policy during the first half of 
1969. First, it examines President Nixon’s initiatives from January to March 1969. 
Second, it analyses the implications of the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes 
in March 1969. Third, it conducts a detailed analysis of the policy option studies, 
including the State Department’s recommendations and the inter-departmental 
studies, namely the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs). This study 
interprets the initial development of the U.S. China policy as a much more complex 
and dynamic political process than previously considered, on the basis of a number of 
policy option studies within the administration.1
1. First development
1.1. Inaugural address
In his Inaugural address on January 20, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the entry 
into an “era of negotiation” after the long period of confrontation: “Let all nations 
know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open. We 
seek an open world - open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a
1 “U.S.-China Policy 1969-72,” Far East, Box 86, Countries Files (CF), HAK Office Files (HAKOF), 
National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National 
Archives (NA). The date and issue o f internal studies, policy statements, and public steps in the 
following analysis are based on a detailed chronological survey o f  this document. Media sources, such 
as the New York Times and the Washington Post are also used where appropriate. Finally, there remains 
the so-called “black-box,” namely private exchanges between Nixon and Kissinger. Allen Whiting, 
Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. This study examines the exchange o f memoranda between 
Nixon and Kissinger as well as the record o f their conversations.
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world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.”2 The use of the 
phrase “angry isolation” reflected his message in the October 1967 Foreign Affairs 
article. In his memoirs, Nixon emphasized that he had intended to send a diplomatic 
signal toward Beijing.3
Nixon took drafting of presidential addresses very seriously, reviewing the NSC 
staff s draft and adding phrases reflecting his own thoughts. For his inaugural address, 
Nixon approved of the inclusion of some statement to the effect that the new 
administration believed in “open lines of communication,” which Kissinger intended 
“toward Moscow.”4 Kissinger recommended to Nixon that the overall attempt in the 
inaugural address was to present a new message of “sober, precise, methodical, and 
un-dramatic progress.”5 On January 21, 1969, however, the New China News Agency 
strongly denounced Nixon as the “puppet” of the “monopoly bourgeois clique” 
attempting to implement the “vicious ambition of US imperialism to continue to carry 
out aggression and expansion in the world.”6 Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) and 
Hongqi (The Red Flag) also jointly published an editorial essay characterizing 
Nixon’s address as nothing but “a confession in an impasse,” which demonstrated that 
“the U.S. imperialists...are beset with profound crises both at home and abroad.”7
2 For Immediate Release, Office o f the White House Press Secretary, The White House, “Inaugural 
Address o f President Richard M. Nixon” The Capitol, January 20, 1969, p.5, HAK Administrative & 
Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon reviewed his 
predecessors’ inaugural addresses, especially Kennedy’s.
Richard M. Nixon, RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p.545.
4 Kissinger to Nixon, January 8, 1969, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAK Administrative & Staff 
Files (HAK-ASF), Box 1, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Kissinger thus reminded Nixon that he would 
pass this implication to his “Soviet contact” on January 17.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Proposed Foreign Policy Section o f Your Inaugural Address, January 14, 1969, 
p.2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
6 Chen Jian, M ao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North Carolina Press, 
2001), p.238; Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and Thawing o f  U.S.-China Relations,” p.333, in 
Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.), Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954- 
1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001). Major newspapers all 
over China also reprinted Nixon’s address, which was unprecedented in the history o f the People’s 
Republic. It was Mao Zedong who personally ordered the publication o f N ixon’s address. Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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1.2. Nixon’s memorandum to Kissinger and the directive of NSSM 14
During early months, Nixon’s public statements still included two contradictory 
elements. On January 27, 1969, in his first press conference at the White House, 
President Nixon stated that it was up to the Chinese Communist representatives at the 
forthcoming Warsaw meeting on February 20 to clarify “whether any changes of 
attitude on their part on major substantive issued may have occurred.”8 In addition, 
Nixon also reiterated that the United States would “continue to oppose Communist 
China’s admission to the United Nations.”9
On February 1, 1969, Nixon sent a confidential memorandum to Kissinger, 
directing that: ‘I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this 
administration is “exploring possibilities of raprochement [sic] with the Chinese.” 
This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into 
the public prints from this direction.’10 In his memoirs, Kissinger explains that 
Nixon’s memorandum did not ask him to do anything toward the Chinese; it only 
urged him to create the “impression” that the United States was “exploring a move 
toward China.”11
In reality, however, Nixon’s memorandum was much more important as the 
beginning of substantial policy studies on China during 1969. On February 5,
8 The New York Times, January 27, 1969.
9 Ibid.
10 Nixon to Kissinger, February 1, 1969, Quotation marks in original, White House Confidential Files 
(WHCF), White House Special Files (WHSF) Co (Countries), [Ex] Co 32 Chad, Republic o f [1969-70] 
to [Gen] Co 34 China [1969-70], Box 17, NPMS, NA.
11 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 169. Italic in original. On 
January 29, 1969, the National Security Study Memorandum 9 (NSSM9) entitled “Review o f  
International Situation” examined the deepening strains in Sino-Soviet relations: “it is possible that 
each will become more active in seeking to prevent the other from aligning too closely with the U.S., 
and to use its own relations with the U.S. as a means o f checkmating the other’s policies.” Cited in 
Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative story (New York: Public 
Affairs, 1999), p.55.
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Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSC14) directing an 
inter-departmental study to examine:
• The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic 
of China;
• The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
• The interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested 
countries toward China;
• Alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.12
It was still a general directive to review the U.S. policy toward China. Kissinger’s 
directive requested that the paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by 
March 10. It would be submitted on April 30, 1969, and throughout 1969 there were 
crucial review meetings to discuss and improve the main issues and contents of 
NSSM 14. Winston Lord, a former NSC staff member and Kissinger’s special 
assistant, emphasizes that Nixon was privately “very quick” to move to a new China 
initiative.13 At this early stage, however, Kissinger still remained sceptical for both 
necessity and possibility of opening toward China.14
On February 17, the first official meeting between President Nixon and Soviet 
Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin, was held. The pursuit of secrecy by 
Nixon and Kissinger was already emerging, and thus Secretary Rogers was not
12 National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSC 14), Subject Files (SF), Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
13 Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
14 Alexander Haig recalls that Kissinger was very bewildered by Nixon’s directive to reassess U.S. 
China policy: ‘“Our Leader has taken leave o f reality... He thinks this is the moment to establish 
normal relations with Communist China. He has just ordered me to make this flight o f fancy come 
true.” He grasped his head in his hands, “China!”’ Alexander Haig Jr. (with Charles McCarry), Inner 
Circle: How America Changed the World, A Memoirs (New York: Warner Books, 1992), p.257; 
Alexander Haig Jr., Interview Transcript, Nixon’s China Game, PBS American Experience; and PBS 
Correspondence with Komine, September 1, 2004.
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invited to attend. Nixon told Dobrynin that Kissinger was the one to be his 
counterpart in a confidential channel. Calling for serious negotiations at various 
levels, Dobrynin delivered a letter from Moscow, which agreed to move forward on 
issues of the two superpowers’ concern, such as Arms Control and Vietnam. Nixon in 
turn hinted that if U.S.-Soviet relations did not develop well, he could explore 
opening to “others,” which Dobrynin interpreted as China.15
1.3. The cancellation of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in February 1969
The immediate major issue between the United States and China was the 
resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks scheduled on February 20, 1969. 
Although Kissinger’s memoirs do not explain any particular issues, the preparation 
for the Warsaw talk provided an important opportunity for the new administration to 
re-examine the agenda for its China policy. As for possible Chinese motivations, both 
an airgram from the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong and Kissinger’s 
memorandum to President Nixon examined the following possibilities:
• Internal difficulties, caused by the Cultural Revolution, which might increase 
the desire for an easing of external relations;
15 Memcon, Nixon, Kissinger, Dobrynin, and Toon, February 17, 1969, Subject Files (SF), Box 340, 
USSR, Memcons Dobrynin/President, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Richard Reeves, President Nixon: 
Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp.39-40; and Anatoly Dobrynin, In 
Confidence: M oscow ’s Ambassador to Am erica’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: 
Times Books, A Division o f Random House, Inc, 1995), pp.198-199. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger 
referred to this point in their respective memoirs. See Nixon, RN, pp.369-370; and Kissinger, White 
House Hears, p. 143. On US-USSR SALT negotiations, see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography 
(Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp.316-332; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 146-226.
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• The continuing U.S.-North Vietnamese Paris peace talks in accordance with 
the declining military outlook of the North Vietnam;
• A reaction to increased Sino-Soviet tensions, caused by the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia -  the Chinese might believe in a U.S.-USSR collusion and 
perceive the resumption of the Warsaw talks as a means to counter-pressure 
Moscow;
• An effort to explore the views of the new Administration of President Nixon;
• An effort to detect U.S. positions, particularly in its relations with the 
Republic of China in Taiwan.16
Kissinger was still unfamiliar with China policy, and thus relied heavily on the NSC
staffs recommendations.17 In his memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger argued that the
Warsaw talks could offer an opportunity to shift the focus of U.S. policy and to
promote a dialogue with the Chinese which would provide “greater stability” for East
Asia a) “without abandoning our commitments to Taiwan or undermining its
1 8position” or b) “damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan.” 
Kissinger’s memorandum suggested three major approaches toward China. Option 1 
was to indicate that the United States was “prepared to negotiate a normalization of 
relations” with Beijing. However, the memo suggested that this option would involve 
“considerable risk” because it could make the Chinese interpret “softness” on the 
U.S., cause a “crisis of confidence” in Taiwan and “seriously upset” Japan.19 Option 2
16 Air gram, Consulate General Hong Kong, “Communist China: U.S. Policy Assessment,” January 24, 
1969, pp.2-3, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records o f  
the Department o f  State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), NA; and Kissinger to Nixon, “Warsaw 
Talks,” February 11, 1969, pp.1-2, Country File (CF)-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
17 Prior to N ixon’s inauguration, NSC staff member Richard Sneider wrote to Kissinger that the 
Warsaw ambassadorial talks scheduled for February 20 would provide the “first clear opportunity” for 
the new Administration to “signal its own policy.” Sneider argued that: “At this stage I would be 
inclined to move very cautiously with the Chinese” and wait until they respond with “any specific 
proposals for peaceful co-existence but leaving the door open for reconsideration o f our policies with 
the exception o f our commitment to Taiwan.” Finally, Sneider recommended that the China policy 
required a comprehensive NSC consideration in mid-term (four to five months) rather than short-term 
(within the next two months). Sneider to Kissinger, January 7, 1969, “Major Issues Anticipated During 
the Next Six Weeks in East Asia,” pp.1-2, HAK Administrative & Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, Nov 
1968 - Jan 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.




was to indicate that the U.S. was “prepared to enter into serious discussions or 
negotiations with respect to our policies” except U.S. commitment to Taiwan.20 
However, this approach was likely to leave Japan and other Asian countries nervous if 
there was no immediate positive response from Beijing, and there would be a “quick 
and negative response” from Taipei. Option 3 suggested that the United States would 
pick up the Chinese reference to “peaceful coexistence” and “ask whether they have 
any specific proposals to make,” without taking any initiatives.21 Kissinger 
recommended the risk-free position of option 3.
In a memorandum to President Nixon, State Department officials recommended that 
the United States adopt a “firm posture” on its commitments to the Republic of China 
coupled with a “general expression of willingness to negotiate all other issues,” as
77well as work toward peaceful coexistence with Beijing. In particular, the “mutual 
hostility and suspicion” between Beijing and Moscow had led each side to regard any 
possibility of the other’s rapprochement with the United States with the “greatest
7^concern” and to do what they could to “prevent it.”
State Department officials declared that: “Here is an opportunity for us to determine 
how far Peking may be prepared to move from its current positions.”24 The ultimate 
premise for any U.S. move was that “it symbolizes the emphasis and direction in 
which the new Administration wishes to proceed.”25 The initial proposal represented a 
combination of (a) the U.S. proposal for “renunciation of the use of force”, and (b) 
“our desire not to prejudice our defense commitments on Taiwan.” The key new 
element was an “explicit expression of willingness to negotiate normalization” with
20 Ibid., p.4.
21 Ibid.
22 Rogers to Nixon, “U.S. Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw 





Beijing while “not changing our present normal relations with the Republic of 
China.”26 The State Department proposal was thus mainly concerned with the impact 
of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks on U.S. relations with the Republic of China. Very 
importantly, moreover, State Department officials recommended that for the “first 
time,” the United States offer to “send a special US representative” to Beijing.27
On February 18, however, the Chinese cancelled the planned 134th Warsaw 
meeting, because of the fact that a Chinese diplomat in the Netherlands defected and 
was given political asylum at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague in late January 1969. 
On February 18, following President Nixon’s instruction, Secretary of State Rogers 
expressed U.S. regret at the Chinese cancellation of the Warsaw talks and declared 
that the United States wanted to engage in a broad program of cultural and scientific 
exchange with China.28 On March 4, however, Nixon himself stated at a news 
conference that: “Looking further down the road, we could only think in terms of a 
better understanding with Red China. But being very realistic, in view of Red China’s 
breaking off the rather limited talks that were planned, I do not think that we should 
hold out any great optimism for any breakthroughs in that direction at this time.”29
26 Ibid., pp.7-8.
27 Brown to Rogers (via Richardson), “US Policy Toward Peking and Instruction for the February 20 
Warsaw Talks -  Action Memorandum,” February 5, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, 
SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. The notion o f sending a special representative to Beijing was originally 
raised within the instructions for the Warsaw talks in November 1968. Memo from Paul H. Kreisberg 
to Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, “Warsaw Talks Instructions,” November 8, 1968, POL Chicom- 
US, 1967-69, Box 1972, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
28 “U.S. China Policy 1969-1972,” Box 86, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
29 President Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, March 4, 1969, Box 88, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
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1.4. The Nixon-De Gaulle talks
It was during his first official European trip from February 23 to March 2, 1969 that 
Nixon met French President Charles De Gaulle in Paris and discussed the need for a 
new China initiative.30 Both the NSC staffs briefing paper and Nixon’s Talking 
Points reveal that U.S. officials paid particular attention to the appointment of a new 
French Ambassador to Beijing, Etienne M. Manach -  their top Southeast Asian 
expert.31 It was anticipated that De Gaulle would be likely to ask about U.S. China 
policy, and the NSC staff suggested that the President inform the French leaders that 
the United States would “seek maximum contact” with mainland China.32
In their talk on February 28, 1969, it was Nixon who initially asked for De Gaulle’s 
evaluation on China.33 De Gaulle suggested that Nixon put himself in the position of 
the Soviet leaders to see China:
This is an enormous country which has a common frontier thousands of miles 
long with Russia. The Chinese have always detested the Russians and will 
probably detest them tomorrow more than at any other time in the past. Chinese 
ambitions are directed mainly against Russia. ...The Russians know this and 
China is their main preoccupation. ...They are thinking in term of a possible
30 See Nixon, RN, pp.371-374; and William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f  Foreign Policy in 
the Nixon Presidency (Hill and Wang, A Division o f Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, 1998), 
pp. 100-103.
Talking Paper for European Trip, China, p .l, General Background Papers, President N ixon’s Trip to 
Europe -  Feb.-March 1969, Box 442, President’s Trip Files (PTF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.
32 Talking Paper on European Trip, France -  General Talking Points, p.9, General Background Papers, 
Box 442, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
33 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, General De Gaulle’s Office in the Elysee Palace, Paris, February 28, 
1969, p .l, Presidential/HAK MemCons (P/HAK Memcons), Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Regarding 
secrecy, Nixon emphasized to De Gaulle that: “what would be said would not be put on the normal 
diplomatic circuit,” and even Kissinger was not present. Ibid. A former NSC staff member, John 
Holdridge, recalls that Nixon “preferred one-on-one in his meetings with chiefs o f state and heads o f  
government.” John Holdridge, Oral history interview in A China Reader, Volume II, p. 10, January 
1995, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and 
Training, Georgetown University Lauinger Library.
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clash with China tomorrow. They cannot face both China and the West (the U.S. 
in particular) at the same time. .. .they would like in the light of their growing 
quarrel with China to be sure that the West would not act against their back. 
They know that you and they are rivals. .. .the Russians were willing to meet 
with the US to secure a detente, it was partly because of the fear of China.34
It was the growing Sino-Soviet mutual hostility within which the two Presidents came 
to share the idea of the Russian “primary fear” of China.35 In their second talk on 
March 1, it was De Gaulle who raised the China issue by indicating that: “Some said 
that one should try and play the Chinese off against the Soviets and try to divide them. 
Others felt that it was worth trying to improve relations with both.”36 De Gaulle 
suggested:
We should have exchanges at all levels and we might eventually see the 
beginnings of a detente. How this would affect the Soviets was difficult to 
know. .. .The West should try to get to know China, to have contacts and to 
penetrate it. We should try to get them to sit at the table with us and offer them 
openings. .. .If the U.S. began to have relations with China this would mean that 
China would probably get into the UN.37
In his response, Nixon assessed a long-range policy toward China:
[I]n looking down the road towards talks with the Soviet Union we might keep 
an anchor to windward with respect to China. This did not mean that we would 
do anything so crude as to suggest we play China off against the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets would resent this bitterly. In 10 years when China had made
34 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
35 Ibid., p.4.
36 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, Grand Trianon, Versailles, March 1, 1969 [Morning session], p.7, 
P/HAK Memcons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
37 Ibid., p.8. See also Nixon, RN, pp.373-374.
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significant nuclear progress we would have to have more communications than 
we had today.38
De Gaulle agreed with Nixon by urging that: “it would be better for the U.S. to 
recognize China before they were obliged to do it by the growth of China.”39 
In his memoirs, Kissinger assesses that Nixon did not ask for any specific assistance 
on March 1; it was De Gaulle who “initiated” the China issue by stressing its 
importance as a “huge entity with great resources,” and Nixon appeared to be 
“skeptical” of it.40 Kissinger thus argues that the new administration had “no clear-cut 
plan.”41 In reality, however, as a result of two decades of assessment, there was a 
solid basis for Nixon to realize that it would be better to resume a dialogue with China 
before it became too strong to deal with. Finally, it was during the Nixon-De Gaulle 
talk on March 2 in which Nixon proposed to establish a confidential direct channel 
with De Gaulle: “if either of them wished to communicate directly with the other they 




40 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 170.
41 Ibid.
42 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, General De Gaulle’s Office -  Elysee Palace, Paris, March 2, 1969, 
p .l, P/HAK MemCons, Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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2. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes
2.1. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969
On March 2, 1969, the Sino-Soviet border dispute worsened when Chinese and 
Soviet patrolling troops exchanged fire at Chenpao (in Chinese)/Damansky (in 
Russian), an island on the Ussuri River.43 The New York Times reported that: “Soviets 
and Chinese Clash on Border; Each Lists Deaths in Siberian Encounter.”44 The State 
Department’s intelligence analysts estimated that the clash was the result of 
“persistent efforts by both sides to establish control” over the islands in the Ussuri and 
was not likely to lead to “wider fighting in the near future,” however, that similar 
incidents could be expected from time to time.45 Beijing had launched its “most 
extensive anti-Soviet denunciation campaign since January-February 1967.5,46
On March 4, 1969, during a briefing to the Congressional leaders on his trip to 
Europe, Nixon expressed that to side with the Soviets against the Chinese might be 
good short-range policy. However, it would be a suicidal long-range policy, for the 
Russians were “extremely sensitive” about this possibility. It was his experience that
43 Among recent works on this subject see, for example, Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash 
o f 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
August 2000; William Burr, “Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and 
Steps towards Rapprochement,” Cold War History, V ol.l, No.3, April 2001; and Evelyn (Chui-Ling) 
Goh, “From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit’ Ally: Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974” 
PhD thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2001. See also Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.47-49.
44 The New York Times, March 3, 1969.
45 Intelligence Note, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research (INR), Department o f State, “USSR/China: 
Soviet and Chinese Forces Clash on the Ussun River,” March 4, 1969, p .l, POL 32-1 Chicom-USSR, 
1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
46 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Millions Denounce Moscow,” March 7, 1969, p .l, POL 
Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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“fights between members of the same ideologies were more severe usually than fights 
between members of differing ideologies or religions.”47
On March 15 and 17, the second and third Sino-Soviet border clash erupted at 
Chenpao/Damansky in a much larger scale. The State Department’s intelligence 
officials judged that Beijing responded to the March 15 and 17 border clashes with a 
“less threatening tone and far less internal propaganda exploitation.”48 It appeared that 
Beijing sensed a “greater danger of military escalation” than it did immediately after 
the March 2 clash and was assessing the problem in a “much more sober fashion.”49 
Moreover, CIA intelligence officers concluded that it was the Chinese side that 
“triggered the initial clash” and thus the battle was the Chinese attempt to “contest” 
the Soviet presence.50
47 Patrick Buchanan to Nixon (Buchanan’s notes o f the second bipartisan leadership meeting), March 4, 
1969, pp. 18-19, Box 77, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records o f  Meetings, President’s 
Office Files (POF), White House Central Files (WHCF), NPMS, NA.
48 Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Border: “Has Peking Bitten Off More Than It Can Chew?” 
March 18, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. Initially, the 
Chinese leadership, Mao and Zhou were “very poorly informed.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry ceased 
its function during that period. There was only an element o f the intelligence apparatus, which later 
became the China Institute o f  Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). At that time, CICIR was 
a part o f the investigation department o f the Central Committee o f the Chinese Communist Party, and 
was the only institute that functioned. After the Sino-Soviet border clashes o f March 1969, several 
members o f  that institution were brought back to Beijing to “brief Mao and the leadership specifically 
on world affairs, including the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.” David Shambaugh, 
Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. In late February, following Mao’s instructions, Zhou told 
the four Marshals to meet “once in a week” to discuss “important international issues” and provide the 
Party Central Committee with their options. On March 18, they finished their first report, “An Analysis 
o f War Situation in the World”; eleven days later they had completed their second report, “The 
Zhenbao Island as a Tree in the Forest o f the Whole World.” Chen, M ao’s China and the Cold War, 
p.246.
49 Ibid., pp.2-3.
50 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate o f Intelligence, “Weekly Review,” 21 March 1969, p. 12, 
CIA Freedom o f Information release to National Security Archive. On March 15, 1969, Mao gave 
instruction for the preparation for the outbreak o f war: “The northeast, the north, and the northwest 
should be prepared.... We will try to gain mastery by striking the enemy only after he has struck.” 
“Mao Zedong’s Talk at a Meeting o f  the Central Cultural Revolution Group” March 15, 1969 Chen 
Jian and David L. Wilson (eds.), ‘“All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos’— Beijing, the Sino— Soviet 
Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69,” p. 162, Bulletin 11, 
Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
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Kissinger recalls that after the Ussuri River clashes, “ambiguity vanished, and we 
moved without further hesitation toward a momentous change in global diplomacy.”51 
Kissinger’s memoirs thus create a misleading impression that the March border 
clashes were the decisive events for the administration to comprehend the depth of 
Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. In reality, however, since January 1969, the State 
Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA had already engaged in a series of 
research studies on the Sino-Soviet border dispute.52 In contrast, at this stage, 
Kissinger was still sceptical of a new China initiative.
On March 31, the day after Eisenhower’s funeral in Washington D.C., President 
Nixon held talks with French President De Gaulle.53 Nixon asked De Gaulle to play 
the role of a go-between and inform the Chinese of the U.S. decision for a withdrawal 
from the Vietnam War and of Washington’s desire to improve its relations with 
Beijing.54 Accordingly, on April 23, De Gaulle instructed the French Ambassador in 
Beijing, Etienne M. Manach to deliver Nixon’s private message to the Chinese leaders 
at the highest official level.55
Hereafter, Nixon and Kissinger spent until September 1969 to assess the nature of 
Sino-Soviet relations and their possible impact on U.S. policy toward Asia. Therefore,
51 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.170-171.
52 For example, the State Department’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research initiated an intelligence 
study series entitled “Sino-Soviet Affairs.” Sino-Soviet Affairs, BIR, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, 
SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
53 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, Yellow Oval Room, The White House, March 31, 1969, p.2, P/HAK 
MemCons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
54 Ibid. Regarding Vietnam, De Gaulle stated that “the sooner it was clear the U.S. was leaving, the 
greater would be the willingness o f the Thieu regime and the NLF to get together and work out some 
sort o f a solution.” In other words, “the longer they believed the U.S. would remain, the less likely they 
were to arrive at some solution.” Ibid. On March 17, 1969, the United State secretly began to bomb the 
so-called Ho Chi Minh Trial through Laos and Cambodia - the North Vietnamese’ supply road. The 
bombings, which became public knowledge on May 9, 1969, continued until May 1970. As for the 
Nixon administration’s military operation o f the Vietnam War, see Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam 
War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press o f Kansas, 1998); and Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: 
Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 2001).
55 With De Gaulle’s support, Nixon might have considered the “French backchannel” as a possible 
main means o f communication with the Chinese. In reality, however, De Gaulle resigned the 
presidency on April 28, 1969 and died on November 9, 1970.
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the March border clashes should be regarded as the beginning of substantial White 
House assessment of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility.
2.2. The first official initiatives bv the State Department
The first official signal of the Nixon administration’s policy toward China since 
Nixon’s inaugural address and the cancellation of the Warsaw talks came from the 
State Department. On April 21, in an address in New York, Secretary Rogers made 
clear the U.S. intention to promote a new dialogue with China:
One cannot speak of a future of Pacific community without reference to China. 
The United State Government understands perfectly well that the Republic of 
China on the island of Taiwan and Communist China on the mainland are both 
facts of life. .. .Not even a nation as large as mainland China can live forever in 
isolation from a world of inter-dependent states. Meanwhile, we shall take 
initiatives to re-establish more normal relations with Communist China and we 
shall remain responsive to any indication of less hostile attitudes from their 
side.56
56 Address by Secretary o f State William Rogers, before the Associated Press Annual Luncheon 
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, April 21, 1969, pp.5-6, Extra Copies o f Memo to President on Asia 
Trip [27Jun.-23July 1969] [Part I], Box 465, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon and Kissinger did not 
refer to Rogers’ speech in their respective memoirs. From April 1 to 24, 1969, the Ninth Congress o f  
the Chinese Communist Party was held, and Lin Biao was named Chairman Mao’s heir-designate. 
Lin’s speech reiterated that China would not attack unless it was attacked and criticized U.S. 
imperialism and Soviet revisionism as equal threats to China. “Mao Zedong’s Addition to Lin Biao’s 
Political Report at the Party’s Ninth Congress,” April 1969, p.162, in Chen and Wilson (eds.), “All 
Under the Heaven is Great Chaos,” CWIHP. The State Department’s intelligence officials analysed that 
while the party Congress promised “little change in the substance” o f  Beijing’s foreign policy, it left 
“room for a normalization in the conduct o f  Chinese diplomacy.” Intelligence Note, BINR, 
“Communist China: Lin Piao’s Report to Party Congress Published,” April 28, 1969, p .l; and 
Intelligence Note, BINR, “Communist China: Lin Piao Charts China’s Foreign Policy Course,” April 
30, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1962, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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In a broad sense, the State Department shared the general objective o f improving 
relations with China with the White House. During 1969, senior officials in the State 
Department would give public statements on the China policy. However, the State 
Department was not entirely informed o f the real intentions o f Nixon and Kissinger. 
Therefore, the State Department operated independently in assessing a new China 
policy until the re-activation of the Warsaw channel in late 1969. The Bureau o f East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs principally conducted interdepartmental studies on U.S. 
policy toward China.
Particularly important, during his trip to Asia in March and April 1969, the 
Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs-designate, Marshall 
Green informed many o f the Asian leaders that the United States “would make moves 
from time to time designed to prove that it is Peking, not Washington, that is isolating 
China.”57 On his return, Green produced a long report to the President. Green assessed 
that there was “ less of a consensus” among Asian leaders on “whether Peking’s
CO
growing nuclear capability would lead to adventurism.” In particular, Green 
emphasized that: “No one seemed to share the Soviets’ concern that the U.S. was 
contemplating normalization o f relations with Peking.” Green concluded that: 
“Moscow may not have any clear idea as to how to proceed in Asia. Moscow must 
have been left in a deep dilemma by the widening Sino-Soviet rift, the upheaval in
57 Marshall Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, pp.52-53, and Idem, Evolution o f  
U.S.-China P olicy 1956-1973: M emoirs o f  An Insider, p .27, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, 
Volume II, January 1995, FAOHCF. After his return from the Asia trip, Green becam e the Assistant 
Secretary by replacing W illiam  Bundy. Neither N ixon nor Kissinger refers to the Green memorandum  
in their respective memoirs.
Green to N ixon, “A V iew  o f  East A sia,” April 21, 1969, enclosed in M em o from K issinger to 
Rogers, May 28, 1969, POL Asia, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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Indochina, and the costs and risks of supporting Hanoi and Pyongyang in the years 
ahead.”59
“This is Great,” Nixon commented on the top page of Green’s report, and Kissinger 
sent the copies of the report to Secretaries of State and Defense, the administrator of 
the Agency for International Development, and the director of the U.S. information 
agency.60 In reality, however, Kissinger was not pleased with Green’s direct contact 
with Nixon, which had bypassed the National Security Adviser and his NSC staff. 
After this earlier contact, the relationship between Kissinger and Green began to 
deteriorate.
On April 16-17, April 25, and May 2, more clashes broke out along the Sino-Soviet 
border areas, about two thousand five hundred miles to the west of the frontier 
between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan. On April 26, Moscow publicly proposed to 
Beijing the resumption of the Sino-Soviet meetings of the Joint Commissions for 
Navigation on Boundary Rivers, which had been suspended since 1967. On May 11, 
Beijing accepted the Soviet proposal. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research interpreted Beijing’s response in a May 24 government statement on the 
Soviet proposal as the affirmation of the Chinese desire to take the dispute off the 
battlefield to the conference table.61
However, more fighting erupted along the Amur River on May 12, 15, 25, and 28; 
and further clashes occurred on May 20 and June 10 in the Sinkiang border area. The 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that the recent
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Intelligence Note, INR, “Peking Agrees to Soviet Border Talks,” May 28, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom- 
USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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Sino-Soviet border incidents suggested that the Chinese were the provocateurs.62 In 
the short term, Beijing was trying to “agitate” the Soviets and “test” from the reaction 
to these counter-pressures “how far the Soviets may be prepared to go.”63 Beijing’s 
tactics had been developed “out of fear to offset a position of weakness.”64
In his memoirs, Kissinger recalls that the Sinkiang clash convinced him that the 
Soviet Union was “the aggressor.”65 However, this statement is misleading because, 
as new evidence in this study shows in the following sections, until late 1969, 
Kissinger remained uncertain about the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
2.3. NSC Review Group Meeting on NSSM 14 in May 1969
On April 30, 1969, the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group completed 
the first comprehensive study entitled “United States China Policy” in response to 
NSSM 14 of February 5, 1969.66 The paper explored the nature of the Chinese threat 
to U.S. interests and the range of U.S. objectives and options vis-a-vis the PRC. The 
paper also examined wide-ranging specific issues, such as the impact of U.S. policy 
toward China on Communist states and Non-Communist states, U.S. relations with 
Republic of China (ROC) as a U.S. military base, Sino-U.S. normalization, the 
Chinese representation issue in the United Nations, and trade.
62 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Peking Inflates Soviet War Threat,” June 3, 1969, p .l, 
POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
63 Intelligence Note, INR, “Peking’s Tactics and Intentions Along the Sino-Soviet Border,” June 13, 
1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
64 Ibid., p.3.
65 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 177.
66 Winthrop G. Brown (Acting Chairman, East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group) to 
Kissinger, “United States China Policy (Response to NSSM 14), April 30, 1969, Senior Review Group 
Meetings, Box H-037, Review Group China NPG [Part 2], 5/15/69, National Security Council 
Institutional Files (NSCIF), NPMS, NA.
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The paper assessed that the PRC wanted to extend its influence in Asia and to be 
treated as a major world power as well as the primary source of revolutionary 
ideological leadership.67 In particular, the PRC would seek the removal of the U.S. 
military presence from both the Taiwan Strait area and Taiwan, and simultaneously a 
U.S. acceptance of its long-term claim that Taiwan was an internal matter.68 As for 
China’s security environment, the U.S.-USSR bipolar situation that characterized Asia 
in the previous two decades was shifting toward a “four-sided relationship among the 
US, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China.”69 It was therefore likely, the 
paper judged, that China’s leaders genuinely felt threatened by a US-USSR-Japan- 
India “encirclement.” Their charges of US-Soviet “collusion” and Japan’s alleged 
intention to re-establish the “greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere” were, in Chinese 
eyes, more than just propaganda.70 The possible impact of current Sino-Soviet 
tensions on US policy toward the Soviet Union and China would be discussed in 
detail in NSSM 63.
At the time, U.S. strategy consisted of two elements: deterrence of any possible 
direct Chinese threat; and limited efforts to suggest to the Chinese the desirability of 
changing their policies. The paper suggested two alternative strategies: movement 
toward intensified deterrence and isolation; and movement toward reduction of points 
of conflict and international isolation.71 To encourage the reduction of tension, while 
continuing necessary measures to deter any possible overt Chinese attack against US 
allies in Asia, the United States (a) could gradually de-emphasize the military aspect 
of its containment of the PRC; (b) could unilaterally reduce or eliminate economic
67 NSSM14: United States China Policy, p.2, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-037, Review  
Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
68 Ibid., p.2.
69 Ibid., p.5.
70 Ibid., Annex A -10.
71 Ibid.pp. 10-11.
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and political measures designed to isolate Beijing; or (c) could acquiesce to the PRC’s 
fuller participation in the international community.72
In their summary paper of NSSM 14, State Department officials recommended that 
decisions were required on three specific issues: 1) the future use of Taiwan as a 
military base; 2) U.S. policy toward the Offshore Islands; and 3) trade with 
Communist China. In particular, the U.S. military presence on Taiwan had increased 
in support of operations in Vietnam, and therefore a decision on the “over-all question 
of Taiwan as a military base” was required before these specific policy issues could 
be decided upon.74 Thus, the principal interest of the State Department remained the 
Taiwan issue.
The NSC staff commented on NSSM 14 that there was not a sufficient treatment of 
the “broader Asian context” and of possible effects upon relationships with Japan and 
the Soviet Union.75 The NSC staff recommended that that alternative strategy option 
of the “Gradual Reduction in Tension” represented the “most prudent course towards 
China at the moment.”76 In particular, immediate decisions could be made on (a) 
relaxing trade controls and (b) lifting travel restrictions. Finally the NSC staff 
recommended further studies on (a) steps and program for the gradual relaxation of 
trade controls, and (b) alternative UN scenarios. In essence, the NSC staff sought to 
reassess the China policy within a broader geopolitical context. These 
recommendations would be the basis of NSSMs 106 and 107 in late 1970.
72 Ibid., p.5.
73 NSSM14: United States China Policy, Summary Paper on Major Issues for Decision Regaining US 
China Policy (Summary by State at May 2 RG Meeting), p .l, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H- 
037, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
74 Ibid., p.2
75 Review Group Meeting, May 7, 1969, NSSM14: United States China Policy, HAK Talking Points, 




On May 15, 1969, a Review Group meeting on China policy was held. Kissinger, 
who chaired the meeting, presented his fundamental questions: “what do we want 
from China over the longer term and what can we reasonably expect to do to 
influence that outcome?”77 Kissinger believed that a “nation of 700 million people, 
surrounded by weaker states, could be a security threat no matter what type of policy 
it pursued.”78 The question was whether U.S. policy toward China should be framed 
by security considerations, such as a balance of power approach, or by desire for a 
more conciliatory attitude. There was general agreement that U.S. policy could have 
little impact on Chinese behavior over the short term. Kissinger asked: “whether we 
care if China maintains her policy of isolation so long as this is coupled with a 
relatively low level of aggression.”79 In response to Kissinger’s questions, a NSC staff 
member, Morton Halperin, suggested that the basic choice was between status quo 
and some easing. CIA officer, Jack Smith, also argued that the essential issue was 
how to bring China into the world community in the long term, which might make her 
“more manageable.”80 
Suggesting Sino-Soviet difficulties as a “key issue,” Kissinger asked: “What is our 
view of the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, how much can we influence them, 
should we favor one or the other?” Kissinger noted that “the Soviets and Chinese each 
think we are playing with the other.”81 The so-called “Kremlinologists” believed that 
“any attempt to better our relations with China will ruin those with the Soviet Union.” 
However, Kissinger counter-argued that history suggested to him that “it is better to
77 Lord to Kissinger (via Morton H. Halperin), “Review Group Meeting, 2:10-3:55p.m., White House 
Situation Room, May 15, 1969,” May 19, 1969, pp.1-2, SRG Minutes Originals, Box H - l l l ,  Senior 






align yourself with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners,” because 
it would function as a restraint on the stronger.82 Kissinger thus criticized the NSSM 
14 paper for not making clear what the desirable role of China in the world should be, 
nor fully exploring “the US-China-Soviet triangular relationship,” to which a NSC 
staff member Richard Sneider added Japan.83
Kissinger appeared to remain sceptical of a new China initiative. Kissinger 
reiterated an alternative formulation that “it is not our interest -  or at least our task -  
to bring China in. We need not strive to isolate her, but may not be worth great 
investment in US policy to move positively.”84 A State Department official Winthrop 
Brown disagreed, suggesting that the question remained how “we might be able to 
bring about better Chinese behavior as they emerge from present isolation.”85 Sneider 
also argued that “China policy is difficult because the short term threat is much less 
than the longer term threat; we have more flexibility in the short term because of the 
nature of the threat but we have less flexibility because of the Chinese attitude.”86 
Under the option of “reducing tensions,” there was consensus on the three sets of 
issues: a) those that could be taken immediately if it were decided to change the China 
policy -  trade and travel; b) those dependent on other decisions -  use of Taiwan as a 
base; c) longer range problems -  overall policy toward Taiwan, Offshore Islands,
• • • 87United Nations and possibly diplomatic recognition.
82 Ibid., p.9.
83 Ibid., p. 10. However, it is likely that Kissinger read only the NSC staffs summary rather than the 
entire NSSM 14 papers, which explored the question o f U.S.-USSR-PRC-Japan relationship. China 
experts, such as Tucker and Whiting also argue that Kissinger did not carefully read policy study 
papers. Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; and Allen Whiting, Interview with 
Komine, October 19, 2003.
84 Ibid., p .l l .
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p. 12.
87 Ibid., p. 13. Owing to a number o f recommendations for further studies at the interdepartmental level, 
the consideration o f  the China paper at the NSC meeting was postponed (materialized on August 14, 
1969). See Chapter 4, Section 2.1 o f this study.
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2.4. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in June and July 1969
On June 8, 1969, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev delivered an address to 
the International Conference of Communist parties in Moscow: “We are of the 
opinion that the course o f events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a 
system of collective security in Asia.” On June 19, Beijing criticized that the USSR 
and the US were unifying their efforts to encircle China militarily and incite India 
against China’s southwestern frontier, thereby “gravely threatening the security of 
China.”88
On June 22, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific affairs 
estimated that the present Sino-Soviet border tension was “serious,” and there 
remained a possibility that the Soviets might launch a “surgical strike against the 
Chinese nuclear installations.”89 On June 26, Kissinger requested NSC staff a NSSM 
on “U.S. Posture with respect to the Sino-Soviet Split and Our Role in the Triangle.”90
On July 9, 1969, a Sino-Soviet border incident on an island in the Amur River had 
evoked the most direct Soviet threat to date towards China. A Soviet Foreign Ministry 
note of July 8 informed China that the USSR was “compelled to take additional 
measures against the actions of the Chinese authorities.” The State Department’s
88INR, “Concern Over China Pushes USSR Toward Collective Security Concept for Asia,” p .l, Sino- 
Soviet Affairs, No.7, 1969, POL Chicom, 1967-69, Box 1963, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
89 U.S. State Department, Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office o f Asian Communist 
Affairs, “Implications o f Sino-Soviet Developments: Meeting o f June 21,” Pol 32-1, Chicom-USSR, 
SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. Nixon showed continuing interest in achieving a breakthrough in the frozen 
U.S. relationship with the PRC. On a return from his meeting with Vietnamese President Thieu at 
Midway Island in early June 1969, Nixon invited Green to his cabin on Air Force One where for nearly 
two hours they discussed China and other Asian issues. The President was “interested in the history o f  
our efforts to achieve some thaw in U.S.-China relations.” Green, Evolution o f  U.S.-China Policy 1956- 
1973, p.27, Oral history interview in A China Reader, Volume II, January 1995, FAOHC.
90 Haig to Halperin, “NSSMs to be Prepared,” June 26, 1969, Box H-299, NSC Vol. II, 4/1/69-5/30/69 
[2 o f 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
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Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that the wording of this threat was 
deliberately ambiguous.91 However, Moscow might then be persuaded that the 
credibility of its warning would be at stake if Beijing was allowed to continue to 
provoke border incidents.92 On July 15, 1969, Premier Zhou Enlai portrayed to 
foreign officials the Soviet threat as a replacement of U.S. efforts rather than 
“collusion” with the U.S.93
On July 14, in National Security Study Memorandum 69 (NSSM 69) circulated to 
Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and CIA 
Director Richard Helm, Kissinger stated that: “the President had decided on the 
preparation of a study” to examine “U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China” 
and “a range of possible situations in which a U.S. strategic nuclear capability against 
China would be useful.”94 In other words, Kissinger asked Rogers, Laird, and Helm to 
consider how to prevent China from becoming a fully-developed nuclear power by 
targeting its nuclear facilities.
91 Intelligence Note, INR, “USSR-China: Renewed Border Fighting Evokes Soviet Threat,” July 9, 
1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
92 Ibid., p.2.
93 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Chou En-lai Hits M oscow’s Asian Collective Security,” 
July 15, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. In their July 1969 
report, the four Chinese marshals warned o f  the danger o f  collusion and contention between the 
superpowers: “U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists collaborate with each other while at the 
same time fighting each other. The contradictions between superpowers, however, are not reduced 
because o f collaboration between them; rather, their hostilities toward each other are more fierce than 
ever before.” Report by Four Chinese Marshals -  Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie 
Rongzhen -  to the Central Committee, “A Preliminary Evaluation o f the War Situation,” July 11, 1969, 
in Chen and Wilson (eds.), “All Under the Heaven,” pp. 166-167; and Chen, M ao's China and the Cold 
War, p.247.
94 National Security Study Memorandum 69: U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia, July 14, 1969, SF, Box 365, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA. Tyler argues that there was an option for the United States to agree or cooperate 
with the Soviet Union to wipe out China’s nuclear capability in return for Soviet help in Vietnam. 
Tyler, A Great Wall, p.63. However neither Nixon nor Kissinger referred to this study in their 
respective memoirs.
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2.5. NSSM 35: Easing trade and travel restrictions
During June and July 1969, following the review of trade restrictions ordered by 
NSSM 35 on March 28, the U.S. government publicly began to modify its two 
decade-old trade embargo against China.95 On June 26, Kissinger signed a directive to 
the agencies: “The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to modify 
certain of our trade controls against China.”96 Accordingly, the NSC Under 
Secretaries Committee, chaired by Elliot Richardson, was asked to prepare detailed 
recommendations to implement the Presidential decision. In their respective 
memoranda to Nixon, Richardson and Kissinger pointed out the implications for the 
presidential decision at this particular time:
• The decision would “demonstrate the flexibility” that the President now had in 
administering trade controls.
• A delay might lead the United States into a period where “unforeseen 
circumstances,” such as changes in Indochina and worsening of the Sino- 
Soviet border situation, could prevent the announcement and thus cause the 
President to lose the diplomatic benefits. Such a delay would also increase the 
likelihood of [a] press leak.
• If the President waited to announce this decision until his return from 
Bucharest [a friend of China], it would probably be tied in with speculation 
regarding a presumed anti-Soviet purpose in the Bucharest stopover. This 
would give his decision an “overly overt anti-Soviet significance.” 7
95 National Security Study Memorandum 35: U.S. Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries, March 
28, 1969, Box 365, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Kissinger, White House Years, p. 173.
96 National Security Decision Memorandum 17, June 26, 1969, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
97 Richardson to Nixon, “NSDM 17: China Trade,” July 10, 1969, pp.1-2, Quotation marks in original; 
and Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Relaxation o f Economic Controls Against China,” July 11, 1969, 
p .l, China, Box 839, Name Files (NF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. It was initially assumed that actual 
implementation had to await passage by Congress o f the revised Export Control Act anticipated in 
September. Quotation marks in original.
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On July 21, 1969, two days before Nixon’s departure for his official trip to Asia and 
Romania, the State Department announced a partial lifting of trade and travel 
sanctions on China.98 The New York Times reported the announcement as “the first 
sliver of a break in the total embargo” against China.99 In his memoirs, regarding 
economic issues as secondary, Kissinger argues that the actual change itself was not 
important, however, the “symbolism” was vast.100 Lord recalls that: “These [The 
relaxation of trade and travel restrictions] were modest unilateral steps which did not 
require any response from the Chinese.”101 Overall, therefore, officials in the Nixon 
administration regarded unilateral actions as a diplomatic tool to send a low-key 
signal that the United States was willing to improve its relations with China.
In summary, it was Nixon’s presidential leadership that launched the new China 
initiative during the first half of 1969. Fearing bureaucratic leak and U.S. domestic 
conservative backlash, Nixon took the lead very secretly, directing Kissinger to 
conduct a series of NSSMs on the China policy. Nixon believed that a nuclear-armed 
China outside of the international community would be a great threat in the long run 
and thus that it would be important to initiate a new dialogue with Beijing before 
Washington would be forced to do so. In contrast, Kissinger did not have any 
particular interest in China and thus remained sceptical about a new China initiative.
98 Department o f State, July 21, 1969, A Matter o f Record -  No. 8, Public Statements on China by U.S. 
officials, Box 86, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], Country Files (CF) -  Far East, HAKOF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA. The decision permitted tourists and residents abroad to purchase 100 dollars o f  
Chinese goods and authorizing automatic validations o f U.S. passports for travel to China for certain 
categories o f persons, such as members o f Congress, journalists, scholars, scientists, medical doctors, 
and representatives o f the American Red Cross. There was a brief delay for the announcement. On July 
16, two American yacht men were captured by the Chinese when their lifeboat drifted into Chinese 
waters off Hong Kong. Chinese remained silent without playing the incident into any anti-American 
campaign. On July 24, the Chinese released the yachtsmen.
99 The New York Times, July 21, 1969.
100 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 179.
101 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
It was the State Department, especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that conducted a number of studies. In 
particular, the first comprehensive inter-departmental policy study, NSSM 14, 
provided a broad range of policy alternatives for a new China initiative. Finally, the 
outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 marked the beginning of 
the long process for U.S. officials to assess the nature of Sino-Soviet relations 
throughout the remainder of 1969.
141
Chapter 4. The Reassessment of the China Policy from July to November 1969
This chapter explores the bureaucratic reassessment of the U.S. China policy within 
the Nixon administration during the latter half of 1969. First, it examines President
Nixon’s initiative to send both public and private signals towards Beijing for a new
dialogue, such as the U.S. redefinition of its policy toward Asia, symbolized by the 
Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, and the opening of the backchannels, such as Pakistan 
and Romania. Second, it analyzes the escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes 
from August to September 1969 and the first full NSC meeting on the China policy. 
Finally, this study examines the further development of policy option studies by the 
NSC staff and the State Department in late 1969.
1. Nixon’s trip to Asia and Romania in July and August 1969
1.1. The Nixon Doctrine
By the late 1960s, realizing the limitation of power resources, the United States was 
reassessing its open-ended containment policy toward the monolithic threat from 
Communism.1 A major opportunity arrived when President Nixon took an around-the- 
world trip from July 23 to August 3, 1969. On July 25, on his first stop in Guam, 
President Nixon announced major changes in U.S. policy in Asia, in what came to be 
known as the ‘Nixon Doctrine’:
1 On this subject, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982), Chapters 9 and 10.
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• The United States will keep its treaty commitments.
• We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a
nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to 
our security and the security of the region as a whole.
• In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military
and economic assistance when required and as appropriate, but we shall 
look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.2
On July 26, the New York Times reported that: “Nixon Plans Cut in Military Roles 
for U.S. in Asia.”3 Nixon’s announcement brought about anxiety among U.S. allies 
that the United States would withdraw from Asia. Kissinger and the NSC staff 
members were not informed of Nixon’s plan in advance. Winston Lord recalls that the 
pronouncement was “accidental.”4 John Holdridge also emphasizes it as a “complete 
and utter surprise.”5 In his memoirs, Kissinger admits that the Nixon speech was 
“quite to my surprise.”6 Kissinger insists further that: “To this day, I do not think that 
Nixon intended a major policy pronouncement in Guam.”7 
In reality, however, some evidence shows how the fundamental themes of the Nixon 
Doctrine were outlined in advance. Marshall Green co-authored with Winthrop 
Brown and Robert Barnett the so-called “scope paper,” which turned out to be the 
basis of the Nixon Doctrine.8 In particular, the scope paper analysed the growing 
ability of most East Asian countries to assume “greater burdens for their own 
defense.” The paper thus urged that the U.S. position in Asia should “not be one of
2 Richard M. Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A Strategy for Peace,” February 18, 1970, 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970) pp.40-41.
3 The New York Times, July 26, 1969.
4 Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
5 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.90, FAOHC.
6 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p.223.
7 Ibid., p.224.
8 Marshall Green, Evolution o f  U.S.-China Policy 1956-1973, p.27, Oral History Interview in A China 
Reader, Volume II, January 1995, FAOHC; and Robert W. Barnett, Oral History Interview, March 2, 
1990, p. 16, FAOHC. See also Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William Stokes, War and Peace 
with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service o f  the United States (Maryland: Dacor- 
bacon House, 1994), pp.83-86.
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trying to solve East Asia’s problems but rather of helping East Asia’s problem- 
solvers.”9 On July 22, 1969, during a meeting with Congressional leaders, Nixon 
emphasized the continuing U.S. presence: “We must play a role in Asia if we are to 
avoid being dragged into the future war in Asia. ...Our role essentially should be to 
provide a nuclear shield for the Asian countries.”10 Nixon’s handwritten-notes show 
his preparation for the main contents of the Guam announcement. Nixon was fully 
aware that many Asians wondered “what our role is to be,” and was thus determined 
to emphasize that: “we are [a] Pacific power.”11 Nixon wrote that: “Our Goal”: 1) 
“Encourage Asia responsibility (Japan e.g.)”; 2) “Keep commitments -  but don’t 
extend them”; and 3) “Support their initiative.”12 
Solomon argues that the Nixon Doctrine was initially an “effort to avoid another 
Vietnam.”13 Rodman also assesses that the Nixon Doctrine was “not a formula for 
withdrawal” from Asia but the means of ensuring that the United States “stay 
engaged” in a greater cooperation with its allies and non-involvement in the internal 
affairs of other states.14 In essence, the Nixon administration sought to re-define the 
U.S. role as “behind-the-scenes encouragement.”15 In other words, the Nixon Doctrine
9 Ibid. Since his first meeting with Nixon in April 1967, Green had been an advocate o f a low-profile 
U.S. policy in Asia. Lord objects to Green’s suggestion: “It [the Nixon Doctrine] was not the 
introduction o f  low-profile policy in the Pacific. We wanted to preserve a high-profile in the Pacific.” 
Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
10 Buchanan to Nixon, July 22, 1969, POF, Box 78, NPMS, NA.
11 Notes Guam Press Conference, Box 50, President’s Speech Files, July-August 1969, Asia Trip [1 o f  
2] President’s Personal Files (PPS), NPMS, NA. Kissinger recalls that while preparing for N ixon’s trip 
in the summer o f  1969, Nixon and he often discussed the problems o f  the U.S. over-involvement in the 
world and the question o f the U.S. role in post-Vietnam Asia. Kissinger, White House Years, p.223.
12 Ibid.
13 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
14 Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 24, 2004. See also Nixon, RN, p.395; and Melvin 
Laird, Interview in CNN, Cold War, Episode 15, China.
15 Earl C. Ravenal, “Large Scale Foreign Policy Change: The Nixon Doctrine as History and Portent,” 
Policy Papers in International Affairs, Number 35, (California, Berkley: Institute o f International 
Studies, University o f  California, 1989), p.2, p.7, and p. 19. The Nixon administration reduced the level 
of force deployment from “a two-and-a-half strategy” to “a one-and-a-half-strategy.” While the former 
envisaged the possibility o f fighting a war against China in Asia, with one against the Soviets in 
Europe, and a minor conflict elsewhere all simultaneously, the latter acknowledged the Sino-Soviet 
split and thus a conflict with the Soviets would not necessarily involve China. See Nixon, “U.S. 
Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A Strategy for Peace,” pp.128-129.
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was intended to encourage U.S. allies’ further burden sharing as a substitute for U.S. 
direct intervention to maintain regional stability. Importantly, State Department 
officials later learned that the Chinese followed the presidential statement closely.16
In particular, at almost every stop, Nixon sought to leave positive signals of U.S. 
readiness to open communication with the Chinese.17 On the day of departure from 
Washington, Nixon said to Kissinger: “By the time we get through with this trip the 
Russians are going to be out of their minds that we are playing a Chinese game.”18 
John Holdridge, who had recently joined the NSC staff after replacing Morton 
Halperin in July 1969, outlined an initial secret message to China. On Air Force One 
flying between Jakarta and Bangkok, Kissinger asked Holdridge to “draft a cable to 
the Chinese,” proposing that the United States and China get together to talk about an 
improvement in relations.19 Holdridge wrote in his draft that: “we should not look to 
the past, but look to the future. .. .There were many issues that were of mutual value, 
and we should address them.”20 Holdridge recalls that: “I gave the draft to Henry. He
16 The Chinese expressed privately to foreign diplomats that the U.S. was going to “withdraw the bulk 
o f its forces” from Vietnam. U.S. officials interpreted that the Chinese appeared to have believed that 
the U.S. posed a “significantly diminished threat” to Chinese security. Memo from Rogers to Nixon 
“Next Moves in China Policy and Bargaining Moves Toward the Soviet Union,” October 21, 1969, 
pp. 1-2, Attached to Memo from Green and Martin J. Hillenbrand to Richardson, POL Chicom-US. 
1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
17 Richard M. Nixon, RN  (New York: Grssett & Danlap, 1978), pp.394-396; and Kissinger, pp.ISO- 
181. N ixon’s trip included stops in Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, South Vietnam, India, 
Pakistan, Romania, and Britain.
18 H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries (Santa Monica, California: Sony Electronic Publishing, 
1994), August 2, 1969. This study uses the CD-ROM version o f the diaries, which is more detailed and 
comprehensive than a book version. As for reference o f  the diaries, this study notes date rather than 
page. See also H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside The Nixon White House (New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994). Previously made excisions for national security and private reasons are 
published for the first time in Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2001).
19 Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Volume II, pp.25-26, January 1995, FAOHC.
20 Ibid.
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looked at it, gave his characteristic grunt, said nothing. ...That is the last I saw or 
heard of it.”21
Nixon’s handwritten-notes show his extensive preparation for meeting with leaders 
before and during the trip. Nixon wrote that U.S. policy should not be “a Soviet-U.S. 
Collusion against China” and that although there should be “no proposal of change 
now,” the United States “Hope[s] to see [the] time when China changes.”22 On July 
29, Nixon met with U.S. Ambassadors to Asian countries in Bangkok. Regarding the 
U.S. policy toward Sino-Soviet mutual hostility, Nixon stated that: “I don’t think we 
should rush quickly into [an] embrace with USSR to contain China. Best US stance is 
to play each - not publicly. US-USSR-Europe lined up against rest of Asia not a pretty 
prospect. US-USSR security pact would invite Soviet adventurism in area; can let 
people talk about it but not do anything about.”23
1.2. The Nixon-Yahva talks and the opening of the Pakistani channel
Toward the end of the trip, President Nixon made very significant private moves to 
establish back-channel communication with the Chinese through third parties, namely 
Pakistan and Romania. On August 1, 1969, Nixon visited Pakistan and held talks with 
Pakistani President Yahya Kahn.24 Historically, owing to a prolonged rivalry with
21 Ibid. Holdridge estimated that the message was sent to the Chinese either through Pakistan or 
Romania. Ibid.
22 Notes Guam Press Conference, Box 50, President’s Speech Files (PSF), July-August 1969, Asia Trip 
[1 o f 2] President’s Personal Files (PPF), NPMS, NA.
Memcon, Nixon and American ambassadors, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand, July 29, 1969, p.5, 
P/HAK MemCons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The meeting was a gathering o f regional Chief o f  
Mission held during N ixon’s trip to several Asian countries and Romania.
24 Nixon’s visit on August 1, 1969 had been to Lahore rather than Rawalpindi as the official capital 
Islamabad had not yet been completed.
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India, Pakistan valued military and economic aid from China and remained supportive 
of Beijing even during the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution. U.S. officials 
were aware of Pakistan’s unique historical position vis-a-vis China. In the Cabinet 
meeting on June 3, 1969, reporting on his around-the-world trip [of May 1969], 
Secretary Rogers explained that Yahya Khan, who was taking over in Pakistan, “has 
had considerable contact” with Mao, Zhou and other leaders of China.25 Nixon’s 
handwritten-notes show that the President personally admired and respected the 
“strong vitality” and “friendship” of Pakistan.26 In particular, Nixon was aware that 
what he would say to the Pakistani leader would be said to the Chinese.
In his memoirs, without revealing any specific issues, Nixon states only briefly that 
he and Yahya discussed the idea [Yahya’s help as intermediary] in “general terms.”27 
In reality, however, the Nixon-Yahya talk was much more substantial. During a 
strictly confidential talk on August 1, 1969 (even Kissinger was not present), Nixon 
stated that: “the U.S. would welcome accommodation with Communist China and 
would appreciate it if President Yahya would let Chou Enlai know this.” Nixon did 
not consider passing this thought as “urgent,” however he explained that President 
Yahya might convey this message “at some natural and appropriate time” in a “low 
key factual way.”29 The two Presidents also discussed China’s view of the world. 
Yahya stated that China felt “surrounded by hostile forces -  India, Soviet Union and
25 Memo from Jim Keogh, Cabinet Meeting, June 3, 1969, p.5, Box 7, MemforP, Records o f Meetings, 
POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
26 N ixon’s handwritten notations, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [2 o f 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, 
NA. In his memoirs, Nixon recalls his favorable impression o f Pakistan during his previous visits as 
Vice President in 1953 and as a private citizen in 1964. See Nixon, RN, p. 133, and pp.256-257.
27 Nixon, RN, p.546. Former Pakistani President Ayub Khan had once unsuccessfully tried to mediate 
between the U.S. and China in 1965. Department o f State Telegram, STATE 154461 (Extract), 
Attached to Memo from Holdridge to Kissinger, “Sino-American Contacts via Pakistan,” September 
16, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30Nov.69, Box 623, Country Files (CF) -  Middle East, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
28 Memcon, Ambassador Agha Hilaly and Harold M. Saunders, p .l, in Cookies II, Chronology o f  
Exchange with PRC, Feb. 1969-April 1971, Box 1032, For the President’s Files (FPF) -  China
Materials, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
29
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the United States in Southeast Asia,” and thus suggested a “dialogue with China to 
bring China back into the community of nations.”30 Nixon agreed that “Asia can not 
move forward if a nation as large as China remains isolated.”31 Nixon stated further 
that the U.S. should “not” participate in “any arrangements designed to isolate 
China.”32 In the end, Yahya noted that: “it might take a little time to pass this 
message.”33
Later in the same day, Yahya arranged a briefing meeting between Kissinger and 
Air Marshal Sher Ali Khan, who had visited China in July.34 Kissinger asked if there 
was any perceptible change in the Chinese attitude toward the United States. Nur 
Khan explained that Zhou insisted that the Soviets were “deliberately provoking” 
China by trying to extend their territory beyond recognized boundaries.”35 Thus, Nur 
Khan confirmed that Beijing feared the Soviets might try a “preemptive attack on 
China.”36
Nixon’s trip to Pakistan was a huge success. The largest Pakistani daily newspaper, 
JANG, called on President Nixon to review U.S. China policy in order to “reduce the 
threat to peace.”37 Haldeman recorded in his diaries that during the flight from 
Lahore, Pakistan to Bucharest, Romania, Nixon explained how impressed he was by 




33 Ibid. N ixon’s handwritten-notes further show that Yahya personally informed Nixon o f his two-hour 
talk with Mao regarding the Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet rift. Mao and Zhou said to Yahya: 
“if  Russia atomize [sic] us we will break out all over Asia -  what are they going to do -  atomize [sic] 
all over Asia?” N ixon’s handwritten notations, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [2 o f 2], PSF, 
PPF, NPMS, NA.
34 Telegram, American Embassy Rawalpindi, Pakistan, August 1, 1969, Pakistan Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 
Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also, Kissinger, White House Years, p. 181.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Special Memorandum, Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon’s Trip to Asia and 
Romania, 23 July -  3 August 1969, 6 August 1969, p.6, East Asian Trip 1969 [Part 3], Box 464, PTF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Union - an Indian ally, and China - maintaining close relations with Pakistan.38 Nixon 
said to Kissinger: “He could be a valuable channel to China -  maybe Russia, too.”39
On August 6, 1969, James S. Spain, American Charge d'affaires in Rawalpindi, sent 
a letter of enquiry to Kissinger, after having discovered the substantial difference 
between the notes of the Nixon-Yahya talks provided by both the U.S. side and the 
Pakistani side. Spain pointed out that President Nixon was supposed to have told 
President Yahya that the U.S. wished to seek an accommodation with China, wanted 
Zhou to know this, and would appreciate the Pakistani passing the word and using 
their influence to promote it. President Yahya was supposed to have agreed on the 
desirability of this arrangement but stressed that Pakistan’s relationship with Beijing 
“tended to be overrated in the West.” He was reportedly debating whether to utilize 
the local Chinese Ambassador to convey the message or to wait for a still unscheduled 
visit to Pakistan by Zhou -  which might be months off.40
On August 19, 1969, Kissinger sent a reply to Spain emphasizing that the Nixon- 
Yahya talks were conducted on a “strictly head-to-head basis” and the President 
contemplated that the contents of these discussions would go “no further than Yahya 
and himself.”41 Consequently, it was the President’s personal desire that there be “no 
written record or further reference” to his private discussions with Yahya and that “no 
official communications refer to them.”42
38 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, August 2, 1969.
39 Ibid.
40 Spain to Kissinger, August 6, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF—Middle East, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA.
41 Kissinger to Spain, August 19, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA. On his return to Washington, Nixon asked for information about the U.S. Embassy 
staff in Pakistan. Letter from Assistant Secretary o f Commerce to Nixon, August 11, 1969 Pakistan, 
Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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On September 16, 1969, Holdridge reported to Kissinger that President Nixon’s 
interest in “using the Pakistanis as a line of communication” to the Chinese had 
become “known to a number of people in State.”43 In particular, Holdridge attached a 
State Department cable, which reported a conversation between Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco and Pakistani Ambassador 
Agha Hilaly. The cable showed that Hilaly referred to the Nixon-Yahya talks on 
“Pakistan’s possible usefulness in communicating” with Beijing and reiterated 
Pakistan’s willingness to “help” Washington’s communication with Beijing.44 At this 
stage, therefore, the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger was not as 
complete as they expected.
On August 28, under Kissinger’s instruction, NSC staff member Harold Saunders 
met Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly and reiterated U.S. interests in improving 
relations via Pakistan. In particular, Saunders explained that the U.S. wished to 
establish “a single channel” between Hilaly and Kissinger as “the two points of 
contact” for any further discussion of U.S.-PRC relations.45 Hilaly explained that 
Zhou accepted an invitation to Pakistan without specifying the timing. Hence, 
President Yahya might initially convey that the U.S. had “no hostile intent” toward 
China. However, Yahya would wait until his meeting with Zhou to “convey President 
Nixon’s specific views.”46 In November 1969, Yahya finally delivered Nixon’s 
messages to Zhou. Thus was the origin of the so-called Pakistan backchannel, which
43 Holdridge to Kissinger, “Sino-American Contacts via Pakistan,” September 16, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 
1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
44 Ibid. Joseph J. Sisco was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1969- 
1974.
45 Memcon, Ambassador Agha Hilaly and Harold M. Saunders, p .l, in Cookies II, Chronology o f  
Exchange with PRC, Feb.l969-April 1971, Box 1032, FPF-China Materials, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
46 Ibid., p.2
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would play the crucial role of “intermediary” in delivering secret messages between 
Washington and Beijing, especially from October 1970 to June 1971.47
1.3. The Nixon-Ceausescu talks and the opening of the Romanian channel
On August 2 and 3, 1969, Nixon visited Bucharest and met with Romanian 
President Nicolae Ceausescu whom he personally respected for his strong presidency 
and a long-term preservation of his country’s independence in Soviet dominated 
Eastern Europe. In 1967, Nixon as a private citizen had already met Ceausescu and 
thus was aware that the Romania leader was one of the few Eastern European leaders 
who had reached out to Beijing despite Moscow’s displeasure. Importantly, as the 
“first state visit by an American President” to the capital of a communist country in 
Eastern Europe since the end of the World War II, Nixon’s visit to Romania caused
. 4 0media sensation.
Nixon was fully aware of the long-term importance of this trip. For example, on 
July 22, Nixon explained his decision to Congressional leaders: “We do not go there 
to antagonize the Soviets. ...We go there to offer hope to the people of Eastern
47 Lord recalls that: “I don’t know whose idea it [back-channel] was. But it clearly required tight 
control and secrecy which Nixon and Kissinger wanted for the secret opening to China.” Lord, 
Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. On Pakistan’s interest in strengthening its security position 
against India by playing an intermediary role between Washington and Beijing, see G.W. 
Chroundhury, “Reflections on Sino-Pakistan Relations,” Pacific Community, vol.7, January 1976, 
pp.248-270; Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies 
(Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001); and F.S. Aijazuddin (ed.) The White House 
& Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974 (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002).
48 See Nixon, RN, pp.281-282, pp.395-396; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 155-158.
49 N ixon’s handwritten-notes, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [1 o f 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, NA. 
The Romania trip was N ixon’s idea. In early June, Nixon wrote to Kissinger: “I believe we could 
needle our Moscow friends by arranging more visits to the Eastern Europe countries.” On June 21, 
Kissinger met with Romanian Ambassador Comeliu Bodgan and conveyed the President’s interest in 
visiting Romania. On June 28, 1969, the White House announced that the President had accepted an 
invitation from Romania, which surprised both the press and the public. See Kissinger, White House 
Years, p. 156.
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Europe.”50 In particular, Nixon’s handwritten-notes before his arrival to Bucharest 
show that the President prepared his personal messages to Ceausescu regarding U.S. 
attitude toward Sino-Soviet relations: 1) “We don’t want Soviet v. China hostility” 
and 2) “We will not gang up with one against another.”51
During his confidential talk with Ceausescu on August 2, 1969, being aware that his 
statement would be passed on to the Chinese, Nixon made clear that: “We have no 
interest in creating a bloc or other arrangements in Asia which can be interpreted as 
fencing off Communist China.”52 In the short term, Nixon explained that: “We do not 
recognize Communist China and we oppose its entry into the UN, not because of 
China’s internal policy but because of its policies toward its neighbors.”53 In the long 
term, however, Nixon expressed his hope that: “Our policy is to have good relations 
with the Soviet Union and eventually, when China changes its approach to other 
nations, we want to open communications channels with them to establish 
relations.”54 Nixon concluded that: “China is a reality and no real peace is possible 
without China’s playing a role.”55 
In response, Ceausescu commented that “ideology was not crucial” in the Sino- 
Soviet dispute; the real issues were “national,” because the Soviets were “reluctant to 
concede China its proper place in international affairs.”56 Ceausescu insisted therefore 
that the U.S. and the USSR eventually would have to recognize that China could “not 
occupy a second class position internationally.” As for the growing tension in Sino-
50 Buchanan to Nixon, July 22, 1969, MemforP, Records o f Meetings, Box 78, POF, WHCF, NPMS, 
NA.
51 N ixon’s handwritten-notes, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [2 o f 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, NA.
52 Memcon, Nixon and Ceausescu, Bucharest, Romania, August 2, 1969, p.7, P/HAK MemCons Box 




56 Ibid., p .l 1.
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Soviet border areas, Ceausescu did not think that the Beijing-Moscow antagonism 
would lead to war, but admitted that “the unexpected could always happen.”57 
Finally, Nixon asked Ceausescu to convey a confidential message to the Chinese 
regarding his willingness to restore U.S.-PRC relations: “Frankly, if it serves your 
interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a 
mediating role between us and China.”58 Ceausescu replied by affirming Romania’s 
willingness to “mediate” between the U.S. and China that: “we shall tell our opinion 
to the Chinese, and of your opinion of this problem. We shall act to establish relations 
on the basis of mutual understanding.”59
In his memoirs, Haldeman recalls his exchange with Kissinger before the departure 
from Romania: “You know, he [Nixon] actually seriously intends to visit China 
before the end of the second term.”60 “Fat chance,” answered Kissinger.61 In 
particular, Nixon was considering the promotion of trade in order to open up 
communist countries. Aboard Air Force One (on his way from Pakistan to Romania), 
Nixon told Marshall Green that trade might be a good means to draw the Chinese out 
of their international isolation, since China’s trade relations with the Soviets had 
already collapsed.
Overall, the Romanian trip was very successful, illustrating the Nixon 
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new dialogue. The Romanian media gave extensive news coverage to all phases of the 
President’s Bucharest visit while seeking to limit comment in evident deference to 
Soviet sensitivities.63 Thereafter, Nixon regarded Romania as one of the major back- 
channels in U.S.-PRC relations. It turned out however that the Chinese did not prefer 
Romania as the main backchannel. Solomon explains that the Chinese distrusted 
Communist states, especially those in Eastern Europe and remained suspicious that 
Romanians were probably “penetrated by the Soviet intelligence.”64 In comparison, 
Lord reassesses that: “Pakistan was more attractive to China, because China always 
had a problem with India, and Pakistan had a close relationship with China. The 
Romanians, although they had independence from the Russians, were still in Eastern 
Europe, so it made the Chinese feel uncomfortable.”65
1.4. Reactions to the Nixon trip
The White House and the State Department carefully monitored the local media in 
the countries which the President visited, and noted that mostly favorable coverage 
with considerable comment was provided.66
The Soviet media “played down” the President’s visit to Bucharest, “refraining from 
any direct comment.”67 However, it described the aim of the Asia trip as restoration of 
American influence in Asia in the wake of the damage by the Vietnam War. It pressed
63 Special Memorandum, Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President N ixon’s Trip to Asia and 
Romania, 23 July -  3 August 1969, 6 August 1969, p. 17, East Asian Trip 1969 [Part 3], Box 464, PTF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA.
64 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
65 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
66 Special Memorandum, Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President N ixon’s Trip to Asia and 




the USSR’s Asian Collective Security proposal as the proper alternative to U.S.- 
sponsored “military blocs.” There had been “only brief mention of U.S. China policy” 
in Soviet comment on the tour. However, none of the Soviet comment was at an 
authoritative level.68
Beijing’s comment at a low level sought to “undercut any tendency to credit” the 
Nixon Administration with a new approach to Asian affairs, denouncing both the 
United States and the Soviet Union for practicing “imperialism in Asia.” 69 In 
particular, Beijing had “remained silent” on the State Department’s June 21 
announcement of a relaxation of trade and travel restrictions, and had also “avoided
70mentioning” the President’s visits to Pakistan and Romania. Importantly, Beijing’s 
comment on the President’s trip did “not raise the question of Taiwan or other issues
71directly affecting Sino-American relations.”
On August 4, 1969, President Nixon gave a briefing on his recent trip to the 
legislative leaders of both parties, including Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield 
and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright. 
Nixon began to articulate that: “American policy in Asia is in a transition stage... The 
U.S. must move away from a monolithic approach to a country-by-country 
approach.”72 Nixon reiterated his strong belief in the continuation of the U.S. presence 
in Asia, because the U.S. withdrawal “would leave a vacuum of power in Asia which 
would be filled only by the Chinese or the Soviets.”73 Regarding the Soviet proposal
68 Ibid., p.iii.
69 Ibid, p.iv; and Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Peking’s Reaction to the President’s 
Trip,” August 13, 1969, p .l, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p.27.
72 Buchanan to Nixon (Notes o f  Legislative Leadership Meeting August 4, 1969), August 5, 1969 p .l, 
MemforP, Records o f Meetings, Box 79, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
73 Ibid., p.3.
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of an Asian Collective Security System, Nixon emphasized that he sought to assure 
“every Asian leader” that the United States would not enter into an “anti-Chinese 
security pact with the Soviets in Asia,” because it would “enormously enhance Soviet 
influence” in Asia.74 Finally, Nixon concluded that: “We should not go along with the 
Soviet-American condominium on Asia”; and that “We have to find a way to 
communicate with the Chinese.”75
In the meanwhile, the State Department took its initiative to clarify the new 
direction of U.S. policy toward China. On July 31, Secretary Rogers stated in Tokyo 
that the Nixon administration had indicated “several times and in many ways” that 
“we would like to improve relations with Communist China.”76 On August 8, 1969, 
Secretary Rogers gave a speech at Canberra, Australia, expressing that China had 
been “too isolated from world affairs,” and thus the United States had been seeking to 
“open up channels of communication.”77 The Rogers speech caused media sensation 
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2. The escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in August and September 
1969
2.1. NSC Meeting on NSSM 14: U.S. China Policy in August 1969
During the summer of 1969, tension along the Sino-Soviet border areas continued to 
increase. After a particularly violent clash at the Xijiang province border on August 
13, 1969 (the largest scale fighting since March), the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research reported that both the USSR and China were “determined 
to assert what they regard as their rights along the entire length of the frontier” and
• 78that, consequently, sharp border clashes were “likely to continue for some time.” 
Although the two sides probably intended to “contain these incidents and prevent
79them from getting out of hand,” “unintended escalation might take place.” The 
National Intelligence Estimate also reported that “for the first time” it was possible to 
ask if a “major Sino-Soviet war” could take place in the near future.80 The report 
estimated that Moscow might consider it could “launch a strike against China’s 
nuclear and missile facilities” without getting involved into a “prolonged and large- 
scale conflict.”81
On August 14, 1969, the first NSC meeting fully devoted to China policy was held 
in order to discuss NSSM 14 paper. Given Nixon’s recent Asian trip, it was a useful 
time to focus on U.S. relations with China and to “develop a new policy toward Asia,
78 Intelligence Note, INR, “USSR-China: Ominous Rumbling From the Enigmatic East,” August 13, 
1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
79 Ibid., p.2.
80 National Intelligence Estimate, Number 11/13-69, “The USSR and China” August 12, 1969, p .l, 
Tracking the Dragon: Selected National Intelligence Estimates on China, 1948-1976, National 
Intelligence Council, CD-ROM, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004).
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and the Sino-Soviet dispute.”82 The unilateral steps which the U.S. announced on July 
23 with regard to travel and tourist purchases were designed to show Washington’s 
“willingness to have a more constructive relationship” with Beijing while maintaining 
its commitments to Taipei. Nixon reiterated that he made these points clear 
throughout his recent trip.83 There was a general agreement within the administration 
that U.S. policy could have little impact on Chinese behavior in the short term.84 In 
the long term, however, there was a concern that an “isolated and excessively 
insecure” China would increase the danger of “miscalculation and irrational 
behavior.”85 Therefore, while a more moderate China was not necessarily less of a 
threat, it could be “more manageable and predictable.”86 
The revised NSSM 14 paper issued by the NSC staff (after the Review Group on 
May 15) included an updated reassessment of the deepening Sino-Soviet mutual 
hostility. Both Beijing and Moscow were “extremely suspicious” of U.S. relations 
with the other. Thus, there were a few different angles within the administration about 
the U.S. relations with each communist giant.87 One view argued that the Soviets were 
so suspicious of U.S.-Chinese “collusion” that any U.S. efforts to improve relations 
with China would make better U.S.-USSR relations impossible.88 Those who held this 
view believed that Washington should give top priority to improving relations with
82 NSC Meeting, August 14, 1969, Talking Points (The President): China, p .l, Box H-023, NSC  
Meeting (San Clemente) Briefing Korea/China [2 o f 3] 8/14/69, Minutes o f Meetings (1969-1974), 
NSCIF, NPMS, NA. Nixon and Kissinger requested CIA director Richard Helms hold a briefing on 
“Assessment o f Present Chinese Communist Situation, including development o f their nuclear 
capability and political trends.” Kissinger to Laird, “Briefing Requirements for NSC Meeting,” August 
9, 1969, p .l, Box H-299, NSC Vol. II, 4/1/69-5/30/69 [2 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
83 Ibid.
84 NSC Meeting, August 14, 1969, HAK Talking Points: U.S. China Policy, p.4, Box H-023, NSC 
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Moscow and, for this reason, should avoid any efforts to increase contact with 
Beijing. An opposing view argued that the Soviets were more likely to be conciliatory 
if they feared that the United States would otherwise pursue a rapprochement with 
China. Those who held this view (the so-called “Realpolitik” approach in Kissinger’s 
words) would urge that the United States expand its contacts with China as a “means 
of leverage against the Soviet Union.”89 A third view held that consideration of U.S. 
relations with the Soviet Union should “not be a major factor” in shaping America’s 
China policy.90 Those who held this view believed that: a) the United States did not 
fully understand how its China policy would affect Soviet behavior; b) by talking to 
the Soviets, the U.S. could decrease any fears they might have; and c) marginal 
actions to increase Soviet nervousness might be useful, however, fundamental 
changes in the US-China relationship should be guided by determining on its own 
merits what America’s China policy should be.91
Nixon emphasized that he made clear to Asian leaders during his trip that the U.S. 
did not intend to join the Soviets in any plan to “gang up” on China.92 Particularly 
important, Nixon judged the Soviet Union as the more aggressive party in the Sino- 
Soviet conflict, stressing that it was against the U.S. interest to let China be 
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of 1969 “made clear the potential for triangular diplomacy” of U.S.-USSR-PRC 
relations.94
2.2. The Kissinger-Whiting consultation in August 1969
On August 16, 1969, Kissinger, accompanied by NSC staff member Holdridge, met 
with a distinguished academic expert on China, Allen Whiting.95 Whiting stressed the 
arrival of an “historic opportunity” for the United States to explore the Chinese 
perception o f a “common cause” with the U.S. against the growing Soviet military 
threat. Whiting explained that the Chinese would have a “tendency to exaggerate the 
threat” and that “we could exploit and move forward to the Chinese but not on their 
terms but with our terms.” The question was “not the literal threat” but it was a 
“perceived threat, as the Chinese perceived it.”96 
After the meeting, Whiting drafted a detailed memorandum in which he analyzed 
the massive Soviet military deployments along the Sino-Soviet border areas and 
warned of the danger of a Soviet military attack (including the use of nuclear 
weapons) on China possibly “aimed at destroying China’s nuclear capability.”97
94 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
95 Allen Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. Whiting had worked successively at the 
State Department’s Bureau o f  Intelligence and Research and the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong 
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Perceiving the outbreak of a larger scale clash on the Sinkiang border on August 13 as 
a deliberate Soviet initiative, Whiting suggested that the U.S. objectives should be: 
“(1) to deter a Soviet attack on China, (2) to inhibit the use of nuclear weapons in a 
Sino-Soviet war, and (3) to maximize the possibility of China identifying Russia as its 
sole antagonist, in contrast with the rest of the world and particularly with the United
9 98States.” Finally, Whiting urged that by taking such concrete steps as to resume 
contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and through third parties and to lift the trade 
embargo with China, the U.S. should assure the Chinese of its opposition to a Soviet 
attack."
Holdridge, however, was not convinced of Whiting’s assessment of the possible 
Soviet air strike against China. The Soviets would be “appalled at the magnitude of 
the situation” which would develop if they entered a war with China, with its vast 
territory and strong resistance from its large population.100 Hence, Holdridge 
concluded that the Soviets were going to be “very careful about what kind of decision 
they make.”101 On the other hand, Whiting recalls that Kissinger’s (and Holdridge’s) 
understanding of the nature of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility and the Soviet military 
deployment along the Sino-Soviet border was still “very little” in August 1969.102
After that meeting, Whiting received no feedback from Kissinger and the NSC staff. 
In November 1971, Kissinger explained to Whiting that: “you know until you brought 
that memo [of August 1969], we had a laundry list of things we would do, individual 
kind of signals. But we didn’t have it in a strategy. And your presentation put the
98 Ibid., p.8.
99 Ibid., p. 10.
100 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p. 105, FAOHC. See also Holdridge, Crossing the 
Divide, p.34.
101 Ibid.
102 Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. Whiting regarded Holdridge as a generalist on 
Asia rather than a China expert.
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whole thing into a strategic context.”103 Overall, despite Kissinger’s omission in his 
memoirs, the consultation with Whiting in August 1969 provided a crucial 
opportunity for Kissinger to improve his understanding of the nature of Sino-Soviet 
relations.104
In the meantime, the Soviets remained highly suspicious of a possible Sino-U.S. 
collusion against them. On August 18, 1969, during a meeting with State Department 
official William L. Stearman, Soviet Embassy official Boris N. Davydov raised the 
question of possible U.S. reactions in the case of their direct air-strike against China’s 
nuclear installations: “Wouldn’t the US try to take advantage of this situation?”105 
Accordingly, on August 28, William Hyland, Soviet expert in the NSC staff, 
estimated that a limited Sino-Soviet war would involve Soviet strikes to destroy 
China’s nuclear facilities, and consequently become a “solution” to China’s nuclear 
problem.106
On August 29, a group of outside consultants to the State Department reviewed an 
on-going interdepartmental policy study - NSSM 63 ‘U.S. Policy on Current Sino- 
Soviet Differences.’ Among them, the Asian experts, such as A. Doak Barnett, Ralph 
Clough, and Fred Greene, counter-argued that “any Soviet punitive strike at China or 
an effort to take out Chinese nuclear facilities would result in strengthening Chinese
103 Ibid.
104 There still remains ambiguity as to what extent Kissinger and the NSC staff came to realize the 
subtleness o f Chinese diplomatic practice in 1969, because they occasionally failed to grasp the 
implications o f China’s diplomatic signals in 1970.
105 Memcon “US Reaction to Soviet Destruction o f  CPR Chinese People’s Republic Nuclear 
Capability; Significance o f latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash,” August 18, 1969, p.2, D ef 12, Chicom, 
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106 Hyland to Kissinger, “Sino-Soviet Contingencies,” August 28, 1969, p.2, CF—USSR Vol. IV, 
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nationalism and unity, and would solidify Mao’s position.”107 Finally, all the 
consultants agreed that the NSSC 63 paper “underestimated the danger in a Soviet 
preemptive strike” and that “even a non-nuclear Soviet strike would have a vast 
destabilizing effect in Japan, elsewhere in Asia, and in Western Europe.” These 
experts urged that the U.S. should make clear to the Chinese that the U.S. was “not 
colluding” with the Soviets.108 Overall, Rodman recalls that the Soviets “tested us and 
asked us if we would object to a Soviet attack on the Chinese nuclear facilities.”109 In 
consequence, the U.S. government would privately send a “very important signal” 
toward Beijing that “we would not welcome a Soviet attack on China.”110
2.3. The Zhou-Kosygin talks in September 1969
On September 3, 1969, Premier Zhou visited Hanoi to attend Ho Chi Min’s funeral. 
The event provided a crucial opportunity for U.S. officials to assess the current 
situation in Beijing-Hanoi-Moscow triangular relations, and President Nixon ordered 
a large-scale intelligence operation. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research estimated that Premier Zhou and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin were 
“likely to cross paths for the first time since February 1965” at funeral ceremonies in 
Hanoi, however that their “separate consultations” with the North Vietnamese would 
highlight their different views on the Vietnam War.111 Hanoi in turn would question
107 Miriam Camps (State Department Planning and Coordination Staff) to Richardson, “NSSM 63 -  
Meeting with Consultants,” August 29, 1969, p. 2, Freedom o f Information Act release to the National 
Security Archive.
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the Soviets and the Chinese on their respective “intentions in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute.”112 State Department officials anticipated that the Chinese might have felt 
that it would provide an opportunity for conveying to the Soviets their growing 
concern about the “danger of war” by emphasizing Chinese “determination to resist if 
attacked.”113
In public, the State Department took a major step. On September 5, 1969, Under 
Secretary of State Elliot Richardson made a speech at a convention of the American 
Political Science Association in New York. Richardson stated that the “long-run 
improvement” of relations with China was “in our own national interest.”114 In 
particular, Richardson made it clear that the United States would “not seek to exploit” 
the hostility between the Soviet Union and “the People’s Republic” and that 
ideological differences between the two Communist giants were “not our affair.”115 
The speech was crucial because it officially clarified the U.S. attitude toward the 
Sino-Soviet border problem during the peak of its tension. Richardson’s handwritten 
notes show that he personally prepared the speech combining a set of 
recommendations from his staff. Particularly important, it was Richardson himself 
who changed the terms “Communist China” in the draft speech to “the People’s 
Republic.”116 Media coverage was generally very favorable to the Richardson speech. 
For example, the New York Times described the Richardson speech as “one of the 
most explicit public statements” on the Nixon Administration’s position regarding the
1,2 Ibid.
113 Ibid., p.4
114 Address by Under Secretary o f  State Elliot L. Richardson, September 5, 1969, p. 15, Box 102, 
Folder speeches (1), Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library o f  Congress.
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rift between Beijing and Moscow.117 It also reported that diplomatic observers in 
Washington viewed the speech as the State Department’s “opposition” to those who 
argued that it would be a good idea for the two Communist states to “engage into a 
full-scale war.”118 The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
assessed that, despite its public harshness toward the Nixon administration, since July 
Beijing had “privately exhibited increased curiosity about US Asian policy,” which 
appeared to be influenced by a series of policy statements by Nixon as well as by 
other senior officials, such as Rogers and Richardson.119
On September 11, 1969, after their separate trip to Hanoi, Premier Zhou and Soviet 
Prime Minister Kosygin held talks at the Beijing airport. Although rhetoric continued 
to remain harsh in public, especially from Chinese side, the talks prevented rapid 
escalation of tension along the Sino-Soviet border areas.120 On September 12, the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that this first 
meeting between Zhou and Kosygin since February 1965 may have been suggested by 
the Soviets, and accepted belatedly by the Chinese unwilling to appear as the obstacle 
to Communist unity and peaceful reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions. However, the 
meeting probably “produced no breakthrough in the dispute” between Beijing and 
Moscow.121 On September 18, Bureau of Intelligence and Research also reported that
117 The New York Times, September 6, 1969, in Box 108, Scrap books (1), Elliot Richardson Papers, 
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the recently published slogans for China’s 20th anniversary celebrations on October 1 
warned explicitly of “atomic war.”122
On October 7, 1969, the New China News Agency announced that Beijing had 
agreed to resume border talks with Moscow at the Deputy Foreign Minister level in 
Beijing. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research judged that 
China had been motivated by a combination of “fear” over a Soviet preemptive attack 
on its nuclear installations which had surfaced in propaganda in the previous few 
months.123 On October 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called for a mutual 
withdrawal from disputed border areas.124
The same day, Under Secretary of State Richardson sent a memorandum to 
President Nixon describing the decision for the resumption of Sino-Soviet border 
negotiations as a “new phase in Sino-Soviet and perhaps ultimately Sino-US 
relations” and as a “practical move demonstrating a flexible approach” in Beijing’s 
external behavior.125 State Department officials noted particularly that the Chinese 
statement of October 7 declared that “irreconcilable differences of principle” should 
not hinder the “maintenance of normal state relations” between China and the Soviet 
Union on the basis of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence.” The Chinese 
further stated that even if no border agreement could be reached, the “status quo” 
should be maintained, and there should be “no resort to force.”126
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3. Two lines of policy studies -  the NSC and the State Department
3.1. Drafting of NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences
Meanwhile, the interdepartmental study on Sino-Soviet conflict was in progress, 
and the Review Group (September 25 and November 20, 1969) and the Washington 
Special Action Group (September 4, 17, 29, and October 20, 1969) met to review 
NSSM-63: ‘U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences.’127 The paper examined 
the “triangular relationship” between the U.S., the USSR, and China, especially the 
“problems and opportunities” for U.S. policy under two sets of circumstances: 1) the 
Sino-Soviet dispute continuing mainly in non-military ways, and 2) the outbreak of a 
major war.128 The paper considered four broad strategies:
• To collaborate with China in its efforts to avoid Soviet-imposed political-
economic isolation;
• To collaborate with the Soviets in isolating China;
• To adopt a “hands-off’ attitude, refusing to have anything to do with either 
opponent that could be interpreted by the other as tilting the balance;
• To improve relations with both opponents, gaining “leverage” from the
dispute where the U.S. could in pursuit of its own interests.129
127 The Chinese side was also conducting a series o f policy option analyses. From July 29 to September 
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The “most important benefit” to Washington from the Sino-Soviet rivalry was that 
the growing dissidence between Beijing and Moscow had “limited both countries in 
the pursuit of policies basically antagonistic to U.S.” In other words, both sides 
genuinely feared the “possibility of the U.S. siding with the other.”130 Importantly, 
however, the “triangular relationship” between the U.S., USSR, and China was 
“markedly unequal.” It was therefore important “not to relieve Soviet concern about a 
possible improvement in Sino-American relations” in order to preserve the U.S. 
leverage in the Sino-Soviet dispute.131 Hence, the paper suggested that the U.S. 
longer-term purposes toward the USSR and China required a continuous effort to 
improve relations with both sides even-handedly, namely while exerting pressure on
• 132the Soviets in the short-run, “keeping the door open” to China in the long-run.
However, Soviet specialists, such as former Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen, still insisted that U.S. overtures to China 
might introduce “irritants” into the U.S.-Soviet relations, and thus the Soviets might 
adopt a “harder line both at home and in international affairs.”133 Hence, these experts 
argued for “caution in making moves toward better relations” with China.134
Overall, the NSSM-63 paper outlined the anticipated consequences which the 
dispute would have on Chinese and Soviet policy, and thus no specific policy options 
emerged directly from it.135
In his memorandum to Nixon on September 29, 1969, Kissinger again raised the 
question of U.S. reactions toward “a possible Soviet air-strike against China’s
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nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions,” including the use of 
nuclear weapons.136 Kissinger estimated that the Soviets might be “using” the U.S. to 
create an impression in China and the world that the U.S. was “being consulted in 
secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.” Thus, the U.S. 
should continue to “avoid the appearance of siding with the Soviets.”137 Finally, 
Kissinger estimated that the Chinese were willing to put U.S.-Chinese relations on “a 
more rational and less ideological basis.”138
3.2. State Department’s Policy Studies in October 1969
On October 6, 1969, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Marshall Green completed a detailed memorandum, reviewing U.S. relations with 
China in the first 9 months of the new administration, and recommending the next 
public and private steps toward China.139 The Nixon administration had indicated its 
“willingness to seek friendlier and more normal relations” through a series of public 
steps, such as modification of trade and travel restrictions on China and its repeatedly 
expressed “willingness to renew” its bilateral talks with the Chinese in Warsaw.140 
Despite public attacks against the administration in general and the President
136 Kissinger to Nixon, “The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China,” September 29, 1969, p .l, 
attached to Memo from Haig to Kissinger, October 11, 1969, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meeting May
1969-December 1969, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
137 Ibid. The Soviet attitude toward Chinese representation in the UN was showing a sign o f change. In 
his UN speech at the annual meeting o f the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko for the first time did not refer to Beijing’s admission. On September 22, 1969, Nixon sent a 
memorandum to Kissinger urging that: “I think that while Gromyko is in the country would be a very 
good time to have another move to China made.” Confidential Files, 1969-71, Box 6, CO 34, WHCF, 
NPMS, NA.
138 Ibid., p.2.
139 Green to Richardson, “Next Steps in China Policy,” October 6, 1969, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, 
Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. In their respective memoirs, neither Nixon nor Kissinger referred 
to Green’s memoranda in late 1969.
140 Ibid., p .l,
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specifically, the Chinese privately had told a number of foreigners that they were 
“aware” that U.S. policy toward China was “under review” and noted that the “trade 
and travel moves” were made within the context of this broad review.141 However, the 
Chinese had stressed that these moves were “insufficient” and that “some move 
relating to Taiwan was necessary.”142 Green assessed that the Chinese had conveyed 
“mixed signals”: while some reports suggested Beijing was seeking only some 
“symbolic” gesture such as a minor troop withdrawal from Taiwan or pull-back of the 
patrol ships in the Taiwan Strait, other reports focussed on Beijing’s long-term large 
objectives of complete U.S. “withdrawal” from Taiwan.143
Importantly, Green emphasized that Beijing had privately expressed its 
understanding (through Premier Zhou to the French Ambassador to China, Etienne M. 
Manach) that the U.S. had “not attempted to take advantage” of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute and that the U.S. did not perceive a Sino-Soviet war as in its interest.144 Green 
indicated that there had been an internal Chinese “debate” over policy toward the U.S. 
over the last year.
As for particular new steps, the United States had decided privately to withdraw, for 
budgetary reasons, the two US Navy destroyers which had regularly patrolled the 
Taiwan Strait.145 Green recommended that the Administration attempt to use the 
opportunity presented by the withdrawal to “improve the atmosphere” for US-PRC 
talks in “Warsaw or elsewhere.” In particular, Green recommended informing the 
Chinese of the U.S. move through a CIA contact in Hong Kong, which Nixon 





145 Ibid., p.2. Taipei had not been informed o f this decision in advance.
146 Ibid., p.4
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On October 10, 1969, during his trip to Washington, the Pakistani Minister of 
Information and National Affairs, Sher Ali Khan, told Kissinger that the Chinese had 
been informed that Yahya was ready to talk about U.S. intentions in Asia when 
Premier Zhou visit Pakistan, presumably early in the next year. In response, Kissinger 
informed Sher Ali and Hilaly that if Yahya was communicating with the Chinese 
Ambassador to Pakistan, he might say “confidentially” that U.S. would remove two of 
its destroyers from Taiwan Strait.147 Kissinger emphasized, however, that it did “not 
affect our basic position on Taiwan but it was an effort to remove an irritant.”148 After 
reviewing the report of the meeting, Nixon wrote his comment on the margin of the 
memorandum: “K, also open trade possibilities.”149
On November 7, the State Department announced the U.S. decision to terminate 
active routine patrolling by two destroyers of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits. 
Their presence was a symbolic remainder of President Truman’s decision to re- 
intervene in Chinese Communist-Nationalist relations at the outbreak of the Korean 
War in June 1950. Therefore, State Department officials anticipated that Beijing 
might interpret the decision as a “further indication of a diminished U.S. threat” to
147 Kissinger to Nixon, “President Yahya and Communist China,” October 16, 1969, p .l, “Exchange 
Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969-July 1971, 2 o f 2,” Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam 
Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
148 Ibid.
149 Nixon’s handwritten notations in Ibid. On October 20, during a meeting with Nixon and Kissinger, 
Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed Soviet readiness to open SALT talks and also formally warned 
against any attempt to exploit Sino-Soviet tensions. Nixon made it clear that U.S. policy toward China 
was “not directed against the Soviet Union.” Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador 
to Am erica’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division o f Random 
House, Inc, 1995), p.202. Dobrynin assesses that the Soviet Union was making a mistake from the 
beginning by “displaying our anxiety over China” to the Nixon administration. Ibid.
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Chinese security.150 Washington also reiterated publicly that the U.S. defense 
commitment to the Government of the Republic of China would “remain 
unaltered.”151
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research also assessed that since 
October, the Chinese media had “increased its abuse” directed at the U.S. military 
presence in Asia in general and President Nixon in particular. Importantly, however, 
State Department officials noticed that the difference between Beijing’s public and 
private attitude towards the United States had widened during the past few weeks.152
Simultaneously, State Department officials continued to monitor developments in 
Sino-Soviet relations. On October 21, in his memorandum to Under Secretary of State 
Richardson, Green emphasized that the U.S. interest was served by taking “parallel 
actions” and highlighting a general posture of “evenhandedness” regarding its
i
relations with China and the Soviet Union.
On November 6, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
reported that the Sino-Soviet border talks were already “deadlocked” after only three 
weeks of negotiations in Beijing.154 In short, while Beijing demanded disengagement 
along the border areas as a “prerequisite to further progress,” Moscow insisted that 
disengagement could “only be part of the final settlement” and was seeking to 
“broaden the talks” to include political and economic issues.
150 Green and Hillenbrand to Richardson, “Memorandum for the President: Next Moves in China 
Policy and Bargaining Moves Toward the Soviet Union,” October 21, 1969, p.3, POL Chicom-US. 
1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
151 Ibid. On November 26, this decision was conveyed to the Chinese through the CIA contact in Hong 
Kong.
152 Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Relations: Peking’s Double Game, November 21, 1969, p .l, 
POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
153 Green and Hillenbrand to Richardson, “Memorandum for the President: Next Moves in China 
Policy and Bargaining Moves Toward the Soviet Union,” October 21, 1969, p.7, POL Chicom-US. 
1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
154 Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Border Talks Reach An Early Impasse,” November 6, 1969, 
p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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3.3. NSC Review Group Meeting on NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences in November 
1969
On November 20, 1969, a Review Group meeting was held to examine Sino-Soviet 
differences. While there were no immediate operational decisions to be made, the 
NSC staff members, including Holdridge and Sonnenfeldt carefully reviewed the 
NSSM 63 paper in advance to discuss any proposed restatements with the State 
Department’s representatives. Kissinger commented that if the U.S. actively 
supported the Chinese, the Soviets would be provoked, but he was still uncertain what 
the U.S. could do operationally.155 All-out support for the Soviets might also make 
Moscow consider this as a “signal” of a U.S. support for them to make a preemptive 
move.156 Hence, Kissinger asked what the U.S. attitude would be in the event of a 
Soviet preemptive strike. A State Department official, William I. Cargo, suggested a 
minor injection of U.S. support for China would only irritate the Soviets, and that 
massive U.S. support of China, with the implication of military support, was not 
thinkable as a U.S. policy.
Kissinger explained that the President thought “opening up certain exchange 
possibilities would not necessarily mean giving up neutrality.” For example, the U.S. 
could still take steps toward China by promoting “maximum trade with China without 
getting involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute.”157 Overall, there was consensus among 
the participants that the U.S. should distinguish between neutrality on the dispute and
155 Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger, “Minutes o f [November 20, 1969] Review Group Meeting on Sino- 
Soviet Differences,” November 25, 1969, p.2, Box H - l l l ,  NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences 





neutrality in its relations with China and the USSR. In particular, Kissinger 
emphasized that neutrality on the dispute would not necessarily prelude the U.S. 
leaning toward one or the other and that if there were such reciprocity, it would mean 
a “diplomatic revolution.”158
In summary, the latter half of 1969 saw the development of a broad range of policy 
options within the Nixon administration for its opening to China. Nixon continued to 
lead the initiative, using his long-term personal relations with foreign leaders, such as 
Yahya and Ceausescu, to test and develop his ideas for a new China policy. In 
particular, Nixon established his private backchannels thorough these foreign leaders 
to begin sending secret signals to the Chinese leaders.
The escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes during the summer of 1969 
provided crucial opportunities for U.S. officials to reassess the seriousness of Sino- 
Soviet mutual hostility. By August, Nixon came to grasp the short-term importance of 
preventing China from being destroyed in the border conflicts with the Soviets. On 
the other hand, Kissinger perceived the China policy as a part of the U.S. policy 
toward the Soviets. Throughout 1969, Kissinger was preoccupied with the danger of a 
Soviet preemptive military attack on China. Thus, he heavily depended on his NSC 
staff and academics for expertise on China. Kissinger’s understanding of both the 
necessity and the possibility of a new China initiative was still limited in 1969.
During the latter half o f 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs continued to produce a 
number of intelligence analyses and policy recommendations. NSSM 63 provided a 
detailed assessment of the deepening difference in Sino-Soviet relations. Moreover,
158 Ibid., p.7.
contrary to Kissinger’s underestimation in his memoirs, the State Department was 
also in charge of the public presentation of a new China initiative, including easing 
trade and travel restrictions and ending the Seventh Fleet’s regular patrol in the 
Taiwan Strait. Overall, during 1969, a wide range of policy options and issues were 
presented within the administration.
As the following chapter demonstrates, it was the resumption of the Warsaw 
Ambassadorial talks from December 1969 to January and February 1970 that 
provided concrete opportunities for both the White House and the State Department to 
have direct talks with the Chinese.
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Chapter 5. The Resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks from 
December 1969 to May 1970
This chapter examines the implications of the resumed Warsaw Ambassadorial 
talks. First, it analyses the initial direct contact between the U.S. and Chinese 
ambassadors in December 1969. Second, it examines the main issues during the 
Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in January and February 1970. Third, this study 
conducts a detailed analysis of the escalation of the bureaucratic rivalry between the 
Kissinger NSC and the State Department during March and April. Finally, this 
chapter explores the implications of the Cambodian military operation of May 1970.
It was Kissinger who had principally tended to “downgrade” the bureaucratic efforts 
which provided the groundwork for the development of a new dialogue with the 
Chinese.1 This study counter-argues Kissinger’s underestimation and interprets that 
the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks was a more substantial event 
during the U.S. opening to China.
1. Initial Contact with the Chinese at Warsaw in December 1969
1.1. Nixon’s instructions to Stoessel
From September to December 1969, the White House secretly sought to make direct 
contact with the Chinese. On September 9, 1969, President Nixon asked Walter 
Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to Poland who returned to Washington for consultations, 
to “pass a message to the Chinese privately” suggesting that he attempted to talk
1 Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
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directly with the Chinese Charge’ at a diplomatic reception at one of the neutral 
• • 2embassies in Warsaw. Nixon requested for Stoessel to convey that the President was 
seriously interested in concrete discussions with China. Finally, Nixon emphasized 
that if  the press noted Stoessel’s conversation with the charge d’affaires, he should be 
“noncommittal” in his comments.
Without knowing the intentions of the White House, the State Department was also 
sending cable messages to Ambassador Stoessel in order to resume the Warsaw 
ambassadorial talks, which the Chinese had previously cancelled in February 1969. 
On October 27, 1969, Ambassador Stoessel sent a cable to Paul H. Kreisberg, the 
Director of Asian Communist Affairs in the State Department, explaining that he had 
not yet managed to contact the Chinese because there had not yet been a reception at a 
mission that maintained relations with them both.3 Stoessel also anticipated that an 
attempt to talk with the Chinese at a reception would be noticed by other diplomats 
present and would quickly be picked up by journalists.4 Despite Nixon’s warning in 
September, Stoessel had an impression that the President might prefer that his effort 
to talk with the Chinese should “become public.”5 Stoessel thus asked for more 
specific instructions from Washington regarding the handling of the press.
2 Memcon, Nixon, Kissinger, and Stoessel, “Conversation with the President Concerning China and 
U.S.-Chinese Contacts,” September 9, 1969, 3:00pm, The White House, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967- 
69, Box 1973, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records o f the Department o f State, Record 
Group 59 (STATE-RG59), National Archives (NA). A former State Department official, Walter 
Jenkins recalls that: ‘I think the first experience o f how we worked together was a cable that came in 
from Henry Kissinger in early 1969 that said: “It’s time to reopen our China talks. I want you to make 
contact with the Chinese ambassador to reopen these talks.’” Walter Jenkins, (Deputy Chief of 
Mission, United States Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, 1966-1970), Oral History Interview, p.6, Poland, 
Country Collection, 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for 
Diplomatic Studies and Training, Special Collections Division, Lauinger Library, Georgetown 
University.
3 Stoessel to Kreisberg, October 27, 1969, p .l, Country File (CF)-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], The 




On November 21, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of Research and 
Intelligence reported that in late October or early November, a Chinese diplomat 
suggested to a Czech journalist that if Washington was to propose an agenda, Beijing 
might be “receptive to a resumption of the Warsaw talks” -  the first specific hint since 
the cancellation of the meeting in February 1969.6 In public, the Chinese still 
maintained a consistent ideological posture against the United States. State 
Department officials interpreted that by reminding the Soviets of the possible option 
of closer Sino-American relations, the Chinese wanted to worry the Soviets.7
Meanwhile, State Department officials were considering possible public moves. On 
December 2, 1969, Secretary Rogers sent a set of recommendations to President 
Nixon to proceed with the remaining measures to relax economic controls against 
China on the basis of NSDM-17 (which Nixon approved in June).8 State Department 
officials estimated that the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Beijing might lead to a “partial 
rapprochement,” which might take the form of some restoration of normalcy in state- 
to-state relations. Simultaneously, Soviet agreement to negotiate both with China on 
border problems and with the U.S. on SALT would enable the U.S. to maintain its 
posture of “non-involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute.”9
6 Intelligence Note, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research (INR), “Sino-US-Soviet Relations: Peking’s 
Double Game,” November 21, 1969, pp.1-2, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE- 
RG59, NA.
7 Ibid., pp.2-3.
8 Rogers to Nixon, “Next Steps in China Policy,” December 2, 1969, p .l, Attached to Memo from 
Kissinger to Richardson, “Next Moves in China Policy,” December 16, 1969, POL Chicom-US. 1967- 
69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. The decision allowed unlimited tourist purchases and relaxed 
limits on trade in non-strategic goods by U.S.-owned firms abroad.
9 Ibid., p .l.
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1.2. The December 1969 contacts in Warsaw
On December 3, direct contact with China was finally made when U.S. Ambassador 
Walter Stoessel spotted the Chinese Charge d'affaires Lei Yang at a Yugoslav fashion 
show at Warsaw’s Palace of Culture.10 Stoessel conveyed a message to Lei’s 
interpreter that: “I was recently in Washington and saw President Nixon. He told me 
he would like to have serious concrete talks with the Chinese.”11 Lei agreed to pass 
the message to Beijing. On December 7, 1969, without any public explanation, China 
released two Americans who had been held since February 16 when their yacht had 
strayed into Chinese waters off Kwangtung province.12 On December 10, the Chinese 
suddenly proposed that Stoessel visit the Chinese embassy the next day. The State 
Department’s instructions to Ambassador Stoessel directed that he should make a 
“generalized statement of US desire for improved relations” and suggest a date and 
arrangements for formal meetings but avoid any specific discussions on other issues.13
The State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs interpreted the 
Chinese proposal within the context of Sino-Soviet difficulties. Green wrote to 
Rogers, arguing that Beijing’s motives reflected a change in November as a result of
10 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Jenkins, Oral History Interview, 
p.6, Poland, Country Collection, FAOHC. Jenkins recalls that Ambassador Walter Stoessel “kept 
things on an even keel, and very, very professionally. He developed very good relationships with other 
diplomats and Polish officials, because they really recognized him as a competent professional.” As for 
initial Warsaw contact see also Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 
pp. 188-189; and Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History 
(New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp.74-75.
11 Stoessel to Rogers, “Contact with Communist Chinese,” December 3, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 
1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
12 Stoessel to Rogers, “Return o f American Yachtsmen; Contact with Communist Chinese,” December 
7, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. This was a different 
from the July incident, which is previously described in p. 140, footnote no. 98.
13 Rogers to Stoessel, “Sino-US Meeting,” December 11, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 
1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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“deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations” and the beginning of U.S.-USSR SALT talks.14 
On the other hand, Kissinger wrote to Nixon, suspecting that the Chinese may have 
called the meeting “primarily to get a feeling for your Administration’s attitude 
toward them.”15 Hence, Kissinger remained cautious: “I do not believe that we should 
be under any illusions that a whole new era in Sino-US relations is opening.”16 
Kissinger judged that Beijing might regard contact with the U.S. as a “tactical step 
designed to put pressure on Moscow” by showing that the Chinese “have options 
open which are unpleasant to the Soviets.”17 Kissinger concluded that a “contact of 
even a limited nature could turn into something more significant if it can be 
maintained.”18
On December 11, Ambassador Stoessel visited the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw 
and held talks with Lei Yang. Following the State Department’s instructions, Stoessel 
formally proposed the resumption of ambassadorial talks at the U.S. Embassy in mid- 
January, stressing that: “We believe China has an important role in Asia, and that in 
the last analysis Asian decisions must be taken by Asian nations themselves, a process 
in which China should take part.”19 Lei agreed to deliver the message to Beijing. On 
December 12, a State Department spokesman, Robert McCloskey gave a press 
statement, describing the contact as being held in a “cordial” atmosphere.20 On 
December 14, 1969, The Washington Post ran the headline that “China Sees Leverage
14 Green to Rogers, “Implications o f PRC Agreement to Meet with US Ambassador -  Information 
Memorandum,” December 10, 1969, p .l, Country File (CF)-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.





19 Stoessel to Rogers, “Sino-US Meeting,” December 11, 1969, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, 
SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
20 The New York Times, December 12, 1969.
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in U.S. Talks” and that although the details of the meeting had been “kept secret,” 
Chinese suspicion that the United States was “colluding” with the Soviet Union was 
still speculated.21
The State Department sent its general account of the Stoessel-Lei meeting of 
December 11 to the U.S. Embassies in Moscow, Tokyo, Taipei, and to the U.S. 
Consulate General in Hong Kong.22 The State Department also briefed the 
governments of Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, and New Zealand before the 
announcement of the Stoessel-Lei meeting.23 In particular, the only governments 
which were “informed in advance” (a few hours before the December 11 meeting) 
were those of the Republic of China and Japan, and no leaks came from either 
capital.24 However, Nixon and Kissinger became very concerned about “wide 
dissemination” and the danger of leaks which could undermine a new China 
initiative.25 When Kissinger reported what had been done by the State Department, 
Nixon sighed: “We’ll kill this child before it is bom.”26 
Senior State Department specialists on U.S.-Soviet relations, such as Llewellyn 
Thompson strongly insisted that the U.S. government keep Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin informed of all contact with the Chinese. On December 12, Kissinger wrote 
to Secretary Rogers, who initially recommended against advising Ambassador 
Dobrynin of the U.S. talks with the Chinese, that the President had asked that “under 
no circumstance should we inform Dobrynin of the talks or their content.”27
21 The Washington Post, December 14, 1969.
22 Rogers to Nixon, “Warsaw Talks,” December 18, 1969, pp.1-2, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 
1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Kissinger to Nixon, “Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Handling o f  Warsaw talks,” December 
20, 1969, p .l, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
26 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 190.
27 Kissinger to Rogers, “Ambassador Thompson’s Recommendation that We Inform Dobrynin o f Talks 
with the Chinese,” December 12, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE- 
RG59, NA. In his memoirs, Kissinger argues that since the Soviets never informed the U.S. o f  its
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Accordingly, the increasing concern about leak would become a major reason for 
Nixon and Kissinger to almost completely cut off the State Department from China 
policy from the mid 1970.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government continued to take unilateral public actions. On 
December 15, the State Department announced that the United States would remove 
all of its nuclear weapons from Okinawa, Japan, by the end of 1969.28 The weapons 
were originally installed for the containment of China and were reportedly still aimed 
at the Chinese mainland. On December 16, 1969, Kissinger informed Under Secretary 
Richardson that President Nixon had approved the implementation of Secretary 
Rogers’ December 2 memorandum in a “low-key manner” in order to “minimize 
public speculation.”29 On December 19, the State Department thus announced that it 
would 1) remove financial restraints on foreign subsidiaries of United States firms 
engaged in “non-strategic” transactions with China; 2) eliminate the present 
restrictions on U.S. business participation in “third-country trade in presumptive 
Chinese goods” and; 3) allow the “non-commercial purchase of Chinese goods by 
American travelling or resident abroad.” Importantly, the State Department 
emphasized that: “It is with this same spirit that we have resumed discussions with 
Communist China in our talks at Warsaw.”31
contact with the Chinese or any other country, there was no point o f giving the Russians an opportunity 
which might increase Beijing’s suspicion from the beginning o f the resumption o f Warsaw meeting. 
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 190.
28 The New York Times, December 15, 1969.
29 Kissinger to Richardson, “Next Moves in China Policy,” December 16, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 
1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
30 “Changes in China Trade Restrictions,” December 19, 1969, A Matter o f Record - No. 18, Public 
Statements on China by U.S. officials, Box 86, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], CF-Far East, 
HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
31 Ibid.
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1.3. The Kissinger-Hilalv backchannel exchanges
On December 18, 1969, in an end of the year backgrounder to the press, Kissinger 
outlined the U.S. general approach toward China:
We have always made it clear that we have no permanent enemies and that we 
will judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically 
countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the 
basis of their domestic ideology. And we hope we have started a process 
towards Communist China, that over a period of years, will permit a more 
calibrated relationship to develop, and one in which such a large part of 
humanity will not be excluded from the international community.32
On December 19, 1969, Kissinger had a meeting with Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly. 
Hilaly briefed Kissinger that shortly after November 5, President Yahya explained to 
the Chinese Ambassador in Rawalpindi that U.S. interest in normalization with China 
and its withdrawal of the two destroyers from the Taiwan Straits (on November 7) 
should be seen “as a gesture.”33 Beijing appreciated Pakistan’s role and explained that 
a recent Chinese decision to release two American yachtsmen (on December 7) was a 
direct response to the U.S. initiative.34 Kissinger asked Hilaly to convey a secret
32 HAK backgrounder, December 18, 1969, A Matter o f Record - No. 8, Public Statements on China by 
U.S. officials, Box 86, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA. On December 22, 1969, Kissinger reiterated to Dobrynin that the United States would not accept 
permanent hostility in its relations with China, and that the U.S. would “take no sides” in the Sino- 
Soviet dispute and its policy was “not against” the Soviet Union. See Kissinger, White House Years, 
pp. 192-193.
Saunders to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Hilaly,” December 22, 1969, Box 624, CF- 
Middle East, Pakistan, Vol II, 01Dec.69-Sep.1970, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On December 17, 1969, 
Romanian’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu briefed Kissinger in general terms on 
the Chinese reaction to Nixon’s talk with Ceausescu. Kissinger interpreted this as a signal that the 
Chinese were ready to have contact with the U.S., however it did not necessarily through the Romanian 
channel. See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 191.
34 Ibid.
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message to the Chinese that the U.S. was “serious” in wishing to have conversations 
with them and if they wanted to have the talks “in a more secure manner than Warsaw 
or in channels that are less widely disseminated within the bureaucracy,” President 
Nixon would be prepared to proceed.35 In the end, Kissinger and Hilaly agreed that 
they would “keep the channel between them active.”36 
On December 23, Kissinger met Hilaly and handed over President Nixon’s letter to 
President Yahya (dated on December 20) in which Nixon reiterated his “interest in 
trying to bring about a more meaningful dialogue with Chinese leaders.”37 Nixon’s 
letter also noted that it was a “slow process at best,” but he had “not abandoned it,” 
and therefore the United States was still “exploring the possibilities of contact.”38 
Kissinger re-emphasized to Hilaly that Nixon “wanted to stay in communication with 
the Pakistani President.”39 In response, Hilaly explained that soon after their previous 
meeting on December 19, he received a letter from Yahya (dated December 14). The 
letter explained that the Chinese appeared to be “willing for a resumption of talks at 
Warsaw at the Ambassador level without insisting on any preconditions”; they were 
still worried about the revival of Japanese militarism as a threat not only to China but 
also to the whole of Southeast Asia.40
35 Memcon, Kissinger and Hilaly, December 19, 1969, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, 
December 1969 -  July 1971 (1 o f 2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 
In his memoirs, Kissinger fails refer to the U.S. willingness to communicate with the Chinese in a more 
confidential channel.
36 Ibid., p.3.
37 Nixon to Yahya, December 20, 1969, p. 1, in Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, 
December 1969 -  July 1971 (1 o f 2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
38 Ibid.
39 Memcon, Kissinger and Hilaly, December 23, 1969, p .l, in Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to 
China, December 1969 -  July 1971 (1 o f 2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
40 Ibid; and “Direct and Indirect Specific Messages Between The U.S. and PRC,” p .l, in Exchange 
Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969 -  July 1971 (2 o f 2), FPF-China/Vietnam 
Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger fails to explain specific issues o f  
the Yahya message.
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1.4. The State Department’s Instructions to Ambassador Stoessel
Without knowing about the secret messages passed from the White House to the 
Chinese through Pakistan and Romania, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs had begun to prepare detailed instructions to Ambassador 
Stoessel.41 On December 23, 1969, the Director of Asian Communist Affairs, Paul H. 
Kreisberg wrote to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Marshall Green, estimating that the main U.S. objectives for the Warsaw talks were to 
“test the Chinese air [and] to keep the door open for subsequent meetings.”42 It was 
anticipated that the Chinese would be more interested in listening to the U.S. position, 
especially regarding: U.S. military presence on Taiwan; and Agreement on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (which was proposed on November 25, 1968). The 
Chinese might also raise the following issues: a) U.S.-USSR collusion; b) Vietnam 
and the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia; c) Trade and Travel; and d) Chinese 
representation in the United Nations.
More particularly, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that the 
Chinese were interested in how the U.S. would apply the Nixon Doctrine to Taiwan. 
The report thus emphasized that the U.S. would be “dangerously misunderstood” if it 
failed to make it clear that “we have no intention of weakening our commitment to
41 In his memoirs, Kissinger misleadingly claims that the Stoessel-Lei contact o f December 11, 1969 
was the “first operational involvement o f regular State Department machinery” in China policy since 
the beginning o f the Nixon administration. See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 189. In reality, 
however, contrary to Kissinger’s omission, the State Department already prepared a set o f policy 
options and instructions to Ambassador Stoessel for the Warsaw talk o f February 1969, which was 
cancelled. See Chapter 3, Section 1.3 o f this study.
42 Kreisberg to Green, “Draft Opening Statement and Contingency Guidance for Possible Warsaw 
Meeting, December 23, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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defend the Republic of China against attack from the Mainland.”43 Finally, the INR 
recommended that the Chinese would take note if the U.S. made it clear that the 
degree of U.S. presence in Taiwan depended on the development of the Vietnam War 
and that “we will phase down our presence in Taiwan as the war in Vietnam 
subsides.”44
Overall, the State Department’s draft opening statement for Ambassador Stoessel 
was designed to “set a positive tone” for the resumption of ambassadorial talks as a 
“new beginning.” The draft had avoided any concrete proposals, and instead had 
emphasized that “this is a new Administration with a sincere desire to improve Sino- 
U.S. relations.”45
Importantly, despite Kissinger’s criticism on the lack of a geopolitical perspective, 
the State Department continued to analyze the implications of Sino-Soviet hostilities 
on the Warsaw talks. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research judged that while there 
might be “some gesture of interest in testing current US intentions,” Sino-Soviet 
considerations had been the “predominating motive.” The Chinese willingness to talk 
with the U.S. was almost surely intended as a “reminder to the Soviets that the 
Chinese have other options” regarding the “potential interplay among the US, USSR, 
China, and even Japan.”46 In comparison, the Chinese might “adopt enough flexibility 
to keep the talks going.”47 On the other hand, the Soviets might make a “minor
43 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Peking and Warsaw Talks,” December 23, 1969, p.3, 
POL ChiCom, 1967-69, Box 1962, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
44 Ibid., p.4.
45 Harry E. T. Thayer to Barnett, “Draft Opening Statement and Possible Warsaw Meeting,” December 
30, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
46 Intelligence Brief, INR, “Communist China: Peking Negotiates on Two Fronts,” January 14, 1970, 
p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2187, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
47 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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concession in the border negotiations,” but the basic Russian response would more 
likely to “continue the gradual build-up of military strength in border area.”48
2. The 135th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January 1970
2.1. The development of the perception gap between the White House and the State
Department
On January 8, 1970, there was an informal meeting between Walter Stoessel and Lei 
Yang at the American Embassy in Warsaw at which the date for the formal 
resumption of the Warsaw talks was set for January 20, 1970 in the Chinese Embassy. 
The preparation for the 135th Warsaw talk, however, caused bureaucratic friction 
between the White House and the State Department. On the one hand, Nixon and 
Kissinger were willing to use the January meeting to reassure the Chinese directly that 
the U.S. did “not propose to take sides in Sino-Soviet differences or to join any 
condominium against China” and that the U.S. would “not participate in or encourage 
any Soviet sponsored security arrangement in Southeast Asia.”49 Moreover, Nixon
and Kissinger wanted to propose sending a special envoy to Beijing. On the other
hand, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific affairs, especially 
Assistant Secretary Green emphasized a “new beginning in Sino-U.S. relations and 
this Administration’s new approach to Asian policy.”50 In particular, State
48 Ibid., p.3.
49 Haig to Theodore Eliot (Executive Secretary), “Rationale for Inclusion in Instructions to Ambassador 
Stoessel,” January p .l, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
50 Rogers to Nixon, “Guidance for Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting, January 20, 1970,” January 14, 
1970, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2187, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. Kissinger’s 
underestimation o f the State Department’s role for the preparation o f the Warsaw talks in January and 
February 1970 is very misleading. Kissinger, White House Years, p.686. On the other hand, a 
bureaucratic friction emerged between the State Department and the Defense Department, and between 
Marshall Green and the Republic o f China desk. Defense sought the renounce o f the use o f force in the
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Department officials insisted that the Taiwan issue was the “key to any improvement 
of relations with the PRC.”51 
In comparison, while the White House was principally interested in assuring the 
Chinese of the U.S. non-committal attitude toward the Sino-Soviet hostilities, State 
Department officials believed that it was important to emphasize that progress would 
depend on resolving long-standing issues, such as getting China join in arms control 
talks and the renunciation of the use of forces to resolve the Taiwan issue. While the 
White House wanted to move fast, the State Department wanted to take the East 
Asian reactions into consideration in a step-by-step manner. Overall, the White House 
and the State Department had made a bureaucratic compromise by having accepted 
and combined the main interests of the respective sides.
2.2. The January talks
On January 20, 1970, during the 135th Warsaw Ambassadorial talk, Stoessel 
reiterated the U.S. official position that “it did not seek to stand in isolation from 
China or to join in any condominium with the Soviet Union directed against China.”52 
As the “single most complex problem,” Stoessel also made clear that the U.S. would 
continue to “honor its commitment” to the Republic of China by defending Taiwan 
from “military attack,” and that its only concern was that this issue “not be resolved 
by force of arms.” In this same spirit, the U.S. would also “oppose any offensive
Taiwan Strait. The ROC desk opposed Green, saying that the U.S. would lose influence on Taiwan, and 
thus a sentence -  “we intend to interfere in whatever the settlement may be reached.” -  was deleted 
from the original instructions to Stoessel.
51 Ibid.
52 Airgram, U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, “Stoessel-Lei Talks: Report o f 135th Meeting, January 20, 1970,” 
January 24, 1970, p.2, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2187, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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military action from Taiwan against the mainland.”53 On the other hand, Stoessel 
assured that the limited U.S. military presence on Taiwan was “not a threat to the 
security of your Government, and it is our hope that as peace and stability in Asia 
grew, we can reduce those facilities on Taiwan that we now have.”54 Importantly, this 
assurance was intended to reduce China’s long-term concern of the U.S. using of 
Taiwan as a prelude to encircle and attack the mainland. Finally, Stoessel proposed 
that the United States “would be prepared to consider sending a representative to 
Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative from 
your government in Washington for more through exploration of any of the subjects I 
have mentioned in my remarks today or other matters on which we might agree.”55 
In response, without calling for any specific U.S. actions, Lei Yang reiterated that 
there had long existed “serious disputes” between the two sides on Taiwan which was 
an “inalienable part of China’s territory” and a “province of the People’s Republic of 
China.”56 Lei Yang also stressed that the discussion between the two sides should be 
promoted “in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence” in order to 
“reduce tensions.”57 Finally, Lei Yang suggested that the bilateral talks might be 
continued “at the ambassadorial level” or “at a higher level or through other channels 
acceptable to both sides.”58 The January Warsaw talk thus played a crucial role in the 
breakthrough from the frozen Sino-American bilateral relations that had existed over 
two decades. In particular, the January talk was the origin of the U.S. proposal to send
53 Ibid, p.3.
54 Ibid., pp.3-4. In his memoirs, Kissinger fails to refer to this crucial statement on the Taiwan issue. 
Kissinger, White House Years, p.687. This is a very serious omission.
55 Ibid., p.4. The State Department’s instructions to Ambassador Stoessel for the cancelled Warsaw 
meeting o f February 1969 already included an explicit proposal o f sending a presidential representative 





a special representative to Beijing, which the White House would keep raising in 
backchannels until the Chinese acceptance on December 9, 1970.
On January 21 and 22, 1970, the State Department gave a briefing on the 135th 
Warsaw meeting in general terms to the governments of Japan, the Republic of China, 
Australia, Canada, and Britain, feeling it “essential” to do so promptly to maintain 
U.S. “credibility” with them.59 In particular, State Department officials considered 
that the briefing served to minimize Taipei’s concern by reassuring that U.S. defense 
commitments to the Republic of China would “remain unaltered.”60 On the other 
hand, the Soviets impatiently showed their anxiety. On January 21, Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin visited Kissinger, demanding a briefing on the Warsaw talks. 
Dobrynin emphasized his hope that the United States was not “using” China as a 
military threat against the Soviets.61 However, Kissinger remained non-committal.
2.3. The Game Plan for the February talks
Meanwhile, the preparation for the 136th Warsaw meeting was proceeding. On 
February 3, 1970, Kissinger sent to the State Department a presidential request for a 
“game plan” to outline U.S. objectives and the tactics in the following talks.62 The 
Assistant Secretary Green wrote to Secretary Rogers the next day, anticipating that 
the Chinese might “put this issue [Taiwan] to one side” to proceed to discuss other
59 Eliot to Kissinger, “Discussing Warsaw Meeting with Other Governments,” January 21, 1970, p .l, 
CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
60 Ibid., p.2.
61 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.687-688.
62 Kissinger to Rogers, “Game Plan for Warsaw Talks,” February 3, 1970, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, 
Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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bilateral Sino-U.S. issues.63 On February 7, Secretary Rogers sent the State 
Department’s proposed guidance for the 136th Warsaw meeting to President Nixon. 
The memorandum outlined U.S. objectives in the talks as being to reduce U.S.-PRC 
tensions and to indicate the U.S. interest in dealing even-handedly with Beijing as 
well as Moscow. In particular, the memorandum emphasized that during all previous 
negotiations, the Taiwan issue had “blocked any progress.”64 Hence, the key new 
elements in the State Department’s instructions included:
• To state that the U.S was prepared to discuss with the Chinese a joint 
declaration incorporating the position on Taiwan in accordance with the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence;
• To indicate U.S. intention to reduce those military facilities in Taiwan as 
tensions in the area diminished, but gave no indication of the timing of such 
moves or how far they would be taken.65
The preparation of instructions for the 136th Warsaw meeting, however, caused 
more friction between the White House and the State Department regarding the U.S. 
proposal of sending its emissary to Beijing or receiving a Chinese one in Washington. 
Kissinger strongly objected to Secretary Rogers’ memorandum suggesting that “we 
pull slightly back from our proposal in January.”66 Thus, Kissinger wrote to Under
63 Green to Rogers, “Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks on February 20, 1970 -  Action Memorandum,” 
February 4, 1970, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2187, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
64 Rogers to Nixon, “Sino-US Negotiations in Warsaw,” February 7, 1970, p .l, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 
of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
65 Ibid., 2.
66 Kissinger to Nixon, “Sino-US Negotiations in Warsaw,” p.2, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 o f 2], NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
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Secretary Richardson, emphasizing that “the President believes that it would be 
preferable to take a more positive approach to a favorable Chinese response.”67
On February 18, 1970, in the first Foreign Policy Report to Congress, the Nixon 
Administration officially expressed that:
The Chinese are a great people who should not remain isolated from the 
international community. In the long run, no stable and enduring 
international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of 
more than 700 million people.68
The above statement was designed to give a diplomatic signal to the Chinese and to 
enhance a positive political atmosphere for “improved practical relations” with 
Beijing.69 The report also explicitly claimed that the U.S. interest in improving 
relations with China was “not a tactical means of exploiting” the Sino-Soviet dispute: 
nor was the United States interested in “joining any condominium or hostile coalition
• 70of great powers” against either of the Communist giants. Finally, the Kissinger NSC 
sought to take a lead in bureaucratic politics. As previously discussed, it was the NSC 
staff that drafted the entire report, and the State Department was completely excluded 
from its process.71
67 Kissinger to Richardson, February 18, 1970, Attached to Memo from Green to Richardson, 
“Guidance for 136th Warsaw Meeting -  Action Memorandum,” February 19, 1970, POL Chicom-US.
1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
68 Richard M. Nixon, “United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace,” 
February 18, 1970, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 104.
69 Ibid.; and Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
70 Ibid., p. 106.
71 See Chapter 2, Section 3.1.2 o f this study.
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3. The 136th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in February 1970
On February 20, 1970, at the 136th Warsaw talks, the PRC Charge d'affaires Lei 
Yang stressed that the “fundamental improvement” in Sino-U.S. relations and the 
“settlement of other questions” could come about only when the Taiwan question was 
resolved.72 He then added that: “We are fully aware that the settlement of the Taiwan 
question requires making every effort to create the conditions.”73 After reiterating 
Chinese willingness to discuss the relaxation of tensions in the Far East, especially in 
the Taiwan area, Lei made it clear that: “if the U.S. Government wishes to send a 
representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy of the U.S. President to Peking 
for further exploration of questions of fundamental principles between China and the 
United States, the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him.”74
In response, Ambassador Stoessel stated that: “It is our Government’s intention to 
reduce those military facilities which we now have on Taiwan as tensions in the area 
diminish.”75 Significantly, the U.S. side altered the previous utilization of the term 
‘hope,’ used in January, to ‘intention,’ used in February. Therefore, contrary to 
Kissinger’s brief reference in his memoirs, the resumption of the Warsaw talks in 
January and February 1970 was the first major break-though in the U.S. 
rapprochement with China. First, the State Department developed a new formula for 
the Taiwan issue and for the first time officially indicated the future possibility of 
U.S. military withdrawal. Nixon and Kissinger would follow this formula in their
72 Airgram, U.S. Embassy, Warsaw “Stoessel-Lei Talks: Report o f 136th Meeting, February 20, 1970,” 
February 21, 1970, p.2, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
73 Ibid.
7* Ibid., p.3.
Ibid., p.5. In his memoirs, Kissinger fails to refer to the new formula for the Taiwan issue, and thus 
undermines the significance o f the State Department’s contribution. See Kissinger, White House Years, 
p.689.
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direct talks with the Chinese leaders. Second, the timing and issues for a special 
representative mission became the major concern for the White House and the State 
Department during the contacts with Beijing until June 1971.
On February 22, 1970, Hilaly relayed to Kissinger Yahya’s assessment of Chinese 
thinking about U.S.-PRC relations.76 Yahya claimed that U.S. initiatives had 
encouraged the Chinese, who no longer saw U.S.-Soviet “collusion,” and emphasized 
that the U.S. should not regard Chinese readiness for meaningful dialogue as a sign of 
“weakness” or of “fear” of U.S.-Soviet collaboration against China.77 The possibility 
of the expansion of the Vietnam War was seen as having “lessened,” and thus a 
China-U.S. war was now seen as a “remote possibility.”78 Kissinger stated to Hilaly 
that Yahya should tell the Chinese that it was difficult to control press speculation, 
and thus the President would be prepared to “open a direct White House channel” to 
Beijing.79 On the margin of Kissinger’s memorandum reporting on the meeting, 
Nixon wrote “Good.”80
4. Attempts for the third Ambassadorial talk
4.1. The March proposal
In the meantime, however, the perception gap between the White House and the 
State Department expanded further regarding the question of a higher-level meeting
76 Kissinger to Nixon, “Message from President Yahya on China,” February 23, 1970, “Direct and 
Indirect Specific Messages Between the U.S. and PRC,” Box 1031 (2 o f 2), FPF-China/Vietnam 
Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
77 Ibid., p.2.
78 Ibid.
so IbidNixon’s handwritten notations in Ibid.
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with the Chinese. While Kissinger wanted to proceed with sending a high-level 
representative to Beijing, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs still remained cautious. Kissinger regarded the Chinese general acceptance of 
Washington’s willingness to send a representative of “ministerial rank or a special 
Presidential envoy” to Beijing as the “most dramatic development” in terms of its 
effect on the outside world, such as its impact on Hanoi.81 After months’ of 
assessment, Kissinger finally came to believe that the Chinese were serious, as a 
collapse of such a high-level contact might encourage the Soviets to believe that a 
Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. had failed. Kissinger thus recommended to 
Nixon that: “We need not move immediately in naming a representative. However, 
we should not delay over long, so as to avoid creating a negative impression.”82 
Rogers and Green wanted to uncover exact Chinese intentions for accepting the 
U.S. proposal of sending or receiving a representative mission. As Kreisberg recalls, 
State Department officials were not sure “how far they were going to go. We were 
cautious in how far we wanted to go on our next step than the White House was.”83 In 
reality, Green was “shocked at the pace at which this was moving,” considering 
incorrectly that the State Department was “pushing faster than the White House was 
pushing.” He was also “very reluctant” to move one step further unless it was clear 
that the U.S. government was going to “inform the Japanese, because he saw this as
”84seriously damaging our relationship with Japan.
81 Kissinger to Nixon, “Chinese at Warsaw talks Suggest US Send High-Level Representative to 
Peking, February 20, 1970, p .l, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
82 Ibid., p.2.
83 Paul Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p.6, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC, 
ADST.
84 Ibid., p.7. The Kissinger NSC insisted that: “We can’t trust the Japanese, so we don’t want them to 
know.” Thus, State Department officials had a number o f arguments on the possibility o f leakage by 
Japan. However, as Kreisberg recalls, “None o f us recall a single instance where we had ever told the 
Japanese anything really secret which they had then leaked.” Ibid., pp.7-8.
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On March 10, 1970, Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon, suggesting March 19 as 
the date for the next Warsaw meeting. The memo outlined that U.S. objectives were 
to “put the issue of Taiwan to one side” and to improve U.S.-PRC relations in other 
areas, such as agreement on non-use of force, trade, and cultural exchanges.85 On the 
other hand, State Department officials suspected that Beijing might wish to give the 
“appearance of movement” in its discussion with the U.S. in order to increase its 
pressure on the Soviets, and to damage U.S. relations with the Republic of China 
without giving Washington anything in return. Therefore, a higher-level meeting in 
Beijing or Washington “should only come after progress at the ambassadorial-level 
talks in Warsaw.” Moreover, the memo suggested that the U.S. should “only reaffirm 
its willingness” to consider a higher-level meeting. Finally, the memorandum 
recommended testing Beijing’s positions on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issues between Beijing and Taipei.87 On March 16, the State Department announced 
validation of U.S. passports for travel for any legitimate purpose, which was aimed at 
sending a more positive diplomatic message to Beijing for the improvement of U.S.- 
PRC relations.
4.2. The April proposal
In reality, however, the continuing friction between the White House (especially 
Kissinger) and the State Department (especially Green) delayed a formal U.S. 
proposal for the date of the 137th Warsaw meeting. On March 20, 1970, Kissinger
85 Green to Rogers, “How to Deal with the Question o f a Higher-Level Meeting with the Chinese -  





strongly urged the State Department to propose an immediate Warsaw meeting and to 
draft instructions to Ambassador Stoessel which would take a positive approach 
toward higher-level meeting. Accordingly, in their revised instructions for the April 
meeting, State Department officials proposed the explicit statement that the United 
States had no intention of imposing “Two Chinas” or “One China, One Taiwan.”88 
The memorandum also suggested that the U.S. emphasize its firm belief that “matters 
other than Taiwan can and should be discussed.”89
On April 1, 1970, the U.S. government finally proposed that the next Warsaw 
meeting take place on April 20 or any date thereafter. On April 28, the Chinese 
replied by suggesting May 20. State Department officials estimated that because of 
the military situation in Southeast Asia, the Chinese might have been having “second 
thoughts” between late March and early April on the desirability of pursuing their 
“high-level meeting” with the U.S.90
Overall, State Department officials considered that Beijing’s interest in exploring 
the limits of U.S. policy toward Taiwan would persuade the Chinese leaders to 
continue along the same track as the January and February meetings.91 However, NSC 
staff member Holdridge wrote to Kissinger, suspecting that the “real motive” of the
88 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (Executive Secretary, Department o f State) to Kissinger, “Revised Warsaw 
Instructions, March 31, 1970, p.6, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
89 Ibid. From April 22 to 29, 1970, the Vice Premier o f the Republic o f China, Chiang Ching-kuo 
visited the United States. Nixon privately reassured that: “The United States will always honor its 
treaty obligations and, to use a colloquial expression, I will never sell you down the river.” James C.H. 
Shen, The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally (Lakewood, Colorado: Acropolis Book, 
1983), p.51. The State Department’s Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs assessed that Taipei 
strongly opposed to the Warsaw talks as the “disturbing trend,” which “could seriously undermine the 
GRC’s political position internationally.” Memo from Thomas P. Shoesmith to Green, “An Appraisal 
of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo’s Visit, May 6, 1970, p .l, POL Chicom, 1970-73, Box 2202, SNF, 
STATE-RG59, NA.on
Elliot to Kissinger, “May 20 Sino-U.S. Talk in Warsaw, April 28, 1970,” p .l, CF-Europe, Box 700 
[2 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
91 Ibid., p.3.
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State Department could be to “soften him [Kissinger] up” for a new attempt to take a 
“more cautious line” in responding to the Chinese invitation to meet in Beijing.92
Meanwhile, intelligence analysts in various departments and agencies were closely 
continuing to monitor developments in Chinese foreign policy. On April 9, 1970, the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that the Chinese and 
the Soviets seemed to have made some progress in “lowering the tensions” between 
them: the Soviets had unilaterally withdrawn some troops from their disputed border
93areas. The INR officials particularly noted that the Chinese and the Russians had 
agreed to exchange ambassadors “for the first time since 1967” and that there was 
enough confirmation from the Chinese side to suggest a limited break in the stalemate 
of the last six months.94 On April 11, having grasped the “signs of life” in recent 
Chinese foreign policy, China watchers in the CIA estimated that a “new period” was 
underway and that anxiety about a “Soviet threat” encouraged China’s “diplomatic 
offensive.”95 In particular, CIA analysts reported that Premier Zhou had signed a 
secret directive ordering a “limited flexible approach” toward the United States in 
order to put the Soviets off balance.96
92 Holdridge to Kissinger, “Chinese Attitude on the Warsaw Talks, May 1, 1970,” p .l, CF-Europe, Box 
700 [2 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
93 Intelligence Brief, INR, “Communists China/USSR: Sino-Soviet Stalemate Breaks,” April 9, 1970, 
p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
54 Ibid.
95 “Signs o f Life in Chinese Foreign Policy,” April 11, 1970, Secret, No Foreign Dissem, Directorate of  
Intelligence, Office o f Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Electric Reading Room.
96 Ibid. During his state trip to North Korea from April 5 to 7, 1970, Premier Zhou sought to ensure 
continued North Korean “neutrality” in the Sino-Soviet dispute and emphasized the revival o f Japanese 
militarism as no longer just a “danger” but a “reality.” Zhou’s trip to North Korea was his first state 
visit outside China since June 1966 (except a brief trip to Hanoi to pay respects before Ho’s funeral). 
Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/North Korea: Chou Courts The North Koreans,” April 14, 
1970, p .l, POL Chicom, 1970-73, Box 2180, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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5. The Cambodia military operation and the collapse of the Warsaw channel in 
May 1970
On April 30, 1970, believing in the need for a “bold move,” President Nixon made 
public his decision to order military operations into Cambodia to destroy the supply 
lines of the North Vietnamese.97 As Holdridge recalls, the principal objective of the 
Cambodian operation was to “preserve the concept of Vietnamization,” however, it 
“intensified the sentiment” against the war on the U.S. domestic front.98 On May 4 
and 5, China strongly condemned the U.S. for its “flagrant provocation” by quoting 
Mao’s statement that the United States was a “paper tiger.”99 The White House sent a 
secret message to the Chinese via Major General Vernon Walters in Paris, informing 
that the U.S. had “no aggressive intentions” concerning China.100
97 Kissinger to Nixon, April 22, 1970, Box 2, Memoranda from the President, 1969-74, President’s 
Personal Files (PPF), White House Special Files (WHSF), NPMS, NA. The presidential decision was 
made against the oppositions from Secretary o f State Rogers and Secretary o f Defense Laird. The so- 
called “Cambodia incursions” lasted from May 1 to June 29, 1970. NSC staff members, such as 
Anthony Lake, Roger Morris, and William Watts resigned in protest. See Richard Reeves, President 
Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Touchstone, 2001), pp.179-181, pp.192-227, and pp.232- 
234; Bundy, A Tangled Web, pp. 145-164; Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.256-284; Nixon, RN, pp.445-469; 
and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.483-505. Former State Department official Michael Rives 
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one time. ...They rather admired the Chinese.” Michael Rives (Charge d’ Affairs, Phnom Penh, 1969- 
1970), Oral History Interview, p. 10, Cambodia, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.
98 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.87, FAOHC. Congress placed unprecedented 
restriction on the executive branch, namely the Supplemental Foreign Aid Authoritalization Act o f  
December 1970: “no funds were to be used to introduce ground combat troops into Cambodia or to 
provide U.S. advisors to Cambodian military forces in Cambodia. Nor should the provision o f military 
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Phnom Penh, 1970-1973, Oral History Interview, p.6, A Cambodia Reader, Country Collection, 1996, 
FAOHC. The Cambodian operation ended the war in the southern half o f South Vietnam. Peter 
Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.28, FAOHC.
99 Kissinger, White House Years, p.694. During a meeting with North Vietnamese officials, Chairman 
Mao criticized the U.S. for being “overextended” and affirmed the continual struggle against its 
interventionism. Importantly, however, Mao also hinted at the possibility o f  having a “shortened war.” 
Mao Zedong and Le Duan; Beijing, the Great Hall o f the People, May 11, 1970, CWIHP.
100 Message to be Passed to the Chinese, Box 333, Policy Planning Staff (Director’s File -  Winston 
Lord), STATE-RG59, NA.
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The State Department was still preparing instructions for the 137th Warsaw meeting. 
On May 12, following Green’s recommendations, Secretary Rogers sent a 
memorandum to President Nixon with a set of alternative courses of action. The State 
Department recommended separating Southeast Asia and the Warsaw talks by 
avoiding raising the question and continuing to focus on bilateral issues.101 The 
guidance also suggested delaying detailed discussion of a higher-level meeting. 
Ambassador Stoessel should limit his opening remarks to a request for confirmation 
on whether or not Beijing still felt that a higher-level meeting would be useful.102 
Finally, the memorandum recommended that the U.S. government brief the 
governments of the Republic of China and Japan “at the higher level very candidly as 
soon as possible after the meeting.”103
Kissinger wrote to Nixon criticizing the State Department as still preoccupied with 
the question as to “whether, and at what pace, we should press” for the higher-level 
meeting in Beijing.104 In particular, Kissinger argued that: “State believes that if we 
push forward, we might risk a total - and embarrassing - Chinese rebuff.”105 Finally, 
Kissinger suggested to revise the State Department guidance in order to make sure 
that “our reference to reducing tensions in the Far East does not appear to be restricted 
to the Taiwan area and to avoid setting a time limit for the period during which we 
would engage in higher-level talks” in Beijing.106
101 Rogers to Nixon, “Guidance for the May 20 Sino-US Ambassadorial Meeting,” May 12, 1970, p.2, 
CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA; and Green to Rogers, “Guidance for the May 20 
Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting -  Action Memorandum,” May 9, 1970, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970- 
73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
102 Ibid., p.3.
103 Ibid., p.5.
104 Kissinger to Nixon, “State’s Guidance for May 20 Sino-US Ambassadorial Meeting,” p .l, CF- 




On May 18, 1970, the New China News Agency issued a statement that in view of 
the “brazen” invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese government considered it “no longer 
suitable” for the 137th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talk to be held on May 20, and that the 
date for a future meeting would be decided “through consultation by the liaison 
personnel” of the two sides.107 On May 19, Secretary Rogers sent a memorandum to 
President Nixon, comparing the previous day’s cancellation with the Chinese 
handling of the cancellation of the meeting scheduled for February 20, 1969. The 
memorandum assessed that the Chinese: (a) clearly implied a continuing interest in 
the Warsaw dialogue; (b) attacked the U.S. actions in Indochina in milder terms than 
circumstances might have permitted; and (c) issued their public statement more 
routinely as an announcement by the New China News Agency rather than by the 
Foreign Ministry.108 State Department officials thus argued that because of the 
“relatively moderate tone,” the recent Chinese move should be seen as a “tactical 
psychological warfare.”109 Overall, the memorandum estimated that with this 
cancellation, Beijing might be seeking to “warn” Washington that U.S. military 
actions in Indochina would have a “negative impact” on developing Warsaw talks and 
on prospects for an early higher-level meeting in Beijing. In addition, Beijing 
welcomed this opportunity to subject the Nixon administration to U.S. domestic 
criticism for the entry into Cambodia.110
On May 20, in the name of Chairman Mao Zedong, Beijing called for “People of the 
World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs.”111 The
Chen, M ao’s China and the Cold War, p.252.
108 Rogers to Nixon, “Chinese Cancellation o f May 20 Warsaw Meeting,” May 19, 1970, p .l, CF- 
Europe, Box 700 [2 o f 21, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
109 Ibid.
"° Ibid., p.2.
111 Ibid. This statement enraged President Nixon. He thus ordered every element o f the Seventh Fleet 
not needed for Vietnam into the Taiwan Strait. Kissinger and other close associates quietly ignored it. 
Kissinger, White House Years, pp.695-696.
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State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that Mao’s “rare 
pronouncement” was clearly intended to “convey Chinese concern at the highest level 
over the US military incursion into Cambodia and the bombing of North Vietnam.”112 
On May 26, the New York Times ran the headline that: “Cambodia War Said to Cause 
Major Peking Shift.”113 
On May 28, the Special National Intelligence Estimate reported that Beijing had 
been both “cautious and prudent,” and its decision “not to intervene” overtly into the 
Vietnam War was “consistent” with its policy of not risking any major hostilities with 
either the U.S. or the Soviets.114 In his memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger commented 
that the “low-key nature” of the Chinese action had served to reduce the impact of this 
particular ploy.115 As for the implications of Mao’s statement, Kissinger interpreted 
that the announcement made no direct threat, offered no commitments, and was not 
abusive toward President Nixon himself.116
Thereafter, both the White House and the State Department respectively followed 
foreign governmental and media reactions to the Cambodian operation. U.S. officials 
concluded that despite the harsh rhetorical attack in the Chinese press and government 
statements surrounding the Cambodian incursions, the Chinese still showed restraint 
in Sino-U.S. relations in order to avoid a complete break in dialogue with the Nixon 
administration. In comparison, however, there was a widening gap between the White 
House and the State Department on both the pace and the agenda regarding the
112 Intelligence Brief, INR, “Communist China,” May 20, 1970, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 
2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
113 The New York Times, May 26, 1970.
114 Special National Intelligence Estimate, Number 13-9-70, “Chinese Reactions to Possible 
Developments in Indochina,” May 28, 1970, p.3, Tracking the Dragon: Selected National Intelligence 
Estimates on China, 1948-1976, National Intelligence Council, CD-ROM, (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2004).
115 Kissinger to Nixon, “Secretary Rogers’ Evaluations o f the Chinese Cancellation o f  the May 20 
Warsaw Meeting,” May 28, 1970, p .l, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger, White House Years, p.695.
resumed dialogue with the Chinese. The White House was willing to move faster 
within a strategic context of formulating tacit cooperation with Beijing against 
Moscow. The State Department, however, remained cautious, still regarding the 
Taiwan issue as the main problem to be discussed at ambassadorial-level talks before 
proceeding to higher-level meetings. During the middle of 1970, the White House 
thus sought to find ways to convey its intention of military withdrawal from 
Indochina and to reactivate a dialogue with Beijing through intermediaries. The 
following chapter examines how both the White House and the State Department 
would seek to explore respective channels of communication with the Chinese in 
order to send a special envoy to China.
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Chapter 6. The Development of Backchannel Communications from June 1970 
to July 1971
This chapter explores the development of secret diplomacy between the White 
House and the Chinese leaders. First, it examines the search for a channel of 
communication with the Chinese, conducted by the White House and the State 
Department. Second, it analyses President Nixon’s secret initiative to re-activate the 
Pakistani and Romanian backchannels. Moreover, it examines the policy studies 
conducted by the Kissinger NSC and the State Department. Finally, this study 
assesses the final breakthrough via the Pakistan channel in the spring of 1971.
1. The exploration of the channels of communication with the Chinese in late 
1970
1.1. The State Department’s attempt to preserve the Warsaw channel
During the mid and late 1970, the State Department was still seeking to re-activate 
the Warsaw channel with the Chinese, preparing a list of new instructions for 
Ambassador Stoessel. On June 20, U.S. officials in Warsaw had an informal liaison 
meeting with Chinese diplomats.1 However, the Chinese postponed the Warsaw talks, 
stating that their resumption would be “discussed later at the proper time.” On July 
10, Secretary Rogers stated publicly in Japan that China was the key to the future of 
Indochina and that a settlement in Vietnam could be achieved “very quickly” if
1 U.S. Embassy, Warsaw to Rogers, “Sino-US Talks: ChiCom Propose Liaison Officer Meeting,” June 
18, 1970, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records o f the 
Department o f  State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), NA.
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Beijing was willing to make an effort.2 On the same day, the Chinese suddenly 
released Bishop James Edward Walsh who had been imprisoned since 1958 on 
charges o f spying and sabotage.3
On July 21, 1970, the American Consulate General in Hong Kong sent Washington 
its assessment that China’s approach to Sino-U.S. relations had not fundamentally 
changed since the beginning of the year. On June 27, on the 20th anniversary of the 
outbreak of the Korean War, Beijing reiterated that Taiwan was the crucial issue in 
Sino-U.S. relations, charging that the U.S. had continuously refused to withdraw its 
armed forces from Taiwan.4 However, China had not recently insisted on the 
abrogation of the ROC-U.S. mutual security treaty. Hence, the China watchers in 
Hong Kong assessed that the definition of how the Taiwan question could be settled 
was “still open.”5 One complicating factor in Beijing’s view was Japan’s relations 
with Taiwan, particularly the link between Japanese security and the security of 
Taiwan and South Korea drawn in the Nixon-Sato Communique of November 1969.6 
Finally, the memo emphasized that it was the Soviet military threat that still motivated 
the Chinese to continue its renewed dialogue with the United States.
On July 23, 1970, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
completed its mid-year assessment of China’s policy towards America. The 
memorandum argued that the Chinese attitude toward the Warsaw talks was designed 
to “play on Soviet fear o f a Sino-American accommodation” in East Asia and to 
“undermine Soviet confidence in the U.S. neutrality” in the event of a Soviet attack on
2 The New York Times, July 10, 1970.
The New York Times, July 13, 1970. The State Department was also obtaining information from U.S. 
embassies abroad. In early July, the Romanian Vice President privately informed the American 
Ambassador to Bucharest, Leonard Meeker that Mao was still interested in resuming a dialogue with 
the United States.
American Consulate General Hong Kong to Rogers, “Communist China: The Current State o f  Sino- 
U.S. Relations,” July 21, 1970, p.7, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
Ibid., p.2.
Ibid., p.5. This subject will be discussed further in Chapter 6, Section 2.3.
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China.7 As for the Chinese view on the U.S. threat, State Department officials 
estimated that while the Nixon Doctrine provided the first real hope of reduction of 
U.S. military presence in Asia since the end of the Korean War, Japan would replace 
the United States as the “principal obstacle to the recovery of Taiwan.”8 As for the 
diversion over Cambodia, the U.S. actions announced on April 30 probably caused 
“temporary uncertainty” in Beijing about the overall direction of U.S. policy in 
Indochina.9 To maintain their flexibility, the Chinese emphasized that they wanted 
“only a temporary postponement o f the session, not a cancellation,” and Zhou Enlai 
dropped hints to Eastern European diplomats that the talks “would soon be 
resumed.”10 Accordingly, on July 27, without knowing the real intentions of the 
White House, the State Department publicly expressed U.S. willingness to resume the 
Warsaw talks. On December 23, Secretary of State Rogers still expressed the hope 
that the Warsaw talks would be resumed, indicating that the China policy was under 
review. In reality, however, from late 1970, the State Department was cut off from the 
White House’s initiative to enhance back-channel communication with Beijing.
1.2. The search for backchannels by Kissinger and the NSC staff
After the Chinese cancellation of the 136th Warsaw ambassadorial talks on May 20, 
1970, the White House kept silence, waiting for emotions aroused by the Cambodian 
incursions to subside and making various secret plans to explore new and more
7 Intelligence Brief, Bureau o f  Intelligence and Research (INR), “Communist China: A Mid-year Look 






restricted means o f communication with the Chinese. On June 15, under Kissinger’s 
instructions, Haig gave a message to Major General A. Vernon Walters to deliver to 
his Chinese contact in Paris (a defense attache named Fang Wen). The message stated 
that the U.S. government wished to continue exchanges through the Warsaw 
ambassadorial talks. However, owing to its formal nature (namely the number of 
officials having been involved in the Warsaw channel and the publicity surrounding 
the talks), it was difficult to maintain “complete secrecy.”11 The message thus 
suggested the establishment of an alternative channel “for matters of the most extreme 
sensitivity” with knowledge of the talks “confined to the President, his personal 
advisors and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed.”12 Finally, the 
message proposed the opening of a channel through General Walters and indicated the 
White House’s readiness to send a “high-level personal representative of the President 
to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location for direct talks.”13 
Meanwhile, the White House continued its assessment of Seno-Soviet relations. For 
example, according to Haldeman’s diaries, on August 15, 1970, Kissinger concluded 
that in their disputed border areas, the Soviets were moving forward and the Chinese 
were responding.14 The Soviets intended to use nuclear weapons to destroy Chinese 
missile installations and were positioning troops to defend against the possibility of
11 Haig to Walters, June 15, 1970, enclosing a message to be delivered by Major General Vemon  
Walters to the Chinese Communist Government (approved by Nixon but unsigned), “Exchange 
Leading Up to HAK Trip” [lof2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NPMS, NA.
12 Ibid.
M  I b l d 'The Haldeman Diaries, August 15, 1970. In his memoirs, Kissinger even claims that the collusion  
against China was the “real Soviet price” for a U.S.-USSR summit and that the U.S. was being asked to 
give the Soviets a “free hand” against China. Kissinger, White House Years, p.554. Former Soviet 
Ambassador to America Dobrynin argues in his memoirs that: “I do not remember any such demands 
about an alliance [by M oscow and Washington] against China.” Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: 
M oscow’s Am bassador to A m erica’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, 
A Division o f  Random House, Inc, 1995), p.207.
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the Chinese retaliatory land invasion. The idea seemed absurd to Nixon.15 Even at this 
stage, there still remained a difference between Nixon and Kissinger.
On September 12, 1970, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon, explaining the 
current situation of U.S.-China relations.16 There had been no response from the 
Chinese yet; it appeared that if  there was to be any success, it would be “through 
Paris.”17 At that moment, Kissinger thus argued: “we have no choice but to wait and 
see if they are willing to respond.”18 Moreover, on September 27, Kissinger had a 
private meeting with French diplomat Jean Sainteny in Paris, asking him to play an 
intermediary role to “set up a channel” with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Hung 
Chen.19
1.3. Nixon’s reactivation of the Pakistani and Romanian backchannels
On October 1, 1970 - China’s National Day - as a symbolic diplomatic gesture, 
Chairman Mao invited American journalist Edgar Snow to stand next to him to watch 
the public parade in the Tiananmen Square.20 As China experts, such as Chen Jian and
15 Ibid.
16 Kissinger to Nixon, “Contact with the Chinese,” September 12, 1970, p .l with an attached Memo to 
General Walters, “Sensitive Message to be delivered to Chinese Communist Government,” June 15, 
1970, in Cookies II, “Chronology o f  Exchange with PRC February 1969 -  April 1971,” Box 1032, 
Files for the President -  China Materials, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. The secrecy for Kissinger’s back-channel communication was not entirely preserved. In mid 
August 1970, the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff placed a spy on Kissinger’s staff, a Navy yeoman, Charles 
Radford, officially a stenographer. He was assigned to copy and send on every piece o f  paper he saw to 
the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. In mid January 1974, the Chicago Tribune reported the story. See Richard 
Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p.244.
19 Memcon, Kissinger and Sainteny, at Sainteny’s apartment in Paris September 27, 1970, p.3, Box 
1031, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip ( lo f  2), FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA. Sainteny had previously served in Hanoi, and his wife was a student o f  Kissinger at Harvard.
20 Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (London: Hutchinson & CO Publishers LTD., 1973), pp.10-12.
From August 23 to September 6, 1970, the Second Plenum o f  the Ninth Congress o f  the Party Central 
Committee had been held at Lushan. Mao revealed his readiness to accept a U.S. proposal for a 
representative to visit China. Accordingly, M ao’s support for the opening to the U.S. temporarily
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David Shambaugh point out, Beijing intended to send a symbolic diplomatic signal to 
improve its relations with Washington.21 However, as Kissinger defensively admits in 
his memoirs, U.S. officials were slow to comprehend the implication of the Chinese 
gesture: “we have missed the point when it mattered. Excessive subtlety had produced 
a failure of communication.”22
Coincidently, President Nixon was looking for public and private opportunities to 
reiterate his continuing interest in China. In a Time magazine interview published on 
October 5, 1970, Nixon stated that: “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is 
to go to China. If I don’t, I want my children to.”23 Nixon also sought to renew secret 
communications with the Chinese through the Pakistani and Romanian channels. On 
October 25, 1970, after the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the establishment 
of the United Nations, the President held a private meeting with Pakistani President 
Yahya Khan in the Oval Office (at which even Kissinger was not present). Having 
read Kissinger’s memorandum in advance, Nixon was aware that Yahya was 
scheduled to visit Beijing in the following month (which took place from November 
10 to 15).24 Nixon briefed Yahya that the U.S. had been disappointed at the lack of 
response from the Chinese as well as the failure to resume the Warsaw talks; however 
it was gratified at the release of Bishop Walsh.25 In particular, Nixon asked Yahya to
postponed the deepening rivalry between the moderate faction led by Zhou Enlai and the military 
faction led by Lin Biao (supported by M ao’s wife Jiang Qing). Philipe Short, Mao: A Life (New York: 
Henry Holt & Company, 1999), pp.592-594; and Chen Jian, M a o ’s China and the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2001), pp.253-254.
Chen, M a o ’s China and the Cold War, p.255; and David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, 
October 8, 2003.
23 Kissinger, White House Years, p.699.
Rodman to Kissinger, “Who Invited Whom?” October 13, 1971, Box 13 China, HAKOF, NPMS, 
NA.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Talk with President Yahya -  October 25, 1970,” p .l, Memoranda for the 




convey a message to the Chinese that it was “essential” for the United States to “open 
negotiations with China” and that the U.S. would make “no condominium” with the 
Soviets against China. Finally, Nixon made it clear that the U.S. was willing to send 
a high-level personal representative, such as retired diplomat Robert Murphy, or the 
senior Republican leader Thomas E. Dewey to Beijing to “establish links secretly.”27
On October 26, Nixon met Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu and explained 
his willingness to improve relations with both China and the Soviet Union.28 In 
particular, Nixon asked Ceausescu’s assistance in informing Beijing that the U.S. 
would bear them “no hostility” and would “welcome a more normal relationship.”29 
Ceausescu replied that he believed China wanted to improve relations with the United 
States. Finally, Nixon declared U.S. readiness for talks with China and for the 
exchange of high-level special representatives. During the state dinner, Nixon used 
his toast for a public expression of U.S. interest in improved relations with the 
“People’s Republic of China,” which was, very importantly, the first use of China’s 
official name by a U.S. President.30
On October 27, at Nixon’s instruction, Kissinger held a private talk with Ceausescu 
and reiterated the U.S. interest in establishing diplomatic communications with the
26 Memcon “Meeting Between the President and Pakistan President Yahya,” October 25, 1970, p.2, 




Rodman to Kissinger, “Who Invited Whom?” October 13, 1971, p.2, Box 13 China, HAKOF, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA; and Kissinger to Nixon, “My Conversation with President Ceausescu, October 27, 1970,” 
with Memcon attached, October 31, 1970, Box 1032, Cookies II “Chronology o f  Exchange with PRC 
February 1969 -  April 1971,” NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Romanian President Ceausescu, October 26, 1970,” p.6, 
Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records o f  Meetings (ROM), Box 82, POF, WHCF, NPMS, 
NA.
In his memoirs, N ixon recalled that he intended to send a “significant diplomatic signal” to Beijing. 
Nixon, RN, p.546.
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• 31 • •People’s Republic o f China. Kissinger explained that such communications could be 
“free from any outside pressures or questions of prestige” and stressed that such 
communications would be restricted to the White House.32 Ceausescu re-confirmed 
that he would inform the Chinese leaders of their conversation and would pass on any 
communication from them as he had done in the past. Accordingly, in early 
November, Romanian Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulescu visited Beijing and 
delivered Nixon’s message to the Chinese.
2. Progress in backchannel communications
2.1. NSSMs 106 and 107: The Chinese Representation issue in the UN in November 
1970
On November 7, 1970, Kissinger received a letter from Jean Sainteny regarding his 
contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen. Huang passed 
Kissinger’s message (which he conveyed to Sainteny in September) to his leaders, 
which indicated the White House’s desire to set up a secret channel.33 Sainteny 
reported that Hung had been a member of the Central Committee and thus his view 
“must be listened” to in Beijing. NSC staff member Richard Smyser assessed that 
Sainteny’s information was still basic; however, he added that the Chinese were 
recently expressing their interest in “being admitted to the UN.”34 Kissinger
31 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Conversation with President Ceausescu, Tuesday, October 27,” October 31, 
1970, pp.1-2, Box 1024, Memcons -  The President/HAK and President Ceausescu Oct.26&27, 1970, 
Presidential/HAK MemCons, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
2 Ibid.
Smyser to Kissinger, “Letter from Your Friend in Paris, and Other Chinese Miscellania,” November 
7, 1970, p .l, Cookies II, Chronology o f  Exchanges with PRC Feb. 1969 -  April 1971, Box 1032, FPF- 
China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
4 Ibid., p.2.
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interpreted the Sainteny-Huang contact as Beijing’s confirmation on the use of other 
backchannels.35
Regarding the major issues in Washington’s relations with Beijing, Kissinger and 
his NSC staff were now paying more attention to Chinese representation issue in the 
United Nations. On November 19, 1970, the day before the UN vote, Kissinger 
initiated two inter-departmental studies, NSSM 106: “China Policy” and NSSM 107: 
“Study of Entire U.N. Membership Question: U.S.-China Policy.”36 Coincidently, on 
November 22, President Nixon sent a memorandum to Kissinger to launch a study of 
the Chinese representation issue in the UN:
On a very confidential level, I would like for you to have prepared by your 
staff -  without any notice to people who might leak -  a study of where we are to 
go with regard to the admission of Red China into the UN. It seems to me that 
the time is approaching sooner than we might think when we will not have the 
votes to block admission.
The question we really need an answer to is how we can develop a position in 
which we can keep our commitments to Taiwan and yet will not be rolled by 
those who favor admission of Red China.
There is no hurry on this study but within two or three months I would like to 
see what you come up with.37
As former CIA official James Lilley recalls, in the following four months, the NSC
35 Kissinger, White House Years, p.703.
National Security Study Memorandum 106 (NSSM 106): “China Policy,” and National Security 
Study Memorandum 107 (NSSM 107): “Study o f  Entire U.N. Membership Question: U.S.-China 
Policy,” November 19, 1970, Subject Files (SF), Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In October 1970, a 
China expert in academia, Richard Moorsteen, wrote to the Kissinger-NSC that China-related questions 
usually came up the policy making level as “part o f  another problem,” and China did not come into 
focus as a “national entity.” Moorsteen thus suggested the establishment o f  a “high-level China Study 
Group.” Letter from Moorsteen to Kissinger, October 8, 1970, and Memo from Lord to Holdridge and 
Kennedy, “Establishing a China Policy Group,” October 30, 1970, Box 334, Policy Planning Staff 
(Director’s Files -  Winston Lord), STATE-RG59, NA.
Nixon to Kissinger, November 22, 1970, Memoranda from the President, 1969-74, Box 2, 
President’s Personal Files (PPF), White House Special Files (WHSF), NPMS, NA.
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staff, State Department, and the CIA would conduct a wide range of policy studies.38 
It was the State Department officials who took the principal initiative to develop 
concrete issues for the technically complicated UN representation question.
2.2. Initial invitation through the Pakistani channel
Meanwhile, the Pakistan backchannel began to function actively. On December 9, 
Nixon and Kissinger received Zhou’s reply (approved by Mao and Lin) through 
Yahya. The letter stated that in order to discuss the subject of “the vacation of 
Chinese territories called Taiwan,” a “special envoy” of President Nixon would be 
“most welcome” in Beijing.40 Zhou also noted that it was “the first time the proposal 
had come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head” and that China attached special 
importance to this message because the U.S. knew that Pakistan was “a great friend of 
China.”41 Yahya commented that it was important that Zhou had consulted Mao and 
Lin before his reply and that during his recent contact with the Chinese, there was no 
direct rhetorical criticism of the United States. Thus, these were some additional signs 
of the “modification” in the Chinese approach to their relations with the United 
States.42
In his memoirs, Kissinger downgrades the Chinese continuing reference to Taiwan 
as a “standard formula,” insisting that the Chinese were “driven by some deeper
38
James R. Lilley (CIA Station, Hong Kong, 1969-1970, China Operations Division, CIA, 1971-1973), 
Oral History Interview, p.67, 1996, FAOHC.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Chinese Communist Initiative,” December 10, 1970, enclosed draft note o f  
verbal message and message from Zhou, as conveyed by Hilaly, and with comments by Yahya. 
Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip (1 o f  2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, 





imperative,” namely the security of China itself rather than the future o f one 
province.43 However, this interpretation is misleading, given China’s persistence on 
Taiwan throughout the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in the 1950s and 1960s. While 
over-emphasizing the Soviet military threat toward China, Kissinger underestimated 
Chinese long-term sensitivity to the Taiwan question as the symbol o f U.S. 
intervention into the Chinese civil war.
At a press conference on December 10, 1970, President Nixon stated that no change 
in the Chinese representative issue in UN would be made at this time. However, 
Nixon reiterated explicitly that: “we are going to continue the initiative that I have 
begun, an initiative of relaxing trade restrictions and travel restrictions, an attempting 
to open channels of communication with Communist China, having in mind the fact 
that looking long toward the future we must have some communication and 
eventually relations with Communist China.”44
On December 16, 1970, Kissinger handed to Hilaly an unsigned memorandum for 
delivery to Yahya, which stated that the U.S. government would be prepared to 
proceed to a higher-level meeting in Beijing in order to discuss not only the Taiwan 
question, but also “other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions.”45 
Very importantly, the message made clear that the U.S. policy was to “reduce its 
military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region
43 Kissinger, White House Years, p.701.
44 President Nixon, Press Conference, December 10, 1970, “U.S. China Policy 1969-1972,” CF, Far 
East, Box 86, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Memorandum o f  Record by Col. Richard T. Kennedy, December 16, 1970, enclosing the response to 
the PRC (via Hilaly and Yahya, delivered in Beijing on January 5 1971), p. 1; and Memorandum by 
Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, “Record o f  a Discussion with Mr. Henry Kissinger On [sic] the 
White House on 16th December 1970,” pp. 1-2, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip, Box 1031, FPF- 
China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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diminish.”46 In his memoirs, Kissinger explains that the last sentence, a product of 
many interagency studies, was designed to induce Chinese interest in a negotiated 
settlement in the Vietnam War by “tying” the U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan 
to the ending of conflicts in Indochina.47
On December 18, 1970, Mao Zedong received American journalist Edgar Snow for 
a five-hour interview. Mao explained that the Chinese Foreign Ministry was 
considering the matter of admitting Americans, including the President, into China. 
Mao made clear his preference that “at present the problems between China and the 
U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon.”48 Therefore, Mao would be “happy to 
talk with him either as a tourist or as President.”49 As Bundy interprets, the Chinese 
grasped two major aspects of the U.S. Presidential initiative: Nixon’s personal 
willingness for a “large and visible” role in the rapprochement, and the “political 
timing” in his desire to present the new China initiative in public.50 In his memoirs, 
Nixon recorded that: “We learned Mao’s statement within a few days after he made 
it.”51 On the contrary, in his memoirs, Kissinger states that neither Nixon nor he knew 
of Mao’s comments until Snow’s report of the interview was published in Life 
magazine on April 30, 1971.52
^  Ibid., pp.1-2.
47 Kissinger, White House Years, p.702.
48 Edgar Snow, “A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung,” Life, April 30, 1971, p.3, in Book V-a, The
President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) (FPF/Lord)-
China Trip/Vietnam, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Mao made it clear to Snow that he would not object 
to publication o f  his comments without the use o f direct quotation several months later. Snow received 
the notes o f  the talk taken by Chinese interpreter Nancy T ’ang. For a detailed account o f  the entire talk, 
see Snow, Long Revolution, pp.160-163, pp.172-176; and Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.83-86. In May 1971, 
Mao ordered the complete transcript o f  his interview with Snow be relayed to the entire party and the 
whole country. Chen, M a o ’s China and the Cold War, p.262.
so
William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f  Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: 
Hill and Wang, A Division o f  Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 1998), p.166.
1 Nixon, RN, p.547.
2 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.702-703.
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On December 24, 1970, in his end-of-the-year backgrounder, Kissinger stated that: 
“We are in the process now of reviewing the still existing restrictions. We remain 
prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to talk to the Communist Chinese about 
differences that divide us.”53 Kissinger concluded that despite the interruption of the 
Warsaw talks, the U.S. principles would remain the same as to “seek, on the basis of 
equality, to remove the causes that have produced the tensions” with China.54
2.3. Another invitation through the Romanian channel
From the beginning of 1971, the Romanian backchannel also became active. On 
January 11, 1971, Romanian Ambassador Comeliu Bogdan brought an oral message 
to Kissinger, which was passed from Vice Premier Gheorghe Radulescu, who had 
visited Beijing in late November 1970. It was a message from Premier Zhou, 
“reviewed by Chairman Mao and Lin Biao,” expressing that if  the U.S. had a desire to 
settle “one outstanding issue” - “the U.S. occupation of Taiwan” - the PRC would be 
prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Beijing.55 Zhou also suggested that since 
President Nixon had already visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be 
welcome in Beijing.56 The message had two particularly important implications. First, 
the Chinese emphasized the fact that because of their independence from Moscow, 
Nixon had already visited these two communist capitals. Second, apart from an 
informal comment by Nixon in an October 1970 Time interview, the first reference to
Kissinger, Press Backgrounder, December 24, 1970, “U.S. China Policy 1969-1972,” Countries 
Files, Far East, Box 86, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
*4 Ibid.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Conversation with Ambassador Bogdan, January 11, 1971,” FPF-China 
Materials, Box 1032, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
56 Ibid.
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a Presidential visit to China came from the Chinese side.57 Kissinger interpreted that 
importantly, Zhou’s message did not refer to Indochina and that the Chinese interest 
was the Soviet military threat regardless of their public statement on the Taiwan 
issue.58 On January 29, Kissinger gave an oral message to Bogdan, which stated that 
the United States was prepared to discuss the whole range of international issues, 
including Taiwan.59 The message was given orally in an attempt to indicate 
preference for the Pakistani channel, the White House being wary of possible Russian 
eavesdropping in Romania. Moreover, on January 18, 1971, Kissinger received a 
message from Sainteny.60 Sainteny explained that acting upon Kissinger’s letter of 
November 9, he held a talk with his Chinese counterpart and asked to transmit the 
message to Beijing on December 23.
2.4. The State Department’s reassessments of China Policy
Meanwhile, without knowing of the White House’s reactivation of back-channel 
communications, the State Department was conducting its own assessment of the 
present nature of U.S.-PRC relations. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
assessed Edgar Snow’s interview with Premier Zhou of December 1970, seeking to 
detect any change regarding Beijing’s position on the Taiwan issue.61 Snow reported
57 The Chinese would reiterate this issue on April 21, 1971 after N ixon’s public remark about his 
daughter’s honeymoon, possibly to China.
Kissinger, White House Years, p.704.
Memcon, Comeliu Bogdan and Kissinger, January 29, 1971, Cookies II -  Chronology o f  Exchange 
with PRC, Feb 1969-Aprl 1971, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1032, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Smyser to Kissinger, “Message from Sainteny,” January 18, 1971, with Kissinger’s handwritten 
comments, Cookies II — Chronology o f  Exchange with PRC, Feb 1969-Aprl 1971, Box 1032, FPF- 
China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/US: Did Chou Tell Snow Anything N ew  About 
Taiwan?” January 4, 1971, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2189, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. This 
record suggests that some evidence o f  Edgar Snow’s interview with the Chinese leaders in December
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Zhou’s remarks on the importance o f “respect for territorial integrity.”62 Thus, Zhou 
demanded U.S. recognition of Taiwan as an inalienable part of the PRC; U.S. 
withdrawal of its forces from the island and from the Strait of Formosa; and U.S. 
recognition of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.63 The BINR concluded 
therefore that: “The door is open.”64 
On January 20, 1971, the American Embassy in Taipei reported to Secretary Rogers 
that the Republic of China’s evaluation of the Beijing-Moscow relations had been 
“largely shaped by propaganda considerations and wishful thinking rather than by 
dispassionate objectivity.”65 The airgram stated that Taipei dismissed the increasing 
signs of the Sino-Soviet rift as a “Communist trick to deceive the Free World.”
On January 25, 1971, the American Consulate General in Hong Kong also sent an 
airgram to Washington, assessing a “continuing fluidity” in Beijing’s triangular 
relationship with Washington and Moscow. China watchers argued that although the 
U.S.’s capacity for influencing the course of this relationship with the PRC might be 
“limited,” Beijing would still need to promote Sino-U.S. rapprochement as a “counter 
to Soviet military pressure.”66 In other words, the Soviet Union still constituted a “far 
greater military threat” to the PRC than the U.S. did.67
1970 reached the Oval Office before the publication o f Life magazine in April 1971. Kissinger might 
have overlooked the Snow record.
“  Ibid., p.2.
Ibid., Annex, p .l.
^  Ibid.
American Embassy, Taipei, “GRC Views o f  the Peking-Moscow Relationship,” January 20, 1971, 
p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1970-73, Box 2192, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
American Consulate General Hong Kong, “Peking’s Triangular Relationship with the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R.,” January 25, 1971, p .l,  POL Chicom-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2192, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
67 Ibid., p.2.
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2.5. The Laos military operation in February 1971
Meanwhile, the situation in Indochina was showing developments. In early 
February 1971, the U.S. supported the South Vietnamese strike against the North 
Vietnamese main land-supply line along the Ho Chi Minh Trial in Laos. On February 
4, without attacking President Nixon directly, China’s People’s Daily denounced the 
U.S. military operation in Laos. On February 9, 1971, the New York Times ran the 
headline: “Red China Warns on Move in Laos.”68 The Special National Intelligence 
Estimate judged that Beijing probably saw the U.S. and its allies “still bogged down” 
in a war that offered “no graceful exit.”69 CIA officials estimated that Beijing would 
thus continue to “publicly and privately encourage Hanoi to persist in its protracted 
people’s war.”
On February 17, President Nixon clarified in a press conference that: “this action is 
not directed against Communist China. It is directed against the North Vietnamese 
who are pointed toward South Vietnam and toward Cambodia. Consequently I do not 
believe that the Communist Chinese have any reason to interpret this as a threat
• • 70against them or any reason therefore to react to it.” Nixon also sought to re-assure 
Beijing via Pakistan backchannel on Washington’s continuing commitment to 
promoting a new bilateral dialogue and that the military operation in Laos would last
68 The New York Times, February 9, 1971. In private, however, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao 
Kuan-hua told the Norwegian Ambassador in Beijing, Ole Aalgard that China was aware o f  a new  
trend in U.S. foreign policy and that sooner or later, direct Sino-U.S. meeting would resume. Chiao 
implied that he was interested in meeting with Kissinger. Kissinger, White House Years, p.706.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, Number 13-10-71, “Communist China’s Reactions to 
Developments in Laos,” February 18, 1971, Tracking the Dragon: Selected National Intelligence 
Estimates on China, 1948-1976, National Intelligence Council, CD-ROM, (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2004).
The New York Times, February 17, 1971. See also Nixon, RN, p.548; Kissinger, White House Years, 
pp.706-707; and Reeves, President Nixon, p.300. From March 5 to 8, Premier Zhou visited Hanoi and 
expressed moral support to North Vietnam. Importantly, however, Zhou avoided criticizing Nixon  
directly.
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71 •only six weeks. Finally with regard to domestic criticism of the conflicts in 
Indochina, the President assured Congressional leaders that: “we must not lose sight 
of the main objective -  to continue U.S. withdrawals on schedule and develop a self 
defense capability of our South Vietnamese friends.”72 Overall, as Holdridge argues, 
Laos was a “side show” until the U.S. discovered that the Ho Chi Minh Trail ran into 
its very significant areas.73
The time was ripe for another public gesture. On February 25, 1971, the Nixon 
administration published its second Foreign Policy Report to Congress, encouraging 
China’s participation in the international community:
It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the 
major powers remains largely outside of it and hostile toward it. In this 
decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of 
drawing the People’s Republic of China into a constructive relationship 
with the world community, and particularly with the rest o f Asia.”74
Very importantly, the United States used China’s official name for the first time in an 
official document, intending to send a diplomatic signal to the Chinese. Compared 
with the first report, the February 1971 report more explicitly emphasized the 
importance of the restoration of diplomatic relations with China for the promotion of 
stability and peace in Asia and the world. The New York Times reported that: “Mr 
Nixon prepared to establish dialogue with Peking.”75
^ The Laos operation lasted from February 8 to March 25, 1971.
Notes from the GOP Congressional Leadership Meeting with the President, Tuesday, February 23,
1971, p.4, MemforP, ROM, Box 84, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
^ Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.85, FAOHC.
4 Richard M. Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building the Peace,” February 25, 1971, 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 105-109.
5 February 26, 1971, The New York Times.
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The foreign policy report, however, also caused apprehension in Taipei regarding 
the possibility of a two-China policy. On March 3, 1971, the American Embassy in 
Taipei reported that the Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
instructed “a strong representation” with the U.S. government, opposing the 
President’s use o f term “People’s Republic of China.”76 On March 4, during the press 
conference, President Nixon reiterated that: “under no circumstances will we proceed 
with a policy of normalizing relations with Communist China if the cost o f that policy 
is to expel Taiwan from the family of nations.”77
On March 15, as a diplomatic signal to Beijing, the State Department announced the 
termination of all restrictions on the use of American passports for travel to the 
People’s Republic of China. Equally important, the State Department also announced 
that the U.S. was seeking private channels to resume the Warsaw talks. On March 16, 
1971, The New York Times reported the decision: “U.S. Lifts Ban on China Travel.”78
2.6. NSC meeting on NSSMs 106 and 107: The Chinese Representation issue in the 
UN in March 1971
From November 1970 to February 1971, interdepartmental studies on the U.S. 
China policy (NSSM 106) and the Chinese representation question in the UN (NSSM 
107) had been proceeding.
76 American Embassy, Taipei to Rogers, “GRC To Protest Use o f  Term “PRC” by President Nixon, 
March 3, 1971, p .l, POL ChiNat-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2205, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
President’s news conference, March 4, 1971, Public Statements on China by U.S. officials, Box 86, 
U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], CounF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
The New York Times, March 16, 1971.
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On March 12, 1971, a Senior Review Group meeting was held on NSSMs 106 and 
107.79 The prevailing estimation, especially among China experts in the State 
Department was that before improving U.S.-PRC relations, Washington would have 
to recognize Beijing as the sole government of China or at least allow it into the 
United Nations. The State Department thus pursued the so-called dual-representation 
formula, namely while preserving Taipei’s seat in General Assembly, Washington 
would also admit Beijing’s entry into the UN. In reality, however, both Beijing and 
Taipei had made it clear that they would not tolerate any kind of a ‘two-Chinas’ 
resolution.
On March 25, 1971, the NSC met to discuss NSSMs 106 and 107.80 The purposes of 
the meeting were to examine policy options to deal with a “growing sentiment” in the 
General Assembly for admission of Beijing, and to “protect” the U.S. relationship 
with Taiwan.81 In the NSSM 107 paper, the central argument was whether to maintain 
the U.S. present Chinese representation policy, or to work for a dual representation 
formula, seating both Chinese entities. On the one hand, the Republic of China’s 
expulsion from the UN would erode international support for Taipei and would make 
Washington vulnerable to the charge that its defense treaty with the Republic o f China 
constituted interference in Chinese internal affairs.82 On the other hand, Beijing’s
79 Senior Review Group, March 12, 1971, National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF), 
NPMS, NA. In short, from 1961, the U.S. had pursued a resolution making any proposal to change the 
representation o f  China an “Important Question,” which required a two-thirds majority o f  the General 
Assembly for approval. In November 1970, although having failed for two-thirds, the majority had 
voted for the first time for in favor o f  the so-called ‘Albanian Resolution’ to seat Beijing and to expel 
Taipei (51 votes for, 49 against, and 25 abstentions). See Foot, The Practice o f  Power, pp.45-48; and 
Kissinger, White House Years, pp.770-774.
80 National Security Council Meeting, “UN Membership and China (NSSM s 106 and 107),” March 25, 
1971, Box H-031, UN Representation and China [Part I], Minutes o f Meetings (1969-1974), NSCIF, 
NPMS, NA.
81 President’s Talking Points, NSC Meeting -  Chirep -  March 25, 1971, p .l. National Security Council 
Meeting, UN Membership and China (NSSMs 106 and 107), March 25, 1971, Box H-031 UN  
Representation and China [Part I], Minutes o f  Meetings (1969-1974), NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
Issues Paper -  NSSM  107, p.2, National Security Council Meeting, “UN Membership and China
(NSSMs 106 and 107),” March 25, 1971, Box H-031 UN Representation and China [Part I], Minutes o f
Meetings (1969-1974), NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
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entry into the UN would enable Washington to maintain regular and high-level
83 •contacts. In the end, Nixon and Kissinger still favored continuing the existing policy 
of keeping Taipei in and Beijing out.84 However, Nixon was reluctant to overrule 
Rogers, and thus delayed his decision by allowing the State Department to handle the 
UN issue.
Another crucial issue was the U.S.-Republic of China defense relationship. The 
fundamental question in the NSSM 106 paper was to determine “how far” 
Washington should go in improving its relationship with Beijing and making it 
possible for Beijing to “play a constructive role in the family of nations.”85 
Particularly important, the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan would 
be a “useful test” of Beijing’s willingness to improve relations with the U.S.86 One 
view was that Taiwan was so strategically located that U.S. facilities there were 
“essential” to fulfilling its regional defense commitments in the Western Pacific.87 
Another view was that a reduction in the U.S. military presence on Taiwan would be 
“consistent with the Nixon Doctrine” without seriously damaging the morale of 
America’s Asian allies or its ability to meet its defense commitments to them.88
M  I b i d 'Mr. Kissinger’s Talking Points, NSC Meeting, China-UN Representation and China Policy, March 
25, 1971, National Security Council Meeting, UN Membership and China (NSSM s 106 and 107), 
March 25, 1971, Box H-031 UN Representation and China [Part I], Minutes o f  Meetings (1969-1974), 
NSCIF, NPMS, NA. See also Kissinger, White House Years, p.723.
Issues Paper -  Department o f  State, NSSM 106 -  United States China Policy, p .l, National Security 
Council Meeting, UN Membership and China (NSSMs 106 and 107), Thursday, March 25, 1971, Box  




Ibid., p.3. The Defense Department insisted that the removal o f  the U.S. military presence should be 
linked to the renunciation o f  the force agreement with Beijing. The U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan 
would also impact on other areas in East Asia where the U.S. was phasing down its military presence in 
accordance with the N ixon Doctrine. Jeanne W. Davies (Staff Secretary) to Agnew, Rogers, and Laird, 
“DOD Papers for NSC Meeting on China,” March 24, 1971, pp.2-3, Box H-031, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. 
As the following chapters demonstrate, the handling o f  the U.S.-ROK defense relations would remain 
highly complex in the Washington-Beijing talks.
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On April 9, 1971, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon on the Chinese
• 89 • •Representation at the UN. Nixon’s main concern was to prevent Taipei’s expulsion 
from the United Nations. However, Kissinger was very pessimistic that the U.S. 
would not be able to prevent Taipei’s “expulsion” -  “probably this year, certainly 
next.”90 Thus, Kissinger recommended to Nixon that he should be prepared to lessen 
his problems with Chiang kai-shek by: (a) reaffirmation of the U.S.-ROC Defense 
Treaty; (b) assurance on the maintenance of U.S. force levels in Taiwan; and (c) 
sympathetic consideration of his military assistance needs.91
3. Breakthrough from April to June 1971
3.1. Pine Pong Diplomacy
After the Chinese denouncement o f the Laos operation in early February 1971, 
back-channel communications between Washington and Beijing became quiet for 
about eight weeks. Meanwhile, the State Department assessed that Beijing’s 
diplomatic offensive was “gaining momentum” through “increased flexibility.” State 
Department officials estimated, however, that Beijing still appeared to be “in no 
hurry” to resume the Warsaw talks.92
89
Kissinger to Nixon, “Chinese Representation at the United Nations, April 9, 1971, p .l,  Memcons- 
President/HAK Jan.-April, 1971, Box 1025, President/HAK MemCons, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
90 Ibid., p.2.
91 TlIbid., p.3. On June 1, at the news conference, Nixon announced that: “a significant change has taken 
place among the members o f  the United Nations on the issue o f  admission o f  mainland China. .. .After 
we have completed our analysis, which I would imagine would take approximately six weeks, we will 
then decide what position we, the Government o f the United States, should take at the next session o f  
the United Nations this fall, and we will have an announcement to make at that time with regard to that 
participation problem.” The President’s News Conference, June 1, 1971, Public Statements on China 
by U.S. officials, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], Country Files -  Far East, Box 86, HAKOF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA. Chapter 7, Section 2.1 further examines the Chinese representative issue in UN.
Eliot to Kissinger, “Peking’s Increasingly Activist Diplomacy,” April 1, 1971, p .l,  POL Chicom-US. 
1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
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On April 7, 1971, to the surprise of U.S. officials, China took a major public 
initiative to indicate the changes in its policy toward America. During the world table 
tennis championship game in Nagoya, Japan, the Chinese team invited the American 
team to Beijing.93 Accordingly, the so-called “Ping Pong Diplomacy” produced media 
sensation. On April 10, The New York Times reported that: “ 15-Man U.S. Table 
Tennis Team Crosses Into China From Hong Kong.”94 On April 14, Premier Zhou 
welcomed the American team (which stayed in China from April 10 to 17), describing 
their visit as an opening for a “new page” in Sino-American relations.95
Both the White House and the State Department were carefully monitoring the 
developments. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyzed 
that this move toward “people’s diplomacy” altered Beijing’s longstanding refusal to 
accept American visitors and revived the more flexible policy toward the U.S. which 
initially developed in late 1969.96
On April 14, President Nixon announced additional travel and trade initiatives.97 On 
April 16, during a statement to the American Society o f Newspaper Editors in 
Washington, President Nixon reiterated his administration’s interest in achieving a 
normalization of relations with the government of the People’s Republic of China. In 
particular, Nixon also introduced a conversation with his daughters on the possibility 
of their going to China some day: “I hope they do. As a matter o f fact, I hope
93
The ping-pong diplomacy was Chairman Mao’s initiative. See Chen, M a o ’s China and the Cold  
War, pp.259-261.
94
The New York Times, April 10, 1971.
Chen, M ao’s China and the Cold War, p.261; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.710.
Intelligence Brief, INR, ‘Communist China/US: Peking’s People’s Diplomacy: A “N ew  Page” in 
Sino-American Relations,’ April 14, 1971, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE- 
RG59, NA. The Soviets criticized that China’s policy had not really changed at all, and that Beijing 
remained a disruptive factor in world affairs. Intelligence Brief, INR, “Ping-Pong Diplomacy Triggers 
Soviet Attack on Peking’s Global Policies,” April 23, 1971, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, 
SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
97 Statement by the President, April 14, 1971, pp. 1-2, Box 1031, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to 
China December 1969 -  July 1971 (1 o f  2), and “U.S. China Policy, 1969-1972,” p.3, HAKOF, CF-Far 
East, Box 86, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Thereafter, the Chinese could get visas to visit America, the U.S. 
dollar could be used to purchase Chinese goods, U.S. oil companies could sell fuel to ships and planes 
en route to China, and U.S.-owned ships under foreign flags could visit China
225
sometime I do.”98
Despite the strict secrecy, there were some unexpected interruptions in the Nixon- 
Kissinger back-channel communication with Beijing from other cabinet officials. On 
April 19, 1971 Vice President Spiro Agnew publicly expressed his disagreement with 
any opening to China, which, in the eyes of Nixon and Kissinger, almost undermined 
the secret preparation of direct talks with the Chinese. According to Haldeman’s 
diaries, Nixon argued that Agnew did not understand the “big picture,” explaining 
further to Haldeman that: “the whole China initiative was about the Russian game -  
using the thaw with China to shake up the Russians.”99 On April 27, 1971, The New 
York Times reported that administration officials disclosed that Romania was acting as 
an “intermediary” in communications between Washington and Beijing.100 The Times 
also disclosed that the Romanian Deputy Premier informed Premier Zhou of the 
American desire to improve relations with China during meetings in November 1970 
and in March 1971.101 Solomon recalls that despite Kissinger’s worries, the public did 
not pay much attention to media disclosers, because secret diplomacy toward China 
was “too unthinkable” during that period.102
98
Statement by President N ixon to American Society o f  Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1971, China -  
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3.2. Breakthrough via the Pakistani channel
Behind the dramatic public scene, there was a development in U.S. China policy 
through backchannels. On April 27, Hilaly delivered Zhou’s message (dated on April 
21, responding to Nixon’s message of December 16, 1970) to Kissinger. The message 
reaffirmed the Chinese willingness to publicly receive in Beijing “a special envoy of 
the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) the U.S. Secretary of State or 
even the President o f the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions.”103 On April 
28, Kissinger asked Hilaly to deliver an oral message. The message showed Nixon’s 
appreciation to Zhou for his “positive, constructive and forthcoming” message of 
April 21 and promised an early response.104 Kissinger asked Hilaly to convey a 
separate message to Zhou reflecting Yahya’s personal view that: “President Nixon is 
very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and not let any 
politicians come into a picture until a govemment-to-govemment channel is 
established.”105
On April 27 and 28, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the selection of a special envoy 
to Beijing, and Nixon finally decided to send Kissinger.106 Very importantly, during
103 Message from Zhou to Nixon, April 21, 1971, (delivered on April 27, 1971), Exchange Leading Up 
to HAK Trip (1 o f  2), Box 1031, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Hilaly called at 3: 45p.m. and delivered message 
to Kissinger at 6:12p.m. See Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, April 28, 1971; and Kissinger, White 
House Years, p.713.
104 Haig, “Extract o f  Memcon dated May 5, 1971,” and Memo from Haig to Nixon, “China,” May 5, 
1971, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip (1 o f  2), Box 1031, FPF-ChinaVietnam Negotiations, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA.
105 •
Ibid. On May 7, 1971, Kissinger held a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland, 
informing that he would set up a Navy backchannel via the U.S. navy attache in Karachi, assisted by 
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt. Kissinger to Nixon, “Meeting with Ambassador Farland, May 7, 1971,” 
May 15, 1971, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam 
Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Kissinger also discussed with Farland the itinerary o f  his trip to 
China via Pakistan. Kissinger, White House Years, pp.721-723.
Record o f Nixon-Kissinger Telephone Conversation, Discussing Zhou’s message and Possible 
Envoy to China, April 27, 1971, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China December 1969 -  July 
1971 (1 o f  2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA; and Conversation 2-
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the spring o f 1971, Nixon and Kissinger increased their confidence in the Chinese 
seriousness of direct talks. Lord recalls that: “Once the Chinese agreed to broaden the 
agenda for the secret trip, they [Nixon and Kissinger] became more confident that 
they were really interested in a serious opening of relations. And, we didn’t think they 
would humiliate us. Therefore, I don’t think Nixon and Kissinger were overly nervous 
about the trip.”107
Meanwhile, without knowing of the secret exchanges between the White House and 
the Chinese, State Department officials made contradictory public statements. On 
April 28, 1971, in a recorded interview with the BBC, Secretary Rogers stated that 
President Nixon’s visit to China might be possible if  relations continued to improve. 
Rogers said that he was “very much in favor of an exchange of journalists, students, 
and non-professional people with mainland China in the near future.”108 On April 28, 
a State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray, stated that it might be possible to 
resolve the status of Taiwan through negotiations between Nationalist China and 
Communist China. “Mainland China,” Bray stated, “has been controlled and 
administrated by the People’s Republic of China for 21 years and for some time we 
have been dealing with that government on matters affecting our interests.”109 
On April 29, Nixon urged Haldeman to warn Secretary Rogers regarding the 
administration’s current relations with the media on the China policy. Haldeman’s 
handwritten notes record the messages to Rogers: 1) he should be “very careful” that 
“we’ll not indicate any further decision”; and 2) if  pressed, he should state “we are not
52, The Nixon White House Tapes, 8:18p.m., April 27, 1971, NPMS, NA. See also Nixon, RN, pp.549- 
550; Kissinger, White House Years, p.717; and Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.339-340.
107 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. From the spring o f  1971, the NSC staff began to 
prepare briefing papers for the upcoming meeting with the Chinese. An analysis o f  the briefing papers 
is conducted in the following chapter.
08 “U.S. China Policy, 1969-1972,” p.3, CF, Box 86, Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
109 Ibid.
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in any way trying to irritate [the] Soviet[s] by our own China policy.”110 On the same 
day, in a news conference, President Nixon called the ‘two-Chinas’ idea “unrealistic” 
and emphasized that some recent speculation about the State Department officials’ 
statements was “not useful.”111 Instead, Nixon expressed that: “I hope, and, as a 
matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China sometime in some capacity -  I don’t 
know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long term.”112 
On May 4, the official Chinese newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao denounced Bray’s 
statement of April 28 as “brazen interference in China’s internal affairs.” The article 
spoke of the continuing friendship between the Chinese and American people, but 
added that Nixon’s expressed desire for better relations with China had proven 
“fraudulent” in light of Bray’s remarks.113
On May 10, 1971, Kissinger sent Nixon’s unsigned message to Zhou via Hilaly (a 
reply to Zhou’s message of April 21).114 Nixon made clear that he was “prepared to 
accept” the Premier’s suggestion that he visit Beijing for direct conversations with the 
leaders of the People’s Republic of China. Nixon proposed a preliminary “secret” 
meeting between Kissinger and Zhou or another appropriate high-level official to 
exchange views on “all” issues of mutual concern and to prepare for a presidential 
visit. In addition, the message suggested that the technical arrangements be done 
through Pakistani President Yahya Kahn. Finally, the message emphasized strongly 
that: “z7 is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first
110 Meeting with President at the Executive Office Building, 10:24-10:50a.m., April 29, 1971, File 5- 
48-05, Papers o f  the Nixon White House, Part 5. H.R. Haldeman: Notes o f  White House Meetings, 
1969-1973, Manuscript Division, Library o f  Congress.
111 Ibid.
112 Rodman to Kissinger, “Who Invited Whom?” October 13, 1971, p.3, HAK-ASF, Box 13, China, 
HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
n* “U.S. China Policy 1969-1972,” p.3, Box 86, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Message from Nixon to Zhou via Hilaly, May 10, 1971, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip to 
China -  December 1969-July 1971 [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
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meeting between Dr Kissinger and high officials o f  the People’s Republic o f  China be 
strictly se c re f\The message was received by the Chinese on May 17).115
3.3. Final invitation
On May 31, 1971, Nixon received a message from Pakistani President Yahya Khan 
via Ambassador Hilaly. Yahya added his latest assessment of Sino-U.S. relations:
• There is a very encouraging and positive response to the last message.
• Please convey to Mr. Kissinger that the meeting will take place on Chinese
soil for which travel arrangements will be made by us.
• Level of meeting will be as proposed by you.
• Full message will be transmitted by safe means.116
On June 2, 1971, Hilaly met with Kissinger and delivered a message from Zhou to 
Nixon (dated May 29).117 It was a comprehensive reply to Nixon’s previous messages 
on April 29, May 17, and May 22. Zhou’s letter clarified that Chairman Mao 
“welcomes President Nixon’s visit.” Particularly important, the Chinese treated the 
idea of a Presidential visit for direct conversations with Chinese leaders as Mao’s
115 Ibid. Italic in original. The Chinese initially resisted the idea o f  secrecy because they suspected the 
Americans were ashamed to be seen with them. Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. 
On May 20, 1971, Kissinger handed a note to Farland (to be delivered to the Chinese via Pakistani 
President Yahya), informing the Chinese o f  the May 20 SALT announcement, assuring that the U.S. 
would make “no agreement which would be directed against” China. Memo from Kissinger to Farland, 
enclosing message to the People’s Republic o f  China on SALT announcement, May 20, 1971, 
Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
Assessment o f  Zhou message by Yahya Khan, conveyed by Hilaly to Nixon on May 31, 1971, 
Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
Message from Zhou to Nixon, May 29, 1971, with commentary, conveyed by Hilaly to White 
House, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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“suggestion” which Nixon was prepared to “accept.” The Chinese agreed that during 
Nixon’s visit, the two sides could raise “the principal issues of concern.” However, 
Zhou re-emphasized that “the first question to be settled” was “the withdrawal o f all 
U.S. armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait Area.”118 Finally, Zhou 
welcomed Kissinger’s visit to China as the U.S. representative for a preliminary secret 
meeting with high-level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary 
arrangements for Nixon’s presidential visit. On June 4, Kissinger met with Hilaly and 
delivered Nixon’s reply to Zhou. Nixon’s message approved that Kissinger would be 
authorized to meet with Zhou Enlai in China from July 9 to l l . 119 Nixon finally stated 
that he looked forward to “the opportunity of a personal exchange” with the leaders of 
the People’s Republic of China.120
On June 10, 1971, President Nixon authorized the export of a wide range of non- 
strategic items to China and lifted all controls on imports from China, ending the “21- 
Year Embargo” on trade with China.121
In summary, during the final stage of the opening process from June 1970 to June 
1971, it was Nixon’s even stronger conviction for the importance of the historic 
breakthrough with Beijing that drove the White House’s secret diplomacy. Nixon and 
Kissinger sought to completely cut off the State Department from their highly 
personalized attempt to send a special envoy to China. Only a very restricted number 
of officials within the White House, such as Haig, Haldeman, Holdridge, and Lord,
118 Ibid.
119
The Chinese initially preferred the date from June 15 to 20. On June 21, Hilaly transmitted a short 
message from Zhou (dated June 11) which accepted the July 9 date. Letter from Hilaly to Kissinger, 
June 19, 1971, with message from Yahya on Kissinger’s travel arrangement, Exchanges Leading Up to 
HAK Trip [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Message for the Government o f  the People’s Republic o f  China, (From Nixon to Zhou handed to 
Hilaly on June 4), Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 o f  2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam  
Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
The New York Times, June 11, 1971.
were involved in this final stage. The power balance between the White House and 
the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs shifted toward the 
Kissinger NSC for the planning and implementation of the new China initiative. 
Without knowing of the exchange of back-channel messages between the White 
House and the Chinese leaders, the State Department operated in its own initiative to 
continue to assess change and development in Chinese foreign policy, still seeking to 
resume the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks.
In comparison, while the Kissinger NSC mainly focused on the deepening Sino- 
Soviet hostilities, State Department officials considered Taiwan as the central issue in 
U.S. relations with China. Moreover, while the White House sought to establish direct 
new talks with the Chinese and discuss major security issues within the broader 
international context, the Taiwan issue dominated the main contents of the Chinese 
backchannel messages. Finally, the White House repeatedly stressed the importance 
of strict secrecy for higher-level meetings with the Chinese leaders. It was the above­
examined signal exchange process that resulted in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July 
and October 1971, the PRC’s admission to the United Nations in October 1971, and 
finally, Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972.
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Part III. Direct Talks 
Chapter 7. Kissinger’s Trips to Beijing in July and October 1971
This chapter investigates the major issues between the United States and China 
during Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971.1 First, it examines the 
preparation for the direct talks with the Chinese, including the interdepartmental study 
NSSM 124, the NSC staffs briefing books, and the Nixon-Kissinger private talks. In 
the main analysis o f the Kissinger-Zhou talks, this chapter conducts five case studies: 
1) the Taiwan issue; 2) the conflicts in Indochina; 3) Japan’s future role; 4) the India- 
Pakistan rivalry; and 5) the growth of the Soviet military threat. Finally, this chapter 
assesses foreign reactions to the U.S. opening to China as well as Nixon’s briefings on 
the domestic front.
1. The preparations for the secret meeting with the Chinese
In order to explore the motives behind the U.S. determination to pursue direct talks 
with the Chinese at a higher official level, it is necessary to examine policy option 
studies at various levels within the Nixon administration.
1 For Kissinger’s July and October trips to Beijing, see Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp.736-763, and pp.774-784; John Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An 
Insider’s Account o f  the Normalization o f  U.S.-China Relations (Lanham, Boulder, N ew  York, Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1997), pp.55-63, and pp.67-75; and Patrick E. Tyler, A Great 




On April 19, 1971, soon after Premier Zhou’s dramatic invitation of the American 
table tennis team to Beijing, Kissinger directed an inter-departmental study, the 
National Security Study Memorandum 124 (NSSM 124): “Next Steps Towards the 
People’s Republic of China.”2 In short, NSSM 124 attempted to explore the major 
objectives of furthering the improvement in relations with China in terms of the 
following aspects:
• anticipated reaction or response by the PRC;
• the advantages and disadvantages of the initiative;
• an assessment o f the possible effects on our relations with and the anticipated 
reactions o f the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), the USSR, 
Japan and other nations as appropriate;
• an illustrative scenario by which the initiative could be pursued.3
The NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asian and Pacific Affairs produced a 
policy study paper. The NSSM 124 paper proposed three groups of alternative 
actions. Group 1 suggested a collection of relatively modest steps, such as permission 
for an American flag ship at China’s coasts and the reduction of close-in intelligence 
and reconnaissance flights. Group 2 suggested “greater inducements” for the Chinese,
National Security Study Memorandum 124 (NSSM124): “Next Steps Toward the People’s Republic 
of China,” April 19, 1971, p .l, National Security Study Memoranda, Subject Files (SF), Box 365, 
National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National 
Archives (NA). NSSM  124 directed that this study be submitted to the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs by May 15, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group. At the same 
time, the Chinese were also preparing for direct talks with the U.S., which was summarized in the 
official document: “The Central Committee Politburo’s Report on the Sino-American Meeting,” on 
May 26, 1971. Chen Jian, M a o ’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 2001), pp.264-265.
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including (1) “an offer to establish a Washington-Peking hotline”; and (2) “the 
reduction of U.S. forces on Taiwan consonant with the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from Viet-Nam.”4 More detailed Group 3 suggested important changes in the U.S. 
policy on the Taiwan question, such as: “(a) some form of U.S. presence in Peking; 
(b) an indication o f U.S. willingness to regard Taiwan as part of China; [and] (c) 
removal of U.S. forces from the Taiwan area” on the basis of an assurance that the 
PRC government would not cause a crisis in the Taiwan Strait area.5
The first issue to address was whether and how soon the United States should take 
further steps after announcing the easing of trade with the PRC. Accordingly, the 
question was whether the U.S. should “limit” its policy to the modest steps o f Group 1 
in order to “test” the Chinese willingness to move ahead without substantial change in 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan.6 The study further questioned whether the U.S. should 
“directly proceed” toward a more active initiative from Group 2, and possibly Group 
3, in order to “persuade” the Chinese leaders to begin to resolve the major problems 
before formulating any “basic and lasting accord” between the two sides.7
Importantly, the Taiwan issue remained fundamental. The memo expressed doubt 
over whether or not Beijing would make a major move towards governmental 
contacts without U.S. “flexibility” on 1) the question of Taiwan’s legal status, 2) the 
U.S.’s “political involvement” with the Taipei government, and 3) the U.S. “military 
presence” in Taiwan.8 The memo also estimated that China might “renew and
4 Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group, “NSSM124: Next Steps Toward the 






progressively broaden contacts” with the U.S. at the governmental level in order to 
explore “leverage” against the Soviets.9
The memorandum suggested that the U.S. long-term objective should be “to draw 
the PRC into a serious discussion of the problems” not only in the bilateral relations 
but also in a broader “relaxation of tensions in East Asia.”10 The study also estimated 
that because of the continuing difficulties with the Soviets and the fear of Japan’s re- 
emergence, Beijing might see its interests improved by a dialogue with Washington. 
Hence, the memorandum suggested that the US-PRC contacts should move forward 
“as rapidly as possible” at an official level.11
1.2. The ‘Books’
Parallel with the interdepartmental study, there was another analysis at a more 
restricted level. In the early spring of 1971, soon after the decision for direct talks 
with the Chinese at a higher official level was confirmed, Kissinger ordered to the 
NSC staff: “I want you to start working on a book.... Start working up position papers
• 19on all the issues that would be discussed with the Chinese.” The NSC staff thus 
began to produce the so-called “Books” -  “a detailed set of briefing papers in loose- 
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On May 12, 1971, NSC staff member Winston Lord sent a memorandum to 
Kissinger regarding the on-going drafting of the “Books.”14 The “Books” included the 
estimation o f the situation in China at that period, the major objectives o f the trip, the 
opening statement of Kissinger, and a number of position papers covering every 
possible major issue which might be raised. Each position paper consisted of an 
explanation of specific issues, a brief description of the conceivable Chinese position 
and response, and the U.S.’s response. Kissinger prepared the Soviet papers with 
Winston Lord and the Vietnam papers with Richard Smyser, and John Holdridge 
prepared other East Asian issues, including Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.15
1.3. The Nixon-Kissinger private talks
Behind the policy studies at bureaucratic and highly restricted levels, Nixon and 
Kissinger held their own talks prior to the July 1971 secret meeting with the Chinese. 
About a week before his departure to Beijing, Kissinger showed Nixon the completed 
briefing book, code name ‘POLO.’ Nixon studied the book, underlining significant 
points and writing comments on its cover page.16 In his ‘Scope Paper’ to Nixon, 
Kissinger proposed that a major task of his trip was to concentrate on the 
fundamentals o f the international situation. Within that broader framework, Kissinger 
argued, the Chinese would anticipate that the PRC’s prestige would increase
14 Lord to Kissinger, “Exchanges with China,” May 12, 1971, China -  Communique & memorabilia 
July 1971 HAK visit, For the President Files (FPF) - China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1033, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Holdridge, Oral History Interview in 
A China Reader, Volume II, p.34, January 1995, FAOHC. In addition, Kissinger read widely on 
Chinese history, culture, and philosophy. Details o f  the ‘Books’ are examined in the following sections.
Kissinger recalls that he is not sure how carefully Nixon reviewed ‘POLO,’ because N ixon’s usual 
procedure was to concentrate on the cover memorandum and ignore the backup paper. Kissinger, White 
House Years, p.735.
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enormously in becoming unequivocally one of the “big five”; the ROC’s international 
position would erode very considerably; the PRC’s chances o f getting into the UN 
this year on its terms (especially the expulsion of the ROC) would rise; and the 
Soviets would be faced with a “new complexity in their confrontation with the 
Chinese.”17 Overall, the Chinese might be hoping that the U.S. would end all its 
defense treaties with its allies and “get out of Asia.”18 
Regarding the question of Chinese seriousness toward direct talks, Kissinger 
estimated that they were acting partly in response to the Soviet military threat along 
their borders, and “it would not help them to humiliate us if they want to use us in 
some way as a counterweight to the Soviets.”19 Hence, years o f Chinese propaganda 
calling for a total U.S. withdrawal from Asia might not benefit China’s interests, since 
it would inevitably “leave areas of vacuum” into which the Soviets would “move 
quickly.” Kissinger argued further that there was a possibility to explore the value of 
the U.S. presence in Asia to “exercise restraints” on Japan, which was increasingly 
seen to China as a “rival and potential threat.”21 
The Chinese would almost certainly focus upon Taiwan as the first order of any 
substantive talks. Kissinger would therefore seek to develop Washington-Beijing 
relations while the U.S. at the same time would “retain” its diplomatic ties and mutual 
defense treaty with the ROC.22 Regarding Indochina, Kissinger was determined to 
seek indications firm enough to be taken as “assurances” that the Chinese would “use 
their influence on the North Vietnamese to move them toward a peaceful and
17 Scope Paper, p .l, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, For the President’s Files 
(Winston Lord) (FPF/Lord) -  China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, 
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acceptable settlement of the Vietnam War.”23 Finally, Kissinger would seek to assure 
the Chinese that the U.S. would accept China as a “great power with a legitimate role 
to play in international and particularly Asia affairs.”24
On July 1, Nixon and Kissinger (accompanied by Haig) reviewed Nixon’s 
comments on ‘POLO.’ Concerning the question of U.S. credibility, Nixon wrote: “Put 
[the Chinese] in fear.”25 In particular, Nixon wanted Kissinger to stress that, if 
pushed, he would “turn hard” on Vietnam.26 Nixon also suggested that Kissinger play 
up a U.S. “possible move” toward the Soviet Union.27 Thus, Nixon wanted a 
somewhat “heavier emphasis” on the Soviet threat and directed Kissinger to state to 
the Chinese that there were more Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than those 
arrayed against all o f the NATO pact countries. Overall, Nixon instructed that 
Kissinger should build on three fears: 1) the fear of what the President might do in the 
event of continued stalemate in the Vietnam War; 2) the fear of a resurgent and 
militaristic Japan in the case o f U.S. withdrawal; and 3) the fear of the Soviet Union 
on their flank.28
Nixon also emphasised that U.S.-PRC dialogue could not appear to be a “sellout” of 
Taiwan.29 On the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon thus believed, it would “not be 
essential” for the U.S. military presence to “remain in some areas forever.” However, 
the current U.S. presence in Taiwan was “directly related” to the U.S. military 
conduct in South Vietnam. Essentially, therefore, Nixon wanted to make the U.S.
23 Ibid., p.6.
24 Ibid., p.8.
25 Nixon’s notations on the cover page, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord -  
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P- 2, China -  general -  July-Oct. 1971, FPF, Box 1036, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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“overall willingness” on the Taiwan issue to be somewhat “mysterious.” Finally, as it 
had already conveyed through the Pakistani channel, Nixon told Kissinger to make it 
very clear to the Chinese that he expected them to institute a “severe limit on political 
visitors” prior to any presidential trip itself.30
1.4. The emergence of multipolarity in the world
The U.S. government publicly continued to illustrate the re-emergence of China’s 
great power dynamism in the world. In his speech in Kansas City on July 6, 1971, just 
three days prior to Kissinger’s secret arrival in Beijing, President Nixon outlined the 
emergence o f the multipolar image of the world, referring to the five great economic 
powers, such as the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and 
Japan: “these are the five that will determine the economic future and, because 
economic power will be the key to other kinds of power.”31 
Nixon’s handwritten notes show that he drafted the main theme of the Kansas City 
speech. Nixon questioned: “After Vietnam -  What kind of a world?” He saw that 
the U.S. position in world politics had changed over past two decades: “We live in 
world which is totally different from world of 25 years ago -  even 5 years ago -  U.S. 
was pre-eminent -  in 1946.... U.S. was superior militarily + economically.” As a 
result o f U.S. relative economic decline; “Today we see: 5 great powers playing a
30 Ibid., p.2.
31
The New York Times, July 6, 1971. Critics argued that Western Europe and Japan were not yet able 
to defend themselves without U.S. help and that China still lacked substantial military and economic 
power resources. See Stanley Hoffmann, “Weighing the Balance o f  Power,” Foreign Affairs, July 
1972; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Balance o f  Power Delusion,” Foreign Policy, No.7 Summer 
1972.
32 Kansas City, July 6, 1971, Speech Files, Box 67, President’s Personal Files (PPF), White House 
Special Files (WHSF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. The quotations in this paragraph are all from N ixon’s 
handwritten notations in preparation for his Kansas City speech.
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major role.” As for China, Nixon reiterated the long-term theme from his Foreign 
Affairs article of October 1967: “We must end isolation -  or risk danger.” In other 
words, China outside of international communication was a great source of instability. 
Thus, the U.S. moved to develop dialogue with China: 1) “We have taken steps trade 
and travel”; and 2) “Normalization -  essential.” Overall, Nixon sought co-existence 
with China, moving beyond the previous two decades o f mutual hostility: “We enter 
competition. We shall welcome challenge.”
The Nixon speech, however, was a surprise for other officials in the administration. 
For example, during the first meeting on July 9, 1971, Premier Zhou expressed his 
general agreement with the concept which Nixon outlined in his speech, especially 
“China as a country with potential strength.”33 However, as Solomon argues, the 
speech was made while Kissinger was travelling to China. Thus, Kissinger did not 
even know about it and was “embarrassed.”34 Kissinger admits in his memoirs that: 
“This put me at some disadvantage since I was unaware of either the fact or the 
content o f the speech.”35 Lord argues that the multipolar world itself was “already 
there before the Kansas speech,” and the main concept of the speech was “a reflection 
of the basic worldview” of Nixon and Kissinger.36 Foot assesses that while realizing 
the re-distribution of power resources in military, political, and economic terms in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger still viewed the United States as the 
most powerful state.37
33 Kissinger and Zhou, Memorandum o f  conversation (Memcon), July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening
(4:35p.m.-l 1:20p.m.), p.38, China-HAK memcons July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
35 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
36 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.748-749.
37 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
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2. Kissinger’s trips to Beiiing in July and October 1971
From July 6 to 12, 1971, Kissinger took what was announced as a fact-finding trip 
to Asia during which he secretly travelled to Beijing (July 9 to 11) and held extensive 
talks with Premier Zhou.38 At the beginning of the talks, Kissinger emphasized the 
importance of secrecy: “The President asked that this mission be secret until after we 
meet, so we can meet unencumbered by the bureaucracy.”39 
After two decades o f mutual hostility, one of the most fundamental issues between 
Washington and Beijing was the reduction of tension and the restoration of stability in 
Asia. Kissinger encouraged that the People’s Republic of China “participate” in all 
matters affecting “the peace in Asia and peace in the world” and play an “appropriate 
role in shaping international arrangements.”40 In response, Premier Zhou argued that: 
“the world outlook and stands of our two sides are different,” however, the two sides 
should formulate “a channel for co-existence, equality, and friendship.”41 Finally, 
Kissinger and Zhou discussed the language and contents of a joint announcement for 
the respective domestic audiences and the rest of the world. These talks became a
38
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substantial “mutual learning process” regarding decreasing the degree o f direct threat 
between the two sides.42
From October 20 to 26, 1971, Kissinger took an interim visit to Beijing to make 
arrangements for the Presidential trip.43 Compared with the July secret trip, the 
October trip was widely covered in the media. The NSC staff composed another set of 
“Books,” code name “POLO II” on not only “grand political-military strategy” but 
also what was to be included in the joint communique for the Nixon’s trip 44 In 
addition to the NSC staff members, State Department officials, such as Alfred L. 
Jenkins, office director o f the Office o f Mainland China and Mongolian Affairs, and 
his associates were brought into the preparation. Marshall Green, the Assistant 
Secretary o f State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was the chief liaison between 
the NSC staff and the State Department.
President Nixon principally sought to enhance his presidential leadership. During 
Kissinger’s official trip to Beijing in October 1971, Nixon (via Haldeman) asked Haig 
to transmit a message by wire to Kissinger on an urgent basis. The message explained 
that the President wished Kissinger to “insure” that a “specific time” was arranged for 
“two private head-to-head meetings” between the President and Mao with no one in 
attendance other than interpreters; and in the second instance, with Zhou “under
42 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Solomon recalls further that: “after the secret 
trip, there were very few people who could say they had met Zhou Enlai.” Thus, Kissinger felt that he 
was “ahead o f  everybody else.” Kissinger later admitted to Zhou that: “I had no idea what we would 
find here when I came.” Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, June 19, 1972, p .l, Box 97, CF-Far East, 
HAKOF, NPMS, NA.
43 On August 16, Kissinger discussed with Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen his plan to pay a four-day 
“interim” visit to China in late October. Kissinger also proposed to Huang a possible date for the 
presidential visit, suggesting two ideas, February 21 and March 16, 1972. The Chinese accepted 
February 21, 1972. Memcon, Huang Chen and Kissinger, August 16, 1971, pp.8-9, China exchanges -  
July-Oct 20, 1971, FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp.67-68.
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identical circumstances.”45 As the next chapter demonstrates, Nixon’s talks with the 
key Chinese leaders would be the highlight of his trip to China in February 1972.
2.1. The Taiwan issue
The question of Taiwan remained the most sensitive issue between Washington and 
Beijing. The briefing book “POLO” listed the Taiwan issue on the top of its agenda, 
which involved political considerations, and could “not be lightly set aside.”46 
Kissinger anticipated that apart from Taiwan, there was basically no great conflict 
between PRC and U.S. national interests 47 
It was on the Taiwan issue that Kissinger and his NSC staff particularly depended 
on the State Department’s past efforts and expertise, but without revealing their 
specific intentions. The most difficult task was how to find an acceptable language to 
express the U.S.’s official position on Taiwan. In short, since the period of the 
Warsaw ambassadorial talks in the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing maintained that the 
Taiwan issue was part of China’s internal affairs, which allowed the use of force for 
its resolution, if  necessary. However, Washington insisted on “peaceful means” to 
resolve the differences.48 Throughout the back-channel exchanges, Beijing still 
attempted to create the impression that it was Washington that desired a direct Sino- 
American meeting in order to discuss the Taiwan question. On the other hand, after
45 Haig to Kissinger, October 20, 1971, p .l,  China-HAK October 1971 visit, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
46 Taiwan, p .l, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I (hereafter referred to as Taiwan, 
POLO I), FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
1 Ibid
48 Ibid., p.4. See also Richard Nixon, “United States Foreign Policy in the 1970s: Building for Peace,” 
President N ixon’s Report to Congress, vol. 2. February 25, 1971, (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1971), p.277. As for the strategic importance o f  the Republic o f  China in U.S. policy  
toward Asia, see John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold  
War Strategy (New York: An East Gate Book M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), pp.283-284.
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the Warsaw talks in January and February 1970, the White House reiterated that the 
agenda for direct talks between the two sides consisted of the broad range of issues of 
mutual concern, “including, but not limited to” the Taiwan question.49
In his memoirs, Kissinger states very misleadingly that: “Taiwan was mentioned 
only briefly during the first session.”50 A participant in the July 1971 meeting, John 
Holdridge argues that: “the sole declared reason that Zhou Enlai had agreed to talks 
was to discuss the Taiwan question, even though pressing strategic considerations 
growing out of the Sino-Soviet dispute would surely be involved as well.”51 
Holdridge recalls further that the Taiwan question was presented “to diminish, if  not 
entirely eliminate, for the time being its role as an item of contention in Sino-US
52relations.” In reality, however, the record of the talks between Kissinger and Zhou 
show that the two sides held extensive exchanges on Taiwan.
Although the two sides agreed not to mention Taiwan in a following joint 
announcement, Zhou repeatedly stressed that Taiwan was the “first” and “crucial” 
issue, and had to be regarded as “a part o f China.”53 In response, as “POLO” 
suggested, Kissinger made a crucial statement that: ‘we are not advocating a “two 
Chinas” solution or a “one-China, one-Taiwan” solutions.’54 The statement 
immediately brought about Zhou’s positive response: “the prospect for a solution and 
the establishment o f diplomatic relations between our two countries is hopeful.”55
49 «
Summit, p.3, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
Kissinger, White House Years, p.749.
Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p.58.
2 Ibid.
”  Memcon, July 9, 1971, p. 13.
55 Ibid; and Taiwan, p.2, POLO I.
Ibid. On the afternoon o f  July 10, 1971, Zhou proposed Kissinger to tape-record their discussions. 
The Chinese wanted all the promises on tape, especially Kissinger’s assurances concerning Taiwan.
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Kissinger brought a major concession on the “eventual removal” of all U.S. armed 
forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.56 Within “a specified brief period of time 
after the ending of war in Indochina,” Kissinger explained, the U.S. was prepared to 
remove “two-thirds of our force.”57 Moreover, one-third of it was related to the 
defense of Taiwan itself, however, Kissinger argued, its reduction depended on the 
general state o f the Sino-American relations in the following years. Kissinger made it 
clear to Zhou that the U.S. was prepared to materialize diplomatic normalization 
during “the first two years” of Nixon’s second term.58
Equally important, regarding the so-called “Taiwan Independence Movement,” 
Kissinger clarified that the U.S. would not try to “encourage, support, finance, or give 
any other encouragement.”59 Zhou showed anxiety that after Washington’s opening to 
Beijing, Chiang kai-shek might collude with Tokyo or Moscow. Zhou was also 
preoccupied with Japan’s possible re-entry into Taiwan before and after the U.S. 
withdrawal. Hence, Kissinger repeatedly assured that the U.S. would “strongly 
oppose” any Japanese military presence in Taiwan.60
Finally, as the briefing book emphasized, Kissinger reiterated: “We hope very 
much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.”61 In essence, Kissinger was
trying to link the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan to Chinese renunciation o f force in
order to resolve the question. However, Zhou reiterated China’s long-term principle -  
the use of force as the ultimate means to deal with its internal issue. Hence, Kissinger
The two sides later agreed that there was no need for a tape recording. James H. Mann, About Face: A 
History o f  A m erica’s Curious Relationship with China, from  Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1999), p.32.
*  Taiwan, p.2, POLO I.
57 Memcon, July 9, 1971, p. 12.
^M emcon, July 10, 1971 (12:10p.m.-6:00p.m.), p.16, andp.19.
9 Memcon, July 11, 1971 (10:35.m .-l 1:55a.m.), p . l l .
60 Ibid.
1 Ibid., p. 10; and Taiwan, p.4, POLO I.
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reported to Nixon, regarding Taiwan, “we can hope for little more than damage 
limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty.”62
In “POLO II,” the briefing book for Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in October 1971, the 
NSC staff argued that during the July 1971 talks, the Chinese had “not set any specific 
time-frame” for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan, and therefore that the 
question remained “open-ended.”63 Accordingly, the NSC staff suggested that 
Kissinger “avoid committing the President to any kind of a formal stand on 
normalization and troop withdrawals.” Nixon himself wished to “avoid the 
appearance of selling out an ally.”64 Therefore, the NSC staff recommended that what 
should be stressed to the Chinese was U.S. “intention, not the formality.”65 During the 
talks with Zhou, Kissinger thus reiterated that: “We recognize that the People’s 
Republic of China considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue, and we will not 
challenge that.”66
Importantly, Kissinger and Zhou held intensive negotiations on the language of 
Taiwan’s status to be included in the joint communique for the upcoming summit. 
Lord explains that the NSC staff prepared a draft of what was to be known as the 
Shanghai Communique. It was originally a typical diplomatic draft with two sides 
agreeing on issues. After consulting with Mao, Zhou rejected it criticizing that: “We 
haven’t talked to each other for 25 years. It’s dishonest. It will make our allies
62 Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, p.27, Miscellaneous memoranda 
relating to H AK’s trip to PRC, July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
63 Taiwan, p.5, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], For the President’s Files 
(Winston Lord) -  China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
64 Ibid., p.7.
65 Ibid., p.9.
66 Memcon, October 21, 1971, 10:30a.m.-l:45p.am., p.20, HAK visit to PRC October 1971 Memcons - 
originals, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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suspicious, and it won’t make any sense to our publics. So let each side state its own 
positions, and then we can state where our views converge.”67 Accordingly, Kissinger 
and Lord re-drafted the entire communique overnight, producing the revised version 
in which the U.S. and Chinese sides independently stated their respective positions on 
ideology and on specific issues. Moreover, Lord admits that: “we did draw on State’s 
ideas for the Taiwan portion.”68 In reality, however, Lord’s statement is only a limited 
explanation. More particularly, it was during the preparations for the January and 
February 1970 Warsaw talks that State Department officials, especially the Director 
of Asian Communist Affairs, Paul Kreisberg, and a China Desk official, Donald 
Anderson, developed the whole “conceptual approach.” These officials drafted “the 
new formulations” to describe U.S. “acceptance of the idea of the unity o f China” as 
well as the removal o f U.S. forces.69 On the basis of these bureaucratic inputs, the 
U.S. draft statement of October 25, 1971 read as follows:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province 
of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.... 
The United States accepts the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of its 
armed forces from the Taiwan Straits, and pending that will progressively
70reduce them as tensions diminish.
67 Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.27, The National Security Council 
Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHR), Center for International and Security Studies at 
Maryland and the Brookings Institution, December 8, 1998.
Ibid. In his memoirs, Kissinger admits only in general terms that he adapted the Taiwan language 
from a State Department’s planning document. Kissinger, White House Years, p.783.
Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office o f  Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department o f  State, 
1965-81), Oral History Interview, p.9, and p .14, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, 
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Throughout the talks, Zhou stressed that the Chinese side was “exerting great 
restraint” on the Taiwan issue and that it would not demand “an immediate solution” 
but that it would be resolved “step by step.”71 However, Zhou still sought private 
reassurance that the U.S. would withdraw not only from Taiwan Strait but also from 
Taiwan as a whole.
Kissinger reported to Nixon that Taiwan remained the “single most difficult 
issue.”73 On the other hand, Kissinger interpreted that the PRC was “in no a hurry” to 
have all U.S. armed forces removed from Taiwan but wanted the “principle of the 
final withdrawal” established; China was most interested in “global acknowledgement 
that Taiwan is part of China.”74
In late 1971, the Nixon administration had faced one delicate problem, namely the 
Chinese representation issue in the United Nations which showed a perception gap 
between the White House and the State Department. In short, as previously discussed, 
the Nixon administration adopted the so-called “dual position” : while supporting 
Beijing’s new entry into the Security Council and General Assembly, it continued to 
support the representative of the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan in the General 
Assembly.75 Since Kissinger’s October trip coincided with the UN General 
Assembly’s annual debate on Beijing’s representation issue, U.N. Ambassador 
George H.W. Bush requested that President Nixon delay Kissinger’s schedule, 
because it would “not be helpful at all.”76 Nixon considered that Taiwan still received
71 Memcon, October 24, 1971, 10:28a.m.-l:55p.m., p.25.
72 Memcon, October 26, 1971, p.2.
Kissinger to Nixon, “M y October China Visit: Discussions o f  the Issue,” November 11, 1971, p. 14, 
China -  HAK October 1971 visit, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
74 Ibid., p.4.
75
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important support in America, however the rapprochement with Beijing had priority 
over Taipei’s status in the UN. Nixon thus advised Bush to “fight hard” and did not 
alter Kissinger’s schedule.77 On October 25, 1971, as a consequence of a vote of 
substantial majority, the General Assembly admitted the People’s Republic of China 
to the UN and expelled the Republic of China. On October 26, The New York Times 
reported that: “U.S. Seats Peking And Expels Taipei; Nationalists Walk Out Before
78Vote.” In the end, Nixon and Kissinger privately regarded Beijing’s entry into the 
UN as a matter of inevitability.
2.2. Conflicts in Indochina
It has been pointed out that by opening to China, the U.S. sought to induce a co­
operative attitude from the Chinese to promote a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam 
War.79 In his memoirs, however, Kissinger describes only that: “I would seek some 
moderating influence on Indochina, bearing in mind that the mere fact of the meeting 
and the substantial summit was bound massively to demoralize Hanoi.”80 Kissinger 
therefore fails to show what he precisely sought to obtain from Zhou. In fact, it is 
Kissinger himself who has repeatedly denied the U.S. specific interest in inducing
Nixon, Kissinger, and U.N. Ambassador George Bush,” September 30, 1971, p. 2, in William Burr 
(ed.) Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement'. New American and Chinese Documentation Leading 
Up to Nixon's 1972 Trip, National Security Archive (NSA).
7 Ibid., p.4.
78 The New York Times, October 26, 1971.
79 See for example, Seymour Hersh, The Price o f  Power (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p.375; and 
Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China 1969-1989  (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), p.34.
80 Kissinger, White House Years, p.735. Kissinger brought in a Vietnam expert, Richard Smyser, for 
the preparation o f  the briefing book and the secret trip to Beijing. Richard Smyser, Correspondences 
with Komine, October 2 and 5, 2003; and Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, 
Volume II, p.34, January 1995, FAOHC.
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Chinese “pressuring of Hanoi.”81 Moreover, Holdridge states only that the Vietnam 
issue was “sidestepped.”82 In reality, however, the Indochina issue required a number 
of intensive exchanges between the two sides.
In the briefing book ‘POLO,’ the NSC staff made it clear that the U.S. wanted to 
end the war in Vietnam through negotiations, however that “we will not purchase its 
ending at the price of our humiliation.”83 Kissinger was therefore mainly concerned 
about the question of U.S. credibility. The longer the war continued, the less influence 
the U.S. would have in Saigon, and the less impact the U.S. would have on a political 
settlement.84
During the talks with Zhou, Kissinger explained that the U.S. was willing to end 
the Vietnam War through “negotiations,” and would be interested in setting a “date” 
for the withdrawal.85 On the other hand, Kissinger insisted that it would be crucial for 
the U.S. to make a settlement “consistent” with its “honor” and “self-respect.”86 Thus, 
Kissinger argued that the U.S. and China should take a “great” country point of view 
rather than seeing the issue in terms of a “local” problem.87
Zhou was not convinced, insisting that “all” foreign troops, including the U.S. 
military installations, should be withdrawn from Indochina, and the three countries
81
During an interview with CNN, Kissinger states that: “We did not expect that China would bring 
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(Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) should be “left alone” to determine their own 
political path.88 Kissinger claimed that the U.S. would eventually withdraw 
unilaterally.89 He also admitted that there should be a ceasefire, but North Vietnam 
should not demand for the U.S. military withdrawal and its complete departure from 
South Vietnam simultaneously. Zhou thus criticized the U.S. policy for being a 
conditional withdrawal, questioning that if  the U.S. took a “broad” perspective, why it 
still wanted to leave a “tail” (implying Thieu in South Vietnam and Lon Nol-Sirik 
Matak in Cambodia).90
Importantly, the U.S. pursued a political settlement in Indochina. As the briefing 
book advised, Kissinger thus emphasized that the U.S. required a “transition” period 
between the “military withdrawal” and the “political evolution.”91 During this 
“interim” period, Kissinger argued, Washington would be prepared to accept 
“restrictions” on the types of assistance that could be provided to the states in 
Indochina.92 Zhou replied that as long as the war did not stop, Beijing would 
“continue” its own support for the peoples in Indochina. However, Zhou made it clear 
that China would not “intervene” or negotiate on their behalf. Hence, Kissinger 
claimed that the U.S. was “not” asking China to “stop” giving aid to its friends.93
In his report to Nixon, Kissinger stated that the current peace talks in Paris were 
blocked by the remaining differences between Washington’s proposal for a 
“ceasefire” and Hanoi’s insistence on the “overthrow” of Thieu.94 Kissinger claimed 




91 Memcon, July 10, 1971, p.22; and Indochina, p.5, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, 
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92 Ibid.
98 Ibid., p.26.
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“escalation” of the war.95 Henceforth, Kissinger concluded that the mere fact of U.S.- 
PRC talks would bring about an “impact” in North Vietnam, anticipating that Beijing 
might “exert some influence” on Hanoi96
In ‘POLO II,’ the NSC staff estimated that the China initiative was a positive factor 
for negotiations in Indochina “because of the ricochet effect on Moscow, giving it 
more incentive to get into the act; and the greater likelihood that Hanoi would 
substantively honor the terms of a settlement (at least in the short run) given her 
allies’ stake in it.”97
During the October 1971 talks, Kissinger prepared to give specific assurance that 
the President was prepared: (1) to withdraw completely from Indochina and give a 
fixed date, and (2) leave the political solution to the Vietnamese people alone.98 More 
particularly, Kissinger explained to Zhou that: “We have offered new elections six 
months after a peace is signed. We have offered that all American troops withdraw 
one month before the election. We have offered that the President and Vice President 
of Vietnam resign one month before the election so that they do not run the 
election.”99
As for the Soviet threat in Indochina, the NSC staff estimated that the Soviets 
might favor North Vietnamese dominance of Indochina as a counterweight to the
9*Ib id.
96 Ibid., p. 16. Three days after Kissinger’s departure from Beijing in July 1971, Zhou flew to Hanoi and 
attempted to emphasize China’s continual support. However, the North Vietnamese believed that the 
Chinese used the Vietnam issue to settle the Taiwan question. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam 
Wars, 1950-1975  (Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000), pp.196-197.
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United States. Because of both Hanoi’s consistent streak o f independence and the 
small percentage of Beijing’s military aid, the Chinese influence in Hanoi might “not 
be very substantial.”100 The NSC staff thus pointed out the Chinese fear of “enlarged 
Soviet prestige generally and influence in Southeast Asia in particular.”101 On the 
other hand, the Chinese had made it clear that they did not want to play an 
intermediary role in Indochina.102 In conclusion, the NSC staff recommended that: 
“we should downplay any potential Soviet role.”103 
In reality, however, Kissinger exaggerated that the “continuation” of war in 
Indochina would only help “outside forces,” implying the Soviets.104 As for the 
question of Beijing’s influence on Hanoi, Kissinger stated only that Washington 
would “appreciate” Beijing’s “telling its friends its estimates of the degree of our 
sincerity in making a just peace.”105 Kissinger reported to Nixon that the Chinese 
could be “helpful, within limits” on Indochina.106
2.3. Japan’s future role
Most previous major works on the U.S. opening to China have explained the 
negative impact o f Nixon’s sudden announcement of his trip to China on July 15, 
1971 on Japan.107 Until recently, therefore, the question of how Kissinger and Zhou
100 Indochina, p . l l ,  Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF, Box 850, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., p. 12.
103 Ibid., p. 13.
104 Memcon, October 21, 1971, 4:42-7:17p.m., p.24.
105 Kissinger to Nixon, “M y October China Visit,” November 11, 1971, pp. 17-18, China -  HAK 
October 1971 visit, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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discussed the Japan issue during the July and October 1971 talks was either 
overlooked or given relatively minor attention.108 In his memoirs, without revealing 
any details of his talks with Zhou, Kissinger states only that: “It took me some time to 
convince him that the US-Japan alliance was not directed against China.”109 
In reality, however, the NSC staff recognized that Kissinger was neither familiar 
with nor interested in Japan.110 Thus, as the former Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green recalls, it was State Department 
officials who took the initiative to develop U.S. policy toward Japan from early 1969 
to mid 1971.111 In essence, as the National Security Decision Memorandum 13 
(NSDM 13) stated on May 28, 1969, the vital U.S. interests were to encourage 
“moderate increases and qualitative improvement” in Japan’s defense efforts, “while 
avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially large forces or to play a larger 
regional security role.”112 During the U.S.-Japan summit in November 1969, President 
Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato agreed to “preserve” the U.S.-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty, and affirmed that the two governments “should maintain close
113contact.” In particular, Sato expressed Japan’s interest in the security of “the
108
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Republic of Korea” as “essential” and that of “Taiwan” as “a most important 
factor.”114
Regarding U.S. China policy, State Department officials, such as U. Alexis Johnson 
and Marshal Green, were principally concerned with calming Tokyo’s growing 
anxiety over Washington’s move towards Beijing. In April 1971, the NSSM 124 
paper had already emphasized: “we should concert our moves with Japan through 
close and frequent consultations.”115 However, without the State Department’s 
expertise, Kissinger and the NSC staff used a geopolitical framework to assess the 
conceptual possibilities o f Japan’s future role.116 As former NSC staff member Peter 
Rodman recalls, the Kissinger-NSC believed that: “Japan is a very nationalist country 
and that may some day be asserting itself again.” It would “move in a very nationalist 
direction if  ever it loses confidence in the U.S.”117
As ‘POLO’ shows, there was an urgent need to respond to a consistent PRC 
propaganda theme that a “revival of Japanese militarism” was taking place “at the 
instigation o f the American imperialists.”118 This long-term theme represented 
Chinese sensitivity to the rapid growth of Japan’s economic power and political 
influence, and even without the ingredient of military power, the Chinese regarded 
Japan as a “serious rival” in Asia.119 The NSC staff also anticipated that the Chinese
114 Ibid. On July 5, 1971, during an interview with Ross Terrill, Premier Zhou became very “agitated,” 
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would bring up the Japan issue by specifically referring to the U.S.-Japan Mutual 
Defense Treaty as being “directed against China.”120 The principal issue for direct 
talks therefore was to justify the U.S.’s continuous presence in Asia by persuading the 
Chinese that the U.S.-security relationship with Japan had the particular effect of 
“containing” Japan rather than reverse.121 Being unfamiliar with the historical 
complexity of Sino-Japanese relations, Kissinger would follow Nixon’s private 
instructions of July 1 along with the briefing book’s recommendations.
During the July 1971 secret meeting, it was Premier Zhou who raised the Japan 
issue and accused the U.S. of “rearming” the Japanese “militarists,” for “economic” 
expansion would lead to “military” expansion.122 Following Nixon’s instructions, 
Kissinger explained that: “our defense relationship with Japan keeps Japan from 
pursuing aggressive policies.”123 In other words, Kissinger warned Zhou that if  Japan 
felt “forsaken” by the U.S., and if it built its own “nuclear weapons,” the emergence 
of a “strong” Japan would raise a question of “expansionism.”124 Thus, Kissinger
1 n  c
clarified that: “Neither of us wants to see Japan heavily re-armed.” Finally, 
adopting an expression from the briefing book, Kissinger sought to assure Zhou that 
the U.S. was not “using” Japan against China, as that would be “too dangerous.”126 
Nevertheless, Zhou was still preoccupied with the revival o f Japanese militarism, 
warning of its expansive ambitions not only in “Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam,” but 
also in “Northeast China, Indochina and the Philippines and areas up to the Straits of
120 Ibid., pp.l-2.
121 Ibid., p.3.





Ibid; and Japan, p.3, POLO I.
257
Malacca.”127 Kissinger replied that the U.S. would not “encourage any military 
expansion by the Japanese” and that if  it took place, the U.S. would “oppose” it.128 
Kissinger reported to Nixon that Zhou understood the “restraining role” which the 
U.S. played on Japan.129
In the briefing book for Kissinger’s October trip, the NSC staff assessed that the 
Chinese still had attempted to “drive a wedge” between the U.S. and Japan.130 The 
People’s Daily editorial of September 18 stated that: “U.S. imperialism has no wish to 
see an independent, prosperous and strong Japan in Asia. While glibly calling Japan 
its ‘close partner,’ it is actually ready to betray her at any time.”131 The Chinese paper 
then called on Japan to “take another road, the road of independence...and 
neutrality.”132
During the October 1971 talks, Premier Zhou emphasized that at the present 
economic level, it would be difficult to “put brakes” on Japan.133 Zhou warned further 
that once Japan took “the road of military expansion,” it would be difficult to measure 
“to what degree” it would develop.134
In response, Kissinger stated that Moscow was seeking influence over Tokyo, and
• 1  ^it would be “dangerous for others to use Japan against the United States.” Kissinger
reiterated that the present relationship with the U.S. was a “restraint” on Japan.
127 Memcon July 10, 1971, p.7.
j2* Ibid., p.27; and Japan, p.4, POLO I.
129 Kissinger to Nixon, “My talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, p.17.
130 Japan, p.6, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part II], FPF/Lord, Box 851, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA. Section 3.1.2 o f  this chapter examines the so-called Nixon shock.
Ibid., p.7. Inverted commas in original.
132 Ibid.
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However, Zhou was still unconvinced of whether or not the U.S. was capable of 
“limiting” Japan’s “self-defense strength.”137 Hence, Kissinger explained that the U.S. 
would oppose a nuclear re-armed Japan and that, with its nuclear umbrella, the U.S. 
would do its best to “limit” Japanese armament and expansion.138 In his report to 
Nixon, Kissinger estimated that the Washington-Beijing-Tokyo triangular relationship 
could be “one o f our most difficult problems.”139
2.4. The India-Pakistan rivalry
Previous major works on the U.S. opening to China have mainly focused on the 
development o f the India-Pakistan war of December 1971.140 This study examines the 
India-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia as one of the major issues between Kissinger and 
Zhou during the July and October 1971 talks. Importantly, moreover, the 
interpretation of the nature of India-Pakistan rivalry showed the disagreement 
between the White House and the State Department from March to December 1971.
On March 25, 1971, President Yahya Khan ordered his military to crush the 
separatist movement in East Pakistan, which was calling for an independent 
Bangladesh. Nixon and Kissinger perceived the situation in South Asia through the
Kissinger to Nixon, “M y October China Visit,” November 11, 1971, p.4.
See, for example, Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.295-322, Hersh, The Price o f  Power, 
pp.444-464; Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.371-379; and Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.117-125. Garthoff even 
misinterprets that there is no substantial exchange on the India-Pakistan relations between Kissinger
and Zhou in the July 1971 talks. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p .315. As for recent work on the
India-Pakistan crisis o f  1971 based on new documentary sources, see, for example, F.D. Aijazuddin 
(ed.), The White House & Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp.423-489; Sajit Gandhi (ed.), The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis 
° f  1971, December 16, 2002, NSA; and Jussi Hanhimaki, The F lawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and  
American Foreign Policy  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.154-184.
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prism of U.S. policy toward the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and were mainly concerned about 
the emergence of India’s regional dominance backed by the Soviet Union.141 Nixon 
and Kissinger were also privately concerned with the protection of Pakistan’s role as 
an intermediary in U.S.-PRC relations.142 On the other hand, in an unusual unanimity, 
the State Department denounced the brutality o f the Pakistani troops’ suppression of 
citizens in East Pakistan as a “reign of terror,” and supported India.143
During April and May 1971, Nixon and Kissinger urged President Yahya Khan to 
take a more moderate and conciliatory line in East Pakistan. On April 28, 1971, Nixon 
approved an effort to help Yahya achieve a negotiated settlement and wrote: “Too all 
hands. Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time. RN.”144 Kissinger and the NSC staff 
recognized that Nixon personally had a “high regard” for Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan.145 On May 10, 1971, during a talk with Pakistani officials, Nixon himself made 
it clear that Yahya was a “good friend” and that the U.S. would “not do anything to 
complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him.”146
On May 26, 1971, State Department officials judged that President Yahya was “not 
likely” to take steps to bring about a “political accommodation” until he realized
141 Nixon, RN, p.525; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.767
142 Kissinger, White House Years, p .854. As for a recent controversial work which criticizes Kissinger’s 
quiet approval o f  Yahya’s suppression o f  civilians in East Pakistan, see Christopher Hitchens, The 
Trial o f  Henry Kissinger (London, N ew  York: Verso, 2001), pp.44-50.
143 Telegram, U.S. Consulate, Dacca, “Selective Genocide,” March 28, 1971, Pol and Def, Box 2530, 
Subject-Numeric Files (SNF) 1970-73, General Records o f  the Department o f  State, Record Group 59 
(STATE-RG59), NA. See also, Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger 
Geopolitics and South Asia,” Asian Survey, vol.20 April 1980, pp.339-361. Van Hollen, former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary o f  State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1969-1972), criticizes that 
Kissinger unnecessarily elevated the local crisis in the subcontinent into one o f  U.S.-USSR  
competition. The White House-centered system was not suitable for a “multifaceted regional crisis” 
which required a number o f  operational decisions over months. Ibid., p.357.
N ixon’s handwritten notation, Underline by Nixon in original, in Kissinger to Nixon, “Policy 
Options Toward Pakistan,” April 28, 1971, p.6, Country Files (CF)-Middle East, Box 625, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
145
Memcon, M.M. Ashmad, Agha Hilaly, Henry Kissinger, and Harold H. Saunders, 3:05-3:30p.m., 
May 19, 1971, p.3, CF-Indo-Pak War, Box 578, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Memcon, Nixon, M.M. Ashmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H. Saunders, 4:45-5:20p.m., May 19, 
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himself how essential it was.147 The State Department had also “confidentially 
briefed” India on the positions the U.S. was taking privately with Pakistan.148
On June 3, 1971, during a talk with U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, 
and a South Asia expert of the NSC staff, Harold Saunders, Kissinger made clear that 
President Nixon’s main concern was to discourage India from military action.149 
Kissinger thus explained that: “We want to buy tim e... We have no illusion that West 
Pakistan can hold East Pakistan and we have no interest in their doing so.”150
In ‘POLO,’ the NSC staff analysed that South Asia was an area where the U.S. was 
pursuing “no special geopolitical interests of its own,” which was unlike both the 
Soviets and the Chinese whose positions in South Asia were basically each developed 
against the other.151 The NSC staff also estimated that the Chinese would be pleased 
to see radical elements in East Pakistan come to surface and India “weakened.”152
Hence, Kissinger was prepared to assure Zhou that the U.S. would not want to “play
1anyone off against anyone else,” or to “stir up anti-Chinese sentiment in India.”
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National Security Council, 1971; Near East Affairs Department o f  State, 1974-1976), Oral History 
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152 Ibid.
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During the July 1971 talks, it was Premier Zhou who raised the question of South 
Asia, insisting that India was “committing aggression against Pakistan,” and that 
South Asia was becoming a region in “turmoil.”154 Zhou thus suggested that the U.S. 
“advise India not to provoke such a disturbance.”155 In his reply, Kissinger sought to 
give an assurance to Zhou: “we would under no circumstances encourage Indian 
military adventures against the People’s Republic of China.”156 
Zhou made it clear that: “if India commits aggressions, we will support 
Pakistan.”157 Kissinger misinterpreted what Zhou meant by “support Pakistan.” Thus, 
Kissinger agreed to “oppose” Indian aggression, although the U.S. could not take 
“military measures.”158 Zhou emphasized that the U.S. still had the “strength to 
persuade India.”159
By the summer o f 1971, as a Soviet expert of the NSC staff, Helmut Sonnenfeldt 
assessed, the Soviets might see the Indian subcontinent as offering the “most tempting 
opportunities” for exploiting U.S.-Chinese difficulties and for achieving “unilateral 
advantages.”160 On August 9, 1971, India signed a twenty-year ‘Treaty o f Peace, 
Friendship, and Cooperation’ with the Soviet Union. In his memoirs, Kissinger 
stresses that the Soviets discovered an opportunity to “humiliate” China and also 
“punish” Pakistan for its role as “intermediary” between Washington and Beijing.161 
On August 11, 1971, during a meeting with the principal members of the Senior
154 Memcon July 10, 1971, p.6.
155 Ibid., p .l 1.
156 Ibid., p.29.
157
Memcon July 11, 1971, p.17.
158 Ibid.
m Ibid'Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “US-Soviet Relations in Light o f  the President’s Visit to China,” July 20, 
1971, p.3, Box 500, China Trip -  July-November 1971 [Part 1], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger, White House Years, p.767. Since N ixon’s presidential visit in August 1969, Pakistan was 
an “enthusiastic” cooperator for the promotion o f  Washington-Beijing relations. The Pakistani leaders 
sought to have the U.S. “weight” as a comer o f  national security. Bundy, A Tangled Web, p.245, and 
pp.269-284.
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Review Group, Nixon expressed his conviction with a “great deal o f emphasis” that 
the U.S. “must not — cannot — allow” India to use the refugees as a “pretext for 
breaking up Pakistan.”162 Moreover, Nixon made it clear that the U.S. still had to “use 
its influence to keep the war from happening.”163 
On August 16, during a secret talk with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang 
Chen, Kissinger gave private assurance that the U.S. would “do nothing to embarrass 
the government o f Pakistan by any public statements.”164 In his report to Nixon, 
Kissinger explained that they were “building a solid record of keeping the Chinese 
informed,” especially assuring that the U.S. was “not colluding against their ally.”165
In ‘POLO II,’ the NSC staff estimated that the Soviet-Indian Treaty was aimed at 
Beijing as well as Islamabad.166 The NSC staff assessed, however, that the Chinese 
were “not militarily prepared” on how to sustain major operations against India and 
that a clear-cut Indian victory would seriously weaken Pakistan and enhance India’s 
prestige to China’s detriment.167 Hence, China would judge that a “short war,” which 
the international community would stop, would enable it to join in an effort to give 
Pakistan a “face-saving way to pull back” from East Pakistan.168
162 Memorandum for the Record, August 11, 1971, p.3, CF-Indo-Pak War, Box 578, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
163 Ibid., p.4.
164 Memcon, Huang Chen and Kissinger, August 16, 1971, p.8, China exchanges -  July-Oct 20, 1971, 
FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger fails to provide any 
specific details o f  his briefing to the Chinese. Kissinger, White House Years, p.768.
Kissinger to Nixon, “M y August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris,” August 16, 
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166 The Soviet Union, pp. 11-12, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF/Lord, 
Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.




During the October 1971 talks, as anticipated, Zhou criticized that the Soviet Union 
was “threatening” Pakistan.169 Kissinger reiterated that the U.S. would “totally 
oppose” India’s military action against Pakistan.170 However, Zhou was not 
convinced, insisting that India was seeking to “get two big powers to contend for it in 
the Indian Ocean.”171 In his report to Nixon, Kissinger assessed that China would 
stand clearly “behind Pakistan” but it did “not want hostilities to break out” and was 
afraid o f giving the Soviets a “pretext for attack.” 172
2.5. The Soviet military threat
The Soviet military threat had been a major issue o f analysis in previous works on 
the U.S. rapprochement with China.173 Nixon and Kissinger were seriously concerned 
about how to develop a common perception with Beijing to counteract against the 
Soviet military power. In his memoirs, Kissinger interprets that “China needed us 
precisely because it did not have the strength to balance the Soviet Union by itself.”174 
Hence, Kissinger clarifies that while keeping the Chinese informed of the US-USSR 
negotiations “in considerable details,” Washington would not give Beijing any “veto” 
over its actions.175 In essence, Kissinger was seeking to develop an even-handed
Memcon, October 22, 1971, p.30.
170 n  - ,  ’ vIbid., p .31.
171
Memcon, October 24, 1971, p. 17.
Kissinger to Nixon, “My October China Visit: Discussions o f  the Issues,” November 11, 1971, p.27. 
See, for example, Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.261-262. Garthoff argues that Kissinger 
provided to Zhou “high-resolution satellite photographs” o f  Soviet military activities.
Kissinger, White House Years, p.749.
Ibid., p.837. On the other hand, Bundy argues that Kissinger developed a “double standard” o f  
triangular diplomacy within which U.S. relations with China essentially came to possess a similarly 
close basis as that with the allies. Bundy, A Tangled Web, p.238.
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approach towards both Beijing and Moscow.176 Regarding Beijing’s growing 
sensitivity toward the superpowers’ detente, the NSC staff emphasized in ‘POLO’ 
that: “Our approaches to the USSR are not directed against China and should not be 
regarded as U.S.-USSR collusion at China’s expense.”177
In his memoirs, Holdridge states only that during Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing 
in July 1971, the U.S.-PRC problem with the Soviets was “mentioned but not
178stressed.” In reality, however, Zhou emphasized that: “we would absolutely not 
become a superpower.”179 Moreover, Zhou warned that the Soviet Union was 
following America’s path “in stretching its hands all over the world.”180 
In response, Kissinger explained that the U.S. would not exclude “the possibility o f 
Soviet military adventurism.”181 Importantly, Kissinger took steps beyond the NSC 
briefing book’s recommendations and gave a crucial assurance to Zhou: “I am 
prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral 
negotiation we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT.”182 
In his report to Nixon, Kissinger evaluated that the Chinese did “appreciate” “the 
balancing role” the U.S. was playing in Asia and that the U.S. must be “exceptionally
176 Goh argues that the United States shifted its emphasis from an even-handed approach toward the 
two communist giants (1971-1972) to a “tacit” tilt toward China (1973-1974). Evelyn Goh, 
Correspondences with Komine, August 2 and 3, 2004; and Idem, “From ‘Red M enace’ to ‘Tacit’ Ally: 
Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974” PhD thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford 
University, 2001.
177 Review o f  U.S. and PRC Views on Other Great Powers, the Soviet Union, pp.4-5, Briefing book for 
HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Holdridge, Crossing the D ivide , p.60.
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careful not to drive them away.”183 It was crucial to assure the Chinese that the U.S. 
would “never collude with other powers against China.”184
In “POLO II,” the NSC staff estimated that the U.S. had skilfully managed the 
delicate U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle better than the U.S.-Japanese-Chinese one. With 
the Soviets, the U.S. had stressed its “priority in dealing with them” in the near future, 
having moved ahead on negotiations and having agreed on a summit. The Soviets, at 
least publicly, had to say that they favored the normalization of Washington-Beijing 
relations with emphasis on this “not being directed against Moscow.”185 
The NSC staff judged that Zhou was thinking in “balance of power terms” and did 
not want any sudden shift in this balance in Asia, demonstrated by the “absence o f a 
time-limit for U.S. withdrawals.”186 In reality, Zhou could hardly admit that the U.S. 
was doing the PRC a favor by maintaining a balance vis-a-vis the USSR.187 The NSC 
staff thus recommended to Kissinger to stress that U.S. forces in Asia did “not 
constitute a threat to the PRC” and that a U.S. withdrawal from Asia could create a
1 Rftvacuum that other major powers might be tempted to fill.
During the October 1971 talks, Premier Zhou insisted that despite the existence of 
profound differences regarding world outlook, the two sides came to share a common 
interest in easing tensions in East Asia.189 Hence, Zhou emphasized that: “no country
Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, p. 10.
184 Ibid., p.22.
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People’s Republic. Therefore, by the late 1960s, M oscow could hardly justify its private opposition to 
Washington’s move toward Beijing.
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should make efforts to establish hegemony and no major power should collude with 
any country.”190 Moreover, Zhou suggested that the two sides, through their 
respective actions and influences, “affect” allies “not to go to certain extremes.”191 
Finally, Zhou claimed that both sides should “not allow another greater power far 
away feel easy in coming into the Far East for hegemony.”192 
Kissinger and Zhou thus agreed to include in the communique the so-called “anti­
hegemony clause,” a joint opposition to the emergence of any major threat seeking 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. In his memoirs, Kissinger recalls that although 
the term hegemony later became “a hallowed Chinese word, it actually was 
introduced first by us.”193 Holdridge interprets that China “removed” the “American 
hegemonists” from the lists o f “offenders” o f this principle and it was the Soviet 
Union that remained.194
After the October trip, Kissinger reported to Nixon, emphasizing that “a deep and 
abiding Chinese hatred of the Russians” repeatedly came through during his
instructions. “Kissinger’s Second Visit to China in October 1971,” pp.7-8, Diplomatic History Institute 
of the Chinese Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Xin zhaogguo wenjiao fengyun [New China’s Diplomatic 
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190 Ibid., p .15.
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193 Kissinger, White House Years, p.783. The term, “hegemony,” originally came from a Greek word 
for “leader.” Isaacson, Kissinger, p.403n. Viotti and Kauppi define “hegemony” as the relations when a 
major power exercises “dominance” over the states within its sphere o f  influence and explain 
“leadership” as a “pre-eminent” position for a state. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International 
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conversations with Zhou.195 Kissinger assessed that for the U.S., a rapprochement was 
a “matter o f tactics,” but for the Chinese, it involved a “profound moral 
adjustment.”196 However, the July 15 presidential announcement had “not changed the 
direction of Soviet policy but had improved Russian manners.”197 Finally, therefore, 
Kissinger emphasized that the Chinese should be “under no illusions that we fully 
intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with 
Peking.”198
2.6. Kissinger’s report to Nixon after the July and October 1971 trips
In his report to Nixon, Kissinger described the secret trip as the “most searching, 
sweeping and significant discussions.”199 Premier Zhou spoke “with an almost matter 
of fact clarity and eloquence. He was equally at home in philosophic sweeps, 
historical analysis, tactical probing, light repartees. His command of facts, and in 
particular his knowledge of American events, was remarkable.”200 Lord also assesses 
that: “Zhou Enlai was a survivor. You don’t survive the Cultural Revolution without 
being brutal, although he was more pragmatic than Mao. He certainly was the most
• 901impressive foreign leader I have ever met.”
195
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More specifically, Kissinger emphasized the remaining profound perception gap 
with the Chinese:
The Chinese clearly like to picture themselves as free from the vice of great 
power ambitions.... Their attitude toward great powers now is a mix of 
hostility, suspicions, and fear... they may be making a virtue out of a 
necessity. And their very interest in a U.S.-Chinese summit has them 
playing a great power game.202
Finally, Kissinger defined the U.S. role in world politics:
For Asia and for the world we need to demonstrate that we are enlarging the 
scope o f our diplomacy in a way that, far from harming the interest o f other 
countries, should instead prove helpful to them. Our dealings, both with the 
Chinese and others, will require reliability, precision, finesse.203
As his handwritten comments on ‘POLO II’ show, President Nixon strongly 
believed that the Chinese continuing demand for U.S. total withdrawal from Asia was 
“out of question.”204 Therefore, during the “very intensive substantive discussions for 
some twenty-five hours” in October 1971, while Zhou continued to pressure “the 
prospect o f a lower American military profile in Asia,” Kissinger sought a “built-in 
restraint on Chinese activities in Asia.”205 Together, Kissinger and Zhou attempted to 
ensure “less danger o f miscalculation” and develop a “counterweight to the Soviet
202 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, pp.22-23, Miscellaneous 
Memoranda Relating to HAK Trip to PRC, July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Union.”206 In consequence, the two sides established the “basic technical and 
substantive framework” for the upcoming summit.207 Kissinger particularly explained 
to Nixon that: “they are clearly gambling on your re-election.”208 Finally, Kissinger 
estimated that “if we can navigate the Taiwan issue successfully, we should have a 
communique that is realistic, clear, dignified, reassuring to our friends and positive 
for the further development of US-Chinese relations.”209
3. Reactions to the China Breakthrough
3.1. The Nixon presidential announcement o f July 15. 1971
On July 13, the day of Kissinger’s return from his secret trip to Beijing, Nixon and 
Haldeman discussed how to “set something up” for Secretary Rogers and agreed that 
Rogers should not state “anything about China.”210 Nixon urged Haldeman to ask 
Kissinger to inform the press that it was President who “did the whole thing.”211 
Nixon and his advisers determined to remind the press that the recent China initiative 
did not happen “accidentally” and that it was a “culmination of a long process.”212
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207 Ibid., p.3.
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philosophical turn o f  mind; (7) A  man who works without notes; (8) A man who knows Asia; (9) 
Steely but who is subtle and appears almost gently.” Nixon to Kissinger, July 19, 1971, POF, Box 85, 




Accordingly, it became Haldeman’s task to enhance Nixon’s “world leader image.”213 
Secretary Rogers agreed later that there was no need to “say anything beyond 
announcement.”214
On the morning of July 15, 1971, Haldeman, Rogers, and Kissinger discussed the 
upcoming presidential announcement. The United States would need to “reassure 
Pacific allies” that “no secret deal” was made during Kissinger’s trip to Beijing.215 
The main issues of U.S. messages to allies were: 1) “we are not changing our policy”; 
and 2) “we don’t deal with our friends behind their back.”216
On July 15, 1971, at 8 p.m. local time in California, President Nixon appeared on a 
major TV network broadcast and read the joint announcement, prepared by Kissinger 
and Zhou and issued simultaneously in the United States and in China. Nixon 
accepted Zhou’s invitation to visit China before May 1972 “to seek the normalization 
between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concerns to the 
two sides.”217 Anticipating a wide sensation which would be likely to follow the 
announcement, Nixon read an additional explanation that the U.S. opening to China 
“will not be at the expense o f our old friends. It is not directed against any other 
nation.”218 Finally, Nixon expressed his profound conviction that “all nations will
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Meetings o f  H.R. Haldeman with William Rogers and Henry Kissinger at San Clemente, 12p.m., 
July 15, 1971, File 5-54-18, Papers o f  the Nixon White House, Part 5. H.R. Haldeman: Notes o f  White 
House Meetings, 1969-1973, Manuscript Division, Library o f  Congress.
216 Ibid.
217 Announcement o f  Trip to China, July 15, 1971, Speech Files, Box 67, PPF, WHCF, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
218 Ibid. Regarding the U.S. relations with its allies, Nixon revised a draft statement by the NSC staff 
from “Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People’s Republic o f  China does not mean that
the United States will abandon its old friends.” to “will not be at the expense o f  our old friends.” 
Underline by N ixon in original. Ibid.
271
gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship” between the United States 
and China.219
The seven-minute presidential announcement brought about wide-ranging reactions 
not only within the American public but also abroad. The New York Times reported in 
its headline that: “Nixon Is Expected To Visit China Around End of Year; To See 
Both Mao and Chou.”220 The U.S. Information Agency reported that the 
overwhelming majority o f media commentators in non-Communist countries 
enthusiastically greeted the news as a “momentous event.” The announcement was 
also described as a “diplomatic triumph” for President Nixon that dramatically 
conformed his pledge to seek to transform an era of “confrontation” into one of 
“negotiation.”221
However, several observers held that the development enhanced Beijing’s prestige 
and posed some serious risks for the United States. A few right-of-center 
commentators also presented a note o f caution, warning against “expecting too much 
too soon.”222 Finally, the “unusual secrecy” for the conduct o f American foreign 
policy was “very disturbing and very unhealthy.”223
22020 The New York Times, July 17, 1971. Foot explains that the U.S. opening to China stimulated the 
American ambition that the nation was still capable o f  taking a bold action to embrace a long-term 
enemy. Foot, The Practice o f  Power, pp.263-264.
21 Barbara M. White (Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency) to Haig, July 23, 1971, “President’s 
Acceptance o f  Invitation to Peking: An Assessment o f  Foreign Media Reaction, July 22, 1971,” p .l, 
Box 500, China Trip -  July-November 1971 [Part 1], President’s Trip Files (PTF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.
222 Ibid., p.2.
223
“China Trip Secrecy Muddies The Waters,” July 27, 1971, Philadelphia Bulletin.
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3.1.1 The Republic of China’s reactions
Less than two hours after the President’s statement, the U.S. Ambassador to Taipei, 
Walter P. McConaughy was given an official government of the Republic of China 
statement which protested “in the strongest terms possible” the President’s statement 
and termed it “a most unfriendly act” which “will have gravest consequences.”224 The 
U.S. Information Agency reported that Taipei media replayed the Taiwan 
government’s “serious protest.” It also reported that President Chiang kai-shek 
received a personal letter from President Nixon which contained “reassurance” that 
the U.S. would “continue to honor its defense treaty commitment” to the Republic of 
China and maintain the continuing friendship with her.
On August 9, 1971, Secretary Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon, re-assessing 
the ROC’s “feelings of shock and betrayal” over the announced intention to visit the 
mainland, which might generate further “emotionalism.” On the other hand, the ROC 
government had a “realistic appreciation of its vital interests,” the primary one being 
its “continued existence as a viable entity on Taiwan.”225 State Department officials 
thus concluded that the ROC would go through the motions of “bitter protest for the
224 Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 16, 1971, 
p.l, POL Chicom-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2191, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. On July 15, the new ROC 
ambassador to the United States, James C.H. Shen was informed o f  Kissinger’s trip through a phone 
call by Secretary Rogers just twenty minutes before N ixon’s announcement. Shen met Assistant 
Secretary Green to stress how “shocked” and “bewildered” everyone in Taipei was, asking: “Where is 
all this going to end?” James C.H. Shen, The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally 
(Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1983), p.72.
225 Rogers to Nixon, “Probable GRC Reaction to Your Announced Visit to Mainland,” p .l,  Attached to 
Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Estimates o f  Future Reaction to China Initiative,” August 9, 1971, 
Box 499, Reaction to China Initiative (July 1971) Memos, Letters, etc., PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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sake of face,” but might privately feel “some sense of reassurance” concerning its 
existence over the mid-term future.226
3.1.2 The Japanese reactions
In public, the Japanese Acting Foreign Minister Kimura termed the President’s 
announcement a “very good thing,” commenting that although such a development 
was “anticipated,” events had taken a “sudden turn.”227 The State Department 
reported that the Sato government was “taken by surprise and embarrassed by the 
announcement.” The U.S. Information Agency also noted the Japanese media’s 
coverage of “an air o f uneasiness” in Tokyo.229
Soon after the secret trip, Kissinger reported to Nixon: “With Japan our task will be 
to make clear that we are not shifting our allegiance in Asia from her to China.”230 
However, Nixon and Kissinger were seriously concerned about the danger of leaks 
from Tokyo as they personally did not trust the Japanese government.231 In reality, the 
day before the July 15 announcement, following the recommendations from the
Ibid., p.2.
227 •Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 16, 1971, 
J.3, POL Chicom-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2191, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
28 Eliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 22, 1971, 
£.2, Box 499, Reaction to China Initiative (July 1971) Memos, Letters, etc., PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
White to Haig, “President’s Acceptance o f  Invitation to Peking: An Assessment o f  Foreign Media 
Reaction, July 22, 1971,” p.3, July 23, 1971, Box 500, China Trip-July-November 1971 [Part 1], PTF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA.
230
Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, p.27.
Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Solomon further recalls that a former NSC  
staff member and a Japan specialist, Richard Sneider was “furious” after hearing about the Kissinger 
secret trip on the radio, considering that it would “screw up” the U.S. relationship with Japan “very 
badly.” Ibid. N ixon later stated to British Prime Minister Edward Heath that the Japanese had “the 
leakiest government in the world, so we couldn’t afford to give them advance word.” Memcon, Nixon  
and Heath, December 20, 1971, p.5, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records o f  Meetings 
(ROM), Box 87, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA. See also Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.342-343, and pp.347-348; 
Bundy, A Tangled Web, p.233, and pp.244-245; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.762.
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Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Secretary Rogers had planned to send 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to Tokyo to inform 
Japanese officials privately in advance. However, Kissinger vetoed the idea, telling 
Johnson that the President was too worried about the possible danger of a leak, and 
thus the trip was never materialized.232 Lord recalls that alternatively, Kissinger could 
have sent Holdridge or himself to fly to Tokyo just after leaving China; although the 
Japanese would still have been upset, at least they “would not have been humiliated 
publicly.”233 Moreover, Secretary of State Rogers also attempted to reach Japanese 
Ambassador to the U.S. Uchiba, however was restricted by Nixon’s insistence on only 
an hour’s prior-notice.234 Consequently, the Japanese officials were “astonished” and 
“outraged” that there had “not been any advance consultation, much less warning. 
.. .Privately, the Japanese felt that Kissinger had betrayed them.”235 Johnson assesses 
that: “The damage had been done. After this ‘Nixon shokku’ as the Japanese called it, 
there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our two
232 Johnson found out about the cancellation from Lord on the airplane on the way to California. Lord, 
“The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.45, NSCP-OHR.
233 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. In reality, Secretary o f  Defense Laird, who was in 
Tokyo, knew exactly what was happening, through his own sources, such as naval communication 
channels, Yeoman Radford’s secret reports, National Security Agency communications intercepts, and 
the special mission plane that Kissinger used. Laird privately told his Japanese counterpart about the 
Kissinger trip and the forthcoming summit six hours before it was announced. See Isaacson, Kissinger, 
jj.348.
34 State Department officials Richard Erickson and Marshall Green drafted a message o f  explanation 
from President N ixon to Prime Minister Sato. Green recalls that there had been a tendency in the 
Foreign Service for officials to be either pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese. This went back for at least 100 
years and the U.S. Government had fallen into “that syndrome, with the President favoring China over 
Japan.” Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, p.58, pp.60-61, FAOHC.
235 William Sherman (Consul General, Osaka-Kobe, 1968-1970, Political Counselor, 1970-1972), Oral 
History Interview, p. 14, Japan, Volume II, Country Collection, FAOHC. Kissinger had been quoted on 
more than one occasion: “Who cares if  some civil servant is embarrassed? He could care less.” 
Thereafter, there had been very significant attitudinal changes within the Foreign Service: “Can one be 
sure that the policy being given to you by the leadership is really the one that they w ill follow? ...H e  
has to find a mentor, a protector, a rabbi in the White House or in the NSC or somewhere who is going 
to advance his cause.” Robert, Duemling (Head o f  Political-External Section, United States Embassy, 
Tokyo, 1970-1974), Oral History Interview, p.2, Japan, Volume II, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.
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governments.”236 Thereafter, Tokyo would begin to initiate its own diplomatic move 
toward Beijing.237
3.1.3. The Soviet reactions
The Soviet media reported President’s Nixon’s acceptance of Premier Zhou’s 
invitation. However, it did not mention the President’s statement that his trip to the 
PRC was “not directed against any other nation.”238 The unofficial Soviet reaction to 
the President’s Beijing visit remained a “low key approval.”239 The State Department 
reported that there had been no comment from official Soviet sources in Moscow.
On July 20, 1971, a Soviet expert in the NSC staff, Sonnenfeldt sent a memorandum 
to Kissinger, analysing the implications of the presidential announcement on U.S.- 
Soviet relations.240 In the Soviets’ view, immediate U.S. goals had been to “bring the 
USSR under pressure” in various negotiations and to limit the Soviet role in the Asia- 
Pacific. These suspicions, reinforced by deep-seated “antagonism toward the 
Chinese,” would have been raised further by the presidential announcement. Finally, 
regarding a possible U.S.-USSR summit, Sonnenfeldt estimated that the 
materialization of the Beijing trip would make Soviet interest in a summit greater than
236 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand o f  Power (Enlgewood Cliffs, N ew  Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 
pp.552-554. Inverted commas in original. In August 1971, Japan was surprised by another “Nixon  
shock” - the announcement o f  the end o f  gold currency to impose an import surcharge and suspend the 
dollar’s convertibility into gold.
This subject is discussed in Michael Schaller, ‘Detente and the Strategic Triangle: Or, “Drinking 
Your Mao Tai and Having Your Vodka, Too,” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.), Re- 
Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (New York: Harvard University Press, 
2001); and Ogata Sadako, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study o f  U.S. and Japanese 
Process (Berkley: Institute o f  East Asian Studies, University o f  California, 1988).
Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 16, 1971, 
p.4, POL Chicom-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2191, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
239 .
Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971, July 22, 1971,
P-6, Box 499, Reaction to China Initiative (July 1971) Memos, Letters, etc., PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “US-Soviet Relations in Light o f  the President’s Visit to China,” July 20, 
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it was before, but the Soviets, and Brezhnev personally, would still psychologically be 
reluctant to disclose this interest.241
On July 22, Kissinger sent an analysis of the China initiative to Nixon. The 
following point drew Nixon’s attention: “Moscow simply cannot help gaining the 
conviction that our new China policy is but a symptom of our overwhelming desire to 
see reconciliation and disengagement anyway and everywhere.”242 At the end of the 
memo, Nixon wrote: “K[issinger] -  Our task is to play a hard game with the Sovietfs] 
and to see that wherever possible -  including non Communist Asia -  our friends are 
reassured.”243
In reality, Nixon’s announcement of his presidential trip to China brought about a 
more cooperative attitude from the Soviets. On July 19 and August 17, 1971, 
Kissinger gave a briefing on his trip to the Soviet ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly 
Dobrynin. Kissinger mainly sought to re-assure Dobrynin that the U.S opening to 
China was not against the Soviet interests. However, Moscow worried that 
Washington’s quick opening might push Tokyo to move close to Beijing, leading to 
the real danger of a “combination of China and Japan.”244 The Soviets were thus 
worried that a Sino-Japanese rapprochement would lead to the worst strategic 
situation, namely encirclement by the United States, China, and Japan. Despite 
Kissinger’s denial, Dobrynin was still concerned about a U.S. attempt to engage in 
“an anti-Soviet manoeuvre.”245 On September 29, 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister
Ibid., pp.7-8.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Analysis o f  the China Initiative,” July 22, 1971, Underline by N ixon in 
original, Reaction to China Initiative (July 1971) Memos, Letters, etc., PTF, Box 499, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA.
Nixon’s handwritten notations, in Ibid.
244 Memcon, Kissinger and Dobrynin, August 17, 1971, p .l, Box 340, Policy Planning Staff (Director’s 
Files -  Winston Lord), STATE-RG59, NA. See also Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: M oscow ’s 
Ambassador to A m erica’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division  
of Random House, Inc, 1995), pp.227-228.
45 Ibid., p.2.
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Andre Gromyko formally invited President Nixon to meet Secretary Leonid Brezhnev 
in Moscow in May 1972.246
The U.S. and Chinese officials carefully monitored the Soviet reactions to the Nixon 
announcement. After the July trip, Kissinger established the Paris channel with the 
Chinese, namely General V.A. Walters’s contact with the Chinese Ambassador in 
Paris, Huang Chen. On August 16, Kissinger affirmed to Huang that he would 
carefully be “keeping the PRC informed” on any developments with Moscow.247 On 
September 13, Kissinger informed Huang in advance that Gromyko would be likely to 
convey a formal invitation for the President to visit Moscow.248 Accordingly, on 
October 9, General Walters gave Huang a text of the October 12 announcement of the 
US-USSR summit set for May 1972, stressing the importance that China being the 
“first country to be informed.”249
246 On October 12, 1971, N ixon officially announced his decision to visit M oscow in late May o f  1972.
247 The Soviet Union, pp.8-9, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF/Lord, Box  
850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Vernon A  Walters, Silent Missions (New York: Doubleday, A  
Division o f  Random House, Inc, 1978), pp.535-539.
248 Ibid., p. 10.
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3.1.4. Briefings o f the new China initiative
After the July 15 presidential announcement, Nixon and Kissinger conducted 
domestic briefings on the background of the China initiative. On July 19, 1971, Nixon 
explained to the White House Staff the need to bring “one-fourth of the world’s 
population” into the community of nations:
They’re [the Chinese] not a military power now but 25 years from now they will 
be decisive. For us not to do now what we can do to end this isolation would 
leave things very dangerous.... it means a dialogue, that’s all. Looking to the 
future, the world will not be worth living in if  we can’t get the great potential
o snexplosive forces under control.
Regarding the secrecy of the new initiative, Nixon emphasized strongly that: 
“Without secrecy, there would have been no invitation or acceptance to visit China. 
Without secrecy, there is no chance of success in it.”251 Nixon explained further that 
in the “critical early stages” of the initiative, “No one else on his staff knew,” except 
Kissinger.252 Finally, Nixon demanded the continuation of strict secrecy for his staff: 
“What can we say? Stick to the President’s announcement and say you know no 
more.”253 Kissinger warned the staff further: “The most impressive thing we can do as 
far as the Chinese are concerned is to shut up. Don’t even quote what the President 
said here.”254 Kissinger, who was particularly sensitive to leak from his staff,
250 “Briefing the White House Staff on the July 15 Announcement o f  the President’s Trip to Peking,” 
July 19, 1971, 11:40a.m., The Roosevelt Room, The White House, pp.3-4, MemoforP, ROM, Box 85, 
POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.





explained the importance of reliability in that: “Our problem is to keep discipline.... 
The Chinese wanted to keep it secret, as we did, but they wondered about us.”255 
On July 20, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger briefed the Republican Congressional 
leaders. Kissinger stressed that there were no secret agreements or understandings 
during his trip and it was improbable that the Chinese would cancel the presidential 
visit.256 Nixon also made it clear that “each of us agreed to this visit for our own 
reasons,” and therefore there would still be a “basic disagreement in policy” between 
the two sides.257
On July 22, 1971, during the Bipartisan Senate Briefing, President Nixon reiterated 
the world outlook from his Kansas City speech that “the world was evolving into one 
of five economic giants” and that “as we move into the post-Vietnam world, military 
confrontation will be replaced by economic competition.”258 Finally, Nixon 
emphasized the fact that China was “a reality” and it was best to attempt to “bring her 
into the family of nations.”259
Ibid., p.4.
256 “Notes on Republican Leadership Meeting on Tuesday, July 20, 1971, at 8:00a.m.,” p .l,  MemforP, 
ROM, Box 85, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
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3.2. The India-Pakistan War in December 1971
The most severe event related to the U.S. breakthrough with China in 1971 took 
place in South Asia. On November 4, Nixon met with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
and discussed the latest developments in South Asia. Gandhi made it clear that: “India 
has never wished to the destruction of Pakistan or its permanent crippling. Above all, 
India seeks the restoration of stability. We want to eliminate chaos at all costs.”260 
Privately, however, Nixon was not convinced, suspecting that India was motivated by 
anti-Pakistan attitude.261
On November 22, 1971, India conducted a cross-border operation to support the 
rebellion within East Pakistan against West Pakistan. Kissinger interpreted this 
incident as the “beginning” o f an India-Pakistan war that India had started.262 On 
December 3, 1971, the day of the outbreak of a full-scale India-Pakistan war, 
Kissinger told representatives from State, Defense, CIA, and the NSC staff in the 
Washington Special Action Group meeting that President Nixon was criticizing that 
“we are not being tough enough on India.... He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan.”263 
The President believed that India was “the attacker.”264 As Harold Saunders assesses, 
Kissinger thought that the Chinese would “measure our steadfastness by our
260 Memcon, N ixon and Indira Gandhi, November 5, 1971, POF, Box 86, MemforP, WHCF, NPMS, 
NA.
261 In his memoirs, N ixon criticizes that Gandhi had “purposely deceived” him, because during the 
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intervene in East Pakistan and were also considering contingency plans to attack West Pakistan. Nixon, 
RN, pp.525-526.
262 Kissinger, White House Years, p.885; and Van Hollen, “Tilt Policy in South Asia,” p.350. Garthoff 
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Kennedy and Saunders to Commander Howe, The Anderson Papers, January 6, 1972, p.2, CF- 
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willingness to support our Pakistani allies” in the context of Soviet expansionism.265 
“If the Chinese were permitted to doubt America’s reliance, then they might have 
questioned the utility o f closer relationships. ...When the war broke out, our main 
objective was to make sure that the Pakistanis would not seriously [be] damaged.”266 
State Department officials considered that India was limiting its aims in East 
Pakistan and had no designs for West Pakistan, and therefore the danger o f Soviet or 
Chinese intervention was small. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, strongly disagreed with an intelligence report that stated “the 
Indians intended to go beyond separating Bangladesh from Pakistan, but also to 
pursue military operations in order to destroy effectively the overall military capacity 
of Pakistan for an indefinite period.”267 Donald Anderson explains that the Indians 
were “very furious” when the U.S., particularly Kissinger, was tilting very heavily 
toward Pakistan. In the eyes of State Department officials, “there’s no question 
Pakistan started the war.”268
On December 10, 1971, Kissinger held a secret talk with the Chinese Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Huang Hua, at a CIA “safe house” in New York.269 Kissinger
265 Harold Saunders (South Asia Specialist for the National Security Council, 1971; Near East Affairs 
Department o f  State, 1974-1976), Oral History Interview, p .l, Pakistan, Country Collection, 1996, 
FAOHC.
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handed Huang Hua a top-secret folder of U.S. intelligence as well as photos of how 
the U.S. was “moving a number o f naval ships in the West Pacific toward the Indian
270Ocean.” Kissinger sought to induce China’s move against India by indicating that: 
“if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a 
threat to its security, and if it took a measure to protect its security, the U.S. would 
oppose efforts of other to interfere with the People’s Republic.”271 
In response, Huang emphasized that: “The Soviet Union and India now are 
progressing along on an extremely dangerous track in the subcontinent. And as we 
have already pointed out this is a step to encircle China.”272 Realizing China’s 
sensitivity, Kissinger emphasized that “both of us must continue to bring pressure on 
India and the Soviet Union.”273 
In reality, however, China remained very cautious thought the war. Although 
Chinese troops were positioned on the Indian border, they did not take the risk of 
aiding Pakistan by attacking India. As Huang Hua informed Haig on December 12, 
China would be willing to support the UN General Assembly’s call on India and 
Pakistan to “institute an immediate cease fire and to withdraw troops from each 
other’s territory.”274 On December 14, Nixon and Kissinger received a formal note 
from Moscow which informed them of “firm assurances by the Indian leadership that
270 Ibid., p .5. On December 10, N ixon authorized the creation o f  a task force o f  eight ships centered 
around the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, which would head from waters o ff  Vietnam to the Bay o f  
Bengal.
271 Ibid., p.6.
272 Ibid., p . l l .
273 Ibid., p. 14.
274 Memcon, Haig and Huang Hua, December 12, 1971, pp. 1-2, China exchanges -  Oct 20, 1971 — 
Dec.31, 1971, FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA. N ixon assessed that the Chinese played a “very 
cautious role” because they understandably “feared” that the Soviets might use Chinese aid o f  Pakistan 
as an “excuse for attacking China.” Nixon, RN, p.530. Moreover, after the Lin Biao incident o f  
September 1971, the Chinese leadership was still seeking to resolve internal division, and it was too 
risky to use its army abroad. See Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p .316.
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India has no plans of seizing West Pakistani territory.”275 On December 16, 1971, 
India offered a cease-fire, and Pakistan surrendered unconditionally.
Nixon and Kissinger believed that if  India and the Soviet Union succeeded in 
“destroying Pakistan as a military and political entity,” it could have a “devastating 
effect in encouraging the USSR to use the same tactics elsewhere.”276 “A victory of 
India over Pakistan was the same as a victory of the Soviet Union over China.”277 The 
best solution would therefore be an arrangement in which “neither the USSR nor 
China are in a position of having won or lost.”278 However, because o f the highly 
secretive decision-making style and the lack of effective communication with the 
State Department from the summer to the winter of 1971, Nixon and Kissinger 
became isolated within the administration. Finally, as the U.S. rapprochement with 
China came to be materialized from July 1971 to February 1972, Pakistan’s role as 
the intermediary between Washington and Beijing ended.
In summary, the U.S. breakthrough with China in 1971 took place as U.S. officials 
came to realize the reduction of the direct threat from China. In the short term, it was 
China’s weakness in the Sino-Soviet border clashes and the conflicts in Indochina that 
provided a crucial opportunity for U.S. officials to reassess U.S. China policy. As for 
the Chinese strategic perception, Nixon estimated that “the Chinese view the U.S. as 
no longer its major enemy. The Soviets are their greatest fear; Japan is second 
[because of the likelihood of its rearmament] and very probably India in the light of
275 Kissinger, White House Years, p .911. On December 12, in a public statement, Indian Prime Minister 
Gandhi already denied any territorial ambitions in West Pakistan. Van Hollen, “Tilt Policy in South 
Asia,” p.352. Dobrynin recalls that Kissinger privately acknowledged the importance o f  Soviet 
“assurance about India’s intensions” as the “breakthrough” in ending the war. Dobrynin, In 
Confidence, p.238.
276 Memcon, Nixon and Pompidou, December 13, 1971, 4:00p.m., p.4, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, 
WHCF, NPMS, NA.
277 j , . ,  ’
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recent events [the India-Pakistan conflicts].”279 For his upcoming trip, Nixon was thus 
determined to exploit China’s growing sense of fear of being surrounded by its major 
neighbouring states.
In the long term, it was China’s potential strength that persuaded U.S. officials to 
pursue a new dialogue with her. Nixon assessed that “China is a reality.”280 Nixon 
illustrated the China initiative as “the culmination of a long period of careful 
preparation,” which originated in his Foreign Affairs article of October 1967. Despite 
the difficulties posed by the U.S. treaty commitment to Taiwan, China’s continued 
isolation “could no longer be tolerated. In ten years, China will be a great nuclear 
power and an incalculable danger to peace should it continue to be isolated from the 
world community.”281 Finally, Nixon believed that his visit to Beijing would be “the 
opening o f a channel o f communication” with the PRC Government which had been 
“isolated” from the U.S. for a quarter of a century.282 It was on the basis o f the above 
conviction that Nixon would take his trip to China in February 1972, as the following 
chapter examines.
279 Memcon, N ixon and Brandt, December 29, 1971, p.2, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, 
NPMS, NA.
280 Memcon, N ixon and Brandt, December 28, 1971, p.7, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, 
NPMS, NA.
2 8 1  t i  • j  1Ibid., p. I.
282 Memcon, N ixon and Brandt, December 29, 19 7 1, p.2, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, 
NPMS, NA.
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Chapter 8. Nixon’s Trip to China in February 1972
This chapter investigates the major issues in Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. 
First, it examines the final preparations for the summit, such as Haig’s advance trip to 
China in January 1972 and the NSC staffs briefing books for the President. The main 
body of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Nixon-Mao talks and the Nixon- 
Zhou talks. Finally, this chapter assesses foreign reactions to the China trip and the 
briefings by Nixon and Kissinger on the trip to the Cabinet members and 
Congressional leaders.
1. Haig’s advance trip to China in January 1972
From January 3 to 10 1972, General Alexander Haig Jr., the Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs of the United States, headed a delegation to 
China to make final technical arrangements for President Nixon’s visit to China.1 His 
main role was to play the role of Nixon’s “stand-in.”2 Although Haig’s two memoirs 
do not reveal substantial details, nor does he refer to any particular documents, Haig 
held intensive and substantive talks with Premier Zhou Enlai on such major issues as 
the Indochina conflicts, the India-Pakistan conflict, and the Taiwan question.
1 The trip was arranged through the N ew  York channel between NSC staff member Jonathan Howe and 
Chinese Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua. The White House wanted to “ensure” that this major 
foreign policy initiative would be “given full world-wide coverage.” Janka to Haig, “Official Media on 
China Trip,” December 23, 1971, China - HAK October 1971 visit, Box 1035, For the President’s Files 
(FPF)-China/Vietnam Negotiations, National Security Council Files (NSCF), N ixon Presidential 
Materials Staff (NPM S), National Archives (NA).
For Haig’s accounts o f  the trip, see Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat; Realism, Regan, and Foreign 
Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp.201-202; Alexander M. Haig, Jr. with Charles 
McCarry, Inner Circles: How America Changed The World (New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp.258- 
266; Alexander Haig Jr., Interview Transcript, N ixon’s China Game, American Experience, PBS 
Online; and PBS, Correspondence with Komine, September 1, 2004. See also Kissinger, White House 
Years, pp. 1049-1051.
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On January 3, during his first talk with Zhou, Haig explained the U.S. assessment of 
the Soviet military threat. Referring to the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, 
Haig warned that the Soviet policy toward South Asia was “to keep the subcontinent 
divided.” Drawing from the record of Kissinger’s previous talks with Zhou, Haig 
also exaggerated that the Soviets were seeking to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly 
states.”4 Haig thus sought to make it clear that “the future viability of the PRC” was 
of the greatest interest to the U.S.5 In his cable to Kissinger, Haig suggested that the 
Chinese were still “sensitive” to Soviet criticism of U.S.-PRC “collusion.”6 
Haig also warned that the continuation of war in Indochina would “only give 
Moscow an opportunity to increase its influence in Hanoi.”7 As for Nixon’s visit,
o
Haig claimed that it had to be successful “in fact and in appearance.” Finally, 
regarding the future o f Taiwan, Haig re-affirmed Kissinger’s assurance for the “One 
China” principle, the prevention o f Japanese entry, and the reduction o f U.S. armed 
forces.9 Haig interpreted Zhou’s silence as approval.
3 Memcon, Haig and Zhou, January 3, 1972, Midnight, p.2, Alexander M. Haig Special File (Haig- 




6 Haig to Kissinger, January 6, 1972, p .l,  Haig China Trip December 29, 1971 -  January 10, 1971, p.5. 
Haig-File, Box 1015, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
7 Ibid., p.4; and Cable from Haig to Kissinger, January 6, 1972, p .l. Haig originally anticipated that the 
Chinese would not push hard on Vietnam. For example, Haig reviewed the N ew  China News A gency’s 
non-authoritative article o f  December 30, 1971, which denounced the U.S. Government for its 
“insolence and adventurism” in the twelve day bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The article, 
however, did not directly criticize the U.S. action, nor attack the President by name. By Wire, Richard 
T. Kennedy to Haig, December 31, 1971, “Peking Media on the U.S. Bombing o f  North Vietnam,” by  





After the talk, Haig sent a cable to Kissinger, reporting his impression in rather 
optimistic terms. It was likely that the U.S. could achieve “some PRC movement on 
more positive expressions,” especially “some better language” on the Taiwan issue in 
the joint communique.10 Haig decided to refrain from discussing these issues further 
during his visit. He would only seek to assure the Chinese that the U.S. was prepared 
to make “positive suggestions” in February.11
On January 7, Zhou presented the Chinese reply, formally approved by Chairman 
Mao, to Haig’s previous statements.12 Zhou reiterated that the Chinese perceived the 
Soviet conclusion of a treaty of peace with India as, “friendship and cooperation in
1 Tname,” but “a military alliance in substance.” Hence, by supporting the Indian 
armed aggression against Pakistan, the Soviets were continuously “contending for 
hegemony.”14 As for the U.S. policy in Indochina, Zhou criticized that the U.S. 
bombing of North Vietnam in December 1971 consequently increased the Soviet 
influence in Southeast Asia. Zhou insisted that it was Washington that was “insulting 
Hanoi” rather than the other way around.15 In his memoirs, however, Haig over­
10 Haig to Kissinger, January 4, 1971, p .l, Haig China Trip December 29, 1971 -  January 10, 1971, 
Haig-File, Box 1015, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
“ ibid.
12 On January 6, Zhou reported the issues in his first talk to Mao. In Chinese eyes, Haig appeared to be 
“excited and nervous.” Mao was unconvinced by Haig’s assessment o f  the Soviet threat. Mao viewed  
that not only the Soviets, but also South Asia, Indochina, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea 
were all “surrounding” China. Regarding N ixon’s political standpoint, Mao claimed that the worst case 
would be that the visit itself was to be “cancelled.” “Haig’s Preparatory Mission for N ixon’s Visit to 
China in January 1972,” p.3, Diplomatic History Institute o f  the Chinese Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, 
Xin zhaogguo wenjiao fengyun [New China’s Diplomatic Experience] (Beijing: Shijie shishi, 1991), 
Volume 3, pp.71-82, in William Burr (ed.), Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement: New American 
and. Chinese Documentation Leading Up to N ixon’s 1972 Trip, Electronic Briefing Book No. 70, NSA.
Memcon, Haig and Zhou, January 7, 1972, 11:45p.m., p.2, Haig-File, Haig China Trip File [Haig 




estimated that Chinese leaders would help the U.S. end the war in Vietnam on terms 
favorable to the United States and South Vietnam.16
Zhou argued further that China was “a big country” but not yet “a very strong 
one.”17 However, disagreeing with Haig’s description of China’s “future viability,” 
Zhou insisted that: “no country should ever rely on external forces to maintain its 
independence and viability.”18 As for Haig’s reference to the importance of the 
“appearance” of Nixon’s visit, Zhou claimed that one’s image depended on his own 
“deeds” and expressed serious doubt about “self styled” attitude in public.19
Haig explained defensively that “the simple language of a soldier” might have been 
“misinterpreted.”20 In particular, Haig argued that the U.S. would not unilaterally 
assume the role o f “protector” or the “guarantor” of China’s viability, but China’s 
“viability and future health” were in the U.S.’s national interest.21 Finally, Haig 
sought to defend that “popularity” was not the “criteria” for President Nixon’s 
decisions.22
In his report to Kissinger, Haig characterized the Chinese reply as “tough and 
polemic in tone” on Indochina and South Asia. Haig also noted that Zhou criticized 
that the U.S. assessment o f Soviet “expansion” was in “error.”23 Most importantly, 
Haig reported Zhou’s assurance that the Chinese would “do nothing to embarrass the
16 Haig, Inner Circles, p.266.
17 Memcon, Haig and Zhou, January 7, 1972, 11:45p.m., p. 3, Haig-File, Haig China Trip File [Haig 






23 Haig to Kissinger, January 8, 1972, p.2, Haig China Trip December 29, 1971 -  January 10, 1971, 
Haig-File, Box 1015, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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President during his trip.”24 Overall, Haig’s talks with Zhou played a crucial role in 
clarifying the respective sides’ view on the latest development of global and regional 
security issues. Finally, the two sides determined to leave the remaining differences to 
the February summit.
2. Final Preparations for the China Summit
2.1. The ‘Books’
From early January to mid February 1972, the NSC staff and the State Department 
prepared their respective briefing papers for Nixon’s presidential trip to China.
Kissinger and his NSC Staff prepared the ‘Books’ - six black-ring notebooks 
including main briefing papers on major security issues between the U.S. and Chinese 
sides, such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, South Asia, and the Soviet Union. Since it 
was anticipated that the President’s conversations with the Chinese leaders would be 
very “lengthy and intensive,” these papers were “more detailed than usual,” arranged 
as follows:
• Chinese broad perceptions of the problem (including relevant background and 
what they would want);
• Issues and Talking Points (including the Chinese Position in specific terms, 
along the lines Zhou used with Kissinger; and Your Position, consistent with 
the line Kissinger used with Zhou); and
• The draft language of the joint communique.25
24 Ibid., p.3. Solomon explains that Haig “warned the Chinese they should make N ixon look good” -  if  
the Chinese “embarrassed or humiliated” the President, it would “hurt them and their problems with the 
Soviet Union.” Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
25 Kissinger to Nixon, “Briefing Papers for the China Trip,” February 8, 1972, Underline in original, 
Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)- 
China Trip/Vietnam (FPF/Lord), Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The NSC staff considered that Nixon
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The State Department’s ‘Books’ contained issues papers, which were considerably 
briefer but substantively consistent with the NSC briefing papers on subsidiary 
questions and background information.26 Kissinger also requested for the CIA to 
prepare background studies on the following subjects: 1) the philosophies and the 
present political roles of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai; 2) the internal political 
situation in the PRC; 3) the PRC’s approach to international affairs; and 4) the present 
state of Sino-Soviet relations.27 The CIA papers became the basis of the NSC staffs 
briefing papers to the President.
2.2. Kissinger’s briefings to Nixon
In his detailed memos to Nixon, Kissinger stressed that the conversations with the 
Chinese leaders would be at a “far greater intensity and length” than any previous 
talks the President had previously conducted.28 In essence, the Chinese leaders would 
take a “very principled approach,” but within that framework they would be
knew little about most international issues apart from the U.S. relations with the Soviets and with 
Vietnam. They thus sought to produce the main book as more o f  a “tutorial” for the President. John H. 
Holdridge, Crossing the D ivide: An Insider’s Account o f  the Normalization o f  U.S.-China Relations 
(Lanham, Boulder, N ew  York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p.77.
Kissinger to Rogers, “Briefing Books for the President’s Visit to the People’s Republic o f  China,” 
January 20, 1972, p .l, Box 501, China Trip-January 1972 [Part I], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger to Helms, “Studies to be Prepared for the President’s Visit to the People’s Republic o f  
China,” January 20, 1972, p .l,  Box 501, China Trip-January 1972 [Part I], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Encounter with the Chinese, February 5, 1972, p .l, Box, 13, China, HAK- 
ASF, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. As for Chinese leaders’ diplomatic practice see Richard Solomon, 
Chinese Negotiating Behaviour: Pursuing Interests Through ‘Old F riends’ (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute o f  Peace, 1999).
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9 0“realistic.” Thus, it was important for the President to demonstrate his grasp of the 
strategic outlines:
[T]heir main attention will be on the perspectives you paint. They will be 
primarily interested in your judgement of the future and the principles and 
reliability o f your policy. Accordingly, one basic task is to get across to them 
that we can make certain moves they want in the future because it is in our own 
self-interest, and that we will make such moves in the future because we are 
reliable.30
Kissinger also presented a detailed briefing on the Chinese leaders. Premier Zhou 
was “the tactician, the administrator, the negotiator, the master of details and the 
thrust and party.”31 Zhou would talk in “philosophic and historical” terms, but his 
main concern would be on “the concrete substantive issues.” He could also be 
“extremely -  and suddenly -  tough,” certainly directed by Mao.32 Overall, one could 
“have a dialogue” with Zhou who was clearly “running China.”33 
Relying on the NSC staffs  briefing information and the CIA background studies, 
Kissinger wrote that Chairman Mao was “the philosopher, the poet, the grand 
strategist, the inspirer, the romantic.” Mao would set the “direction and the 
framework” and leave the negotiations to Zhou. He would want to talk about the
30 I b i d
Ibid., p.3. Underline in original.
Ibid., p.7. As for Zhou’s diplomatic career, see, for example, Shu Guang Zhang, “In the Shadow o f  
Mao: Zhou Enlai and N ew  China’s Diplomacy,” in Gordon Craig A., and Francis L. Loewenheim. 
(eds.) The Diplom ats 1939-1979  (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994); Suyin 
Han, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making o f  M odem  China (London: Pimlico An Imprint o f  
Random House, 1994); Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy o f  Zhou Enlai (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989); and Dick Wilson, Zhou Enlai: A Biography (New York: Viking, 1984).
22 Ibid., p.6.
Kissinger to Nixon, “Mao, Chou and the Chinese Litmus Test,” February 19, 1972, p.4, Box, 13, 
China, HAK-ASF, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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“long view, the basic tides running in the world, where China and the US are heading, 
with each other and with others.”34 
Mao and Zhou had believed that “the U.S. has learned the hard wav that it cannot 
manipulate political affairs in Asia to its own advantage.”35 They would thus try to 
persuade that China constitutes no threat to the U.S.”36 Mao felt that “the other 
barbarians, the Russians and Japanese,” were now “far more dangerous.” Thus, he 
would “let the American barbarians come in briefly, just enough to offset the other 
dangers.” Mao would “study our President’s mind” and test the “degree of 
determination and shrewdness.” Overall, as Solomon assesses, Nixon had “brought 
a lot o f personal experiences” for the trip and was “making some assumptions about 
how Chairman Mao thought about politics.”39
2.3. Nixon’s handwritten notations
President Nixon reviewed the briefing material, memorizing his basic positions and 
taking extensive notes. The notes essentially show the development of Nixon’s 
thoughts on the vital interests in U.S.-PRC relations.40 Former NSC staff member 
Winston Lord recalls that: “Nixon read every page, almost all o f the briefing books
34 Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Encounter with the Chinese,” February 5, 1972, p.7. As for the 
biographical analysis o f  Mao, see Philipe Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 
1999); Jonathan D. Spence, M ao Zedong  (New York: Viking, Penguin, 1999); and Shaun Breslin, Mao 
(London and N ew  York: Longman, 1998).
35 Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Meetings with Mao,” February 15, 1972, p.3, Underline by N ixon in
original, Book IV, The President, China Visit, Readings on Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai, FPF/Lord,
Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Ibid., p.4. Underline by N ixon in original.
Ibid., p .8. Underline by N ixon in original.
Ibid., p.9. Underline by N ixon in original.
Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
Nixon preferred to talk without notes whenever possible in order to impress people. As for the 
published excerpts o f  the N ixon notes, see James H. Mann, About Face: A H istory o f  A m erica’s 
Curious Relationship with China, from  Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), pp. 13-15, 
and pp.40-49.
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for his China trip. You can see him marking up almost every page. Even during the 
trip over in the plane [to China in February 1972], he sent them pages back, asking for 
additional information.”41 Nixon’s handwritten notes on the cover page o f the main 
‘Books’ show his broad aim of the China trip:
We will play a role in Pacific.
We do not threaten anyone’s freedom -  or peace.
China and America have unique opportunity to change the world -  
Let us not miss it.
We were to write a new page in history 
The world is watching.
We like you believe in honesty
We have had differences
We will continue to have -
Let’s talk about what brings us together42
Nixon perceived his trip as a “major turning point” in U.S.-PRC relations hoping that 
“our discussions this week will lav the foundation for a new and enduring 
relationship.”43 He also recognized the depth of the remaining perception gap between 
the two sides regarding their respective world outlooks. Thus, while reviewing the 
briefing books on February 15, Nixon wrote:
Understanding of difference is worth achieving -
We must be honourable -  (to our friends) or our friendship is worthless to new 
friends -
We don’t ask them to give up their ideology or their friends
41 Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
2 Nixon’s handwritten notations on the cover page, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the
China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
3 Plenary Opening Statement, p .l , Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing
Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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They must not ask us to do so.44
During a stopover in Hawaii on February 18, Nixon wrote his positions for 
negotiating with Chairman Mao:
Trust him (as emperor)
1. Don’t quarrell [sic]
2. Don’t praise him (too much)
3. Praise the people -  art, ancient
4. Praise poems.
5. Love o f country - 45
We will make moves in our self interest 
can because we are reliable -  
We’ll tell you nothing if  I can’t 
Prudence, Will do more than say46
Be strong so that they respect you - 1
Nixon also wrote his thoughts on the vital issues in U.S.-PRC rapprochement as 
follows:
What they want:
1. Build up their world credentials -
2. Taiwan
3. Get U.S. out o f Asia -
44 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.3, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
45 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 18, 1972, p. 11, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
46 Ibid., p. 12.
47 Ibid., p. 14.
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What we want:
1. Indo China (?)
2. Communication -  To restrain Chinese expansion in Asia -
3. In Future - Reduce threat o f confrontation by Chinese Super Power
What we both want
1. Reduce danger o f confrontation + conflict
2. A more stable Asia -
3. A restraint on U.S.S.R.48
On February 21, prior to his arrival on the Chinese mainland, Nixon again wrote on 
Chinese interests:
What do you want?
You must think of your security
1. Soviet -  present threat
2. Japan -  future
3. India -  an irritation (except o f built by Soviet)
4. Peace -  but a need to retain your principle -
How can we work together?
Your opponents are ours -
Taiwan -  V.nam [Vietnam] are irritants - 49
With these respective vital national interests in mind, Nixon prepared his 
negotiating positions with the Chinese leaders.
48 Ibid.
49 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p .15, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
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3. Nixon’s presidential trip to China in February 1972
3.1. The Nixon-Mao talks
On February 21, 1972, President Nixon arrived at the Beijing airport where the 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai welcomed the historic arrival. The handshake between 
the two leaders sparked the public spectacle of the summit to “mark the end of a 
generation of hostility” and to “begin a new but still undefined” relationship between 
the most powerful and most populous nations in the world.50
After the arrival ceremony, Zhou visited official U.S. guest-house and informed 
Kissinger that Mao was “inviting” Nixon to hold a meeting “fairly soon.”51 Until that 
time, Nixon and Kissinger were not entirely sure whether the Chairman would meet 
with the President.52
Lord recalls that Mao and Zhou were “extremely charismatic figures” who had a 
“broad worldview which concerned strategic and long-term interests.”53 The Chinese 
understanding of the nature of the international situation from the late 1960s to the
50 “Nixon Arrives in Peking to Begin an 8-Day Visit; Met By Chou at Airport,” The New York Times, 
February 21, 1972. The trip was heavily televised, creating tremendous impact in America, leading to 
instant euphoria.
51 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 2:30-2:40p.m., p .l, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in 
the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, Box 92, Country Files (CF)-Far 
East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. From the U.S. side, only the President, Kissinger, and a NSC staff 
member Winston Lord attended the meeting with Mao. Kissinger told Zhou: “We w on’t tell him  
[Secretary o f  State W illiam Rogers]. We can announce it a little later.” Ibid. On February 29, 1972, 
President stated to the Congressional leaders that there was some “nonsense” that Kissinger’s 
attendance “downgraded the Secretary o f  State.” Nixon explained that in the Chinese system, the 
Foreign Minister was fifth ranking in protocol, and if  the President had brought in the Secretary o f  
State, they would have had to bring in five additional Chinese. “Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership, 
February 29, 1972, 10:00a.m. The Cabinet Room,” p.2, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), 
Records o f  Meetings (ROM), Box 88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
Soon after the Nixon-M ao talk, Kissinger admitted to Zhou that: “I did not know we were going to 
see the Chairman today. I was going to raise this problem with you. It is not right for the President to 
wait until he is summoned to see the Chairman.” Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 
4:15-5:30p.m., p.9, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit 
February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On the other hand, State Department 
officials worked out a plan to minimize damage if  Mao decided not to grant an audience. See Walter 
Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp.400-401.
Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
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early 1970s “was remarkably sophisticated.” Lord also assesses that Mao and Zhou 
had a “very good grasp o f geopolitics and they understood what they needed.” On the 
other hand, as Solomon recalls, the elderly Chinese were shocked by the Nixon party 
in “how young they all were, may have made them feel uneasy, made them feel like 
old guys, dealing with these young Americans.”54 
The Mao-Nixon meeting, originally planned for fifteen minutes, turned out to be 
more than an hour-long talk which set the fundamental direction of the following 
negotiations that took place between the two sides at a various official levels.55 Nixon 
emphasized the importance of strict secrecy in the confidential talk at the highest 
official level, assuring that “nothing goes beyond this room.”56 Nixon then sought to 
illustrate the great forces in Asia:
We, for example, must ask ourselves... why the Soviets have more forces on the 
border facing you than on the border facing Western Europe. We must ask 
ourselves, what is the future of Japan? ...[I]s it better for Japan to be neutral, 
totally defenseless, or is it better for a time for Japan to have some relations with 
the United States? The point being - 1 am talking now in the realm of philosophy 
-  in international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure -  we can 
leave no vacuums, because they can be filled. ...The question is which danger 
the People’s Republic faces, whether it is danger of American aggression or 
Soviet aggression.57
54 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
55 Memcon, February 21, 1972, 2:50-3:55 p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 21 Feb. 1972), 
CHINA -  President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, Box 91, CF-Far East, HAKOF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Richard Nixon, RN  (N ew  York: Grssett & Danlap, 1978), pp.560-564; 
and Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 1057-1066. As for M ao’s 
weakened health condition prior to N ixon’s arrival, see Li Zhisui, The Private Life o f  Chairman Mao: 
The Memoirs o f  M a o ’s Personal Physician  (London: Arrow Books, 1994), pp.544-568. There was a 
|>lan for a second M ao-Nixon meeting which never materialized.
6 Memcon 21 Feb. 1972, p.5. The Nixon-Mao talk was interpreted by Chinese interpreter T ’ang Wen- 
sheng (also known as Nancy Tang, bom  in Brooklyn, N ew  York, and emigrated to China in 1955), and 
NSC staff member Winston Lord attended as a note-taker.
Ibid, p.6. In his description o f  the Nixon-Mao talk, Kissinger misleadingly quotes M ao’s statements 
which supported in postponing the resolution o f  the Taiwan issue. Kissinger, White House Years, 
p. 1062. M ao’s statements were made in February and November 1973 and October 1975, not in 
February 1972.
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In essence, Nixon was justifying the U.S. presence in Asia by urging the Chinese 
leaders to re-assess the degree of threat from each superpower. In response, Mao 
outlined the fundamental change between the two sides that materialized in the 
rapprochement:
At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or 
aggression from China is relatively small; that is, it could be said that this is 
not a major issue, because the present situation is one in which a state o f 
war does not exist between our two countries. You want to withdraw some 
o f your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.58
It was the mutual realization of the reduction of direct threat that motivated both sides 
to initiate direct talks in this particular period.
President Nixon: .. .1 think you know the United States had no territorial designs 
on China. We know China doesn’t want to dominate the United States. We 
believe you too realize the United States doesn’t want to dominate the world. 
...Therefore, we can find common ground, despite our differences, to build a 
world structure in which both can be safe to develop in our own ways on our 
own roads. That cannot be said about some other nations in the world.
Chairman Mao: Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.
President Nixon: Nor any country. Nor do we.59
58 Ibid., pp.6-7.SQ _ . rr
Ibid., p.8.
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In essence, the above exchanges established the broad framework for the Nixon-Zhou 
talks that followed. The United States and China would not impose direct threats or 
territorial ambition against each other. Therefore, this mutual understanding would 
promote the partial reduction of the U.S. armed forces originally directed at 
containing China, and in turn encouraged China’s tacit admission of the U.S. military 
presence in Western Pacific region. Finally, the media described Nixon’s meeting 
with Mao as “frank and serious” and as “the highlight of the week.”60
3.2. The Nixon-Zhou talks
Following the Nixon-Mao meeting, the two sides held discussions at various official 
levels. The plenary session indicated the general direction of the summit and arranged 
for 1) a restricted principal talk between Nixon and Zhou on a wide range o f major 
issues61 and 2) an assisting talk between Secretary of State William Rogers and 
Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on a series of steps to promote bilateral 
relations, such as trade, scientific and other exchanges.62 The drafting of the joint 
communique was conducted between Zhou and Kissinger and between Chinese 
Deputy Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua (Qiao Guanhua) and Kissinger. Finally,
60 “Nixon Spends An Hour With Mao And Then, At A Banquet, Hears Chou Toast His Trip As 
‘Positive,’” The New York Times, February 22, 1972.
61 CHINA -  President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, CF-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA. See also Nixon, RN, pp.564-579; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.1070-1087. Among U.S. 
officials, also present were Kissinger, Lord, and Holdridge.
62 MemCons Between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, POL Chicom, 1970-73, Box 2699, Subject- 
Numeric Files (SNF), General Records o f  the Department o f  State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), 
NA. Among U.S. officials, also present were Marshall Green, John Scali, Ron Ziegler, Alfred le S. 
Jenkins, Charles W. Freeman Jr., and Commander John Howe (NSC staff).
63 Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF- 
Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Nixon reiterated to Zhou the importance o f the preservation of secrecy.64 Hereafter, 
this study examines the five major security issues, such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, 
India-Pakistan relations, and the Soviet Union.
3.2.1. The Taiwan issue
As President Nixon wrote before the departure for China, the Taiwan issue 
remained the “most crucial” issue between the two sides.65 While reviewing the 
briefing books, Nixon was fully aware that Taiwan would be “the first item” on the 
Chinese agenda which would require him to “show flexibility in addressing it.” 66 It 
was crucial for him to find a way to put the issue aside: “Neither of us should allow 
the Taiwan issue to color unduly our developing relationship (Taiwan will be 
settled).”67 At the beginning of the first restricted talk, Nixon proposed the so-called 
‘five principles’:
64 Nixon assured Zhou that only five individuals (namely the President himself, Kissinger, Winston 
Lord, John Holdridge, and General Haig) would see the transcripts o f  their talks. Memorandum o f  
conversation, February 22, 1972, 2:10-6:00p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 22 Feb. 1972), pp.3- 
4, CHINA -  President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, CF-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA. Two Chinese interpreters, T ’ang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu interpreted the Nixon-Zhou talks. 
Kissinger arranged interpretation with Zhou in advance: “We will not use our interpreters but will rely 
on your interpreters. We will tell the press that we have Mr. Holdridge there to check on your 
interpreter.” Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 4:15-5:30p.m., p.2, Dr. Kissinger’s 
Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, 
NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon later explained to Congressional leaders that Premier Zhou must have 
understood English because he “corrected the translator many times.” Holdridge told the President that 
it was a disadvantage for the U.S. side because every time the President spoke, while the translator 
translated it into Chinese, Zhou “had a great deal o f time to think about his response.” “Meeting with 
Bipartisan Leadership February 29, 1972, 10:00a.m. The Cabinet Room, pp.3-4, MemforP, ROM, Box  
88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
65 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.2, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
66 Taiwan, p.3, Underline by N ixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China 
Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Ibid., p.7. Underline by N ixon in original. N ixon’s handwritten notations in parentheses.
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Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be 
no more statements made -  if I can control our bureaucracy -  to the effect that 
the status of Taiwan is undermined.
Second, we have not and will not support the Taiwan independence movement.
Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan 
from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage 
Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement.
The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any 
military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to 
the Mainland.
/TO
Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic.
These five principles, especially the ‘One China’ premise was the central assurance 
for the Chinese in proceeding in the Sino-U.S. normalization process. In addition, 
viewing Taiwan as “an irritant” and as having “a high emotional content,” Nixon 
referred to the technical aspect of “language” for public presentation.69 It was a 
question of the U.S. domestic political situation, because there was a possibility that 
the critics might “gang up” and create “a danger to the whole initiative.”70 Thus,
68 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p .5; and Taiwan, pp.4-5, Book V. N ixon’s opening statement on the Taiwan 
issue was a crucial pre-condition for the Chinese to improve Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations. While 
reviewing briefing books, N ixon wrote:
I restate what our policy is:
1. Status
One China, Taiwan is part o f  China -
2. W on’t support Taiwan independence move
3. Try to restrain Japan -
4. Support peaceful resolution
5. D iscuss-
Will seek normalization
Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p. 16, Underline by N ixon in original, China Notes, 
Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
69 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.6.
70 Ibid., p.7.
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Nixon and Zhou decided to have some flexible “running room” which would reflect 
the remaining differences between the two sides in the joint communique.71
Regarding the methods of resolving the Taiwan issue, Nixon sought to clarify the 
U.S. long-term position that Taiwan should be settled peacefully.72 Nixon wrote the 
negotiating position:
You must not listen to what I say. You must watch what I do. 
Coming to Peking has itself created a new reality.
... We want a peaceful resolution.73
As for the timetable, Nixon wrote: “Age: My life is 10 months or 5 years -  then done 
-  I have little time and will do it.”74 “Want RN reelected -  .. .Direction -  must be 
pointed out -[ .]”75
Hence, Nixon suggested to Zhou that the two sides should refrain from making 
Taiwan “a big issue” in the next two or three years which implied his second term in 
office.76 Moreover, it was essential for the Nixon administration to “sell” the 
promotion of the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan “as step by step” to Congress, while 
persuading the public of the importance of normalization with the People’s 
Republic.77
71 Memorandum o f  conversation, February 24, 1972, 5:15 - 8:05 p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 
24 Feb. 1972), p. 10. Underline in original.
Taiwan, p.7, Book V. Underline by Nixon in original.
Nixon’s handwritten notations, in Ibid., p .8. Underline by Nixon in original.
74 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p. 16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. N ixon referred to his presidential terms.
75 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 24, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
76 Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, p. 10.
77 Ibid., p. 12.
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In response, Zhou made it clear that “[w]hile your armed forces are there our armed 
forces will not engage in military confrontation with your armed forces.”78 However, 
Zhou emphasized that China would still treat Taiwan as an “internal issue” and 
“liberate” it in its own way.79 Thus, Zhou did not make any further commitment: “we 
would rather let the question of Taiwan wait for a little while.”80
Regarding the U.S.’s withdrawal from Asia, Nixon sought to link the reduction of 
U.S. armed forces in Taiwan and the promotion of the Vietnam settlement. He wrote 
his calculation:
Taiwan -  V. Nam [Vietnam] = trade off
1. Your expect action on Taiwan
2. Our people expect action on V. Nam
3. Neither can act immediately
O 1
But both are inevitable -  Let us not embarrass each other
In direct talks, Nixon gave assurance to Zhou that:
[T]wo-thirds of our present forces on Taiwan are related to the support of our
forces in Southeast Asia. These forces, regardless of what we may do will be
• 82removed as the situation in Southeast Asia is resolved.
78 Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, p.6.
79 Memorandum o f conversation February 28, 1972, 8:30-9:30a.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 28 
Feb. 1972), p.8.
80 Ibid.
81 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 23, 1972, 6a.m., p. 17, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, 
Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. Garver interprets that the Chinese leaders were hoping to drive a 
wedge between Washington and Taipei by opening to the United States. John W. Garver, The Sino- 
American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy (New York: An East Gate 
Book: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), p.274.
82 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, pp.5-6.
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Finally, Nixon assured that once the military operation in Vietnam was completed, the 
U.S. could reduce its “other forces” -  “the remaining one-third.”83
On February 26, Secretary o f State Rogers and Assistant Secretary Green were 
given the opportunity to read the communique approved by Nixon and Kissinger, and 
also the by Chinese Politburo. Importantly, Green immediately detected “a major 
flaw” in the draft. First, while the communique stated that “all people” on either side 
of the Straits regarded Taiwan as part o f China, Green objected to the word “people.” 
He maintained that the inhabitants of Taiwan, who looked at the island as their home 
regardless of their ancestors’ origin in China, and who regarded themselves as 
“Taiwanese,” would not necessarily agree that Taiwan was a part o f China.85 
Accordingly, Kissinger proposed to re-negotiate with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister 
Ch’iao Kuan-hua (Qiao Guanhua) to change the term “people” to “Chinese.”86 
Second, the draft communique reaffirmed the continuation of the U.S. security 
commitment to its Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, the 
Philippines, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia-New 
Zealand-US treaty (ANZUS). Yet, it did not mention America’s treaty obligation to
83 Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, p. 10.
84 Marshall Green, Evolution o f  U.S.-China Policy 1956-1973: Memoirs o f  An Insider, pp.37-38, Oral 
History Interview in A China Reader, Volume II, January 1995, FAOHC. See also Marshall Green, 
John. H. Holdridge, and W illiam Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the 
Foreign Service o f  the United States (Maryland: Dacor-Bacon House, 1994), pp. 162-165; and 
Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1082-1084. Nixon blamed the State Department’s involvement as a 
failure to preserve secrecy, fearing the leak o f  the major points o f  the communique. In reality, however, 
during the early drafting o f  the communique for his October 1971 trip to Beijing, Kissinger brought in 
a China desk officer, A1 Jenkins, to work with John Holdridge on the second and third round drafting. 
Jenkins also gave much o f  his drafting to his deputy Roger Sullivan.
85 Ibid.
86 Memcon, Kissinger and Ch’iao Kuan-hua, February 26-27, 1972, 10:20-1:40a.m., pp.2-3, Dr. 
Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far 
East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. However, Kissinger dropped Green’s suggestion to change ‘all 
Chinese’ to ‘the Chinese.’
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the Republic of China on Taiwan.87 Green estimated that this omission would almost 
certainly be seized by the opposition to the U.S.-PRC summit, especially the U.S. 
domestic critics charging the Nixon trip as unilaterally terminating the treaty 
obligation and “selling out” the Chinese Nationalists. It also posed a serious question 
for U.S. reliability in terms of its willingness and capability to fulfil treaty obligations 
to its allies. As Kissinger told Ch’iao, ‘every other ally in the Pacific will say “what
oo
about us?’” After intense exchanges, they finally agreed to remove that particular 
section on defense treaty from the communique. On February 27, in a news 
conference in Shanghai, Kissinger orally re-confirmed the U.S. commitment toward 
the Republic o f China.89
Regarding strict secrecy, Lord recalls that: “We could have had more expertise. ...I 
think it would have been worth running that risk.”90 Lord also admits that: “I still feel 
it would have been useful to have State there in dealing with the Chinese, and also it 
would have been much less messy at the end, where the State Department had to 
climb in on the communique at the last minute, for bureaucratic support.”91
In the final version o f the joint communique, China reiterated its long-term vital 
interest in the sovereignty over Taiwan:
87 Green, Evolution o f  U.S.-China Policy, Oral History Interview, pp.37-38, FAOHC. Green recalls 
further that this omission o f  any reference to a treaty obligation toward Taiwan reminded him o f  former 
Secretary o f  State Dean Acheson’s failure in the early 1950. Acheson, defining the “defensive 
perimeter” for the United States ranging from the Ryukyu islands in Western Pacific to the Philippines 
in Southeast Asia, did not include South Korea, and thus might have induced the North Korean 
launching o f  the Korean War. Ibid.
Memcon, Kissinger and Ch’iao, February 26 to 27, 1972, p.3. Ch’iao reacted furiously to Kissinger’s 
proposals: “the sentiments o f  all Chinese are very strong on the Taiwan question. I am restraining 
myself to the utmost. .. .If you have to persist in this, let us not continue tonight.” Ibid., p. 10.
Kissinger prepared a statement as follows: “we are here on the soil o f  a country with which we have 
no diplomatic relations and for which this is the most sensitive issue. Therefore do not keep asking this 
question. I w ill answer it once. We stated in the World Report our position on this, and the statement in 
the World Report remains intact. Then when the President goes back to Congress he will have to 
answer it again.” Ibid., p .l 1.
90 Lord, “The N ixon Administration National Security Council,” p.44, NSCP-OHR.
91 Ibid., p.45.
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[T]he Government of the People’s Republic o f China is the sole legal 
government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been 
returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal 
affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces 
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese 
Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one 
China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and 
“independent Taiwan,” or advocate that “the status o f Taiwan remain to be 
determined.”92
In response, the U.S. declared:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of 
China. The United States does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese 
themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objectives of 
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In 
the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces as the tension in the 
area diminishes.93
After the summit, a China expert in the NSC staff, Richard Solomon, conducted a 
detailed comparative analysis of the English and Chinese versions of the joint 
communique. First, while the English version “acknowledges” “the legitimacy of 
Chinese declaration that Taiwan is part of China,” the Chinese version conveyed that 
the U.S “understands fis awarel” that both Chinese states maintained this position.94
92 The New York Times, February 28, 1972. Quotation marks in original.
93 Ibid.
94 Solomon to Kissinger, “Comparison o f  the Chinese and English Versions o f  the Sino-American Joint 
Communique,” March 17, 1972, p .l, Underline in original, Box 501, China Trip -  February-March
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Moreover, the Chinese version’s use of a verb “understands” [jen-shih-tao] would 
imply diplomatic recognition [ch’eng-jen] or acceptance of the other side’s point of
95view.
Second, the English statement that the U.S. “does not challenge” the Chinese 
position acquired an “even more hands-off implication” in the Chinese version. It 
implied a degree of involvement in the issue -  “does not raise a divergent opinion Tan 
objection!.”96 The Chinese version thus could mean that the U.S. “does not wish to 
get involved in a dispute over the matter.”
Third, where the English version “reaffirms” the U.S. “interest” in a peaceful 
resolution o f the Taiwan question, the Chinese phrase was better translated as 
“reiterate its concern” with a peaceful solution on the U.S. part.97 The likelihood of 
peaceful solution was thus stronger in the Chinese language version. Overall, each 
side interpreted the implications of the communique for its own advantage.
Regarding the U.S. partial withdrawal, the U.S. statement, ‘as the tension in the area 
diminishes’ implied the final reassurance of the linkage between the U.S. withdrawal 
from Taiwan and the progress of Vietnamization. In other words, the U.S. would 
withdraw from Taiwan as the tension in the region eased with its military 
disengagement from the Vietnam War. One of the major purposes o f the communique 
for the U.S., and especially for Kissinger, was “to put off the issue of Taiwan for the 
future.”98 Thus, the U.S. statement was an indication of ‘One China, but not now.’
1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On March 20, Kissinger transmitted a brief summary o f  
Solomon’s detailed memo to the President.
* Ibid-
Ibid. Underline in original.
Ibid., p.2. Underline in original.
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1074.
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3.2.2. Conflicts in Indochina
As President Nixon’s comments on a yellow pad indicate, the conflicts in Indochina 
were the “most urgent” issue between the two sides." While preparing for his trip to 
China, Nixon outlined his negotiating positions.
V. Nam:
1. We are ending our involvement.
2. We had hoped you would help -  but now it doesn’t matter 
(Our lost offer -  It doesn’t matter to us - ) 100
1. We must end it honorably -  it will -
2. S.V. Nam is stronger than you think -
You can’t be expected to do anything -  
Soviet would accuse you of colluding.
But it is in your interests for U.S. to get out (2/3 o f Taiwan) 
It is in Soviet interests for U.S. to stay101
Regarding the promotion of Vietnamization, Nixon was seriously concerned about 
the question of U.S. reliability for its allies in the world. While preparing for the talks 
with Zhou, Nixon wrote:
99 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.2, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
100 Ibid., p.4. On January 30, the Chinese replied to Kissinger’s message (dated on January 26) via Paris 
showing its continuing support for North Vietnamese and refusing to “exert pressure” on Hanoi on the 
behalf o f  Washington. On February 6, 1972, through the Paris backchannel, Nixon and Kissinger asked 
China to arrange a meeting with die North Vietnamese on Chinese soil during the N ixon visit. China 
refused to arrange a meeting with Le Due Tho. Memo from Walters to Haig, February 16, 1972, Box  
330, Policy Planning Staff, (Director’s File -  Winston Lord), General Record o f  the Department o f  
State, Record Group 59, NA. Tyler interprets that while asking the Chinese to help convince Hanoi to 
come to acceptable terms, N ixon was determined to get a breakthrough at almost any cost and as early 
as possible in the presidential campaign season. Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and  
China, An Investigative H istory (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 125-126.
101 Ibid.
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Should take bold action in V. Nam -  
Or others will benefit - 102
Accordingly, Nixon explained to Zhou that: “if the U.S. does not behave honorably,
the U.S. would cease to be a nation as a friend and which the people o f the world
1 0^could depend upon as an ally.” Nixon believed that the U.S. should “react strongly 
if tested.”104 Finally, Nixon clarified that the U.S. would never intend to “engage in 
unilateral withdrawal without accomplishing the objectives o f our policy there.”105
On the other hand, believing that the Vietnam problem should no longer be the 
division line between Washington and Beijing, Nixon wrote his comments on the 
NSC briefing book: “Reduces irritant to our relations”106 Thus, Nixon gave assurance 
to Zhou:
I am removing this irritant as fast as anyone in my position could. My 
predecessor sent in 500,000 men into Vietnam, and I’ve taken 500.000 out. I will 
end American involvement -  it’s a matter o f time. I can speak with certainty on 
this point.107
102 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 22, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 72, China Trip, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
103 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.25.
104 Ibid., p.26.
105
Memcon 24 Feb. 1972., p. 17.
106
Indochina-Vietnam, p .l 1, Book V.
107 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.27.
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Accordingly, Nixon stated further that: “you have no reason to believe that we have 
territorial designs in Southeast Asia.”108
As for China’s influence in Indochina, Nixon underlined the following specific 
points in the NSC briefing book:
The U.S. has recently been suggesting that the PRC exert pressure on its allies. 
(We don’t ask - ) 109
We would thus welcome Peking’s constructive attitude.
(But do not expect)110
Nixon also wrote his comments on the yellow pad:
We would appreciate influence on Hanoi. 
We think it is in your interest 
But if  you can’t, we understand 
We shall chart our own course.111
Hence, Nixon was fully aware that there would be no agreed upon statement on the 
conflicts in Indochina. During the talk on February 22, while still maintaining 
“hopes,” Nixon made it clear that he had “no illusions” about the promotion of a
108 Ibid., p.28.
109 Indochina-Vietnam, p. 10, Book V. Underline by Nixon in original. N ixon’s handwritten notations in 
parentheses.
10 Ibid., p .l 1. Underline by Nixon in original. N ixon’s handwritten notations in parentheses.
111 Nixon’s handwritten notations, Indochina-Vietnam, Point to Emphasize, p.2, Book V-a, The 
President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Vietnam settlement during his stay in Beijing: “I don’t ask the Prime Minister to do 
anything about it, and certainly not do anything about it publicly.”112
Regarding the danger of North Vietnamese expansion, while reviewing the NSC 
briefing books, Nixon underlined that the Chinese would “not want to see Hanoi 
control all o f Indochina.”113 The NSC staff estimated that Beijing had no desire to see 
an “overwhelming North Vietnamese victory” in Laos and Cambodia.114 Nixon wrote 
his comments on the NSC briefing book:
N. V.nam presence in Cambodia + Laos would mean expanded Soviet influence. 
All alien influence should be removed -  
Neutrality + non alignment our policy - 115
In direct talks, Zhou repeatedly urged an earlier completion of the U.S. military 
withdrawal from Indochina: “you went there by accident. Why not give this up?.... It 
would be beneficial for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East to bring about a 
nonaligned Southeast Asia.”116 Thus, Zhou expressed China’s continuing support for 
all Indochina states, “but we will not get involved unless, of course, you attack us.”117 
Moreover, Zhou clarified that China only had an obligation to assist them but not the 
right to engage in negotiation on their behalf, for it respected “their sovereignty and
112 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.29.
13 Indochina-Vietnam, p .l,  Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box  
847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
114 Indochina: Laos and Cambodia, p.3, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, 
FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
115 .
Nixon’s handwritten notations, Ibid.
116 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.28.
117 Ibid., p.29.
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independence.”118 Finally, Zhou stressed that China had “exerted great restraints” in 
Indochina since July 1971.119
Regarding the Soviet expansionism in Indochina. Nixon wrote his comments on the 
NSC briefing book: “Reduces Soviet hand there. 120 Nixon was thus seeking to 
enhance China’s understanding of the U.S. search for a negotiated settlement in 
Indochina by stressing the Soviet threat. During the direct talks, Nixon estimated that 
the Soviets expected the U.S. to be “tied down” in Indochina, and consequently 
increased their influence on North Vietnam to be “the only gainer” from the 
prolonged U.S. military operation.121 On the other hand, Zhou urged that the United 
States should “take more bold action” because the delay o f the U.S. military 
withdrawal was likely to “facilitate the Soviets in furthering their influences.”122 In 
other words, the longer the U.S. stayed, the more difficulty it would bring for the 
satisfactory completion of its military withdrawal from Indochina.
Finally, Nixon anticipated how his domestic political opponents would criticize the 
outcomes of his trip:
Obviously what will be said, even with a skilful communique, is what the 
People’s Republic o f China wanted from us was movement on Taiwan and it got 
it; and what we wanted was help on Vietnam, and we got nothing.123
118 Memcon 28 Feb. 1972, pp.9-10.
119 Ibid.
120
Indochina-Vietnam, p .l 1, Book V.
121 Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, p. 19.
122
Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.20.
123 Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, p. 16.
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Nixon expressed appreciation to Zhou that China would “not try to discourage the 
North Vietnamese from negotiating.”124 In the joint communique, the U.S. side stated: 
“the peoples in Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without 
outside intervention; its constant objective has been a negotiated solution.”125 In the 
“absence of a negotiated settlement,” the United States “envisages the ultimate 
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self- 
determination for each country of Indochina.”126 On the other hand, with a strong 
opposition to “foreign aggression, interference and subversion,” the Chinese side 
expressed “its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia” in their 
continual efforts to achieve “freedom and liberation.”127 Lord assesses that the U.S. 
rapprochement with China “generally helped to provide stability in Asia and the
1 98Pacific region. It was o f some help on Vietnam.” In reality, however, it took 
another eleven months for the United States to achieve the Paris Peace Accords with 
the North Vietnamese, which took place on January 13, 1973.
3.2.3. Japan’s future role
The NSC staffs  briefing book explained that the Chinese traditionally had both 
“hated and feared the Japanese.”129 Thus, the Chinese would not want to “push Japan 
in the direction o f a heavily-armed neutralism (including nuclear weapons) outside 
China’s ability to control.” The NSC staff recommended that the President should
124 Ibid., p.24.




Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
129 Japan, p. 1, Underline by N ixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China 
Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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“focus the Chinese attention on this possibility and on the countervailing.”130 Nixon 
thus sought to exploit China’s long-term fear of Japan’s possible move in the future. 
Nixon wrote specific instructions to Kissinger:
K -  Japan
Don’t say “we oppose rearmament of Japan.” 
We oppose nuclear Japan131
Nixon further outlined his negotiating positions:
Japan ready for take off commercially 
Best to provide nuclear shield -
1. To keep Japan from building its own.
2. To have influence from US.
(1) We oppose Japan “stretching its hands” to Korea, Taiwan, Indochina -
(2) But if  we don’t keep a truly our recommendation would be like “empty 
cannon.”
1 39Wild horse would not be controlled.
Regarding the anticipated Chinese position, Nixon wrote: “You prefer neutral -  (you 
should say it)[.]”133 Nixon was aware that discussions on the Japan issue would be 
“very difficult.”134
130 Ibid., p.4. Underline by N ixon in original.
131 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 18, 1972, p.8, Quotation marks in original, China Notes, 
Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. The NSC staff originally recommended the 
following point that: “We oppose a rearmed Japan particularly with nuclear weapon. N ixon erased 
“particularly with nuclear weapon” and added “nuclear” in front o f  “rearmed.” Japan, p.6, Book V. 
Underline by N ixon in original.
Ibid., p. 10, Quotation marks in original.
133 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p .16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
134 Ibid.
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During the direct talks with Zhou, Nixon sought to justify the US-Japan Security 
Treaty by re-emphasizing the danger of U.S. withdrawal from East Asia:
The U.S. can get out of Japanese waters, but others will fish there. And both 
China and the U.S. have had very difficult experiences with Japanese 
militarism.... The Japanese, with their enormously productive economy, their 
great natural drive and their memories of the war they lost, could well turn 
toward building their own defenses in the event that the U.S. guarantee were 
removed. That’s why I say that where Taiwan is concerned, and I would add 
where Korea is concerned, the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in as the 
U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if  we had no defense
1 'X Sarrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned.
In essence, as Nixon wrote, “It is a U.S. Japan policy with a U.S. veto.”136 On the 
other hand, as the NSC suggested, ‘Tilf Japan feels abandoned, it could follow a much 
more dangerous course.”137 There were basically two possible directions for Japan, 
either toward China or toward the Soviet Union “for nuclear protection.”138 During 
the direct talks, Nixon thus explained the essential implications o f the U.S. role in 
East Asia as: “the U.S. will use its influence with Japan and those other countries 
where we have a defense relationship or provide economic assistance, to discourage 
policies which would be detrimental to China.”139 Thus, Nixon sought to persuade
Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.12.
136 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.5, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
137 Japan, Points to Emphasize, p. 1, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V-a, The President, Briefing 
Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
138 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.5, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7,
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
139 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p. 12.
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Zhou for the continuation of the U.S. military presence, as he wrote: “Our friendship 
with Japan is in your interests -  not against.”140
Premier Zhou estimated that Japan, as an emerging economic great power, was “at 
the crossroads.” Zhou thus warned: “Since their development has been at such a great 
rate the result is bound to be expansion abroad. Expanding in such a great way as they 
are toward foreign lands, the inevitable result will be military expansion.”141 
Moreover, Zhou insisted that once reaching “a certain point,” Japan would “cease 
listening to” the U.S. and begin to pursue its own path.142 In response, Nixon gave 
assurance that the U.S. policy was, to the extent possible, to “restrain the Japanese 
from going from economic expansion to military expansion.”143
Regarding Beijing’s diplomatic relations with Tokyo, Zhou emphasized the 
remaining historical antagonism and “a state of war” between China and Japan.144 
However, Zhou also hinted that: “if China and Japan are able to restore diplomatic 
relations, Chinese-Japanese friendship [sic] should not hurt the relations between 
Japan and the United States.”145
140 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
41 Memorandum o f  conversation February 23, 1972, 2:00-6.00p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 
23 Feb. 1972), p. 18.
142 Ibid., p. 19.
143 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
145 I b i dIbid. However, Zhou remained suspicious o f  the Sato Cabinet’s pro-Taiwan attitude. Hence, the 
Chinese did not make any substantial diplomatic move until Kakuei Tanaka’s new cabinet came to 
power in June 1972. See Epilogue, pp.339-341.
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In the joint communique, the U.S. side declared that:
The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it 
will continue to develop the existing bonds.146
The phrase ‘the existing bonds’ implied a broad relationship, including the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty. It was a crucial reassurance for the maintenance o f the U.S. presence 
in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, the Chinese side maintained that:
It firmly opposes the revival of and outward expansion of Japanese militarism 
and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, 
democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.147
The Chinese statement reflected its long-term opposition to the revival of Japanese 
military expansionism.
Overall, the U.S. gave an assurance that it would attempt to discourage the designs 
of the Japanese if  they pursued an expansionist policy. In response, China gave its 
acknowledgement of the U.S. continuous presence in the Asia-Pacific region. For 
both sides, a Japan closely allied with the United States and diplomatically related to 
China was more preferable to its pursuit of an independent defense policy.
The New York Times, February 28, 1972.
147 Ibid.
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3.2.4. The India-Pakistan rivalry
The NSC staffs briefing book explained that Beijing had “wanted to strengthen 
Pakistan as a power rival to China’s great opponent in the subcontinent. India.”148 
Therefore, the U.S. and the PRC had “parallel interests in coping with expanded 
Soviet influence in the subcontinent.”149 In his comments, Nixon wrote:
Moscow seeks a dominant role in India -  
U.S. help to India would blunt this role - 150
On February 15, while reviewing the briefing books, Nixon wrote his concerns:
Need for U.S. to be strong as counter to Soviet -  
India shows -  if  a vacuum 
Jhey  will fill i t .151
During the direct talks, Nixon sought to stress the expansion of the Soviet military 
threat in the subcontinent: “India is no threat to China, but India supported by the 
Soviet Union is a very present threat to China.”152 Thus, Nixon explained that during 
the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, “we were speaking not just to India or
148 South Asia, p .l ,  Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the 
China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Ibid., p.3. Underline by N ixon in original.
Ibid. N ixon’s handwritten note on a paper between page 3 and page 4.
151 Nixon’s handwritten notations, Underline by Nixon in original, February 15, 1972, p.2, China 
Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
152 Memcon Feb. 22, pp. 10-11.
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Pakistan but also -  and we made them well aware of it -  to the Soviet Union.”153 
Accordingly, Nixon sought to develop further cooperation with China in the 
subcontinent: “our policies in the subcontinent go together.... we don’t want to make 
movement with respect to India and Pakistan unless you are fully informed, because 
we believe your interest here is greater than ours.”154 Finally, Nixon revealed to Zhou 
that during the December 1971 war, he was “prepared to warn the Soviet Union 
against undertaking an attack on China.”155 
In essence, while Nixon sought to re-affirm a get-tough policy against any further 
Soviet advancement in the subcontinent in order to protect U.S. credibility in the 
world, Zhou still viewed the growth of the India-Soviet relationship as a major step 
toward the encirclement of China. Together, the two sides were principally concerned 
about the expansion of India’s hegemonic aspiration to establish “a great Indian 
empire” backed by the Soviet Union.156 Hence, the two sides would coordinate their 
policies and “go in tandem,” in Nixon’s words, to counterbalance the India-Soviet 
expansive aspiration in South Asia.157 Thereafter, the India-Pakistan rivalry became 
less of an urgent issue between the two sides.158
153 Ibid., p . l l .
154 Ibid.
155 Memcon Feb. 23, p.21.
156 Ibid, p. 10. Kissinger provided intelligence reports on N ew  Delhi’s arms purchase from M oscow. 
Ibid., p.9.
157 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
158 During the rest o f  his term in office, President Nixon visited neither India nor Pakistan again. He 
also never visited Bangladesh.
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3.2.5. The Soviet military threat
The handling of the Soviet threat in the direct talks with the Chinese required 
diplomatic subtlety. While reviewing the NSC briefing book, Nixon underlined the 
following specific point of reality: “Although the Soviet Union is the PRC’s major 
reason for seeking better relations with us (and although they know we know that), 
they w ill o f course, never acknowledge the fact.”159 Thus, Nixon anticipated that the 
Chinese leaders would still try to show their self-reliance against the Soviets. 
Regarding the deepening Sino-Soviet mutual hostility, Nixon wrote: “We will treat 
with even handedness [.J”160 Before his arrival in Beijing, Nixon outlined his policy:
Russia:
1. Maintain balance o f power -
2. Restrain their expansion (if our interests are involved)
3. Try to reduce tension between us
4. Not make them irritated at you -
5. Make no deal with them we don’t offer to you 
Will inform you in all details161
While preparing talks with Zhou, Nixon wrote: “Can be no vacuum in the world[.]”162 
In the direct talks, Nixon thus stressed the importance o f the two superpowers’ 
continuing presence in the world: “in terms of the safety o f these nations which are
159 The Soviet Union, p.2, Underline by N ixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for 
the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Nixon’s handwritten notations, in Ibid., p.6.
161 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p. 16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
162 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 22, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 72, China Trip, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
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not superpowers in the world, they will be much safer if  there are two superpowers, 
rather than just one.”163 Nixon warned that if the U.S. fell into a position of weakness, 
it would raise a credibility problem in terms of its “shield of protection” for its 
allies.164 Thus, the United States must maintain its military strength at least to be in a 
’’position of equality” with the Soviets.165
In response, Zhou explained the danger of the full encirclement of China: “The 
worst possibility is ... that you all would attack China -  the Soviet Union comes from 
the north, Japanese and the U.S. from the east, and India into China’s Tibet.”166
Accordingly, Nixon sought to assure Zhou that the U.S. “would oppose any attempt 
by the Soviet Union to engage in an aggressive action against China.”167 Moreover, 
Nixon made it clear that while the U.S. would continue arms control talks with the 
Soviets, it would put both China and the Soviets on “an absolutely equal footing.”168 
More particularly, Nixon reiterated the U.S. intention to respect China’s interests vis- 
a-vis the Soviets: “under no circumstances will I negotiate about or discuss our 
relations with the People’s Republic of China without his [Zhou’s] approval or 
knowledge.”169
Memcon 22 Feb. 1972., p.9.
164 Ibid., p. 10. N ixon offered Zhou a briefing by Kissinger on “very sensitive material” on the position  
of the Soviet forces against China. Ibid. Accordingly, “on a very restricted basis,” Kissinger briefed 
Zhou with “a list o f  all the negotiations” which the U.S. was conducting with the Soviet Union and also 
“some information on dangers” the U.S. and China might confront in “the military field.” Memcon, 
Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 4:15-5:30p.m., p.2, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s 
Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In 
reality, the Soviets knew “as a fact” that when Kissinger visited Beijing first time, he handed over to 
the Chinese “American satellite pictures o f  Soviet installations along the Sino-Soviet border.” Memo 
from John Scali to Kissinger, March 8, 1972, p .l, Box 501, China Trip -  February-March 1972 [Part 
1], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
165 Ibid., p .l 1.
166 Ibid., p. 18.
167 Memcon 23 Feb. 1972, p.21.168T1-, r
Ibid, p.22.
169 Ibid., p.36; and The Soviet Union, Points to Emphasize, p .l,  Book V-a, The President, Briefing 
Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Regarding the restoration of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Nixon wrote on his 
yellow pad: “Neither seeks Hegemony.”170 In the direct talks, Nixon and Zhou 
discussed a new principle.
Premier Zhou: ...[N]either of us should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific 
region. And that would not only imply our two countries should not seek 
hegemony in this region, but that Japan should not either.
President Nixon: And the Soviet Union.
Premier Zhou: That’s right. Nor the Soviet Union.
President Nixon: Nor India.
Premier Zhou: That’s right. Here implies that both will try to do good things, not 
do bad things.
President Nixon: Let me clarify. It implies that neither of our two sides should 
seek hegemony. It also implies, to the extent that each of us can, that we will 
resist efforts o f others to seek hegemony. In that what it means?
171Premier Zhou: Yes, that is we, oppose any efforts by another country.
In other words, Nixon and Zhou sought to apply the so-called “anti-hegemony clause” 
not only to the United States and China, but also to the Soviet Union, Japan, and India 
in order to prevent any potential threat from expanding its influence in the Asia- 
Pacific region. Equally important, Zhou was fully aware of the Soviet sensitivity to 
the Sino-U.S. collusion: “They claim that our two sides are discussing how to oppose 
the Soviet Union, to conclude an anti-Soviet alliance.”172 Hence, Zhou clarified that: 
“neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf o f third countries or enter into agreements
170 N ixon’s handwritten notations, February 24, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, PPF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA.
171
Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, pp.3-4.
172 Ibid., p.3.
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or understanding directed at other states.”173 Together, the U.S. and China sought to 
impose restraints on great powers in the Asia-Pacific region.
4. Reactions to the February 1972 summit
4.1. The Shanghai Communique
At the end of the February 1972 summit, the two sides released the so-called 
Shanghai Communique. Following the formula developed in the October 1971 talks, 
the joint communique took a unique approach in clarifying both the new common 
grounds and the remaining historical differences.174 The two sides jointly declared the 
five principles of peaceful coexistence as the fundamental basis of state relations, 
namely “the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of
1 7^other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” Finally, both 
sides clarified the common interest in the materialization o f diplomatic normalization.
While preparing his statement for the final banquet in Shanghai on February 27, 
Nixon wrote: “We have changed the world -  But it is only a beginning[.]”176 Upon his 
return to Washington, Nixon made a public statement:
173 Ibid., p.4.
174 The New York Times, February 28, 1972. The communique was issued on February 27 at Chinese 
local time. For the full text o f  the Shanghai Communique, see Appendix.
175 Ibid.
176 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 27, 1972, Shanghai, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, 
PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. Nixon declared in his toast: “This was the week that changed the world,” 
with a conviction that the two governments were committed to “build a bridge” across the Pacific after 
22 years o f  mutual hostility. Max Frankel, “China Visit Ends: President Presents a Pledge to Build 
Pacific ‘Bridge,’” The New York Times, February 28, 1972.
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As a result o f this trip, we have started the long process of building a bridge 
across that gulf o f almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of non-communication and 
hostility... We have demonstrated that nations with very deep and fundamental 
differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally, and frankly, 
without compromising their principles.177
In essence, Nixon emphasized the new characteristics of the U.S. relations with 
China, namely the beginning of the long process to establish substantial 
communication after two decades of mutual hostility.
4.2. Foreign Reactions
While staying in China, Nixon and Kissinger already developed concerns about 
possible reactions to the summit. On February 27, Haig, who stayed in Washington, 
sent a memo on initial reactions. In short, the travelling press corps and reports from
178 . . .foreign capitals had been “positive and objective.” Anticipating wide speculation 
especially in Asia, President Nixon decided to send Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green and NSC staff member John Holdridge 
to brief U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region.179 The main purpose of their mission
177 Return to Washington, February 28, 1972, Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents, 
February 28, 1972, The President’s Trip to China, pp.483-484, Box 86, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 
[2of 2], CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
178 Haig to Kissinger, “Initial Reactions to Communique and briefing,” February 27, 1972, p .l, Box 88, 
China -  President’s Trip 15-29 Feb. 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
179 Green, Evolution o f  U.S.-China Policy, Oral History Interview, pp.41-45, FAOHC. The Green- 
Holdridge mission included visits to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. See also Holdridge, Crossing  
the Divide, pp.97-102.
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was to assure allied leaders that “we will remain true to our commitments and have 
struck no secret deals.”180
The Republic of China expressed its “surprise and shock” by the U.S. statement in 
the communique on its future withdrawal from Taiwan.181 Taipei also demonstrated 
“strong disapproval” o f the Chinese positions in the joint communique. Importantly, 
however, the statement “avoided any invective” toward the United States or the
1 8 9Americans. After the initial shock over the communique, Taipei was “still highly 
apprehensive” o f U.S. “long-term intentions.”183 The Green-Holdridge mission 
appeared to have “reassured” the ROC that the U.S. defense commitment was “intact 
for the present.” Nevertheless, the Chinese Nationalist officials still wondered 
whether the long-run U.S. strategy might “not be to preserve the appearance of
1 84adherence to its commitment.”
In Japan, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda described the President’s trip as “fruitful” 
and stated that it would serve as a “lubricant” for Japan to normalize its relations with 
China.185 The Japanese Government, “fearful of being undermined” by the Nixon trip, 
reached with “almost visible relief’ to the limited concrete achievement in the joint 
communique.186 On the other hand, some Japanese critics called the trip a “betrayal”
180 Haig to Nixon, “Summary o f  Foreign Reactions to Your Trip to China,” March 24, 1972, p .l, Box  
501, China Trip -  February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
181 Haig to Kissinger, “Initial Reactions to Communique and briefing,” February 27, 1972, p .l, Box  
501, China Trip -  February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
182 Tillman Durdin, “Taipei says N ixon’s Trip Will Not Result in Peace,” February 29, 1972, The New  
York Times.
183 Haig to Nixon, “Summary o f  Foreign Reactions,” March 24, 1972, p .l, Box 501, China Trip -  
February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
184 Ibid.
185 Haig to Kissinger, “Initial Reactions to Communique and briefing,” February 27, 1972, p .l, Box 88, 
China -  President’s Trip 15-29 Feb. 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
186 John M. Lee, “Tokyo Is Relieved By Limited Result,” February 28, 1972, The New York Times. 
Green gave assurance to the Japanese Government that President Nixon had made “no secret deals” 
with the Chinese leaders. Green conveyed N ixon’s personal letter to Sato reassuring that Japan 
“remained a key ally” o f  the U.S. Green also assured Fukuda that U.S. delegation refused to accept
326
by the United States and blamed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato for having been 
“outstripped” by Washington in forming ties with Beijing.
The Western media reported that the Soviets were “fearfully of some new power 
grouping directed against Moscow.”187 The Soviet press agency Tass reported that 
there remained “essential differences” between China and the United States on 
foreign policy issues and in their social systems. Tass also noted that the joint 
communique stated some of their views with “insufficient clarity.” For nearly three 
weeks, the Soviet government itself withheld official comment, confining itself to a 
“cautious” and equivocal reaction expressing “suspicion o f possible U.S.-PRC secret 
arrangements.”188
1 80The general reaction in Saigon appeared to be “cautious and favorable.” “We felt 
at ease,” reportedly stated a senior official of South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. On 
the contrary, despite Premier Zhou’s trip to Hanoi immediately after Nixon’s 
departure from China, the North Vietnamese were “bitter and disenchanted.”190 
The most negative reaction came from India, where there was a “tendency to read 
the worst possible into the trip,” namely a “new balance of forces” that would 
“circumscribe Indian freedom of action.”191 In contrast, Pakistani reaction to the trip
9 192was “strongly positive,” and the communique was “welcomed.”
In sum, most Asian states were “publicly approving” of the trip and privately 
became “less apprehensive” as a result of assurance given by the Green-Holdridge
Chinese charges o f  a “revival o f  Japanese militarism.” Green, Evolution o f  U.S.-China Policy, Oral 
History Interview, p.41, FAOHC.
187 “Soviet Shows R elief At Results o f  Talks,” February 29, 1972, The New York Times.
188 Haig to Nixon, “Summary o f  Foreign Reactions,” March 24, 1972, p.3, Box 501, China Trip — 
February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
189 Craig R. Whitney, “Saigon Pleased By Communique,” February 28, 1972, The New York Times.
190 Haig to Nixon, “Summary o f  Foreign Reactions,” March 24, 1972, p.2, Box 501, China Trip -
February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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mission.193 Many Asian capitals came to believe that they “must begin adapting their 
policies to a changing international context.”194 However, there was a wide-spread 
belief in Asia that there were “secret agreements or understanding” in Beijing that 
were “left out of the communique.”195 In particular, there still remained “uncertainty” 
among Asian states over whether the U.S. had “loosened its commitment to defend” 
its allies.196
4.3. Briefing on the domestic front
After his return to Washington, President Nixon conducted numerous briefings on 
the trip. On February 29, 1972, Nixon met the bipartisan Congressional leaders in the 
Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss his trip to China. Nixon pointed out two 
lessons for the future. First, the Chinese had reiterated that they were “not a super 
power.”197 However, the President stressed that: “750 million Chinese Communists 
are something to be reckoned with. Consequently, they are destined to become a 
major force.”198 Second, the U.S. relationship with China was “a very delicate one,” 
which required building upon “trust,” assuring that: “We are reliable, we are strong 
and we will continue to build for the future.”199
193 Ibid., p .l.
194 Ibid.
195 The New York Times, February 29, 1972.
196 Ibid.
197 Tom C. Korologos (via, W illiam E. Timmons), “Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership February 29, 
1972, 10:00a.m. The Cabinet Room,” p.3, MemforP, ROM, Box 88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
198 t v -j  ^Ibid., p.5.
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During a Cabinet meeting on the same day, Nixon emphasized that: “we both 
agreed we will not resort to the threat of force or the use of force in international 
relations and with each other. We agreed that no nation should dominate Asia. This is 
the heart o f the communique.” 200 Kissinger also explained that what the President had 
done was to “set a major new direction.”201 Finally, when asked a question about the 
most important thing to the Chinese, Nixon replied “[c]old blooded interest, [n]ot 
friendship”:
They see the Soviet Union, India, Japan -  with all o f them, each in its way, 
encircling them -  so they need somebody who is not antagonistic. They know 
the Soviets have more men on the Chinese frontier than against Western Europe. 
As for Japan, history has to give them some pause. With India, they’ve had a 
little squabble. As for the United States, first, we’re long way off; and second, 
while they would never state publicly that India, Russia and Japan have designs 
on them, they know very well, I think, that we don’t.”202
It was Nixon’s realization of Chinese perception of threat regarding full 
encirclement that drove the entire initiative of rapprochement.
Shambaugh confirms that the Chinese were approaching the United States “not out 
of the question o f balance of power but out of the self-survival.”203 The Chinese 
leaders believed that the Soviet Union would really attack them. Therefore, they 
thought that the United States could be a “counterweight and perhaps even help to 
defend China if  it were attacked.” Shambaugh thus assesses that the balance of power
200 Raymond K. Price, Jr., “Cabinet Meeting, February 29, 1972, 12:02p.m.-l:20p.m.,” p.7, MemforP, 
ROM, Box 88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
201 Ibid., p. 18.
202 Ibid., pp.21-22. Underline in original.
David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
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between the U.S., the Soviets and China was “the consequence rather than the 
motivation” o f the opening.204 Beijing’s motivation was “very much fear o f the 
military attack,” and thus the Chinese wanted to “put pressure on the Soviet Union 
from another flank.”205
As for the balance o f power in Asia, Solomon assesses that the United States, allied 
to various Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, was “the 
balancer checking the expansion o f China.”206 However, the Chinese at that point 
were principally worried about the Soviet Union. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger did “not 
let that view o f history and traditional pattern o f international relations in East Asia 
affect their policy.”
Finally, Nixon and Kissinger viewed that “if we can not resolve our strategic 
difference with China, then a nuclear China is going to be a big threat. We already got 
one threat from the Soviet Union. So it was an effort to establish the basis or common 
strategic interest with China.”207 In his meeting with Mao, Nixon clarified that there 
was no fundamental strategic conflict between China and the U.S., which became his 
way o f saying “We do not want to have a confrontation with another nuclear
204 Ibid. Shambaugh argues further that balance o f  power relates to “shifting correlates and w eights o f
power either in the region or in the globe.” Ibid.
Jos Ibid.
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The February 1972 summit promoted dynamism and optimism in the U.S. relations 
with China for the rest o f the year and the first half of 1973.1 One o f the principal 
consequences of the pursuit o f strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger was the 
development of a highly personalized diplomatic practice. A China specialist in the 
NSC staff, Richard Solomon, emphasized the importance of “personalized 
diplomacy” during the “transitional period” before the U.S. relations with China were 
“institutionalised.” A highly “valuable factor” was that Kissinger developed a 
“notable degree of personal rapport” with Premier Zhou. Thus, “timing” became very 
important, as “changes in key personnel” were likely to require “further visitations,” 
and thus possibly “delaying progress” toward normalization.4 In other words, to the 
U.S. advantage, “the degree of mutual personal respect” was a key quantity in 
“breaking down the distrust of the past,” and in “generating a degree of confidence.”5 
Finally, therefore, Solomon suggested that it was in the U.S.’s vital interest to 
“consolidate the political gains” “before Mao and Chou pass from the scene.”6
1 As for the U.S. relations with China in the mid 1970s, see Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The 
United States and China 1969-1989  (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), chapter 4; 
Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, an Investigative History (New York: Public 
Affairs, 1999), pp. 183-225; and James H. Mann, About Face: A History o f  A m erica’s Curious 
Relationship with China from  Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfled Knopf, 1999), chapter 3. Some 
copies and excerpts o f  Kissinger’s talks with the Chinese leaders during the mid 1970s have been 
published. See W illiam Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret talks with Beijing and  
M oscow  (New  York: N ew  Press, 1999). This study has made direct access to the original documents at 
the U.S. National Archives.
2 Solomon (via John Holdridge) to Kissinger, “Impressions o f  Peking and its Politics,” June 28, 1972, 
Country Files (CF)-Far East, Box 97, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF), National Security 






Kissinger was “really impressed” by Mao and Zhou for their “intelligence and 
charisma.”7 During his trips to China from 1972 to 1975, Kissinger “did share a 
general strategic view” with the Chinese leaders and found it was “exciting and 
interesting to have these encounters.”8 Thus, as a former State Department official, 
Donald Anderson recalls, Kissinger “retained a very direct interest in China” and “set 
a tone that really shaped the way we dealt with China for a very long time.”9 There 
was an atmosphere within the U.S. government that “as long as Kissinger was running 
the show that basically in dealing with China you looked at the big picture and the 
strategic relationship, don’t bother with details.. .but a lot of people [were] feeling that 
we were giving away things that we didn’t need to give to China.”10 
Following Nixon’s landslide re-election victory in November 1972, Kissinger and 
the NSC staff estimated that “we now had four years to deal with each other, building 
up a certain mutual trust. ...The Chinese knew that they would have four more years 
to deal with a strong leader.”11 Thus, Kissinger and the NSC staff anticipated that the 
Chinese leaders would be willing to “accelerate the normalization and 
institutionalisation” of the U.S.-PRC bilateral relations.12 Importantly, however, as 
Kissinger reported to Nixon, “we have no assurance that the PRC will continue its 
policy toward us when Mao and Chou depart.”13
7 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
8 Ibid.
9 Donald Anderson (Talks with Chinese American Embassy Paris, France, 1972-73, Political Officer, 
American Liaison Office Beijing, China, 1973-75, Political Officer, American Consulate General Hong 
Kong, 1975-77), Oral History Interview, p .13, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, Foreign 
Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger 
Library, Georgetown University.
10 Ibid.
1 Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
12 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, p .l, HAK China Trip -  February 1973 
Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
13 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Visit to China,” November 19, 1973, p.3, China-Sensitive WL File 
Misc&Reports N ov 1974, Box 374, Records o f  Policy Planning Staff (PPS), Director’s Files (Winston 
Lord), 1969-1977, General Record o f  the Department o f  State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG 59), NA. 
By late 1973, Zhou’s health was declining. However, U.S. officials were not yet sufficiently aware o f
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By late 1973, the Watergate scandal was damaging Nixon’s presidential authority, 
and it had “tremendous impact on foreign policy in general.”14 The NSC staff came to 
perceive “greater aloofness and lack of cooperation” from the Chinese at the 
operational level.15 Owing to “the policy and philosophical differences,” Beijing 
opposed Washington’s attempt to improve the mere “appearance” of bilateral 
relations.16 A former NSC staff member, Peter Rodman, recalls that Kissinger “did 
not see how he could function in any way at all without the presidential authority. He 
did not think he could survive, or the policies he believed in could survive, unless he 
had institutional base of the State Department.”17 Thus, after his swom-in as the 
Secretary of State in September 1973, Kissinger sought to pursue more personalized 
and secretive relations with the aging Chinese leaders.18 It appeared, however, that the 
Watergate scandal “puzzled” the Chinese.19 The NSC staff estimated that the Chinese 
leaders increased their doubt as to whether Nixon could still be in a position to “act in 
a strong manner in foreign policy” and to make “further major initiatives” in the 
normalization process.20
On August 8, 1974, President Nixon resigned from the Oval Office, elevating 
Gerald R. Ford to a new presidential power.21 It was the pursuit o f strict secrecy that 
materialized the U.S. rapprochement with China; ironically, however, it was also the
Zhou’s fatal illness. See, for example, Zhisui Li, The Private Life o f  Chairman Mao: The M emoirs o f  
M ao’s personal physician, (London: Arrow Books, 1994), pp.604-608.
14 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
15 Solomon to Kissinger, “The PRC’s Domestic Political Situation and Foreign Policy as a Context for 
Your Meeting with Deng Tsiao-p’ing and Ch’iao Kuan-hua,” April 12, 1974, Box 376, China- 
Sensitive-Feb.-April 1974, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.
16 Ibid.
17 Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.55, FAOHC.
18 Kissinger held his position as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until October 
1975, when he was replaced by his deputy Brent Scowcroft.
19 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
20 Solomon to Kissinger, “Peking Sends the U.S. Some Warning Signals,” February 16, 1974, China 
Exchanges 1 N ov 1973-31 March, Box 330, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG59, NA.
21 As for the fall o f  the N ixon presidency, see, for example, Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in 
the White House (New  York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp.604-609; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: 
Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp.592-606.
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excessive secrecy that destroyed the Nixon presidency as a whole. During the Ford 
presidency, it was principally Secretary Kissinger who sought to negotiate with the 
aging Chinese leaders in order to explore “their continued presence on the scene as 
leaders, and to discuss in concrete terms which we have in mind.”22
Conflicts in Indochina
After the February 1972 summit, the Vietnam War remained the “predominant” 
issue that hindered U.S. relations with China.23 During Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in 
June 1972, Zhou took a “hand-off attitude” on military and negotiating questions in 
Indochina.24 Kissinger judged that while Beijing was not letting Vietnam block U.S.- 
China bilateral relations, the Chinese would be “less willing” than the Russians to 
“exert actual pressure” on Hanoi to be reasonable at the negotiating table. Kissinger 
estimated further that while the Chinese would approve the U.S. course of action 
toward a ceasefire, withdrawal, and “leaving the political solution to the Vietnamese 
alone,” it was North Vietnam that was still “reluctant to rely upon it.” 26 Therefore, in 
his report to Nixon, Kissinger concluded that the U.S. could “not expect to solve the 
Vietnam issue” in Beijing.27
22 Kissinger to Ford, “Commitments to the People’s Republic o f  China,” August 14, 1974, Box 371, 
PPS-Lord, STATE-RG59, NA. As for Kissinger’s recent reassessment o f  the Ford Presidency, see 
Henry Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal (New York: Little Brown, 1999), pp. 169-191.
23 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to Peking, June 19-23, 1972,” June 27, 1972, p.2, CF-Far East, Box  
97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. As for the Nixon-Kissinger strategy toward the Vietnam settlement, 




Ibid., p.5. Underline in original.
27 Ibid., p .6.
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On January 17, 1973, the United States and North Vietnam finally agreed upon what 
became the Paris Peace Accords -  U.S.-Vietnamese Armistice Agreement.28 
Henceforth, the principal interest between the U.S. and China in Indochina coincided, 
for neither side wished for North Vietnam to fulfil its regional hegemonic aspiration. 
Rodman recalls that China supported the Paris agreement because they were “happy
90to have Vietnam divided.”
In reality, however, the radicals’ criticisms of Zhou in China increased after the 
failure of a Sino-U.S. joint approach in Cambodia to establish a neutral coalition 
government under Prince Sihanouk bringing together the Lon Nol regime and the 
Khmer Rouge.30 After the collapse of the Nixon presidency, the United States failed 
to prevent the fall o f the Cambodian regime; Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh on 
April 17, 1975 and replaced the Lon Nol regime. On April 30, North Vietnamese 
troops captured Saigon, defeating the remaining South Vietnamese and expanding its 
aspiration in Indochina. In consequence, as Kissinger reported to Ford, the collapse of 
the Indochina policy had “created a context where any major change in our 
relationship with Taiwan which implied the abandonment of yet another ally would be 
unacceptable.”31
28 Berman argues that despite the terms “peace with honor,” Nixon and Kissinger never believed in the 
peace settlement. They expected North Vietnam to violate it, which would enable the U.S. continuing 
bombing without Congressional cut-off. Hence, Nixon and Kissinger considered that the U.S. could 
return with air power in order to avoid being criticized for the “loss” o f  war. Larry Berman, No Peace, 
No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 2001).
Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
30 Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, pp.61-62; Henry A. Kissinger, Years o f  Upheavals (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1982), pp.344-355, and pp. 678-681; and Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975  
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000), p.221.
31 Kissinger to Ford, “Your Trip to the People’s Republic o f  China: A Scope Analysis,” November 20, 
1975, Box 380, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.
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The Soviet military threat
Winston Lord recalls that the opening to China “had a particularly strong short-term 
impact on the Soviet behavior.”32 Nixon’s presidential trip to Moscow from May 22 
to 29, 1972 symbolized detente -  an era of negotiation, resulting in the SALT I Treaty 
and the Agreement and Declaration on Basic Principles of U.S.-USSR relations.33 
During his trip to Beijing in June 1972, Kissinger gave long briefings to Zhou on 
Nixon’s recent talks with the Soviet leaders in Moscow. Kissinger particularly 
stressed that the U.S. was “not joining in any agreements” that might be directed 
against China and was “keeping them fully informed.”34 In his report to Nixon, 
Kissinger argued that the “existence of Soviet global ambitions” remained China’s 
“main preoccupation and principal motive” for moving ahead with the United
o c
States. Thus, Kissinger sought to “play the ominous Soviet themes” with the 
Chinese.36
Kissinger assessed that it was striking “how far” the Chinese had moved from an 
“adversary posture” to one that could be described as a “tacit ally.”37 Kissinger also 
interpreted that the Chinese were “trying to build walls around the Soviet Union” by 
opening to the U.S., encouraging a “united Europe as a counterweight” in the west, 
moving toward Japan in the east, and trying to “contain India” - a “tool o f Soviet
32 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
33 In June 1973, Brezhnev visited Washington D.C. for the second summit, bringing about an 
agreement calling for the Prevention o f  Nuclear War. For the development o f  US-USSR relations, see 
William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f  Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: 
Hill and Wang, A Division o f  Farrar, Straus and Gioux, 1998), pp.322-327.
34 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, p.20, p.27, June 20, 1972, 2:05-6:05p.m., CF-Far East, Box 97, 
HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
35 Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Trip to Peking, June 19-23, 1972,” June 27, 1972, p.2, p.8, CF-Far East, 
Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Following the M oscow summit o f  May 1972, Kissinger visited 
Beijing from June 19 to 23, 1972. Interestingly, however, Kissinger fails to refer to this trip in his 




encirclement” - by supporting an “independent Pakistan” in the south.38 Thus, 
Kissinger reminded Nixon that “only a strong United States” was of use to them, and 
that they would seek “the balance” which the U.S. would provide.39
In his report to Nixon after his trip to Beijing in February 1973, Kissinger evaluated 
the current nature of U.S.-PRC relations: “The Chinese leaders are among the very 
few in the world with a global and longer term perspective -  and it now parallels ours 
in many important respects.”40 In November 1973, Kissinger and Zhou completed a 
new communique, which extended the joint opposition to hegemony to anywhere in 
the world, beyond the Asia-Pacific region.41 As Kissinger reported to Nixon, the 
Chinese crucial calculation was “the steadiness and strength of America as a 
counterweight.”42 Nixon commented: “K -  the key.”43 From the mid-1970s, the 
promotion of the so-called ‘tacit alliance’ would become one o f the central issues in 
U.S. relations with China 44
The Chinese leaders, however, still remained suspicious of the possible collusion 
between the two superpowers against the PRC. In February 1973, Mao warned 
Kissinger that the whole o f the West intended “to push Russia eastward.”45 Mao and 
Zhou also criticized that the U.S. wanted “to reach out to the Soviets by standing on
38 Ibid., p.9, and p. 12; and Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, p.27, June 20, 1972, 2:05-6:05p.m., Country 
Files -  Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
39 Ibid.
40 Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, p.3, HAK China Trip -  February 1973 
Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Kissinger thus 
concluded: “For in plain terms, we have now become tacit allies.” Ibid., p.2, Underline in original.
41 Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Visit to China,” November 19, 1973, p .l, China-Sensitive WL File 
Misc&Reports N ov 1974, Box 374, PPS, STATE-RG 59, NA. See also Kissinger, Years o f  Upheaval, 
p.697.
42 Ibid., p.2, Underline by Nixon in original.
N ixon’s handwritten notations in Ibid.
44 Inverted commas added. On the development o f the U.S.-PRC military and intelligence cooperation 
in the middle o f  1970s, see Mann, About Face, pp.56-60; Jussi Hanhimaki, The F lawed Architect: 
Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and 
Michael P. Pillisbury, “US-Chinese Military Ties?” Foreign Policy, No. 20, Fall 1975.
45 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, HAK China Trip -  February 1973
Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
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Chinese shoulders.”46 By late 1973, the NSC staff saw an increasing sign that the 
Chinese leaders did not fully trust Kissinger, especially in terms of the issue of “who 
is using whom” against the Soviet Union, which was the “nature of the triangular 
dynamic.”47 In November 1973, Mao and Zhou “even intimidated Kissinger a bit.”48
During the November 1974 Vladivostok summit, Ford and Brezhnev reached an 
interim agreement on the overall numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, leading to 
grain sales, technology transfers, and the signing of the Final Act at the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in August 1975. However, the 
Soviet adventurism continued in Third World conflicts, such as in the Middle East 
and Africa. The development of Eurocommunism in Italy, France, Portugal, and 
elsewhere -  Communist parties in Western Europe’s search for a more independent 
path -  threatened to undermine the unity of the W est49 It appeared that detente did 
not create the expected effect of self-restraint of the Soviets’ external behavior.50
Equally important, the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger detente became the principal target of 
U.S. domestic criticisms. While the liberals criticized it for its inadequate attention to 
human rights, the conservatives attacked the Nixon-Ford administrations for being 
soft on the Soviet global threat, and the neo-conservatives stressed the importance of 
American traditional moral values underlining foreign policy.51 During Kissinger’s 
visit to Beijing in November 1974, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping criticized detente:
Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
48 Ibid.
49 See Bundy, A Tangled Web, pp.428-472; and Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.673-692.
50 The Soviet desk officers in the State Department often disagreed with Kissinger: “the errors he made 
were in areas with which he was not familiar. He was making assumptions about the Soviets, that they 
would let economic incentives influence their political actions.” William Dyess (Assistant 
Administrative Officer, Embassy M oscow, 1966-1968; Political Officer, Bureau o f  European Affairs, 
Department o f  State, 1970-1979), Oral History Interview, p.3, Russia, Country Collection, 1996, 
FAOHC.
51 On the U.S. domestic controversy on detente, see Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, pp.92-112; and 
Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.607-611.
338
“we don’t think there is any agreement that can bind the hands of Russia.”52 As 
Solomon reassesses, Deng felt that Kissinger was rather “manipulating intelligence 
information to make them more nervous about the Soviet Union than they felt.”53 
Kissinger himself believed that only the continuing sense of a common adversary 
could preserve “a strictly unsentimental relationship.”54 
On October 21, 1975, Mao criticized Kissinger: “We see that what you are doing is 
leaping to Moscow by way of our shoulders, and these shoulders are now useless.”55 
The Chinese thus would not “let itself be used” because detente was “in trouble.”56 
The NSC staff described this situation as “a cooling o f our relationship linked to the 
Chinese perception of the US as a fading power in the face of Soviet advance.”57 
Kissinger and his advisers became very doubtful of whether Washington was still 
“capable of playing the kind of major world role” which would provide “an effective
CO
counterweight” to Moscow’s attempt to encircle Beijing. U.S. officials estimated 
further that the Chinese would keep their relations with the U.S. at the “present level -  
alive enough to suit their geopolitical purposes” but not more than that.59 In the short 
term, therefore, as Kissinger reported to Ford before his presidential trip to China in 
December 1975, “appearances were everything” in the U.S. relations with China.60 In 
the long term, however, the U.S. remained China’s “only real option as a
52 Memcon, Kissinger and Deng, November 27, 1974, 9:45-11:32a.m., Secretary Kissinger’s Talks in 
China, N ov 25-29 1974, Box 372, PPS-Lord, LORD PRC NOV 1974, STATE-RG 59, NA.
53 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
54 Scowcroft to Ford, November 29, 1974, Secretary Kissinger’s Talks in China N ov 25-29 1974, Box  
372, PPS-Lord, LORD PRC NOV 1974, STATE-RG 59, NA. See also Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, 
p. 138.
55 “Analysis/Highlights o f  Secretary Kissinger’s Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975,”
October 25, 1975, pp.2-3, Underline in original, Attached to Kissinger to Ford, “Possible Approaches 
to Your China Trip,” October 24, 1975, Sec. Kissinger’s Trip to China Oct 1975, Box 374, PPS-Lord, 
STATE-RG 59, NA.
57  I b i d ‘Ibid., p .l. Underline in original.
58 Kissinger to Ford, “Your Trip to the People’s Republic o f  China: A Scope Analysis,” November 20, 
1975, CHINA NOTES, Box 380, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.
59 Ibid; and Kissinger Ford, “Possible Approaches to Your China Trip,” October 24, 1975, China 
Sensitive Chron Oct-Dec 1975, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.
60 Ibid.
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counterweight” to the growing “Soviet menace.”61 Thus, despite the collapse of the 
Nixon presidency and the decline of detente, the strategic triangle between the U.S. 
the Soviets, and China continued to remain as a fundamental element in the 
international situation during the 1970s and the 1980s.
Japan’s future role
The U.S. rapprochement with China paved the way for the restoration of Sino- 
Japanese relations. It appeared that Japan was prepared to abandon Taiwan for 
normalization with China. From the U.S. point o f view, however, it raised the 
problem of Zhou’s three principles for Sino-Japanese normalization: “recognition of 
the PRC as the sole legal government of China”; “recognition of Taiwan as an integral 
part of China”; and “abrogation of the Japan-ROC peace treaty of 1952.”62 The NSC 
staff was concerned that Japan’s “unqualified” acceptance of these three principles 
would be that: 1) the international status of the ROC would be “seriously undercut”;
2) the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty would become “more difficult to justify”; and
3) from the Japanese standpoint, the U.S. bases within Japan could no longer be used 
to defend Taiwan against a PRC effort to “liberate” it.63
The U.S. vital interest was that Tokyo’s moves toward Beijing would “not inhibit” 
the U.S. use o f its bases within Japan in fulfilment o f its “defense commitments to
61 Kissinger to Ford, “Possible Approaches to Your China Trip,” November 24, 1975, Sec. Kissinger’s 
Trip to China Oct 1975, Box 374, PPS, STATE-RG 59, NA.
62 Holdridge to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Tanaka and Ohira,” August 10, 1972, China Policy, p .l,  
Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug -  1 September (1972), Box 926, VIP Visits, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Ibid. Underline in original.
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Taiwan and South Korea.”64 Kissinger and his NSC staff were concerned that the 
Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s new cabinet might “haste” to normalize 
Tokyo’s relations with Beijing, which would give its recognition of the settlement of 
the Taiwan issue as China’s internal problem.65 Thus, Kissinger recommended to 
Nixon to “encourage Japan to preserve its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan.”66
On August 31, 1972, during a two-day summit at Hawaii, Nixon emphasized to 
Tanaka the “overriding importance” that the U.S. and Japan “not get into a conflict 
over China policy.” Nixon cautioned that while the two sides “need not have 
identical positions,” “neither should we allow antagonism to develop between us.”68 
Finally, Nixon cautioned again that Tokyo’s normalization with Beijing “should not 
be done at the expense o f Japan’s friends,” particularly implying the Republic of 
China.69
On September 29, Premier Zhou and Prime Minister Tanaka finally achieved Sino- 
Japanese rapprochement ending the state of war situation and resuming diplomatic 
relations between the two old Asian rivals.70 Japan closed down its embassy in
64 Kissinger, to N ixon “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in Honolulu on August 31 
and September 1,” August 29, 1972, p .l and p.4. Underline by Nixon in original, Tanaka Visit 
(Hawaii) 31 Aug -  1 September (1972), Box 926, VIP Visits, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The NSC staff 
referred to the Nixon-Sato communique o f  November 1969 which stated that the defense o f  Taiwan as 
a “most important factor” for Japan’s security. Ibid. See Chapter 6, Section 2.3 o f  this study. State 
Department officials also recommended that the effective area o f  U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to 
“maintain peace and stability” in East Asia “must continue to encompass Taiwan.” Rogers to Nixon, 
“Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira,” August 18, 1972, 
Issues and Talking Points, p.5, Briefing Paper, Department o f  State, Box 926, VIP Visit, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA.
Ibid., p.2. Underline by Nixon in original.
66 Ibid., p. 1. Underline by Nixon in original.
67 Memcon, N ixon and Tanaka, August 31, 1972, 1:00p.m., p.9, Box 926, VIP Visit, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA. The State Department’s memorandum for the President recommended that the President stress that 
the U.S. did not regard itself “in a race or competition” with Japan to improve its relations with China. 
Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira,” 
August 18, 1972, Issues and Talking Points, p.3, Briefing Paper, Department o f  State, Box 926, VIP 
Visit, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
68 Ibid.
™ Ibid., p. 12.
70 See Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present (New  
York: Addison W esley Publishers, 1997), pp.165-166; and James Babb, Tanaka: The Making o f  
Postwar Japan (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pp.77-78.
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Taiwan while maintaining a non-governmental office for trade and cultural
71 • •  • rrelations. In the joint communique, Beijing and Tokyo declared their opposition to 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The combination of Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement and Sino-American rapprochement thus brought Japan into broader 
triangular relations with the United States and China in order to contain Soviet 
expansionism.72 Consequently, in Kissinger’s interpretation, the Chinese came to 
regard the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a “brake on Japanese expansionism and 
militarism.”73 Equally, the Chinese leaders viewed Japan as an “incipient ally” “to 
counter Soviet and Indian designs.”74 The Washington-Beijing-Tokyo strategic 
triangle against Moscow became one of the major features of the Cold War in Asia 
during the 1970s and the 1980s.
The Taiwan issue
The February 1972 summit enhanced a more regular and direct communication 
between Washington and Beijing. As Solomon explains, the rapprochement with 
China meant “initiating and broadening a political dialogue” that would ultimately 
lead to the U.S. diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China.75
71 The so-called ‘Japan formula’ thus set a restrictive framework for the U.S. in normalizing with 
China.
72 However, Japan was still reluctant to make a substantial military-security role in East Asian 
geopolitical term. On the inter-relationship between Sino-Japanese rapprochement and Sino-American 
rapprochement, see, for example, Michael Schaller, ‘Detente and the Strategic Triangle: Or “Drinking 
Your Mao Tai and having Your Vodka, Too,’” in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.), Re­
examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2001); Sadako Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study o f  U.S. and  
Japanese Process (Berkeley: Institute o f  East Asian Studies, University o f  California, 1988).
73 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, p .l, HAK China Trip -  February 1973
Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
755 Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, pp.55-56, FAOHC.
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In February 1973, Kissinger and Zhou agreed to establish liaison offices in 
Washington and Beijing, which Kissinger saw as “embassies in everything but 
name.”76 Importantly, Kissinger offered an explicit timetable for normalization: in the 
first two years o f Nixon’s second term, the U.S. would remove all the remaining 
armed forces from Taiwan; and in the second two years, it would complete full 
diplomatic normalization with China. Normalization would be achieved along the 
same line as Sino-Japanese normalization, namely the so-called ‘Japan formula’ - 
terminating formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and preserving only an unofficial 
tie with the Taipei government. Finally, the U.S. would “abolish its defense treaty” 
with the Republic o f China.77
In reality, however, the Chinese opening of the Liaison Office in Washington in 
May and the American opening of the Liaison Office in Beijing in July 1973 marked 
the last major official developments in the U.S. relations with China during the 
middle o f the 1970s. Thereafter, Nixon and Kissinger came to further realize the 
seriousness and complexity of China’s persistence on the Taiwan issue, which was 
greater than they had estimated before the February 1972 summit. The Chinese 
leaders were in no rush to resolve the Taiwan issue. In November 1973, Mao 
indicated to Kissinger that: “we can do without Taiwan for the time being, and let it 
come after one hundred years.”78 Kissinger estimated that the U.S. normalization of 
relations with China could be achieved “only on the basis of confirming the principle 
of one China,” to which Nixon commented: “K very significant.”79 By mid-1974,
76 Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, HAK China Trip -  February 1973 
Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
77 “Peking’s Current Posture Towards Normalization,” pp.5-6, Attached to Memo from Habib, Lord 
and Solomon to Kissinger, “Partial Steps Toward Normalization o f  US/PRC Relations,” August 4, 
1975, Box 332, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG59, NA.
78 Memcon, Mao and Kissinger, November 12, 1973, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, 
Box 100, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Kissinger to Nixon, “M y Visit to China,” November 19, 1973, p.4, N ixon’s handwritten notations in 
original, China-Sensitive WL File Misc&Reports Nov 1974, Box 374, PPS, STATE-RG 59, NA.
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however, the NSC staff estimated that “[o]ur China policy is drifting without a clear 
sense of how we will move toward normalization, or indeed what the shape of a future 
normalized relationship with the PRC will look like,” particularly regarding Taiwan.80 
“We are in danger of losing a sense of momentum in our dealing with Peking.”81 
After Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, the Chinese leaders “did bully and put a 
lot of pressure on Kissinger” because they wanted him to “get President Ford to fulfil 
Nixon’s commitment to normalize relations” with them and to “make them to break 
relations with Taiwan” before the end of the Ford presidency.82 However, the Chinese 
did not run risk of seriously damaging the newly established direct communication 
with the United States. The Chinese were “patient” on Taiwan and “confident o f its 
ultimate resolution.” In October 1975, Mao downplayed the Taiwan issue: “The 
small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world.” Taiwan was “unwantable.” “It is 
better for the U.S. to maintain control over Taiwan for the time being” because it was 
“filled with counter-revolutionaries,” and also in order to prevent an independence 
movement or the influence from the Soviet Union. Lord recalls that the October 
1975 trip was very “unpromising. ...W hen we got back, we were so annoyed.”85 “A 
lot of momentum” from the Nixon trip in February 1972 was “declining” by the Ford 
trip in December 1975.86 Therefore, as State Department officials estimated, it 
appeared that the Chinese “want to put us under psychological pressure by
80 Hummel, Lord, and Solomon, to Kissinger, “Imperatives for Planning and Action on the China 
Issue,” May 24, 1974, p .l, China Exchanges Apr 1 - Aug 8 1974, Box 331, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, 
NA.
81 Ibid.
82 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
83 Ibid.
84 Kissinger to Ford, “Your Meeting with Chairman Mao,” November 28, 1975, p.6, Pres. Ford’s Visit 
to Peking-International Issues Dec 1-5 1975 (1 o f  2), Box 372, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA; 
“Analysis/Highlights o f  Secretary Kissinger’s Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975,” 
October 25, 1975, p.6, Sec. Kissinger’s Trip to China Oct 1975, Box 374, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, 
NA.
85 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
86 Ibid.
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manoeuvring us into a position where we want the relationship with them more than
o7
they with us.” Overall, Kissinger believed that although the pro-Nationalist Taiwan 
lobby became a “vocal minority” rather than a majority, the U.S. still needed a 
transitional period to persuade its public.88 In reality, however, without a strong 
presidential authority, it was “impossible” for Kissinger, even with his great 
diplomatic skills, to proceed in full diplomatic normalization with China before the 
1976 presidential election.89
After the death of Chinese key leaders, Premier Zhou and Chairman Mao, and the 
arrest of the radical leaders, namely the so-called “Gang of Four” in 1976, the 
moderate leaders named Hua Guofeng as Party Chairman, and sought to determine 
the timing o f Deng Xiaoping’s return to power.90 In the November 1976 presidential 
election, Ford was defeated by Democrat candidate Jimmy Carter. Hence, the 
completion of full normalization had to wait until January 1979 when it was 
undertaken by President Carter and Vice Premier Deng.91
87 The State Department, Briefing Paper, “Normalization,” Nov. 1975, Pres. Ford’s Visit to Peking- 
Bilateral Issues Dec 1-5 1975, Box 372, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.
88 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, June 22, 1972, ll:03p.m .-12:55a.m ., p.20, CF-Far East, Box 97, 
HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
89 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Memcon, Kissinger and the NSC staff, July 6, 
1975, p .l, Box 331, Box 330, PPS, STATE-RG59, NA.
90 The Gang o f  Four consisted o f  Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao. 
On the final stage o f  political situation in M ao’s China, see, for example, Philipe Short, Mao: A Life 
(New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1999), chapter 16 and epilogue; Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), chapter 22 and epilogue.
91 On U.S. full normalization with the PRC, see Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.229-285; Mann, About Face, 
chapter 4; and Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, chapters 5.
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Conclusion
This thesis has focused on the advantages and disadvantages of the pursuit o f strict 
secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger as a key feature in the foreign policy decision-making 
leading to the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. Within that 
fundamental framework, it has examined three major elements of the U.S. 
rapprochement with China:
• Conception -  The presidential leadership, and the revitalization o f the NSC 
system as the principal foreign policy decision-making machinery;
• Implementation -  The evolution of policy option studies, and the public and 
private signal exchange from January 1969 to June 1971; and
• Direct Talks -  Major issues in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 
1971 and Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972.
Conception
This study has analyzed the similarities and differences between Nixon and 
Kissinger regarding the development of their respective views on China. The origins 
of Nixon’s personal interest in China could be traced back to the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s. While maintaining the political stance of an anti-Communist cold warrior 
in public, Nixon privately took great interest in the development o f domestic and 
international atmospheres surrounding Communist China. By the late 1950s, he came 
to believe that the PRC was there to stay, rather than being a passing phenomenon, 
and realized the advantage of trade as a possible means of promoting an initial 
dialogue with China and widening the split between Moscow and Beijing. However,
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he remained cautious, principally because of the danger of conservative backlash from 
the pro-Chinese Nationalists in Congress.
During the 1960s, crucial changes gradually took place in the American view of 
China. First, academic experts took a lead in the debate on the China policy in 
American domestic politics. There was a long-term development of an “underlining 
willingness” to have better relations with China, which was “less strategic than 
idealistic.”1 The academic contribution to the development of what became solid 
public support for a new China initiative in the long term was much more important 
than was previously thought.
At the same time, the State Department’s middle ranking officials were examining a 
number o f possible policy options, such as the easing of trade and travel restrictions, 
as a means of developing a new dialogue with China. The Warsaw Ambassadorial 
Talks played a crucial role as a channel of communication between Washington and 
Beijing which helped to prevent any miscalculation of the respective intentions during 
the Vietnam War. Therefore, there was already some “fundamental consideration” on 
the China policy by the bureaucracy and also by academic experts in America.2
As a private citizen, Nixon became more aware of changes in China threat in terms 
of the decreasing danger of its entry into the Vietnam War. During foreign trips to 
Europe and Asia, Nixon reassessed China’s geopolitical importance. He concluded 
that China as a central reality with its influence prevailing in Asia could no longer be 
excluded in the international scene. Thus, Nixon as a political pragmatist came to 
realize the utility o f China for the restoration of the U.S. strategic centrality in the 
post-Vietnam world. In his Foreign Affairs article of October 1967, Nixon advocated 
that China should be pulled back into the community of nations, implying that its
1 Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 14, 2003.
David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003.
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external behavior should be modified in the long term. Nixon believed that a new 
China initiative should be taken to make China’s re-emergence safe for the restoration 
of stability in Asia. Simultaneously, however, he was still concerned about the 
remaining danger o f conservative backlash, and thus carefully avoided providing 
open-ended support for the idea of a new China initiative.
As this study emphasized, Kissinger was much more sceptical and even slow to 
comprehend the necessity and possibility of the rapprochement with China than was 
previously estimated. The development of Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to 
September 1969 certainly provided a crucial opportunity for Kissinger to assess the 
necessity o f a new China policy. Even in its weakened state, China was “imposing 
some form of constraint” on the Soviet Union, tying down a large number o f Soviet 
forces along the Sino-Soviet borders.3 Thus, Kissinger came to view the China policy 
as a part of the broader U.S. Soviet policy. However, Kissinger remained uncertain 
about the possibility of a new initiative toward Beijing until late 1969. He was 
pessimistic about the danger of a Soviet military attack on China. Despite his 
underestimation of the bureaucratic contribution to the U.S. China policy, it was the 
resumption of Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 that 
finally convinced him that the Chinese were seriously interested in a new dialogue 
with the United States. Details of unilateral public steps toward Beijing did not really 
interest Kissinger, and what was much more important for him was to “go there 
[Beijing] and to lay out the big picture of what the U.S.-China relations could be.”4 
Kissinger enhanced his negotiation skills and emerged as a great diplomat only as a 
result o f his substantial talks with Premier Zhou in July and October 1971.
3 Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
4 Ibid.
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In essence, Nixon’s presidential authority for the political credibility of a new 
China initiative was even more important than was previously assessed. With his 
strong willingness for bold action, Nixon articulated the U.S. rapprochement policy, 
viewing an isolated China as a great threat to peace and stability in Asia and the 
world. He sought to seize the political opportunity to demonstrate a dramatic opening 
aimed at the easing of great tensions in the world, especially the ending of the 
Vietnam War and the promotion of arms control talks with the Soviet Union. In 
contrast, Kissinger’s role in the early period of the opening to China in 1969 and 1970 
was less important than was previously pointed out. As the chief theorist within the 
Nixon administration, Kissinger examined the structural aspects of the international 
system in terms of the restoration of its stability. He developed a strategic perspective 
to formulate a triangular balance of power relationship between the United States, 
China, and the Soviet Union; the U.S. exploited the escalation of Sino-Soviet mutual 
hostility and played the central role of pivot between the two communist giants. 
Komine’s interviews with former U.S. officials and senior academic experts have re­
confirmed that it was Nixon’s presidential leadership that drove the new China 
initiative, and Kissinger was more of a skilful operator and negotiator.
Regarding the materialization of their conception for a new China initiative, Nixon 
and Kissinger still relied on the foreign policy decision-making machinery in order to 
obtain expert advice from the bureaucracy. The revitalization of the NSC system by 
Nixon and Kissinger was a ‘diplomatic coup.’ The exclusion of the State Department 
from the direct decision-making process was much more systematic than has 
previously been thought. The revitalized NSC system was planned to conduct a 
systematic policy study by obtaining a wide range of policy alternatives from
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departments and agencies without necessarily informing them of the real objectives of 
the White House. As former NSC staff member Peter Rodman recalls, Nixon and 
Kissinger used the interagency process for policy studies “to get what they thought 
was the best of the wisdom of the bureaucracy.”5 Owing to this excessive secrecy, 
however, they did not make sufficient use o f the expert advice that was available in 
the State Department. Instead, they relied on policy analysis papers filtered through 
the perceptions of Kissinger and of his selected NSC staff members.6 Ironically, 
however, even State Department officials considered that some secrecy was needed to 
protect the evolution of a new China initiative from the conservative backlash. Thus, 
Nixon and Kissinger still could have consulted a limited number of senior officials in 
the State Department in a highly confidential way in order to make use of their 
expertise more effectively.7
President Nixon took the lead in the new China initiative by sending very 
confidential memoranda to Kissinger, such as the broad review o f U.S. China policy 
on February 5, 1969, and the promotion of lifting of trade and travel restrictions and 
the reassessment of the Chinese UN representation issue on November 22, 1970. 
Nixon had only a handful of senior officials in his inner circle, such as Kissinger, 
Haig, and Haldeman. In Nixon’s confidential meetings with foreign leaders, such as 
De Gaulle, Yahya, and Ceausescu during 1969, even Kissinger was not present.
5 Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 13, Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Collection (FAOHC), Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.
According to Kom ine’s interviews and oral history collections in this study, there are three types o f  
recollection from former U.S. officials: 1) a highly critical view o f  Kissinger’s (and o f  N ixon’s to a 
lesser extent) excessive secrecy and exclusion o f  State Department, such as those from the former 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, and a former NSC staff 
member, Morton Halperin; 2) a relatively neutral, but still critical view o f  the Nixon-Kissinger 
leadership o f  a China initiative, such as those from former NSC staff members John Holdridge and 
Richard Solomon, and former State Department official Paul Kreisberg; and 3) a supportive and even 
defensive view  o f  Kissinger, such as former NSC staff members Winston Lord and Peter Rodman.
Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
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Nixon used these meetings to test his views on U.S. China policy. Kissinger thus 
became much more eager to ensure that he would be included in every important 
meeting between the President and foreign leaders; and his attempt to exclude 
Secretary of State William Rogers increased. Paradoxically, however, Nixon was 
personally reluctant to have a face-to-face meeting with the heads of departments and 
agencies. Thus, the communication between the Oval Office and the rest of the 
administration was conducted principally through memoranda, which escalated 
further secrecy by the White House.
As the National Security Adviser, Kissinger recruited his NSC staff from a variety 
of background, such as the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, and 
the academia in order to develop diversity and flexibility in policy studies. Regarding 
the China policy, Kissinger pursued highly personalized secrecy by using strictly 
restricted NSC staff members, such as Alexander Haig Jr., John Holdridge, Winston 
Lord, Peter Rodman, and Richard Solomon. The NSC staff provided expertise and 
developed policy options for a new China initiative, taking short, medium, and long 
term perspectives. Simultaneously, however, as Solomon recalls, Kissinger was “very 
jealous of who got credit, and of the visibility that resulted from all facets of the 
China issue.”8
While the NSC staff functioned as the “mini” and “operational State Department,” 
the State Department itself continued to “manage most o f the routine things.”9 
Importantly, despite the pursuit o f strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger, State 
Department officials and NSC staff members had informal and private exchanges 
with each other on the background information of policy studies. In particular, on the 
basis of past efforts in the earlier administrations, the State Department’s Bureau of
8 Richard Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p.28, FAOHC.
Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
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East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared a 
number o f basic materials for policy studies on possible steps towards China. The 
State Department’s principal interest was the Taiwan issue, such as the language of 
the ‘One China’ principle, the renouncement of the use of force between Beijing and 
Taipei, and the Chinese representation issue in the UN. Former Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green confirms that: “The focus was so much 
on Taiwan. China almost meant Taiwan in those days.”10
The NSC sub-committees provided very important occasions on which to examine a 
wide range o f policy options to promote a new China initiative. At Review Group 
meetings (1969-1970) and Senior Review Group meetings (1971) on NSSM studies 
(such as NSSM 14: Initial review of U.S. China Policy, NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet 
differences, and NSSMs 106 and 107: the Chinese representation issue in UN), 
Kissinger encouraged broader discussions for a new China initiative without 
necessarily revealing his true views. China experts in the State Department urged a 
friendly dialogue with China in order to encourage its participation in the world 
community and promote a stable environment in Asia. These experts still thought that 
Taiwan was a crucial issue that would prevent the U.S. from having a contact with 
Beijing without giving up its formal diplomatic relations Taipei. On the contrary, 
Soviet experts opposed any quick move toward China which might provoke Moscow 
because o f its sensitivity to the danger o f the Washington-Beijing collusion. In reality, 
however, as a result o f the opening to China, the U.S. became a balancer in Sino- 
Soviet mutual hostility. Thus, the regional experts who were “too close to a subject” 
misjudged possible policy alternatives in a broader strategic context.11
10 John Holdridge and Marshall Green, Oral History Interview in A China Reader , Volume II, p.9, 
January 1995, FAOHC.
Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
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Implementation
From January 1969 to June 1971, selectively adopting the recommendations from 
the interdepartmental policy studies, Nixon and Kissinger sent a series of unilateral 
public signals toward Beijing, such as lifting trade and travel restrictions. Nixon used 
press conferences, media interviews, and speeches to clarify his personal interest in 
promoting a new dialogue with the Chinese leaders. Kissinger and his NSC staff 
drafted the President’s annual Foreign Policy Reports to Congress in order to promote 
a positive political atmosphere and to encourage China’s participation in the 
community of nations. Importantly, sending these unilateral public signals did “not 
require Chinese reaction.”12 
Simultaneously, owing to their distrust of the State Department, Nixon and 
Kissinger developed a very closely guarded communication with the Chinese through 
the backchannels, such as Pakistan, Romania, and France. These channels were based 
on Nixon’s long-term personal connections with foreign leaders. Nixon and Kissinger
privately conveyed to the Chinese leaders that: “We’re the ones you should talk to,
1 ^and don’t pay much attention to these others.” In every confidential message until 
June 1971, they stressed that the U.S. was “serious about moving toward them.”14 In 
reality, however, owing to excessive secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger occasionally 
missed subtle signals from the Chinese and also developed difficulty in 
comprehending complex regional problems, especially the Taiwan issue and the 
India-Pakistan rivalry.
In military-security terms, while the Chinese insisted on the U.S. total withdrawal
from Asia, the Nixon administration sought to justify the continuing U.S. presence in
12 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
13 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p. 15, FAOHC.
14 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
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the world. In the short term, realizing China’s physical weakness, Nixon and 
Kissinger sought to exploit the deepening Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. While seeking 
a new dialogue with China, the Nixon administration also sought to promote detente -  
the global relaxation of tensions through arms control talks with the Soviet Union. 
Equally important, it was the reduction of China’s direct threat in Southeast Asia that 
enabled the U.S. retrenchment of military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
Nixon Doctrine o f July 1969 thus demanded much more burden sharing among allies 
in order to promote military withdrawal from the Vietnam War. In the long term, it 
was China’s potential strength, especially its geopolitical importance in East Asia 
with nuclear capability, that persuaded Nixon and Kissinger to seek new diplomatic 
relations with her. In other words, it was too dangerous to leave a nuclear-armed 
China outside o f state interactions.
During the early period of the opening in 1969 and 1970, because of the pursuit of 
strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger, a highly complex bureaucratic rivalry emerged 
between the White House and the State Department. While the White House focused 
on promoting U.S. relations with its adversaries, namely China and the Soviet Union, 
State Department officials were more concerned with maintaining regular U.S. 
diplomatic relations with its allies, such as the Republic of China and Japan. In 
contrast to Kissinger’s underestimation in his memoirs, the resumption of the Warsaw 
Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 was very crucial -  it was the first 
major breakthrough during the U.S. opening to China. As this study demonstrated, 
from December 1969 to May 1970, the White House and the State Department were 
respectively testing how far the Chinese were prepared to move forward in a new 
dialogue with the United States. The bureaucratic preparations for the Warsaw talks
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revealed the growing difference between the White House and the State Department 
regarding the timing, agenda, and channel of direct communication with the Chinese. 
The State Department took an initial lead by preparing detailed instructions to 
Ambassador Stoessel in Warsaw. Importantly, it was State Department officials, such 
as the Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Paul Kreisberg and a China 
expert Alfred Jenkins, who originally prepared the draft language on Taiwan. In the 
February 1970 Warsaw talks, Ambassador Stoessel made clear the U.S. intention to 
withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan in accordance with the development of the 
Vietnam settlement. Nixon and Kissinger adopted the same expression in their direct 
talks with the Chinese leaders in July and October 1971, and in February 1972.
After the January and February 1970 talks, however, the White House became 
increasingly irritated by the time-consuming nature of the bureaucratic preparations 
for the Warsaw meetings. As for the materialization of sending a special envoy to 
Beijing, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs remained 
cautious, still seeking to hold one additional Warsaw talk in order to obtain more 
practical and substantial concessions on the Taiwan issue, especially the agreement on 
the renunciation o f the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. Equally important, owing to 
the State Department’s briefing to U.S. allies on the Warsaw talks, Nixon and 
Kissinger became much more sensitive to the danger o f leaks. Thus, Nixon and 
Kissinger wanted to move faster by sending a special envoy to Beijing to hold a direct 
and secret meeting with the Chinese leaders. From late 1970, seeking to materialize 
the opening to China before the presidential election of 1972, Nixon and Kissinger 
thus decided to exclude the bureaucratic involvement and relied on the Pakistan and 
Romanian backchannels to communicate with the Chinese.
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Direct Talks
The bureaucratic preparations for the presidential meetings with the Chinese leaders 
were much more systematic and substantial than previously estimated. The State 
Department prepared and sent over the ‘Books’ to the NSC in advance. The NSC staff 
also wrote their own ‘Books,’ which had more confidential information on the 
backchannel communications as well as Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and 
October 1971. Thus, as Solomon recalls, “we had a double track system.”15 These 
briefing books included the President’s talking points, the anticipated Chinese 
positions as well as background information about the Chinese leaders’ biographical 
sketches, Chinese history, philosophy, and culture. Nixon reviewed the briefing books 
as well as Kissinger’s confidential memoranda carefully and took extensive notes 
(including comments, questions, and new directives), which reflected the 
development o f his own thoughts on major security issues. Nixon and Kissinger also 
came to realize the importance of briefings. In his meetings with Cabinet members 
and Congressional leaders in July 1971 and February 1972, Nixon illustrated the 
essence o f his China initiative, namely the importance of pulling China back into the 
international community before it became too powerful for the U.S. to manage.
Regarding the great powers encircling China, Nixon and Kissinger assessed that the 
Chinese feared the Soviets as the most urgent threat, disdained an India backed by the 
Soviets, and suspected Japan as being a long-term potential threat. Nixon and 
Kissinger concluded that Beijing would view new relations with Washington as the 
beginning o f a long process for its re-emergence in the international scene. Thus, 
Nixon and Kissinger sought to convince the Chinese leaders of the advantage of the
15 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2004.
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U.S.’s continuous presence in the Asia-Pacific region in order to prevent the 
emergence o f any expansive states. In February 1972, Mao and Nixon agreed that 
there was no direct threat between the U.S. and China. In particular, there were five 
major issues between the two sides during the July and October 1971 talks and the 
February 1972 talks, such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, South Asia, and the Soviet 
Union.
The Taiwan issue was the most sensitive and difficult obstacle between the U.S. and 
China. There was long-term disagreement between China’s insistence on the use of 
force to resolve the Taiwan question as its internal affairs and the U.S. persistence on 
a peaceful resolution between Beijing and Taipei. As a historic remainder o f the 
Chinese civil war, the Chinese leaders kept insisting that the Sino-U.S. diplomatic 
communication could progress only after the Taiwan question was substantially 
discussed. On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger tended to perceive Taiwan through 
the lens o f U.S. domestic politics, namely the remaining danger of the conservative 
backlash from pro-Taiwan conservatives in Congress rather than through the lens of 
the Nationalist-Communist Chinese civil war. The handling of the Taiwan issue for 
the Nixon administration was also related to the question of U.S. reliability to its allies 
in the world. Owing to the excessive secrecy by the White House, however, 
Washington’s rapid move towards Beijing significantly shocked Taipei. In October 
1971, Washington failed to preserve Taipei’s membership in the United Nations.
In the February 1972 summit, Nixon gave a crucial assurance to Zhou, admitting to 
the ‘One China’ principle and pledging a future commitment to withdraw the U.S. 
armed forces from the islands and to achieve normalization with the People’s 
Republic. Moreover, Nixon gave an assurance that the remaining U.S. armed forces in
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Taiwan would discourage the Chinese Nationalists from taking any independent 
movement, especially launching a military action against the mainland. Importantly, 
by adopting the State Department’s draft, Nixon and Kissinger sought to link the 
Taiwan issue with the Vietnam settlement. The joint communique thus stated that the 
U.S. withdrawal of its armed forces from Taiwan would be conducted as the tensions 
in the area diminished, which principally implied the ending of the U.S. military 
operation in Indochina. Nixon and Kissinger attempted to defer the Taiwan issue in 
order to concentrate on the U.S.-Soviet-China triangular relations.
In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still underestimated the complexity o f the 
Taiwan issue, especially the importance of the Chinese long-term persistence on its 
sovereignty on Taiwan. In February 1972, because of Kissinger’s willingness to 
obtain credit for an historic document, the drafting of the joint communique caused a 
serious flaw, namely the failure to refer to the U.S. defense commitment to the 
Republic of China. Nixon and Kissinger also failed to obtain Chinese agreement on 
the renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. Overall, by excluding the 
State Department’s expertise and by rushing to the rapprochement to meet the 1972 
presidential election, Nixon and Kissinger made the handling of the Taiwan issue 
more difficult. The opening of the Liaison Offices in the respective capitals in 1973 
was the only official development in the normalization process during the mid 1970s. 
The Chinese demanded three vital conditions for a full diplomatic normalization, 
namely: 1) the U.S.’s formal recognition of Beijing as the sole government o f China 
and the end o f official Washington-Taipei diplomatic relations; 2) the U.S. military 
withdrawal from Taiwan; and 3) the termination of the U.S.-Republic o f China 
Security Treaty. After the fall o f the Nixon presidency as a result o f the Watergate 
scandal and the damaging o f the U.S. reliability to its allies as a result o f the collapse
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of Indochina policy, the fulfilment of the official normalization became impossible 
during the mid 1970s.
The conflicts in Indochina were the most urgent problem for the U.S. in its new 
dialogue with China. Nixon and Kissinger sought to reduce tensions in Indochina by 
promoting the U.S.’s withdrawal and by inducing China’s cooperative attitude 
towards a negotiated settlement between Washington and Hanoi. Nixon and Kissinger 
also sought to develop a common ground with the Chinese leaders in order to prevent 
the emergence o f North Vietnam’s regional hegemonic aspirations in Indochina 
backed by the Soviet Union. For the State Department, the Vietnam factor existed 
principally in terms of the danger of China’s entry into the Vietnam War. Thus, State 
Department officials continued to use the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks to reassure 
the Chinese that the U.S. had no intention to expand the Vietnam War. Importantly, 
both the White House and the State Department shared the view that China was not as 
dangerous as it was previously estimated.
The Chinese leaders, however, were not necessarily willing to cooperate with the 
U.S. in a search for a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War. Moreover, China’s 
influence over North Vietnam was more limited than it was previously estimated 
among U.S. officials. Both the White House and the State Department underestimated 
the degree o f Hanoi’s independence from Beijing and Moscow. Moreover, the linkage 
between the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan and the U.S. negotiated settlement with 
North Vietnam allowed the Chinese to pressure the U.S. for the delay o f its 
withdrawal from Indochina as well as from Taiwan. Overall, Nixon and Kissinger 
were unsuccessful in obtaining Chinese active assistance in Indochina.
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Regarding the future of Japan, State Department officials were principally 
concerned about Japan’s anxiety over the U.S. move toward China. The State 
Department thus sought to reassure Tokyo by briefing Japanese leaders on the 
Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks. On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger focused on the 
possibility o f a more independent Japanese defense policy. In direct talks, Nixon and 
Kissinger over-exaggerated the danger of the revival of Japan’s military expansionism 
in order to exploit China’s long-term anxiety. Nixon and Kissinger sought to convince 
the Chinese leaders that Japan’s independent defense policy should be contained by 
the preservation o f the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger 
gave assurance to the Chinese leaders that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would play 
multiple roles to prevent Japan from expanding its influence over Taiwan, Korea, and 
Indochina. In return, Nixon and Kissinger acquired the Chinese leaders’ tacit 
acknowledgement of U.S. military bases in Asia. Thus, the U.S. rapprochement with 
China led to Sino-Japanese rapprochement and the formulation o f the U.S.-China- 
Japan strategic triangle against the Soviet Union.
In the long term, however, the combination of the Nixon Doctrine’s pressure on 
Japan for further burden sharing in military and economic terms and the rapid 
development o f the U.S. opening to China brought about a functional fragmentation in 
U.S. relations with Japan. The U.S. single-handed initiative toward China led to 
Japan’s more independent economic policy and its diplomatic initiative to normalize 
with China. Nixon and Kissinger calculated that the emergence o f diversity between 
Washington and Tokyo could be contained under its restored credibility in world 
politics. However, a fragmentation within U.S.-Japan relations continued to remain as 
a potential source of uncertainty for the regional security in East Asia, creating an 
imbalance in the U.S. relations with China and Japan respectively in the long term.
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It was the India-Pakistan rivalry over which the perception gap between the White 
House and the State Department became most widened in 1971. Without substantially 
knowing of Pakistan’s role as a crucial intermediary between the White House and 
Beijing from late 1970, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs considered that Pakistan had principally increased tensions and caused 
the war with India. In contrast, Nixon and Kissinger believed that they had to prove 
their reliability in the eyes of the Chinese leaders by supporting China’s friend, 
Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger also sought to exploit Chinese anxiety by exaggerating 
the danger of the emergence of India’s Soviet-backed regional hegemony. In reality, 
however, the Chinese leaders showed little interest in any active involvement in the 
India-Pakistan conflicts o f December 1971. Overall, it was the pursuit o f excessive 
secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger that over-simplified and even distorted the 
complexity of India-Pakistan regional rivalry. After the February 1972 summit, the 
India-Pakistan rivalry decreased in its urgent importance as a major security issue 
between the U.S. and China.
Regarding the deepening Sino-Soviet hostilities, Nixon and Kissinger attempted to 
induce China’s tacit cooperation against the growing Soviet military threat. In 
essence, Nixon and Kissinger were fully aware that the U.S.’s position toward the 
Soviet Union and to China was closer than they were with each other. Nixon and 
Kissinger thus sought to improve U.S. diplomatic flexibility by pursuing an even- 
handed approach toward the two states. For the State Department, however, the Soviet 
factor was not enough to promote a new dialogue with the Chinese; the Soviet factor 
existed as one of the major issues rather than the principal dominant issue. The State
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Department thus underestimated the geopolitical dynamism in the short term, 
especially the U.S. leverage in the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the impact of the U.S. 
opening to China on the Soviets as a patron of North Vietnam.
Nixon and Kissinger tended to view the China policy in global terms rather than 
regional terms. They concentrated on the promotion of a strategic triangle between the 
U.S., the USSR, and China, and then handled regional problems in terms of how they 
enhanced or interfered with the overall stability in the international system. Their 
primary concern with local conflicts was “when a big power attempts to exploit them 
for its own ends.”16 Thus, Nixon and Kissinger over-exaggerated the Soviet threat and 
essentially imposed the simplified measures that developed from global security on 
the complex regional security. Equally important, owing to the pursuit o f the strategic 
triangle, Washington tended to be highly sensitive to the possible reactions from 
Beijing in both global and regional security. After the fall o f the Nixon presidency, 
Kissinger calculated that the continuation of a China policy would sustain the imagery 
of the U.S.’s commitment in international affairs. The fundamental framework o f the 
strategic triangle continued to remain crucial in the U.S. relations with China.
In conclusion, the pursuit o f strict secrecy brought about surprise as well as imagery 
in the U.S. rapprochement with China, restoring the U.S. credibility in world politics 
in the short term. It appeared that Nixon and Kissinger anticipated that the 
overwhelming impacts o f the historic opening justified its highly secretive means and 
processes. However, the rapid and dramatic U.S. opening to China made the 
international and domestic audiences over-expectant for further developments. In 
other words, Nixon and Kissinger over-sold the ending o f mutual hostility and the
16 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, June 20, 1972, 2:05-6:05p.m., p.27, Country Files -  Far East, Box 97, 
HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
easing of tensions with China. Moreover, there was a wishful thinking among U.S. 
officials that China could be brought to accept restraints in regional security to 
facilitate the overall easing of tensions in global security. Certainly, Nixon and 
Kissinger never expected that a single summit would eliminate many conflicting 
issues in the U.S. relations with China. However, Nixon and Kissinger still 
underestimated the depth of the perception gap between the two sides over the 
respective worldviews. The Chinese leaders would not allow the U.S. to continue to 
use its new relations with China for the improvement of U.S. centrality in the world. 
Moreover, by pursuing the highly secret diplomacy with Mao and Zhou, Kissinger 
placed himself in the front position of direct U.S. negotiation with China. The Chinese 
leaders sought to exploit this personalized relationship to pressure and even intimidate 
Kissinger, criticizing the delay of the U.S. diplomatic normalization with China.
Overall, the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s played the crucial 
role o f a substantial learning process and subsequently characterized Washington’s 
diplomatic communication with Beijing in the long term, namely in the pursuit o f 
highly personalized diplomacy with the Chinese leaders. After the February 1972 
summit, neither side allowed the remaining conflicting interests to jeopardize the 
newly established communication. U.S. officials realized that they could disagree 
with the Chinese leaders and that, despite intervals, negotiation could be resumed at a 
later date as long as the diplomatic communication line itself was preserved. Thus, the 
U.S. rapprochement marked the beginning of the long process to pursue pragmatic co­
existence with China - neither as a friend nor an enemy.
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APPENDIX:




President Richard Nixon o f the United States o f America visited the People’s 
Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of 
China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. 
Nixon, U.S. Secretary o f State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, and other American officials. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a 
serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between 
President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization o f relations between 
the United States o f America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other 
matters o f interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and 
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and 
agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing 
discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.
The leaders o f the People's Republic of China and the United States of America 
found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to 
present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the 
international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking 
place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to 
reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United 
States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of 
peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger 
of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social 
progress for all the peoples of the world, free o f outside pressure or intervention. The 
United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving 
communication between countries that through accident, miscalculation or 
misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be 
willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country 
should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own 
attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples o f 
Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; 
its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal 
put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 
represents a basis for the attainment o f that objective; in the absence o f a negotiated 
settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal o f all U.S. forces from
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the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. 
The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of 
Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a 
relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The 
United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will 
continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the 
continuation o f the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal o f all 
military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire 
line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right o f the peoples of 
South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without 
having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.
The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. 
Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution- 
-this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be 
equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the 
weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics 
of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the 
oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people o f all 
countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes 
and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and 
subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The 
Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the 
seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
South Vietnam and the elaboration o f February this year on the two key problems in 
the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the 
Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful 
unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s 
Republic o f Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. 
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” It firmly opposes the 
revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the 
Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral 
Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the 
United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all 
their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides o f the ceasefire line in 
Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their 
struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.
There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social 
systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless 
of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles o f respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other 
states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual
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benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this 
basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the 
People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual 
relations.
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that: 
-progress toward the normalization o f relations between China and the United 
States is in the interests of all countries:
-both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
-neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to 
efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; 
and
-neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into 
agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
Both sides are o f the view that it would be against the interests o f the peoples of the 
world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for 
major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the 
United States. The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial 
question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United 
States; the Government o f the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government 
of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the 
motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other 
country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be 
withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities 
which aim at the creation o f "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," 
"two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status o f Taiwan 
remains to be determined."
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side o f the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of 
China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese them-selves. 
With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all 
U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will 
progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in 
the area diminishes.
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the 
two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, 
technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and 
exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further 
development of such contacts and exchanges.
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be 
derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are 
in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the 
progressive development of trade between their two countries.
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The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, 
including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for 
concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two 
countries and continue to exchange views on issues o f common interest.
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would 
open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that 
the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of 
the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in 
Asia and the world.
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation 
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